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1Introduction
The conceptual framework of neoclassical economics posits that individual decision-
making processes can be represented as maximization of some objective function. In this
framework, people’s goals and desires are expressed through the means of preferences
over outcomes; in addition, in choosing according to these objectives, people employ sub-
jective beliefs about the likelihood of unknown states of the world. For instance, in the
subjective expected utility paradigm, people linearly combine their probabilistic beliefs
and preferences over outcomes to form an expected utility function.
Much of the parsimony and power of theoretical economic analysis stems from the
striking generality and simplicity of this framework. At the same time, the crucial im-
portance of preferences and beliefs in our conceptual apparatus in combination with the
heterogeneity in choice behavior that is observed across many economic contexts raises
a number of empirical questions. For example, howmuch heterogeneity do we observe in
core preference or belief dimensions that are relevant for a broad range of economic be-
haviors? If such preferences and beliefs exhibit heterogeneity, then what are the origins
of this heterogeneity? How do beliefs and preferences form to begin with? And how does
variation in beliefs and preferences translate into economically important heterogeneity
in choice behavior?
This thesis is organized around these broad questions and hence seeks to contribute
to the goal of providing an improved empirical understanding of the foundations and
economic implications of individual decision-making processes. The content of this work
reflects the deep belief that understanding and conceptualizing decision-making requires
economists to embrace ideas from a broad range of fields. Accordingly, this thesis draws
insights and techniques from the literatures on behavioral and experimental economics,
cultural economics, household finance, comparative development, cognitive psychology,
and anthropology.
Chapters 2 through 4 combine methods from experimental economics, household
finance, and cognitive psychology to investigate the effects of bounded rationality on
the formation and explanatory power of subjective beliefs. Chapters 5 through 7 use
tools from cultural economics, anthropology, and comparative development to study the
cross-country variation in economic preferences as well as its origins and implications.
The formation of beliefs about payoff-relevant states of the world crucially hinges on
an adequate processing of incoming information. However, oftentimes, the information
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people receive is rather complex in nature. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate how bound-
edly rational people form beliefs when their information is subject to sampling biases,
i.e., when the information pieces people receive are either not mutually independent or
systematically selected.
Chapter 2 is motivated by Akerlof and Shiller’s 2009 popular narrative that from time
to time some individuals or even entire markets undergo excessive belief swings, which
refers to the idea that sometimes people are overly optimistic and sometimes overly pes-
simistic over, say, the future development of the stock market. In particular, Akerlof and
Shiller (2009) argue that such “exuberance” or excessive pessimism might be driven by
the pervasive “telling and re-telling of stories”. In fact, many real information structures
such as the news media generate correlated rather than mutually independent signals,
and hence give rise to severe double-counting problems. However, clean evidence on
how people form beliefs in correlated information environments is missing. Chapter 2,
which is joint work with Florian Zimmermann, provides clean experimental evidence
that many people neglect such double-counting problems in the updating process, so
that beliefs are excessively sensitive to well-connected information sources and follow
an overshooting pattern. In addition, in an experimental asset market, correlation ne-
glect not only drives overoptimism and overpessimism at the individual level, but also
gives rise to a predictable pattern of over- and underpricing. Finally, investigating the
mechanisms underlying the strong heterogeneity in the presence of the bias, a series
of treatment manipulations reveals that many people struggle with identifying double-
counting problems in the first place, so that exogenous shifts in subjects’ focus have large
effects on beliefs.
Chapter 3 takes as starting point the big public debate about increased political po-
larization in the United States, which refers to the fact that political beliefs tend to drift
apart over time across social and political groups. Popular narratives by, e.g., Sunstein
(2009), Bishop (2009), and Pariser (2011) posit that such polarization is driven by peo-
ple selecting into environments in which they are predominantly exposed to informa-
tion that confirms their prior beliefs. This pattern introduces a selection problem into
the belief formation process, which may result in polarization if people failed to take
the non-representativeness among their signals into account. However, again, we do not
have meaningful evidence on how people actually form beliefs in such “homophilous”
environments. Thus, Chapter 3 shows experimentally that many people do not take into
account how their own prior decisions shape their informational environment, but rather
largely base their views on their local information sample. In consequence, beliefs exces-
sively depend on people’s priors and tend to be too extreme, akin to the concerns about
“echo chambers” driving irrational belief polarization across social groups. Strikingly, the
distribution of individuals’ naïveté follows a pronounced bimodal structure – people ei-
ther fully account for the selection problem or do not adjust for it at all. Allowing for
interaction between these heterogeneous updating types induces little learning: neither
the endogenous acquisition of advice nor exogenously induced dissent lead to a conver-
gence of beliefs across types, suggesting that the belief heterogeneity induced by selected
information may persist over time. Finally, the paper provides evidence that selection ne-
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glect is conceptually closely related to correlation neglect in that both cognitive biases
appear to be driven by selective attentional patterns.
Taken together, chapters 2 and 3 show that many people struggle with processing
information that is subject to sampling issues. What is more, the chapters also show
that these biases might share common cognitive foundations, hence providing hope for
a unified attention-based theory of boundedly rational belief formation.
While laboratory experimental techniques are a great tool to study the formation of
beliefs, they cannot shed light on the relationship between beliefs and economically im-
portant choices. In essentially all economic models, beliefs mechanically map into choice
behavior. However, it is not evident that people’s beliefs play the same role in generat-
ing observed behavior across heterogeneous individuals: while some people’s decision
process might be well-approximated by the belief and preference-driven choice rules en-
visioned by economic models, other people might use, e.g., simple rules of thumb instead,
implying that their beliefs should be largely irrelevant for their choices. That is, bounded
rationality might not only affect the formation of beliefs, but also the mapping from be-
liefs to choices. In Chapter 4, Tilman Drerup, Hans-Martin von Gaudecker, and I take
up this conjecture in the context of measurement error problems in household finance:
while subjective expectations are important primitives in models of portfolio choice, their
direct measurement often yields imprecise and inconsistent measures, which is typically
treated as a pure measurement error problem. In contrast to this perspective, we argue
that individual-level variation in the precision of subjective expectations measures can
actually be productively exploited to gain insights into whether economic models of port-
folio choice provide an adequate representation of individual decision processes. Using
a novel dataset on experimentally measured subjective stock market expectations and
real stock market decisions collected from a large probability sample of the Dutch popu-
lation, we estimate a semiparametric double index model to explore this conjecture. Our
results show that investment decisions exhibit little variation in economic model primi-
tives when individuals provide error-ridden belief statements. In contrast, they predict
strong variation in investment decisions for individuals who report precise expectation
measures. These findings indicate that the degree of precision in expectations data pro-
vides useful information to uncover heterogeneity in choice behavior, and that boundedly
rational beliefs need not necessarily map into irrational choices.
In the standard neoclassical framework, people’s beliefs only serve the purpose of
achieving a given set of goals. In many applications of economic interest, these goals
are well-characterized by a small set of preferences, i.e., risk aversion, patience, and so-
cial preferences. Prior research has shown that these preferences vary systematically in
the population, and that they are broadly predictive of those behaviors economic the-
ory supposes them to. At the same time, this empirical evidence stems from often fairly
special samples in a given country, hence precluding an analysis of how general the vari-
ation and predictive power in preferences is across cultural, economic, and institutional
backgrounds. In addition, it is conceivable that preferences vary not just at an individual
level, but also across entire populations – if so, what are the deep historical or cultural
origins of this variation, and what are its (aggregate) economic implications? Chapters 5
through 7 take up these questions by presenting and analyzing the Global Preference Sur-
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vey (GPS), a novel globally representative dataset on risk and time preferences, positive
and negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust for 80,000 individuals, drawn as represen-
tative samples from 76 countries around the world, representing 90 percent of both the
world’s population and global income.
In joint work with Armin Falk, Anke Becker, Thomas Dohmen, David Huffman, and
Uwe Sunde, Chapter 5 presents the GPS data and shows that the global distribution
of preferences exhibits substantial variation across countries, which is partly system-
atic: certain preferences appear in combination, and follow distinct economic, institu-
tional, and geographic patterns. The heterogeneity in preferences across individuals
is even more pronounced and varies systematically with age, gender, and cognitive
ability. Around the world, the preference measures are predictive of a wide range of
individual-level behaviors including savings and schooling decisions, labor market and
health choices, prosocial behaviors, and family structure. We also shed light on the cul-
tural origins of preference variation around the globe using data on language structure.
The magnitude of the cross-country variation in preferences is striking and raises the
immediate question of what brought it about. Chapter 6 presents joint work with Anke
Becker and Armin Falk in which we use the GPS to show that the migratory movements
of our early ancestors thousands of years ago have left a footprint in the contemporary
cross-country distributions of preferences over risk and social interactions. Across a wide
range of regression specifications, differences in preferences between populations are
significantly increasing in the length of time elapsed since the respective groups shared
common ancestors. This result obtains for risk aversion, altruism, positive reciprocity,
and trust, and holds for various proxies for the structure and timing of historical popula-
tion breakups, including genetic and linguistic data or predicted measures of migratory
distance. In addition, country-level preference endowments are non-linearly associated
with migratory distance from East Africa, i.e., genetic diversity.
In combination with the relationships between language structure and preferences
established in Chapter 5, these results point to the importance of very long-run events
for understanding the global distribution of some of the key economic traits. Given these
findings on the very deep roots of the cross-country variation in preferences, an inter-
esting – and conceptually different – question is whether such country-level preference
profiles might have systematic aggregate economic implications. Indeed, according to
standard dynamic choice theories, patience is a key driving factor behind the accumu-
lation of productive resources and hence ultimately of income not just at an individual,
but also at a macroeconomic level. Using the GPS data on patience, Chapter 7 (joint
work with Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde) investigates
the empirical relevance of this hypothesis in the context of a micro-founded develop-
ment framework. Around the world, patient people invest more into human and physi-
cal capital and have higher incomes. At the macroeconomic level, we establish a signif-
icant reduced-form relationship between patience and contemporary income as well as
medium- and long-run growth rates, with patience explaining a substantial fraction of
development differences across countries and subnational regions. In line with a concep-
tual framework in which patience drives income through the accumulation of productive
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resources, average patience also strongly correlates with aggregate human and physical
capital accumulation as well as investments into productivity.
Taken together, this thesis has a number of unifying themes and insights. First, con-
sistent with the vast heterogeneity in observed choices, people exhibit a large amount
of variation in beliefs and preferences, and in how they combine these into choice rules.
Second, at least part of this heterogeneity is systematic and has identifyable sources:
preferences over risk, time, and social interactions appear to have very deep historical
or cultural origins, but also systematically vary with individual characteristics; belief
heterogeneity, on the other hand, is partly driven by bounded rationality and its system-
atic, predictable effects on information-processing. Third, and finally, this heterogeneity
in beliefs and preferences is likely to have real economic implications: across cultural
and institutional backgrounds, preferences correlate with the types of behaviors that
economic models envision them to, not just across individuals, but also at the macroeco-
nomic level; subjective beliefs are predictive of behavior, too, albeit with the twist that
certain subgroups of the population do not appear to entertain stable belief distributions
to begin with. In sum, (I believe that) much insight is to be gained from further exploring
these fascinating topics.
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2
Correlation Neglect in Belief
Formation?
2.1 Introduction
A pervasive feature of information structures is that decision makers are exposed to cor-
related signals. For example, various news media frequently share common information
sources such as press agencies, so that the contents of different news reports (news-
paper articles, television shows, online print) tend to be correlated. Similarly, in social
networks, the opinions of different network members are often partly based on informa-
tion from a mutually shared third party, so that, in communicating with these people,
one is confronted with correlated information. A common feature of these information
structures is that similar “stories” are getting told and retold multiple times, implying
the presence of informational redundancies, i.e., potential double-counting problems.
Taking this observation as point of departure, we employ a series of laboratory ex-
periments to make three key contributions. First, we provide clean evidence that even
in transparent settings people neglect redundancies in information sources when form-
ing beliefs, albeit with a strong heterogeneity at the individual level.1 As a consequence,
just like recent models of boundedly rational social learning predict, people’s beliefs are
excessively sensitive to well-connected information sources and hence follow an over-
shooting pattern. In a second step, we examine whether the bias persists in markets.
? For valuable comments and discussions we are grateful to Steffen Altmann, Sandro Ambuehl, Anke
Becker, Doug Bernheim, Stefano DellaVigna, Thomas Dohmen, Erik Eyster, Armin Falk, Hans-Martin von
Gaudecker, Paul Heidhues, Holger Herz, Alex Imas, David Laibson, Rosemarie Nagel, Muriel Niederle, Ya-
giz Özdemir, Matthew Rabin, Frederik Schwerter, Andrei Shleifer, Joel Sobel, Charlie Sprenger, Georg
Weizsäcker, and Matthias Wibral. Helpful comments were also received from seminar audiences at Amster-
dam, WZB Berlin, Bonn, Carnegie Mellon, Frankfurt, Harvard, HBS NOM, INSEAD, Kellogg MEDS, Maas-
tricht, Pompeu Fabra, UCLA Anderson, UCSD, Wharton, and Zurich, as well as from conference participants
at NYU BRIC 2015, Russell Sage Foundation ECBE 2015, CESifo Munich 2013, M-BEES Maastricht 2013,
SITE Stanford 2013, TIBER Tilburg 2013, and the North-American ESA conference 2012. Financial sup-
port from the Russell Sage Foundation (Small Grants Program in Behavioral Economics), the International
Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics (Small Grants Program), the Bonn Graduate School of
Economics and the Center for Economics and Neuroscience Bonn is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Throughout the paper, a correlation is implicitly understood as being conditional on a state realization.
Also, we only refer to positive correlations.
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Recently, Shiller (2000) and Akerlof and Shiller (2009) have argued that “exuberant”
public opinions or “panics”, driven by the multiple occurrence of similar stories, may
be a driver of aggregate distortions. In this spirit, we establish that, in an experimen-
tal asset market, the incidence of correlated (and hence partially recurring) news leads
to pronounced and predictable price distortions. Finally, we examine the mechanisms
underlying the cognitive mistake. A series of treatment variations suggests that people
possess the mathematical skills that are necessary to solve the updating task, but do not
identify the double-counting problem in the first place, so that exogenous shifts in focus
debias the majority of subjects.
In the baseline experiment, subjects need to estimate an ex ante unknown state of the
world and are paid for accuracy. The key idea of our experimental design is to construct
two sets of information (one with and one without a known and simple correlation) that
are identical in terms of informational content, and should thus result in the same belief.
In a between-subjects design, one group of subjects receives correlated, the other un-
correlated information. All pieces of information are generated by computers to ensure
that subjects know the precise process generating the data. Specifically, four unbiased iid
signals about the state of the world are generated by four computers (A through D). In
the uncorrelated condition, subjects observe these four independent signals. In the corre-
lated condition, participants obtain the signal of computer A as well as the average of the
signals of A and B, of A and C, as well as of A and D. Thus, just as in the motivating exam-
ples, the signal of the common source A is partially recurring in the averages, implying
the presence of informational redundancies. In this setting, the correlation structure has a
particularly simple form because the signal of computer A is known, so that subjects only
need to invert averages to back out the underlying independent signals. If subjects cor-
rectly took the redundancies into account, beliefs should be identical across treatments.
However, despite extensive instructions and control questions, our results indicate that a
considerable fraction of subjects treats all incoming information as approximately inde-
pendent and hence double-counts the signal of the common source A. Thus, while beliefs
remain statistically unbiased ex ante, they are highly sensitive to well-connected infor-
mation sources and exhibit excessive swings: whenever the relatively low (high) signal
of the common source repeatedly emerges through other messages, people on average
become overpessimistic (overoptimistic) relative to the control condition, an effect that
is sizable, significant, and causes lower payoffs. In light of the strong average tendency
to neglect correlations, we proceed by specifying the precise and possibly heterogeneous
updating rules subjects employ. We find that beliefs follow a bimodal distribution: most
people are either fully sophisticated or very naïve, emphasizing the presence of different
belief formation types. In particular, those subjects that do not succesfully process corre-
lations form beliefs by following a particular simple heuristic of averaging the correlated
messages. These results are robust to a number of variations in the experimental de-
sign such as the precise information structure, the experimental frame, or the incentive
scheme.
An immediate question is whether these biased, but heterogeneous, beliefs persist
in competitive markets and have systematic implications beyond the individual level, or
whether market interaction induces naïve subjects to learn (see, e.g., Camerer, 1987;
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Gneezy et al., 2003, for other studies of biases in market settings). To approach this is-
sue, we embed our individual belief elicitation design into a standard continuous double-
auction environment in which subjects trade financial assets of ex ante unknown value.
To keep the market environment as simple as possible, subjects are allowed to either
buy or sell assets, but not both. Before each trading round, all subjects receive the same
sets of information about the true state as in the individual treatments. Again, we form
treatment (control) groups by providing correlated (uncorrelated) signals about the fun-
damental value of the assets. The results show that our experimental market interaction
does not induce naïfs to learn: market prices differ between treatments in the direction
one would expect if subjects disregard correlations. In periods in which correlation ne-
glect leads to overly optimistic beliefs (because the signal of the common source A is
relatively high), market prices in the correlated treatment are too high relative to both
the control treatment and the fundamental level. Likewise, when neglecting redundan-
cies implies overpessimism, market prices are too low. Thus, correlation neglect causes a
predictable pattern of over- and underpricing. In addition, within the correlated market
treatment, subjects’ propensity to ignore correlations predicts both individual trading
behavior and the degree of price distortions in a market. These findings are reminiscent
of the narratives provided by Akerlof and Shiller (2009) who emphasize how the exces-
sive confidence swings that may be generated by the “telling and re-telling” of stories
could drive aggregate distortions. While other theories can be invoked to explain either
(collective) overoptimism or -pessimism, correlation neglect provides a unified view on
these phenomena and relates them to the informational network structure.
Next, we investigate whether the updating error we observe is driven by a simple
“face value” heuristic. This hypothesis posits that people never think through the process
generating their information and instead treat each number as if it were an unmanip-
ulated independent signal realization, regardless of whether the signals are correlated or
distorted in other ways. We design two treatments to evaluate the empirical validity of
such an extreme heuristic. The results reject a face value heuristic, and correlation ne-
glect persists even when face value bias makes opposite predictions, suggesting that
subjects indeed struggle with correlations as such.
Based on this set of findings, we implement further treatment variations to delve into
the cognitive mechanisms underlying correlation neglect. Understanding the cognitive
underpinnings of belief biases provides crucial inputs into formalizing these errors. Cor-
responding insights may also facilitate predictions about where the bias is likely (not) to
occur in applied work, or how to debias people. For instance, are people less likely to ne-
glect informational redundancies when the financial stakes are high, or when the double-
counting problem is very salient? A key innovation of this paper is to move beyond the
identification of a particular bias and to develop an experimental technology that allows
an investigation of the underlying cognitive mechanisms. We start our corresponding
quest by establishing the crucial role of complexity: just like other behavioral biases, cor-
relation neglect only arises if the informational environment is sufficiently complex, but
not if only two computers generate signals (also see Charness and Levin, 2009). In ad-
dition, we show that subjects’ propensity to double-count signals is significantly related
to both past academic achievement and an IQ test score. To better understand why and
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how low cognitive skills produce correlation neglect, we conceptualize belief formation
in our more complex information setup as a simple two-step process: first, people need
to identify the double-counting problem inherent in our experimental environment; sec-
ond, they ought to execute the mathematical computations that are necessary to solve
the double-counting problem and develop unbiased beliefs. Which of these two steps do
subjects struggle most with, and why?
To address this question, we first show through an additional treatment that once we
solve the first step for subjects by explicitly instructing them to back out the underlying
independent signals from the correlated messages, the vast majority of our participants
is both willing to and mathematically capable of performing the necessary calculations.
Thus, a key challenge in successfully processing correlations appears to be to identify the
double-counting problem in the first place. Even though our experimental procedures
ensure that subjects understand the information structure in an abstract sense, it seems
that they do not detect the informational redundancy when approaching a specific belief
formation task. According to this logic, the first step of our simple belief formation pro-
cess may act as a threshold to developing unbiased beliefs. We bolster this interpretation
empirically: if people struggle with identifying double-counting problems, then nudging
their focus towards the mechanics that generate the correlation may attenuate the bias.
We find that two different treatment variations along these lines indeed debias the large
majority of subjects, hence suggesting that many people are in principle capable of deal-
ing with the informational redundancies in our experimental task, but only so when their
focus is directed to the problematic aspect of the updating environment. In a final step,
we explore whether these results reflect “rational ignorance”, i.e., subjects trading off the
benefits of more precise beliefs against lower cognitive effort costs as resulting from not
even thinking about the problem in detail (Caplin et al., 2011; Caplin and Dean, forth-
coming). We find that an increase in the stake size significantly affects subjects’ effort
levels, but not their beliefs, which again exhibit a bimodal pattern. These findings are
consistent with the idea that – if left to their own devices – subjects attempt to identify
the critical aspect of the informational environment, and do so harder when the stakes
are higher. However, if they do not succeed in passing the threshold of identifying the
double-counting problem, they make use of a specific heuristic.
This paper contributes to the literature on boundedly rational belief formation by
identifying a novel error in statistical reasoning that is associated with a pervasive fea-
ture of real information structures such as the news media Charness et al. (see, e.g.,
2010), Andreoni and Mylovanov (2012), and Esponda and Vespa (2014, for other recent
contributions). In addition, our paper moves beyond existing work on belief formation
by studying in great detail the cognitive mechanisms underlying an updating error. Our
finding that variation in focus might affect the formation of beliefs dovetails with recent
empirical work that highlights the effectiveness of nudging people into paying attention
to certain features of the informational environment (Hanna et al., 2014). Gennaioli
and Shleifer (2010), Bordalo et al. (2015b), and Schwartzstein (2014) provide related
theoretical models.2
2 Brocas et al. (2014) highlight the relevance of attention in strategic settings.
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Our individual belief elicitation treatments admit a natural interpretation in terms
of learning in networks. Eyster and Rabin (2014) develop a model to show that, in many
network structures other than the canonical sequential herding example, rationality re-
quires people to anti-imitate predecessors because of the need to subtract off sources
of correlations. In consequence, these authors argue, empirical tests are needed to sepa-
rate whether people follow others for rational reasons or due to correlation neglect. Our
experimental design provides the first assessment of this issue by making explicit use
of the advantages of laboratory experiments in studying statistical inference: our static
experimental environment with exogenous signals and a known data-generating process
allows for a clean identification of people’s tendency to ignore redundancies in informa-
tion sources that does not require ancillary assumptions on people’s models of others’
decision rules in the presence of no common knowledge of rationality.3 In consequence,
our findings support the assumptions underlying recent theories of inferential naïveté in
social interactions (e.g., DeMarzo et al., 2003; Golub and Jackson, 2010; Eyster and Ra-
bin, 2010; Bohren, 2013).4 Levy and Razin (forthcoming) and Ortoleva and Snowberg
(2015) investigate the implications of correlation neglect in political economy settings.5
Finally, in a broader sense, our paper also relates to work on financial decision-
making in the presence of correlated asset returns (Eyster and Weizsäcker, 2011; Kallir
and Sonsino, 2010). Here, apart from the different context (porfolio choice versus belief
formation), the term “correlation neglect” also has a conceptually different meaning than
in our paper. For instance, portfolio choice problems do not feature the double-counting
problem that is at the heart of our analysis. Also, unlike in the case of informational re-
dundancies, dealing with correlated asset returns requires contingent reasoning (state
by state). None of the papers in this literature studies correlation neglect in information
3While our paper is concerned with updating under a known data-generating process, a literature in
cognitive psychology explores how people aggregate potentially correlated opinions in settings in which the
structure generating the information is left ambiguous to subjects (Budescu and Rantilla, 2000; Budescu and
Yu, 2007). These papers focus on non-incentivized confidence ratings. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) note
that correlated information sources tend to produce consistent signals and may hence lead to an “illusion
of validity” (also see Maines, 1990, 1996).
4 The findings from our individual belief elicitation task contribute to an active empirical literature that
tests key predictions of naïve social learning models and finds mixed results. In the context of sequential
herding experiments, Kübler and Weizsäcker (2005) argue that many people fail to recognize herding
behavior of others. At the same time, such experiments consistently yield the result that people vastly
overweight their private signals, which is the antithesis of correlation neglect in such environments: people
overwhelmingly herd less than the rational model predicts (Weizsäcker, 2010), while correlation neglect
predicts that they herd more (Eyster and Rabin, 2010). Similarly, in dynamic social network experiments,
some studies find belief patterns that are broadly consistent with naïve updating (Brandts et al., 2014;
Chandrasekhar et al., 2015). At the same time, Corazzini et al. (2012) find that exogenously increasing the
number of outgoing links of an agent does not affect his social influence; Grimm and Mengel (2014) find
heavy overweighting of private signals, again at odds with correlation neglect, while Möbius et al. (2013)
cannot reject Bayesian rationality. While these experiments are insightful, the mixed results need to be
interpreted with care because these studies focus on social interactions, implying that signals consist of the
actions of other players; thus, when there is no common knowledge of rationality, such designs potentially
conflate erroneous updating with people’s models of other’s decision rules in attempting to identify updating
mistakes. In consequence, the mixed results may or may not reflect a combination of correlation neglect
and people theorizing that fellow subjects follow certain decision rules.
5 Spiegler (2015) uses Bayesian networks to model boundedly rational belief formation.
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sources, corresponding implications (such as overshooting beliefs and market behavior),
or the underlying mechanisms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present
our baseline experiments including the market treatments. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 investi-
gate the validity of face value bias and the mechanisms underlying correlation neglect,
respectively. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Correlation Neglect and its Implications
We developed a simple experimental design which allows for both the clean identification
of correlation neglect and an investigation of its implications in market settings in a
unified and coherent framework. We first describe the basic belief elicitation design and
then explain how these treatments were extended into market treatments. After stating
our predictions, we present the results.
2.2.1 Experimental Design
2.2.1.1 Individual Belief Formation Treatments
An environment in which updating from correlated sources can be studied requires
(i) control over signal precision and correlation, (ii) subjects’ knowledge of the data-
generating process, (iii) a control condition that serves as benchmark for updating in
the absence of correlated information, and (iv) incentivized belief elicitation.
Our design accommodates all these features. Subjects were asked to estimate an ex
ante unknown continuous state of the world µ and were paid for accuracy. The task was
framed as guessing how many items are contained in an imaginary container. In order
to keep the experiment as simple as possible, we refrained from inducing prior beliefs.6
The only information provided to participants consisted of unbiased computer-generated
signals about the true state. The key idea of the between-subjects design was to construct
two sets of signals (one with and one without a known and simple correlation), which
are identical in terms of their objective informational content. As depicted in Figure 2.1,
subjects in the Correlated treatment received correlated and subjects in the Uncorrelated
condition uncorrelated information about µ.
The computers A-D generated four unbiased iid signals about µ, which were identical
across treatments. Technically, this was implemented by random draws from a truncated
discretized normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ = µ/2.7 In the
Uncorrelated treatment (left panel), the intermediaries 1 to 3, who are fictitious comput-
ers themselves, observed the signals of computers B through D, respectively, and simply
transmitted these signals to the subject. Thus, subjects received information from com-
puter A as well as from the three intermediaries. For example, in one belief formation
task, the signals of computers A through D were given by 12, 9, 10, and 0, respectively.
We will refer to all numbers that are communicated to subjects as “messages”.
6 Section 2.2.4.1 shows that inducing prior beliefs does not affect our findings.
7 Truncation was at µ± 2σ = µ±µ in order to avoid negative signals.





















Figure 2.1. Uncorrelated (left panel) and correlated (right panel) information structure
In the Correlated treatment (right panel), the intermediaries 1 to 3 observed both the
signal of computer A and of computers B to D, respectively, and then reported the average
of these two signals. Again, subjects were provided with information from computer A
as well as from the three intermediaries. Throughout the paper, we will also refer to
computer A’s signal as common source signal. Since subjects knew this signal, they could
extract the other independent signals from the intermediaries’ reports. Continuing the
example from above, each of the three intermediaries took the average of 12 and the
corresponding signal of the other computer it communicated with. Thus, computer A
reported 12, intermediary 1 reported 10.5, intermediary 2 reported 11, and intermediary
3 reported 6. In the terminology of Eyster and Rabin (2014), this information structure
constitutes a “shield”. Here, people need to “anti-imitate” because they predominantly
see messages larger than 9, while the majority of signals and the rational belief are
smaller than 9. In particular, given that the common source signal of computer A is
known, being rational requires subjects to back out the underlying independent signals
from the messages of the intermediaries, i.e., to invert averages.
Notice that our identification strategy relies solely on the identical informational con-
tent of the two sets of signals. Differences in beliefs between the Correlated and Uncor-
related condition can only be attributed to variations in the information structure since
all other factors are held constant. Thus, comparing beliefs between the Correlated treat-
ment and the Uncorrelated benchmark allows us to identify subjects’ potential naïveté
when updating from correlated information.8 Crucially, using computers as opposed to
human subjects in the signal-generating process ensures that subjects have complete
knowledge of how their data are being generated, leaving no room for, e.g., beliefs about
the rationality of the intermediaries. Also note that the correlated information structure
mirrors the examples provided in the introduction. For example, one could think of com-
puter A as a press agency which sells information to various newspapers, which in turn
each have an additional independent information source. Alternatively, in a social learn-
ing context, the intermediaries could be viewed as network members who each received
an independent piece of information, yet have all also talked to a common acquaintance
before communicating their opinion.
8 This holds provided that the treatment did not affect prior beliefs. As we show in Section 2.2.4.1, our
results are robust to explicitly inducing equal priors across treatments.
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Table 2.1. Overview of the belief formation tasks
True Computer Intermed. Intermed. Intermed. Intermed. Intermed. Intermed. Rational Correlation
State A 1 uncorr. 2 uncorr. 3 uncorr. 1 corr. 2 corr. 3 corr. Belief Neglect Belief
10 12 9 10 0 10.5 11 6 7.75 9.88
88 122 90 68 5 106 95 64 71.25 96.63
250 179 295 288 277 237 234 228 259.75 219.38
732 565 847 650 1,351 706 608 958 853.25 709.13
1,000 1,100 1,060 629 1,100 1,085 870 1,105 974.75 1,042.38
4,698 1,608 7,240 4,866 5,526 4,424 3,237 3,567 4,810.00 3,209.00
7,338 9,950 1,203 11,322 11,943 5,577 10,636 10,947 8,604.50 9,277.25
10,000 2,543 10,780 6,898 8,708 6,662 4,721 5,626 7,232.25 4,887.63
23,112 15,160 21,806 20,607 47,751 18,483 17,884 31,456 26,331.00 20,745.50
46,422 12,340 32,168 49,841 61,293 22,254 31,091 36,817 38,910.50 25,625.25
The reports of intermediaries 1 through 3 in the Uncorrelated condition directly reflect the draws of computers B-D. The rational belief
is computed by taking the average of the signals of computers A-D. The correlation neglect belief is given by the average of the signal of
computer A and the reports of intermediaries 2-4 in the Correlated condition. Note that subjects faced the ten rounds in randomized or-
der, which was identical across treatments. Given that we did not induce priors, we could select the true states ourselves. This was done in
a fashion so as to be able to investigate the effects of computational complexity, i.e., we implemented true states of different magnitude.
Upon receiving the information pieces, a subject had five minutes to state a belief.
Subjects completed a total of ten independent belief formation tasks without feedback
between tasks. We used three different randomized orders of tasks, see Appendix 2.B. At
the end of the experiment, subjects were paid according to the precision of their belief
in one randomly selected task using a quadratic scoring rule (Selten, 1998).9 Table 1
provides an overview over the ten tasks. In order to provide an indication of both the
direction and the extent of a potential bias, we also provide the benchmarks of rational
beliefs and “full correlation neglect”, which we define to be the average of the four signals
subjects receive in the Correlated treatment (see Section 2.2.2 for details). Throughout,
we employ the term “belief” to denote the mean of the belief distribution.
Subjects received extensive written instructions which explained the details of the
task and the incentive structure.10 In particular, the signals of the four computers, how
these signals mapmed into the reports of the intermediaries, and the fact that the four
computers are of identical quality, were explained in great detail. For instance, the in-
structions included the applicable panel from Figure 2.1. The instructions also contained
an example consisting of four computer signals as well as the respective messages of the
three intermediaries, given a certain state of the world. Subjects were provided with a
visual representation of an exemplary distribution function and the concept of unbiased-
ness was elaborated upon in intuitive terms. A summary of the instructions was read out
aloud. In addition, subjects completed a set of control questions with a particular focus
on the information structure. For example, in both treatments, subjects had to compute
the reports of intermediaries 1 and 2 given exemplary signals of the four computers in
order to make sure that subjects understood the (un)correlated nature of the messages.
Subjects could only participate in the experiment once they had answered all control
questions correctly.11
9 Variable earnings in euros were given by pi= max{0, 10− 160× (Belief / True state− 1)2}.
10 See Appendix H for a translation of the instructions and control questions for all treatments. The
instructions can also be accessed at https://sites.google.com/site/benjaminenke/.
11We can rule out that subjects solved the control questions by trial-and-error. The quiz was imple-
mented on two consecutive computer screens that contained three and four questions, respectively. If at
least one question was answered incorrectly, an error message appeared, but subjects were not notified
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At the end of the experiment, we conducted a questionnaire in which we collected
information on sociodemographics. To capture dimensions of cognitive ability, we asked
subjects for their high school GPA (German “Abitur”) and had them solve ten rather
difficult IQ test Raven matrices.
2.2.1.2 Market Treatments
In themarket treatments, the belief formation task was embedded into a standard double-
auction setting with uncertainty over the value of the assets. In each trading round, an
asset’s value corresponded to the true state of the world from the individual belief forma-
tion treatments. Before each round, all traders received the same sets of signals about
the state as participants in the baseline design (see Table 1). In the Correlated market
treatment, all market participants received correlated, in the Uncorrelated market treat-
ment they received uncorrelated information. Before each trading round, subjects were
given five minutes to think about an asset’s value and to provide a non-incentivized belief.
Afterwards, subjects traded the assets.
In order to keep the experiment as simple as possible and to retain subjects’ focus
on the information structure, participants were assigned to be in the role of a buyer
or a seller, so that each subject could either buy or sell assets, but not both. A market
group consisted of four buyers and four sellers. Subjects were randomly assigned to be
in either role and kept their roles throughout the experiment; they also remained in the
same market groups. Before each of the ten rounds, each seller was endowed with four
assets. Also, at the beginning of each round, each buyer received a monetary endowment
that was sufficient to purchase between three and six assets at fundamental values.12
In a standard double-auction format, buyers could post buying prices and accept
selling offers from the sellers. Sellers could post selling prices and accept buying offers
from the buyers. Buying and selling offers were induced to converge by the standard
procedure, i.e., a new buying (selling) offer had to be higher (lower) than all previous
offers. An accepted offer implied a trade and erased all previous offers. Trading lasted
for four minutes. Profits per trading period for both buyers and sellers corresponded to
the value of the assets owned plus the amount of money held at the end of the respective
trading round minus some known fixed costs.
which question(s) they had gotten wrong. For instance, the computer screen which contained two ques-
tions that asked subjects to compute the reports of the intermediaries given exemplary signal draws (which
arguably constitute the key control questions) had a total of 13 response options across four questions (i.e.,
2× 3× 4× 4= 96 combinations of responses), making trial-and-error extremely cumbersome. In addition,
the BonnEconLab has a control room inwhich the decision screens of all subjects can bemonitored. From this
monitoring, no attempts to solve the control questions by random guessing were detectable. Furthermore,
whenever a subject appeared to have trouble solving the control questions, an experimenter approached the
subject, clarified open questions, and (very rarely) excluded the subject if they did not show an adequate
understanding of the task.
12 Throughout the experiment, profits, prices etc. were described in points rather than euros. Since the
true state differed in magnitude from round to round, we had to adjust the point / euro exchange rate
across rounds. This was made clear in the instructions. In principle, the exchange rate as well as the budget
was informative of the true state. However, the relationship between these variables was chosen to be non-
constant across rounds, so that the informational content was weak (see Appendix 2.E.7 for details). In
any case, since budgets and exchange rates were identical across treatments, this procedure cannot explain
potential treatment differences.
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We used two different randomized orders of rounds. After each round, subjects re-
ceived feedback about the true state of the world and the resulting profits in that round.
At the end of the experiment, one of the ten rounds was randomly selected and imple-
mented, i.e., payoff-relevant for the subjects. The written instructions included the same
information on the information structure as in the individual belief formation treatments.
A summary of the instructions was read out aloud. In addition to the control questions
about the information structure, we asked several questions related to the trading activ-
ities. After the control questions, we implemented a test round after which participants
again had the opportunity to ask questions.
2.2.2 Hypotheses
In the information structure described above, the computers generated four iid sig-
nals of the form sh ∼N (µ, (µ/2)2) (truncated at (0,2µ)) for h ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. In the Cor-
related condition, subjects observed messages s1 and s˜h = (s1 + sh)/2 for h ∈ {2,3, 4}.
When prompted to estimate µ, a rational decision maker would extract the underly-
ing independent signals from the messages s˜h and compute the mean rational belief
as bB =
∑4
h=1 sh/4, which by design also equals the rational belief in the Uncorrelated
condition.13
However, now suppose that the decision maker suffers from correlation neglect, i.e.,
he does not fully take into account the extent to which s˜h reflects s1, but rather treats s˜h
(to some extent) as independent. Call such a decision maker naïve and let his degree of
naïveté be parameterized by χ ∈ [0,1] such that χ = 1 implies full correlation neglect.
A naïve agent extracts sh from s˜h according to the rule
sˆh = χ s˜h + (1 − χ)sh = sh + 12χ(s1 − sh) (2.1)
where sˆh for h ∈ {2,3, 4} denotes the agent’s (possibly biased) inference of sh. He thus









χ(s1 − s¯−1) (2.2)
where s¯ = (
∑4
h=1 sh)/4 and s¯−1 = (
∑4
h=2 sh)/3. Thus, a (perhaps partially) naïve belief is
given by the rational belief plus a belief bias component which depends on the degree
of naïveté and the magnitude of the common source signal relative to the other signals.
13 For simplicity, when computing the rational belief, we ignore the truncation in the signal distribution
and assume that subjects hold vague priors. Note that the quantitative errors resulting from this are likely
to be very small in magnitude. Given the information provided to subjects, potential priors are very likely to
be weak. Also, the tails outside the truncation are fairly thin. Moreover, our definition of the rational belief
conforms with observed behavior in the Uncorrelated treatment, where subjects tended to merely take the
average of the four signals. Finally, and most importantly, this definition of the rational benchmark has
no effect on the qualitative predictions of our treatment comparison. Regardless of the precise definition,
beliefs should be identical across treatments.
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Hypothesis 1. Assuming that χ > 0, beliefs in the Correlated treatment exhibit an over-
shooting pattern. Specifically, given a high common source signal, i.e., s1 > s¯−1, beliefs in
the Correlated treatment are biased upward compared to the Uncorrelated treatment. Con-
versely, if s1 < s¯−1, beliefs in the Correlated condition are biased downward. The degree of
the belief bias increases the relative magnitude of the common source signal.
Intuitively, by partially neglecting the redundancies among the signals, the decision
maker double-counts the first signal, so that beliefs are biased in the corresponding direc-
tion. Throughout the paper, we will call a belief above (below) the rational benchmark
overoptimistic (overpessimistic). Note that the beliefs of a naïve agent remain statisti-
cally unbiased. Since the first signal is unbiased, any double-counting leads to a zero
expected error. The upshot of this is that naïve agents are correct on average, yet exhibit
excessive swings in their beliefs.
In the market treatments, the standard theoretical prediction is that the competitive
market equilibrium price is given by the rational belief.14 Since it is well-established that
experimental double-auctions tend to converge to the theoretical competitive equilib-
rium, this is also the standard experimental prediction. However, this prediction changes
in the presence of naïve traders. If, for instance, all traders are homogenous in their de-
gree of naïveté, the equilibrium price level is given by the corresponding level of distorted
beliefs. More generally, as we detail in Appendix 2.E.1, under heterogeneity the magni-
tude of a potential price distortion will depend on the naïveté of the marginal traders.15
Hypothesis 2. Assuming that χ > 0, the excessive belief swings induced by correlation
neglect translate into over- and underpricing. If s1 > s¯−1, market prices in the Correlated
market treatment are too high relative to the Uncorrelated treatment, and if s1 < s¯−1 they
are too low.
On the other hand, it has been argued that the influence of cognitive biases on aggre-
gate variables is limited. In the market we implement, two channels in particular may
attenuate such effects. First, competitive forces and market incentives could induce sub-
jects to think harder and thus cause a reduction of correlation neglect. Second, markets
provide ample opportunities for traders to learn. For instance, traders may learn from
realized profits in each trading round. In this respect, we gave rather extensive feedback
between rounds, providing subjects with realized profits as well as the true asset value.
Perhaps more importantly, markets also allow participants to learn from the actions of
more rational traders. For instance, an overly optimistic market participant who observes
others trading at relatively low prices may become inclined to rethink his valuation of the
assets. While all these channels could mitigate the effect of individual biases on market
14 Since every subjects got the same signals about the value of the assets, under homogenous risk prefer-
ences there should be no trade, unless market participants trade at the rational belief.
15 For instance, intuitively, suppose that a fraction α fully ignores correlations and a fraction 1−α holds
rational beliefs. Further suppose that each seller owns four assets and each buyer has a budget sufficient
to buy four assets at fundamental values. Then, assuming that subjects do not learn from others’ trading
behavior and are risk-neutral, the supply and demand curves will be step functions which overlap at the
correlation neglect belief if α→ 1. Similar arguments apply if a fraction α exhibits only partial (or hetero-
geneous degrees of) correlation neglect.
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outcomes, the learning arguments in particular would suggest that correlation neglect
(and its consequences) is reduced in the last trading rounds.16
2.2.3 Procedural Details
The experiments were conducted at the BonnEconLab of the University of Bonn. Subjects
were mostly students from the University of Bonn and were recruited using the online
recruitment system by Greiner (2004). No subject participated in more than one session.
The experiment was run using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
A total of 94 subjects participated in the individual belief formation treatments, which
were randomized within session. Sessions lasted about 1.5 hours and average earnings
equalled 11.60 euros (≈ USD 15 at the time). 288 subjects participated in the market
treatments. These sessions lasted about 2.5 hours and subjects earned 19.40 euros (≈
USD 25) on average. In all treatments, payments included a 6 euros show-up fee.
2.2.4 Results
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we provide evidence for correlation neglect
across the ten belief formation tasks. Second, we investigate how the neglect of informa-
tional redundancies plays out in markets.
2.2.4.1 Clean Evidence for Correlation Neglect
Beliefs Across Treatments
Result 1. In all but one belief formation task, beliefs differ significantly between treatments
in the direction predicted by correlation neglect.
Figure 2.2 visualizes the pattern of beliefs across tasks. Recall the key implication
of the hypotheses developed above that subjects’ beliefs should be too high (low) rela-
tive to the rational benchmark if the signal of the common source A is relatively high
(low) compared to the other signals. Thus, for each of the ten tasks and both treatments,
the figure plots the difference between the respective median belief and the rational
benchmark against the relative magnitude of the signal of the common source (i.e., the
difference between the signal of computer A and the average signal of the other comput-
ers). By construction of the figure, the rational prediction is a flat line at zero (no belief
bias), while full correlation neglect predicts an upward-sloping relationship. Beliefs in
the Uncorrelated condition follow the rational prediction very closely. In contrast, median
beliefs in the Correlated condition always lie between the rational benchmark and the
full correlation neglect prediction, and the magnitude of the belief bias exhibits a clear
relationship with the relative magnitude of the common source signal, as predicted in
Section 2.2.2.
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics for all tasks and reveals that in nine out of
ten cases do beliefs in Correlated significantly differ from those in the Uncorrelated treat-
16 Camerer (1987) provides a more extensive discussion of these feedback and learning effects. Similar
to our approach, he uses experimental markets to test if other updating mistakes (e.g., base-rate neglect)
matter for market outcomes. See also Ganguly et al. (2000) and Kluger andWyatt (2004) for similar studies.
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Figure 2.2. Beliefs in the Correlated and Uncorrelated treatments plotted against the relative
magnitude of the signal of computer A. The logic of the figure is that if the signal of computer A is
relatively high (low) compared to the other signals, correlation neglect predicts that beliefs
should be above (below) the rational benchmark. Accordingly, the x-axis measures the signal of
computer A minus the average signal of the other computers, while the y-axis represents the
median belief for the given signal realizations minus the corresponding rational belief. Both
differences are then rescaled across tasks by dividing them through the Bayesian belief. That is,
in terms of the notation introduced in Section 2.2.2, the variable on the x-axis is computed as
3 · (s j1 − s¯ j−1)/(8s¯ j) and the variable on the y-axis as (b j − s¯ j)/s¯ j . The dashed line represents the
rational prediction, while the solid line denotes the full correlation neglect benchmark across
the ten different signal realizations (tasks).
ment.17 The bias is very stable across tasks and does not seem to depend on the magni-
tude of the true state.18 Also note that we do not find order effects, i.e., subjects do not
seem to learn to deal with correlations over time (see Appendix 2.C.4).
Because beliefs in the Correlated treatment are consistently further away from
the rational belief than beliefs in the Uncorrelated condition, these subjects earned
roughly 2.70 euros less than those in the Uncorrelated group, which amounts to almost
50 % of subjects’ average variable earnings. The earnings difference is significant
(p-value = 0.0025, Wilcoxon ranksum test).
17 The non-significant true state is also the only one in which beliefs and prices did not differ in the market
treatments to be presented below. Notice, however, that subjects’ beliefs indeed reflected correlation neglect,
but beliefs in the Uncorrelated condition were also tinted into that direction. A potential reason for this is
that, in the Uncorrelated condition, subjects received three signals in the ballpark of 10,000 and one which
equalled 1,203. It is conceivable that subjects viewed the latter signal as implausible and formed beliefs
based on the other signals, coincidentally leading to a belief which is biased towards the correlation neglect
prediction.
18 Appendix 2.C.1 illustrates the robustness of this first main result by excluding outliers from the analysis
and by providing kernel density estimates for each of the ten belief formation tasks.
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Distribution of Naïveté
Thus far, we have established a significant amount of correlation neglect on average.
However, these average patterns may mask a substantial amount of heterogeneity.
To investigate this, we develop a measure of an individual’s belief type. To this end,
we aggregate the data across tasks into a one-dimensional measure per individual.
Specifically, our experimental design in combination with the simple model of belief
formation introduced in Section 2.2.2 allows us to derive a simple estimator for the
individuals’ naïveté χ. As a first step, we normalize beliefs across tasks such that they
equal the naïveté parameter χ ∈ [0,1] in eq. 2.2, i.e., we express the normalized belief
b˜ ji of individual i in round j as function of his stated belief b
j
i and the realized signals
s j .19 We then compute the median normalized belief of each individual for further
analysis, yielding the following estimator for the naïveté parameter:
χˆi ≡ med(b˜ ji ) = med

8(b ji − s¯ j)
3(s j1 − s¯ j−1)

(2.3)
The left panel of Figure 2.3 provides kernel density estimates of the distribution of
these naïveté parameters for both the Correlated and the Uncorrelated treatment.20 The
plots reveal that in theUncorrelated treatment the vast majority of subjects approximately
behaves rational, as indicated by the spike around zero. In the Correlated treatment,
on the other hand, we observe two peaks around the rational benchmark and the full
correlation neglect parameters, respectively, which suggests the presence of different
types of subjects. In particular, those subjects that do not succesfully process correlations
form beliefs by following a particular simple heuristic that is essentially fully naïve. As
Table 2.2. Correlation neglect by belief formation task
True Rational Correlation Median Belief Median Belief Ranksum Test
State Belief Neglect Belief Uncorr. Treatment Correlated Treatment (p-value)
10 7.75 9.88 8 9.2 0.0048
88 71.25 96.63 71.2 88 0.0005
250 259.75 219.38 259.75 235.5 0.0067
732 853.15 709.13 847 742 0.0044
1,000 974.75 1,042.38 999 1,030 0.0484
4,698 4,810 3,209 4,810 4,556 0.0082
7,338 8,604.5 9,277.25 8,975 9,044.5 0.8657
10,000 7,232.25 4,887.63 7,232 6,750 0.0087
23,112 26,331 20,745.5 25,000 21,000 0.0001
46,422 38,910.5 25,625 38,885.5 32,000 0.0527
See Table 2.1 for details of the computation of the rational and the correlation neglect benchmarks. Note
that subjects faced the ten tasks in randomized order.
19 This normalization procedure takes into account that the (percentage) difference between rational
and correlation neglect belief differs across tasks. Note that, naturally, in the actual data, not all χ map
into [0,1]. For example, a subject who fully neglects redundancies may in addition make a computational
mistake to end up with a χ higher than one. Likewise, a subject who aims at computing the rational belief
may make a small error, so that their χ may be below zero.
20 In what follows, we use the terms normalized belief and naïveté parameter interchangeably.
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Figure 2.3. Kernel density estimates of median naïveté parameters. The left panel depicts the
distribution of naïveté in the baseline treatments, and the right panel in the robustness
treatments.
visual inspection suggests, comparing median normalized beliefs across treatments also
reveals a pronounced treatment difference (p-value < 0.0001, Wilcoxon ranksum test).
Appendix 2.C.2 confirms that the bimodal structure of the belief distribution in Correlated
is not an artifact of our particular aggregation procedure, but is also clearly visible in the
disaggregated data.21
Our procedure of computing an individual’s belief type only makes use of the first
moment of the distribution of each subject’s set of beliefs (the median), and hence
ignores the variability in beliefs. In Appendix 2.C.5, we pursue a different approach by
structurally estimating the belief formation rule proposed in Section 2.2.2 through a
finite mixture model, which allows for heterogeneity in both the mean and the error
rate of subjects’ belief formation type. The picture resulting from these estimations is
very similar to what can be inferred from Figure 2.3. For example, the estimations also
identify a group of rationals as well as group of fully naïve subjects.
Robustness
Our belief elicitation design made a number of design choices, whose overarching goal
was to create a relatively simple updating environment. To illustrate that none of our
design features was critical in generating the results, we now investigate the robustness
of our treatment comparison. To this end, we conducted a robustness treatment (both
Correlated and Uncorrelated) which was identical to the baseline treatments, with the
exception of variations along four design dimensions.
First, the data-generating process was altered slightly. We induced a prior belief by
informing subjects that µ would be drawn from N (0;250, 000), while the signal distri-
bution was given by sh ∼N (µ; 250,000). As a consequence, negative true states were
possible and we eliminated the truncation of the signal distribution. Both prior and sig-
nal distributions were explained to subjects in great detail, and the instructions included
the corresponding formulas. Control questions ensured that subjects understood the key
21 Appendix 2.C.3 analyzes the stability of the individual-level naïveté parameters across tasks.
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features of the prior distribution as well as the equal variance of the prior and signal
distributions.
Second, we introduced a fourth intermediary which, in both the Uncorrelated and the
Correlated condition, simply transmitted the signal of computer A to the subject. Thus,
subjects only communicated with intermediaries.
Third, subjects’ payment was determined by the binarized scoring rule, which is
incentive-compatible regardless of subjects’ risk attitudes (Hossain and Okui, 2013).22
Fourth, instead of framing the experimental task as guessing how many items are
contained in an imaginary container, we explicitly told subjects that they would have to
estimate a hypothetical true state, which would be drawn by the computer.
96 subjects participated in these treatments and earned 11.10 euros on average. Ap-
pendix 2.D presents details on all ten belief formation tasks as well as the corresponding
results. To summarize, the results of these robustness treatments are very similar to those
in the baseline treatments. The right panel of Figure 2.3 illustrates this by plotting me-
dian naïveté parameters for both conditions.23 As in the baseline treatments, the type
distribution in the Correlated condition exhibits a bimodal structure, according to which
some fraction of subjects fully neglects informational redundancies, while others state
the same beliefs as subjects in the Uncorrelated condition. Accordingly, the belief distri-
butions in the Correlated and Uncorrelated treatments significantly differ from each other
(p<0.0001, Wilcoxon ranksum test). This is also reflected by lower earnings of subjects
in the Correlated condition (earnings difference=2.30 euros, p-value=0.0255, Wilcoxon
ranksum test).
2.2.4.2 Market Treatments – Over- and Underpricing
Price Levels Across Treatments
In both market treatments, we have observations from 18 market groups that trade in
ten trading rounds each. For each market group and trading round, we define the price
of the last concluded trade to be the market price.24 We first consider the effect of our
treatment variation on price levels.
Result 2. Market prices differ between treatments as predicted by correlation neglect. In the
Correlated market treatment, we observe frequent over- or underpricing, depending on the
relative magnitude of the common source signal. Neither prices nor subjects’ beliefs reflect
learning over time.
Table 2.3 provides summary statistics for all ten trading rounds. We present two price
predictions (consisting of the rational benchmark and the full correlation neglect belief,
22 Specifically, we computed a penalty term by squaring the distance between a subject’s belief and the
true state. The subject then received 10 euros if the penalty was smaller than a randomly drawn number
k ∼ U[0;100, 000], and nothing otherwise.
23Given that we induced a prior in these treatments, computing individual-level naïveté towards corre-
lations requires an assumption on potential base rate neglect. We base this assumption on behavior in the
Uncorrelated robustness condition, where subjects uniformly essentially fully neglect the base rate. Accord-
ingly, we assume full base rate neglect, i.e., normalized beliefs are computed using equation (2.3), also see
Appendix 2.D. This assumption has no bearing on our treatment comparison, but only serves to illustrate
the population distribution of naïveté.
24 All results are robust to other definitions of the market price, see Appendices 2.E.2 and 2.E.3.
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Table 2.3. Market prices by trading round
True Rational Correlation Median Market Price Median Market Price Ranksum Test Beliefs
State Belief Neglect Belief Uncorr. Treatment Correlated Treatment (p-value) Differ?
10 7.75 9.88 8.35 9.05 0.0093 Yes
88 71.25 96.63 86.5 93.45 0.0338 Yes
250 259.75 219.38 275 260 0.0113 Yes
732 853.15 709.13 820 737 0.0001 Yes
1,000 974.75 1,042.38 1,000 1,039 0.0723 Yes
4,698 4,810 3,209 5,200 4,470.5 0.0085 Yes
7,338 8,604.5 9,277.25 9,124 8,999 0.6087 No
10,000 7,232.25 4,887.63 7,575 6,250 0.0534 Yes
23,112 26,331 20,745.5 24,100 21,300 0.0007 Yes
46,422 38,910.5 25,625 41,000 35,000 0.0015 Yes
Median market prices are defined as the median of all market prices over the 18 markets in the respective round. Beliefs
are said to differ between treatments in a particular round if and only if p-value < 0.05, Wilcoxon ranksum test. Note
that subjects faced the ten rounds in randomized order.
respectively), actual price levels, as well as an indicator for whether subjects’ beliefs
(as stated prior to trading) differ significantly across treatments. In all rounds but one,
prices significantly differ between treatments in the direction one would expect from a
correlation neglect perspective. While market prices in the Uncorrelated treatment fol-
low the rational prediction rather closely, we observe frequent instances of over- and
underpricing in the Correlated market treatment. Thus, the magnitude of the common
source signal relative to the other signals consistently predicts whether assets sell above
or below the values from the Uncorrelated market treatment.
In Appendices 2.E.2 and 2.E.3, we establish the robustness of the treatment difference
in price levels by excluding outliers from the analysis and by providing density estimates
of the price kernel, both at an aggregated level across periods and separately for each
period. Strikingly, the (aggregated) price kernel is centered around χ ≈ 0.5, suggesting
that rational and naïve types negotiate prices between the two extreme predictions. We
also show that the treatment difference in prices is entirely driven by subjects’ beliefs:
In an OLS regression of all prices from all market groups on a treatment dummy, the
latter vanishes after accounting for elicited beliefs. Thus, the overshooting beliefs that
are implied by neglecting informational redundancies indeed cause overshooting price
levels.
Next, we provide a visual representation of the temporal pattern of the market price
volatility induced by correlation neglect. To this end, we first normalize market prices to
make them comparable across rounds. This is done using a procedure akin to the belief
normalization in the individual belief formation treatments (see eq. (2.3)), so that, for
each market group and trading period, we essentially compute the naïveté inherent in
the market price (which, in principle, should be between zero and one). However, by
construction, this normalization does not allow us to distinguish the occurrence of over-
from that of underpricing. Thus, we slightly reformulate this normalization: In trading
rounds in which correlation neglect predicts overoptimism, the normalization remains
the same, so that a normalized price of one (zero) indicates full correlation neglect (ra-
tional price levels). On the other hand, in periods in which neglecting correlations leads
to overpessimism, we normalize prices such that full correlation neglect is indicated by
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(−1) and the rational benchmark by zero, respectively.25 For each trading round, we
then compute the difference between the median market price in the Correlated mar-
ket treatment and the median market price in the Uncorrelated condition, which gives
us an indication of the price distortion in the Correlated market treatment relative to its
appropriate benchmark.
The two panels in Figure 2.4 plot this difference in market prices against the theoreti-
cal predictions across our ten trading rounds (we used two different orderings of rounds).
First note that, by construction, the rational prediction is always given by zero; if correla-
tion neglect did not impact aggregate outcomes, prices would not differ across conditions.
The full correlation neglect prediction, on the other hand, alternates between one and
(-1) depending on whether correlation neglect implies overoptimism or -pessimism. The
plots show that in almost all periods the price difference follows the correlation neglect
prediction, so that prices frequently overshoot. As a result, the excessive belief swings
implied by correlation neglect directly translate into volatile price levels. In addition, as
visual inspection suggests, this pattern does not attenuate over time. Appendix 2.E.4 for-
mally confirms that the bias reflected in market prices does not become smaller over the
course of the ten trading periods. Appendix 2.E.5 analyzes the time trend of the beliefs
subjects stated prior to trading started. Again, the results provide no indication that sub-
jects learn to deal with correlated signals over time. Appendix 2.E.6 discusses potential
reasons why the market does not debias subjects.
Beliefs, Prices, and Individual Trading Behavior
So far, we have shown that correlated information structures have predictable conse-
quences for experimental market outcomes, i.e., price levels. Next, we demonstrate that
individual-level heterogeneity in the capability to process informational redundancies
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Figure 2.4. Difference between median normalized market prices in the Correlated and
Uncorrelated treatments across trading rounds for the two randomized orders of rounds
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Result 3. In the Correlated market treatment, the pervasiveness of the belief bias within
a market group predicts the degree of price distortions. Additionally, correlation neglect
is reflected in individual trading behavior. When ignoring correlations predicts an upward
(downward) biased belief, subjects with a higher propensity to overlook correlations hold
significantly more (less) assets. Consequently, these subjects earn lower profits.
The higher the degree of naïveté of themarginal traders in a market group, the more
pronounced should be the resulting price distortion (see Appendix 2.E.1). Thus, if it is
indeed correlation neglect which causes the alternating pattern of over- and underpric-
ing, then market groups in which people are more capable of dealing with correlations
should exhibit smaller price distortions. To investigate this issue, we normalize all mar-
ket prices in the Correlated market treatment according to equation (2.3) such that they
capture the size of the price distortion and then, for each trading round, relate these
price levels to the naïveté which is implicit in the beliefs that subjects stated before trad-
ing started. Specifically, we employ as explanatory variable the (average) naïveté of the
marginal traders, for each market group and trading round.26 Columns (1) and (2) of
Table 2.4 provide corresponding OLS estimates, with standard errors clustered at the
market group level. The results show that, within the Correlated market treatment, a
higher propensity to commit correlation neglect is indeed associated with more biased
price levels.
Thus, individual-level heterogeneity in belief updating has implications for price
levels. However, correlation neglect also makes clear predictions about who should hold
the assets and make losses. In trading rounds in which correlation neglect leads to an
overvaluation of assets, subjects who ignore correlations should own most of the assets.
Likewise, when correlation neglect implies an undervaluation of assets, subjects who
correctly process the correlation should hold the majority of the assets. To examine
these predictions, we relate asset holdings to individual beliefs. For each individual, we
employ the median naïveté parameter as explanatory variable. The OLS regressions in
columns (3) through (6) establish that the magnitude of the belief bias predicts asset
holdings. Columns (3) and (4) show that in trading rounds in which correlation neglect
leads to an overly pessimistic belief, those subjects with a higher propensity to ignore
correlations hold significantly less assets. Likewise, when the bias implies overoptimism,
those subjects whose stated beliefs reveal a higher degree of correlation neglect hold
more assets (columns (5) and (6)). Thus, naïve subjects buy when prices are too high
and sell when they are too low. In consequence, these participants earn lower profits
(columns (7) and (8)).
26 To this end, as we detail in Appendix 2.E.1, we construct supply and demand curves from the beliefs
subjects stated ex ante. We then approximate the theoretical competitive equilibrium price by identifying
the buyer and seller who marginally give rise to trade and compute the average naïveté of these two traders.
The results are robust to employing the simple median naïveté across all traders in a given market group
and trading round as independent variable.
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Table 2.4. Determinants of prices, asset holdings, and profits in the Correlated market treatment
Dependent variable:
Normalized Median asset holdings Median asset holdings Median
price distortion if underpricing if overpricing profit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Naïveté of marginal 0.72∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
traders (χ) (0.12) (0.14)
Individual median -1.53∗∗∗ -1.30∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.26∗ -0.12∗∗ -0.11∗∗
naïveté (χ) (0.17) (0.19) (0.12) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 152 152 143 143 143 143 143 143
R2 0.28 0.41 0.31 0.42 0.20 0.43 0.04 0.13
OLS estimates, standard errors clustered at the market group level. In columns (1) and (2), observations in-
clude all (normalized) prices from Correlated excluding outliers for which the (absolute) normalized price or
the naïveté of the marginal trader are larger than three. The results are robust to including these outliers when
employing median regressions. See Appendix 2.E.1 for a definition of the marginal traders. Additional controls
in (1)-(2) include fixed effects for each true state and the average age, average monthly disposable income, and
average final high school grade as well as the proportion of females in a given market group. In columns (3) - (8),
observations include median asset holdings / profits of all subjects in the Correlated treatment. Overpricing (un-
derpricing) is defined as rounds in which correlation neglect predicts overoptimism (-pessimism). Median profits
are computed as median normalized profit across all rounds, where for each trader and for each round a normal-
ized profit is defined as pi= 10× Money holdings + value of assets heldMonetary value of endowment , where for sellers (buyers) the value
of the endowment consists of the value of the initially owned assets (the budget). The individual-level median
correlation neglect parameter in (3) and (4) [(5) and (6)] is computed as median χ of the rounds in which corre-
lation neglect predicts overpessimism [overoptimism]. In (7) and (8), the median correlation neglect parameter
equals the median χ across all rounds. Additional controls in (3) - (8) include a buyer dummy, age, gender,
monthly disposable income, marital status dummies, and high school GPA. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.3 A General “Face Value” Heuristic?
We have shown that many subjects employ a simplifying heuristic and often fully neglect
the informational redundancies present in our environment. A possible, though perhaps
extreme, conjecture is that these subjects never think through the process generating
their information. Instead, they may take the visible and salient messages at “face value”,
meaning that they treat each number as if it were an unmanipulated independent sig-
nal realization, regardless of whether the signals are correlated or distorted in other ways
(see, e.g., the recent literature on the “sampling approach” towards judgment biases
in cognitive psychology or the “system neglect” hypotheses articulated by Fiedler and
Juslin, 2006; Massey and Wu, 2005). If true, this would imply that the updating error
documented in Section 2.2 is inherently unrelated to correlations as such, but rather a
special case of a rather simplistic heuristic. Based on these considerations, we now in-
vestigate the limits of such neglect patterns, i.e., we seek to understand whether people
neglect signal distortions of any kind.27
If a general face value bias was at work in our experimental environment, people
should also make mistakes in all other settings in which they receive distorted signals.
We hence investigate the empirical validity of the face value explanation by introducing
two further treatment variations, in which the source of the distortion is not (just) a
correlation. Key idea behind both designs is to introduce a simple external distortion of
the signals, i.e., a distortion which does not arise from the interplay of various signals, but
rather from the intervention of some external source. According to a simple face value
27 Evidently, the goal of this exercise is not to claim that people only fall prey to correlation neglect.
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heuristic, these environments should also produce a particular pattern of biased beliefs.
First, we designed treatment Multiply, which was identical to the baseline Uncorrelated
condition, except that each of the three intermediaries obtained one of the true signals,
and multiplied it by 1.5. Thus, subjects received messages (s1, s2 × 1.5, s3 × 1.5, s4 × 1.5).
Note that, across tasks, the signal of computer A is well within the range of the distorted
messages, just like in the Correlated treatment. If subjects take all information they see
at face value, this treatment should produce biased beliefs, hence allowing for a first
assessment of the empirical validity of face value bias. We implemented the same true
states, signals, and procedures as in the baseline conditions. 46 subjects participated in
this treatment and earned an average of 11.70 euros.
In a second treatment variation (Face value), we created an information environment
in which (i) the rational benchmark belief coincides with that in the Uncorrelated treat-
ment, (ii) correlation neglect predicts the same beliefs as in the Correlated condition,
and (iii) the correlation neglect and face value predictions do not coincide. Specifically,
as depicted in Figure 2.5, we amended the baseline Correlated treatment by introducing
three further “machines” which communicated with subjects. Computers A through D
generated four unbiased iid signals, and the intermediaries 1-3 again took the average
of the respective signals of the computers. The machines M1 through M3 each observed
one of these averages, and added a known constant X (“noise”). Thus, subjects’ decision
screens contained the signal of computer A as well as the messages of the three machines.
In addition, the written instructions included a table in which X was provided, separately
for each task. In the instructions, the machines were described in a manner that was com-
parable to how we introduced the intermediaries, and we made it clear that the value of
X was unrelated to the solution of the task. In this treatment, both the rational and the
full correlation neglect predictions are identical to those in the baseline conditions. By
tailoring X, the face value prediction can be constructed to take on any desired value. In
five of the tasks, we chose X such that the face value prediction is equal to the rational
belief, i.e., the average of the independent signals. Thus, in these tasks, behaving “ratio-

















Figure 2.5. Treatment Face value. The machines add X to the reports of the intermediaries.
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face value or going through the full debiasing process. On the other hand, neglecting
correlations alone requires subjects to subtract X from the messages of the machines
and then stop in further debiasing the messages. In the other five tasks, we chose X such
that – after normalizing beliefs – the face value prediction was exactly opposite to the
correlation neglect prediction, relative to the rational benchmark. For example, if the
signal of computer A was relatively high, so that correlation neglect predicts an inflated
belief, X assumed a negative value such that face value predicts a normalized belief of
(−1). We implemented the same true states, signals, and procedures as in the baseline
conditions, so that this treatment allows for a sharp separation between correlation ne-
glect and a face value heuristic. 45 subjects participated in Face value and earned 8.10
euros on average.
Result 4. Across contexts, face value bias explains a negligible fraction of beliefs.
The results from both treatments indicate that subjects do not take all information
at face value without reflecting upon the data-generating process. As we discuss in de-
tail in Appendix 2.F.5, virtually all subjects behave fully rational in treatment Multiply,
suggesting that subjects attend to and are capable of correcting for the biased messages.
A similar picture emerges for treatment Face value, see Appendix 2.F.6. Here, the
distribution of beliefs is very similar to the baseline Correlated condition, suggesting that
subjects again fall prey to correlation neglect, but not to face value bias. For instance,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that beliefs in Face Value do not differ from those in the
Correlated condition (p = 0.3670). In addition, beliefs in Face value clearly differ from
both beliefs in the Uncorrelated treatment (p = 0.0086, Wilcoxon ranksum test) and the
respective “face value” predictions. This implies that subjects again detect and correct for
the external distortion introduced through the machines, but then stop in further debi-
asing the (still correlated) messages. Thus, we identify evidence for correlation neglect
even when it makes a prediction different from face value bias.
In sum, we have shown that - unlike a simplistic face value bias would prescribe -
people struggle considerably more with distortions that arise from the interdependence
of multiple signals than with externally biased messages. Of course, these findings do
not imply that correlations are the only type of complexity that induce people to make
systematic errors. However, they show that rather simple distortions of signals such as
adding or multiplying a constant do not suffice to lead people astray. One possible inter-
pretation of these results is that correlations are more complex and less intuitively wrong
than more simple signal distortions.28
28 In Appendix 2.F.7, we further investigate the relevance of face value bias in our setup from a different
angle, using two additional treatment variations. These treatments build on the idea underlying face value
bias, namely the notion that people do not attend to the process generating the data and instead excessively
focus on the visible messages. According to this logic, exogenous measures to steer attention towards the
underlying process should mitigate the bias. We implemented two treatments in which we attempt to shift
subjects’ focus on the information structure (but not on the correlation as such) using two nudges. Our
findings reveal that both nudges were rather ineffective in mitigating correlation neglect. This provides
further suggestive evidence that face value bias is an unlikely driver of correlation neglect.
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2.4 The Mechanisms Underlying Correlation Neglect
This section investigates the mechanisms underlying correlation neglect. This is impor-
tant for at least two reasons. First, regarding theory, studying cognitive underpinnings
may prove valuable in supporting efforts to formalize the bias. Second, for applied work,
one may wish to understand how the neglect of informational redundancies depends on
features of the environment such as the stake size, the degree of mathematical complex-
ity, or how salient the existence of the double-counting problem is, in order to derive
predictions in which type of environments correlation neglect is (less) likely to occur
and which type of interventions are likely to mitigate the bias. Likewise, the strong het-
erogeneity in subjects’ tendency to neglect correlations may be systematically related to
individual characteristics, hence allowing predictions which sub-groups of the population
are more likely to suffer from the consequences of boundedly rational belief formation.
2.4.1 The Role of Complexity and Cognitive Skills
A common theme in the literature is that the degree of complexity of the problem exerts
a substantial effect on the existence and magnitude of cognitive biases (e.g., Charness
and Levin, 2009). To investigate the role of complexity in our setup, we implemented
a new set of treatments in which we manipulated the overall complexity of the infor-
mation structure while keeping the nature of the correlation constant. In our reduced
complexity treatments, only two computers (A and B) generated unbiased iid signals,
see Figure 2.6. In the Uncorrelated treatment, the only intermediary directly transmitted
the signal of computer B. In the Correlated treatment, the intermediary reported the av-
erage of the signals of computers A and B. Thus, the type of correlation is identical to the
baseline condition and requires the same conceptual understanding of double-counting,
yet the complexity of the environment is severely reduced. We implemented the same
ten belief formation tasks as in the baseline treatments using the same incentive struc-
ture, instructions and procedures. In total, 94 subjects participated in these treatments,
which lasted 80 minutes on average and yielded average earnings of 11.60 euros.
Result 5. An extreme reduction in the environment’s complexity mitigates the bias.
Consistent with previous documentations of the role of complexity in different con-
texts, we find that correlation neglect is severely reduced in our low complexity treat-
ments. In none of the ten tasks do we find statistically significant evidence for double-









Figure 2.6. Simple uncorrelated (left panel) and correlated (right panel) information structure
29 Appendix 2.F.1 provides a full analysis of these reduced complexity treatments.
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simple informational environments subjects do grasp the implications of correlated in-
formation structures.30
We proceed by establishing the importance of (low) cognitive ability for correlation
neglect. Table 2.5 presents the results of OLS regressions of each subject’s median naïveté
parameter from the baseline Correlated treatment from Section 2 on two proxies for
cognitive ability, scholastic achievement in high school and the test score on a Raven
matrices IQ test. Results show that falling prey to double-counting is significantly related
to low cognitive skills.
In sum, it appears as if low cognitive skills in combination with a sufficient degree of
complexity are crucial inputs into generating the updating bias. In the remainder of this
section, we seek to develop amore specific understanding of how the combination of high
complexity and low cognitive skills produces correlation neglect. To address this issue
in a systematic manner, we conceptualize the process of belief formation in a simplified
way. Intuitively, solving our more complex experimental task requires people to complete
two sequential steps of reasoning, each of which potentially pertains to a conceptually
distinct aspect of how cognitive skills matter in our environment:
1. Subjects need to identify and think through the problematic feature of our updating
environment. That is, they need to notice that the workings of the intermediaries
introduce a double-counting problem that they need to take care of. After all, it
may not be a priori clear to participants which part of the problem they need to
focus on and think through in detail.
2. Subjects need to actually solve the problem mathematically, i.e., conditional on
noticing and understanding the problem, they ought to execute the computations
that are necessary to debias the messages of the intermediaries.
While such a procedural view of the belief formation process is obviously stylized,
it will nevertheless prove useful in further developing and empirically assessing several
Table 2.5. Correlation neglect and cognitive skills
Dependent variable: Median naiveté χ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High school grade point average -0.24∗∗ -0.25∗∗ -0.29∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Raven test score -0.10∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.11∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Additional controls No No No Yes
Observations 47 47 47 46
R2 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.27
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parantheses. Observations include
all subjects from the baseline Correlated treatment. Additional controls in-
clude age, gender, monthly disposable income, and marital status dummies.
High school GPA 1 (worst) - 5 (best). Raven test score 0-10. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
30Note, however, that this context is very simplistic: Since we did not induce priors, the report of the
intermediary in the correlated treatment equals the rational belief, rendering actual computations by the
subjects unnecessary.
2.4 The Mechanisms Underlying Correlation Neglect | 31
competing explanations for correlation neglect that can account for the important role
of cognitive ability and complexity.
2.4.2 Solving the Problem Mathematically
Suppose for now that people do not struggle with the first step, i.e., they think through
the mechanics that generate the correlation and detect the resulting double-counting
problem. Then, subjects still need to execute the computations that are necessary to de-
velop rational beliefs. However, two issues may prevent them from actually doing so and
hence drive the observed neglect of correlations. First, subjects may lack the mathemati-
cal skills needed to invert the averages computed by the intermediaries. Second, even if
participants could in principle solve the problem, they may incur thinking costs in doing
the necessary calculations.31 Both of these potential channels would account for the im-
portance of cognitive ability and complexity in a straightforward way; for instance, the
level of mathematical skills or the effort cost function likely depend on cognitive ability.
Likewise, higher complexity requires higher levels of mathematical skills.32
Note that both of these channels rest on the presumption that subjects know and
understand that they need to compute the average of the four signals of computers A-D
to develop rational beliefs. To evaluate the empirical validity of this hypothesis, we intro-
duced treatment Math. In this treatment variation, we altered the instructions relative
to the Correlated treatment by explicitly advising subjects to back out the underlying in-
dependent signals from the correlated messages.33 In essence, this treatment solves the
first step of the belief formation process outlined above. Thus, any remaining systematic
mistake can be attributed to either cognitive effort costs or mathematical problems in ex-
ecuting the calculations. 47 subjects took part in this treatment and earned an average
of 11.40 euros.
Result 6. Provided that subjects know how to solve the problem, a large majority are both
willing to and capable of executing the necessary calculations.
Appendix 2.F.2 provides a detailed analysis of treatment Math. To summarize, the
vast majority of subjects states rational beliefs once they know how to solve the prob-
lem. For instance, the (median) naïveté parameter of the median individual in this treat-
ment is χ = 0.00, down from χ = 0.68 in Correlated. Formally, the distribution of median
naïveté parameters in this treatment is significantly different from that in the Correlated
treatment (p = 0.0003) and does not significantly differ from that in the Uncorrelated
condition (p = 0.7593, Wilcoxon ranksum tests). Thus, while a small fraction of our
subjects appear to struggle with the mere task of computing the average signal of the
computers and state fully naïve beliefs, low mathematical skills or prohibitively high
31 The idea that the processing of information is associated with thinking costs can be traced back to
Simon (1956) and has been formalized in different models (see, e.g., Caplin et al., 2011; Caplin and Dean,
forthcoming; Gabaix et al., 2011).
32 In fact, as discussed above, in the low complexity treatment, actual computations are unnecessary since
the intermediary directly reports the rational belief.
33 For instance, the instructions stated: “Important hint: . . . You should attempt to determine the average
of the signals of the computers.” We also introduced a corresponding control question, see Appendix H for
details.
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effort costs in executing the necessary calculations are unlikely drivers of correlation
neglect for the majority of subjects.
2.4.3 Identifying and Thinking Through the Problem
The previous results suggest that many subjects struggle more with identifying and think-
ing through the critical aspect of our updating problem than with its mathematical so-
lution per se (i.e., with the first step of the two-step belief formation process outlined
above). In particular, identifying the double-counting feature may work as a threshold
which subjects do or do not pass, giving rise to a bimodal type distribution. After all, if
subjects do not identify the double-counting issue in the first place, they cannot solve this
problem mathematically. Based on this logic, we proceed by investigating whether peo-
ple become better at processing correlated signals once they are (exogenously) induced
to focus on the double-counting problem. Key idea behind the corresponding treatment
variations – relative to treatment Math – is to directly increase subjects’ focus on the
correlated nature of the signals (i.e., the workings and implications of the intermedi-
aries) without providing any additional information on the double-counting problem or
its mathematical solution. That is, we explicitly alert subjects what to think about, but
not how.
To this end, we introduced two variations of the baseline Correlated treatment. The
first treatment (Intermediaries) was inspired by the evidence in Hanna et al. (2014) who
show that people become better at optimizing behavior once they are induced to focus
on previously overlooked dimensions of a decision problem. To shift subjects’ focus while
forming beliefs, we conducted a treatment variation that is identical to the baseline Cor-
related condition except for one additional short paragraph which was provided both at
the end of the instructions and on subjects’ decision screens along with the graphical
representation of the information structure (see Figure 2.1):
Hint for solving the task: Again consider the figure which depicts the informa-
tion you will receive. Think carefully about what the intermediaries do! What
does that imply for the estimates of the intermediaries?
Note that this constitutes a rather strong intervention in the sense that we explicitly
told subjects what to focus on when approaching the task. However, the paragraph did
not provide any additional information on how to solve the problem and compute ra-
tional beliefs. Subjects completed the same ten belief formation tasks as in the baseline
Correlated condition.
In a second treatment (Alternating), we nudged our participants by varying the na-
ture of the information structure (correlated or uncorrelated) within subjects between
tasks. This allowed us to alert subjects to the workings and implications of the intermedi-
aries in a more indirect manner. The instructions for this treatment introduced both the
correlated and the uncorrelated information structure from our baseline design, which
were framed as “Scenario I” and “Scenario II”, respectively. Subjects were told that in
some tasks they would receive information according to Scenario I and in some tasks
according to Scenario II and that, in each task, they would be informed of the scenario
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before seeing the messages of computer A and of the intermediaries. Consequently, sub-
jects solved five tasks with correlated and five with uncorrelated information. In the
instructions, we emphasized to subjects that they would have to pay special attention to
the prevailing scenario and the corresponding change in the intermediaries’ behavior. In
addition, the control questions in this treatment required subjects to compute the mes-
sages of intermediaries 1 and 2 for exemplary computer signals for both the correlated
and the uncorrelated scenario, which presumably further increased the salience of the
intermediaries. 46 (47) subjects took part in the Intermediaries (Alternating) treatment
and earned 12.70 (13.10) euros on average.
Result 7. Exogenously increasing subjects’ focus on the correlation reduces the bias.
To illustrate, Figure 2.7 visualizes the distribution of median beliefs across the ten
tasks in the Intermediaries treatment, again plotted against the relative magnitude of
the common source signal. As visual inspection suggests, median beliefs are very close
or often identical to those in the Uncorrelated condition, and clearly differ from those
in Correlated. As Appendix 2.F.3 visualizes, very similar results obtain in Alternating.
Appendix 2.F.3 provides a complete analysis of these treatments and shows that in 50 %
of all tasks, beliefs in the nudge treatments significantly differ from those in Correlated
at the 5 % level (Wilcoxon ranksum tests).
A different way to grasp this pattern is to consider the previously identified type het-
erogeneity at the individual level, i.e., to aggregate the data across tasks at the individual
level, rather than across individuals for each task. To this end, Figure 2.8 plots kernel
density estimates of the median naïveté parameters for both additional treatments. The
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Figure 2.7. Beliefs in the Correlated, Uncorrelated and Intermediaries treatments plotted against
the relative magnitude of the signal of computer A. See the notes of Figure 2.2 for details on the
construction of this figure.
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Figure 2.8. Kernel density estimates of median normalized beliefs in the Intermediaries
treatment (median of ten tasks) and the Alternating treatment (median of five tasks), each
compared with median beliefs in the baseline Correlated and Uncorrelated treatments
aries) and χ = 0.03 (Alternating), respectively. The parameter distributions are centered
significantly closer to the rational level and are clearly distinguishable from the Corre-
lated condition (p = 0.0023 for Intermediaries and p = 0.0230 for Alternating, Wilcoxon
ranksum tests). In addition, beliefs do not statistically differ from those in the Uncorre-
lated condition (p = 0.2906 for Intermediaries and p = 0.1361 for Alternating).
In sum, if subjects are nudged to focus on the critical feature of the informational
environment, the bias is substantially reduced. Notably, most subjects do not adjust par-
tially, but rather develop fully unbiased beliefs. These findings are consistent with our
results from treatmentMath: once subjects focus on thinking about the double-counting
problem, they possess the mathematical skills to solve our experimental belief formation
task. In combination, these results lend support to the idea that the first step of our sim-
ple two-step belief formation process may act as a threshold towards developing rational
beliefs, and hence give rise to a bimodal type distribution. In addition, these results are
also consistent with the relationship between correlation neglect and complexity as well
as cognitive skills. After all, subjects may have more problems in identifying the problem-
atic feature of the updating environment when the problem is more complex; likewise,
subjects with high cognitive skills may find it easier to focus on and think through the
double-counting problem.
A possible conjecture is that the results on the relationship between beliefs and
nudges reflect cognitive effort costs: reflecting upon the information structure and iden-
tifying the double-counting problem may be cognitively costly. While the above results
show that effort costs do not prevent participants from executing the necessary calcula-
tions, they may induce subjects to refrain from even thinking about what the correct so-
lution may be, implying that subjects remain “rationally” inattentive towards the double-
counting problem, akin to rational inattention behavior established in, e.g., Caplin et al.
(2011) and Caplin and Dean (forthcoming).
We evaluate the explanatory power of this rational ignorance hypothesis by mak-
ing use of its straightforward and testable implication that an increase in the marginal
financial incentives to hold correct beliefs should increase cognitive effort and hence
reduce the amount of correlation neglect. Accordingly, we triple both the absolute and
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the marginal level of the financial incentives in the Correlated and Uncorrelated treat-
ments.34 Apart from the increase in stake size, these treatments were identical to the
baseline Correlated and Uncorrelated treatments, respectively. 94 subjects participated in
these experiments, which lasted 90 minutes on average and yielded average earnings of
21.90 euros.
Result 8. In our experiments, a moderate increase in financial incentives affects cognitive
effort, but not subjects’ tendency to disregard correlations.
Support for this claim is provided by Table 2.6. Columns (1)-(3) show the results of
a difference-in-difference OLS estimation of each subject’s median naïveté parameter on
(i) a treatment dummy, (ii) a stake size dummy, and (iii) an interaction term equal to
one if subjects were in the high-stakes Correlated treatment. If the increase of the stake
size by 200% lead to more accurate beliefs, then this interaction term should have a
negative coefficient. However, the point estimate is actually slightly positive, and despite
the relatively large sample size, the only sizable and significant effect is the treatment
difference, which is robust to increasing the (marginal) financial incentives. To further
illustrate this result, Appendix 2.F.4 shows that the distribution of naïveté again exhibits
a roughly bimodal structure according to which many subjects essentially fully neglect
correlations.35
While the higher stake size does not induce more belief accuracy, it does affect cogni-
tive effort, as proxied for by response times. Relative to the baseline conditions, subjects
take on average more than 20% longer to solve each task, which indicates that they in-
deed provide higher effort when being confronted with higher stakes (columns (5) and
(6)). However, this higher effort level does not translate into more accurate beliefs. This
is noteworthy as column (4) shows that, within the Correlated treatments, higher effort
(as proxied by higher response times) is indeed associated with higher belief accuracy.
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 2.6 contrast these findings with the response time patterns
in treatments Intermediaries and Alternating. Results show that these nudge treatments
have a large positive effect on response times, which increase by almost one minute on
average.
2.4.4 Discussion
People do not always neglect correlations, but only when the updating problem is suffi-
ciently complex. Starting with the strong relationship between correlation neglect and
cognitive skills in such complex environments, we have decomposed the cognitive bias
using a stylized two-step process of belief formation. We have seen that – at least in the
context considered in this paper – people are both willing to and mathematically capa-
ble of executing the calculations that are necessary to debias correlated messages. What
is more, treatments Intermediaries and Alternating have highlighted that people do not
34 In these high-stakes conditions, variable earnings in euros were given by pi= max{0, 30− 480×
(Belief / True state− 1)2}.
35Unreported regressions confirm that all results on the relationship between stake size, response times,
and beliefs hold if we do not consider the median normalized belief of each subject, but instead all beliefs,
i.e., ten observations per subject.
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Table 2.6. Correlation neglect, stake size, and response times
Dependent variable:
Median χ Median response time
Corr. + Uncorr. Correlated Corr. + Uncorr. Corr. + nudge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 if correlated 0.41∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14)
1 if high stakes -0.046 -0.029 0.074 0.25∗ 0.29∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13)
1 if correlated high stakes 0.029 0.012
(0.13) (0.13)
Median response time -0.21∗∗∗
(0.07)
1 if Intermediaries, 0 if Baseline corr. 0.94∗∗∗
(0.22)
1 if Alternating, 0 if Baseline corr. 0.95∗∗∗
(0.22)
Constant 0.20∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ -0.0060 0.33 0.94∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗ 1.52 2.53∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.24) (0.50) (0.09) (0.54) (1.10) (0.82)
Additional controls No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 188 188 186 92 188 186 92 93
R2 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.08 0.13 0.22 0.23
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable consists of median naïveté
parameters from all subjects in the baseline and the high stakes treatments (both Correlated and Uncorrelated). In column
(4), the sample is restricted to subjects in the Correlated conditions, both high stakes and baseline. In columns (5)-(6), the
dependent variable is the median response time of all subjects in the baseline and high stakes conditions. In columns (7)
and (8), the sample consists of subjects in the baseline correlated condition and the respective nudge treatment. Response
time in minutes. Additional controls include age, gender, monthly disposable income, and marital status fixed effects. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
even need to be told how to solve the problem. Rather, exogenously inducing them to
think about the problematic aspect of the updating environment already has large effects
on beliefs.
Bounded rationality has often been considered as a continuous concept. In contrast,
in our context, identifying and thinking through the double-counting problem appears to
constitute a threshold which people do or do not pass, resulting in a somewhat (discrete)
bimodal distribution of types (see Gabaix, 2014, for a model in which limited attention
acts as a binary threshold). An interesting question is whether the (non-) passing of this
threshold results from costs of thinking (“rational ignorance”) or whether subjects at-
tempt to, but do not succeed in, devising an appropriate problem-solving strategy. While
one could argue that studying belief biases in a controlled laboratory context comes
at the cost of relatively small financial incentives, the response time patterns neverthe-
less provide suggestive evidence that exogenously increasing effort through moderate
increases in incentives may change behavior along the intensive, but not along the exten-
sive margin: in our experiments, higher stakes induce subjects to invest higher effort, yet
people appear to not alter their problem-solving strategy as such. After all, in the high
stakes treatments, the distribution of beliefs also has a mass point at full naïveté. In con-
trast, shifting subjects’ focus on the correlation has large effects on beliefs. A plausible
interpretation of these findings is that – if left to their own devices – subjects attempt to
identify the critical aspect of the informational environment (i.e., to solve the first step
of the simple two-step belief formation process outlined above), and do so harder when
the stakes are higher. However, if they do not succeed in passing this threshold, they
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make use of a specific simple heuristic. On the other hand, once people are told which
aspect of the problem they need to consider in detail, they pass the threshold of step 1
and subsequently take considerably longer to solve each task, because they need to go
through the additional mathematical steps of debiasing the correlated messages.
Our findings on the effects of nudges in debiasing subjects lend themselves to a nat-
ural interpretation in terms of limited and selective attention: if decision-makers face
limits in the level of attention they can allocate to the different features of the task, they
may lack focus on important aspects of the data-generating process. In our context, sub-
jects could in principle focus on a variety of features of the environment, such as the
nature of the distribution generating the signals, the relative signal precisions, the pay-
ment scheme etc. Consequently, attention may be lacking on the precise workings of
the intermediaries and corresponding implications, so that drawing subjects’ attention
towards the mechanics which generate the correlation should attenuate correlation ne-
glect. This selective attention interpretation bears a natural relationship with a small
recent theoretical literature which models the idea that, in forming beliefs, people may
naturally attend to some aspects of the problem, but not to others (Gennaioli and Shleifer,
2010; Bordalo et al., 2015b; Schwartzstein, 2014). However, as they are, these theories
do not posit specific attentional frames in processing correlations.36
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Using experiments with more than 1,000 subjects, this paper provides clean evidence for
people’s tendency to neglect correlations in information sources when forming beliefs
and the corresponding cognitive mechanisms. While we deliberately designed a tightly
controlled and abstract information structure to obtain a clean view on the cognitive
bias and corresponding remedies, an interesting question is whether correlation neglect
persists in more natural informational environments. While studying belief formation
using naturalistic information naturally comes at the loss of some internal validity, in
Appendix 2.G, we explore one possible avenue by investigating subjects’ behavior when
they are confronted with real newspaper reports covering correlated information. To this
end, we make use of a naturally occurring informational redundancy in professional GDP
forecasts that arose because a German research institute contributed to a joint forecast,
but also issued a separate (different) forecast at the same time. Again, the (incentivized)
beliefs subjects state when they are confronted with these correlated forecasts are con-
sistent with the neglect of informational redundancies, hence suggesting that the bias
we identify in this paper also plays out in more naturalistic environments.
Economists have recently increased their efforts to explicitly model erroneous prob-
ability judgments (see, e.g., the discussion in Rabin, 2013). While most of the literature
has focused on formalizing specific biases and drawing out corresponding economic im-
plications (Rabin and Schrag, 1999; Rabin, 2002; Rabin and Vayanos, 2010; Benjamin
et al., forthcoming), more recently economists have started to model the mental process
of belief formation (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010; Bordalo et al., 2015b; Schwartzstein,
36 Also see, e.g., Bordalo et al. (2013), Bordalo et al. (2015a), Taubinsky (2014), Kőszegi and Szeidl
(2013), and Gabaix (2014) for the application of limited attention to consumer choice.
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2014). While none of these theories are designed to apply in the settings we considered,
our empirical results are broadly supportive of this type of models in that we emphasize
the interplay of complexity and focus in generating correlation neglect. An interesting
question is which other prevalent and economically important features of real informa-
tion structures induce the neglect patterns we document in this paper, and how the result-
ing biases are conceptually linked to correlation neglect. As our “face value” treatments
have shown, the tendency to naïvely process distorted signals is not universal across
contexts.
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Appendix 2.A Overview of Treatments
Table 2.7. Treatment overview
Treatment # of subjects Session length (mins) Ave earnings (euros)
Baseline correlated 47 90 10.25
Baseline uncorrelated 47 90 12.92
Robustness correlated 48 80 9.96
Robustness uncorrelated 48 80 12.25
Market correlated 144 150 19.40
Market uncorrelated 144 150 19.33
Reduced complexity correlated 47 80 12.52
Reduced complexity uncorrelated 47 80 11.60
Math 47 90 11.40
High stakes correlated 47 90 19.17
High stakes uncorrelated 47 90 24.58
Intermediaries 46 90 12.70
Alternating 47 90 13.13
Multiply 46 90 11.70
Face value 45 90 8.10
Structure 47 90 10.58
Messages 47 90 12.86
Appendix 2.B Order of Belief Formation Tasks in Main Treatments
/ Trading Rounds
In all individual belief elicitation treatments we implemented three different randomized
orders of rounds. These orders (by true state) are as follows:
1. 10’000, 88, 46’422, 4’698, 250, 23’112, 1’000, 10, 7’338, 732
2. 732, 23’112, 88, 1’000, 250, 4’698, 10, 7’338, 10’000, 46’422
3. 250, 7’338, 10’000, 10, 4’698, 88, 46’422, 732, 1’000, 23’112
In the market treatments, we implemented the first two of these randomizations.
Neither in the individual nor in the market treatments do we find any evidence that the
order of rounds matters.
Appendix 2.C Additional Analyses for Individual Baseline
Treatments
2.C.1 Robustness of Results in Individual Decision Making Treatments
This section demonstrates the robustness of our results in the baseline individual
treatments. First, Table 2.8 provides the p-values of ranksum tests for each of the ten
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belief formation tasks if we exclude all “outliers”, i.e., all observations which are not
within [50 %,150 %] of the rational belief. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 provide kernel density
estimates of the beliefs in each of the ten tasks to provide a visual representation of the
robustness of our results. As the ranksum tests above, these densities exclude beliefs
which are not within [50 %, 150 %] of the rational belief (on average, this resulted in
the exclusion of 4 out of 94 beliefs per true state).
Table 2.8. P-values of ranksum tests in the individual treatments excluding outliers
True state 10 88 250 732 1’000 4’698 7’338 10’000 23’112 46’422
p-value 0.0109 0.0038 0.0067 0.0099 0.0940 0.0096 0.9968 0.0122 0.0002 0.0261
Observations include all beliefs in the low-stakes treatment within a 50 % range around the rational belief. The
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Figure 2.9. Kernel density estimates of beliefs in individual belief formation treatments (1/2)
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Figure 2.10. Kernel density estimates of beliefs in individual belief formation treatments (2/2)
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2.C.2 Individual Treatments: Treatment Comparison and the Role of Cognitive
Abilities
This section establishes that the baseline treatment difference between the Correlated
and the Uncorrelated individual decision making treatments is robust to pooling beliefs
across all ten tasks. To this end, Figure 2.11 plots kernel density estimates of all normal-
ized individual beliefs in the baseline Correlated and Uncorrelated treatments, excluding
4 (out of 462) observations with |b ji |> 10. As the plots show, the disaggregated data
confirm the visual impression arising from plotting the median naïveté parameters of
each individual. Specifically, in the Uncorrelated treatment, the vast majority of beliefs is
approximately rational, while those in the Correlated treatment tend to be either rational
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Figure 2.11. Kernel density estimates of all normalized individual beliefs
To statistically confirm this visual impression, columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.9
present the results of an OLS regression of all normalized beliefs in the Correlated and
Uncorrelated baseline conditions on a treatment dummy and thereby establishes a quan-
titatively large amount of correlation neglect. As columns (3) and (4) indicate, however,
such correlation neglect is not uniform, but significantly stronger for subjects with low
cognitive skills, as proxied for by subjects’ high school grades and their score on a ten-
item Raven matrices IQ test.
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Table 2.9. Correlation neglect and cognitive ability
Dependent variable:
Normalized belief
Full sample Correlated treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 if correlated 0.36∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09)
High school grade point average -0.29∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09)
Raven score -0.100∗∗ -0.087∗∗
(0.04) (0.03)
Constant 0.32∗∗∗ 0.49 2.32∗∗∗ 2.68∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.30) (0.40) (0.56)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 924 914 458 448
R2 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09
OLS regressions, standard errors (clustered at individual) in parentheses. Ob-
servations in column (1) and (2) include all normalized beliefs from all rounds
in the baseline treatments excluding extreme outliers with normalized belief
|b ji |> 10. In columns (3) and (4), observations include all normalized beliefs
from all rounds in the baseline Correlated treatment excluding extreme outliers
with normalized belief |b ji |> 10. All results are robust to including these obser-
vations when employing median regressions. Additional controls include gen-
der, age, marital status fixed effects, and monthly disposable income. † Scale: 1
(worst) - 5 (best). In the German system, the high school GPA (“Abitur”) is a sum-
mary statistic of grades in the final years of secondary education and serves as
primary university entrance criterion. ‡ Scale: 0 (worst) - 10 (best). ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.C.3 Stability of (Median) Naïveté Parameters
To provide an illustration of the stability of the naïveté parameters, we conduct the fol-
lowing empirical exercise. For each subject, we set the belief to missing whose implied
naïveté parameter is closest to that subject’s median naïveté parameter. Then, we re-
compute the median naïveté parameters on the remaining (nine) beliefs and calculate
the difference between the original and the “modified” naïveté parameter. If this differ-
ence is small, this indicates that the median naïveté parameter is stable. For instance, in
the example above, if a median naïveté parameter was 0.5 because the respective subject
switched between implied naïveté parameters of 0 and 1 across the ten belief formation
tasks, throwing out one belief should move the naïveté parameter by 0.5.
The left panel of Figure 2.12 plots a histogram of the difference between the naïveté
parameters if we exclude one belief. The right-hand panel displays the difference
between the original naïveté parameter and a modified naïveté parameter if we exclude
those two beliefs that are closest to that subject’s median naïveté parameter. The results
show that the vast majority of naïveté parameters is very stable, as indicated by the
mass points around zero.
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Figure 2.12. Histograms of the difference between original naïveté parameters and modified
naïveté parameters when excluding the one or two beliefs that are closest to the original
(implied) naïveté parameter
2.C.4 Individual Treatments: (No) Learning Over Time
Column (1) of Table 2.10 provides the results of an OLS regression of all normalized be-
liefs in the individual Correlated treatment on a time trend. This estimation shows that
normalized beliefs do not become smaller over time, i.e., they do not converge to the
rational belief of zero. In column (2), we show that beliefs do not converge to their coun-
terparts in the Uncorrelated treatment, either. To this end, we take all normalized beliefs
from the Correlated treatment, subtract the median normalized belief in the respective
belief formation task in the Uncorrelated treatment and then regress this modified be-
lief on a time trend (in essence, this accounts for potential fixed effects of specific belief
formation tasks). The results show that the difference between the Correlated and the
Uncorrelated treatment does not become smaller over time.
Table 2.10. Time trend of beliefs in the Correlated treatment
Dependent variable:
Normalized Normalized belief minus
belief median in uncorrelated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of round -0.0067 0.024 -0.024 -0.0065
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Constant 0.72∗∗∗ 0.22 0.69∗∗∗ 0.31
(0.12) (0.55) (0.12) (0.56)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 458 448 458 448
R2 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.09
OLS regressions, standard errors (clustered at individual) in paren-
theses. Observations include all normalized beliefs from all rounds in
the baseline correlated treatment excluding extreme outliers with nor-
malized belief |b ji |> 10. The results are robust to including these out-
liers. Additional controls include age, gender, final high school grade,
monthly disposable income, marital status fixed effects, and fixed ef-
fects for each true state. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.C.5 Finite Mixture Model
For the purpose of the finite mixture model, we assume that every individual belongs to a
discrete set of two-dimensional types θk = (χk,σk) with k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, where the popu-
lation weights wk are estimated along with θk. Following equation (2.3), the normalized
belief of subject i in round j, who is of type k, can be expressed as b˜ ji = χk + u
j
i , where
u ji ∼N (0,σk) can be thought of as individual- and task-specific random computational
error. In allowing for heterogeneity both in χ and σ, we will employ standard maxi-
mum likelihood procedures to analyze the prevalence of particular types. The likelihood







P(b˜ ji |χk,σk) (2.4)
where the interior product term computes the likelihood of observing the collection of
(normalized) beliefs given a certain type θk = (χk,σk). This term is then weighted by the
respective population share wk. The grand likelihood is obtained by summing the logs
of the individual likelihood contributions, which is then maximized by simultaneously
choosing (χk,σk,wk) ∀ k.
Table 2.11 presents the key results from these estimations. The table reports the esti-
mated parameters of our belief formation model for three different specifications, which
differ in the number of types we impose. The results show that if we restrict the model
to only one updating rule, the maximum likelihood procedure estimates a substantial
degree of naïveté along with a rather high error rate (variance). However, this model
masks a considerable degree of heterogeneity: If we allow for the existence of two types
of subjects, the model fit increases substantially. In particular, the model indicates that
the data are explained as a mixture of two clearly distinguishable groups of subjects. For
the first group, the estimation generates a naïveté parameter very close to the rational
level of χ = 0. The second group, on the other hand, is characterized by a large degree of
correlation neglect with little adjustment from full naïveté. The high variance estimated
for the second type motivates us to allow for the presence of further sub-groups in the
data. Accordingly, if we allow for three classes of updating rules, the model fit further
improves, but not dramatically so. While the parameter estimates for the first (rational)
group remain intact, the model now distinguishes between a fully naïve type of subjects
(estimated with a rather small error rate) and an intermediate group which is charac-
terized by a rather high degree of naïveté.37 In sum, our individual-level analysis has
shown that the strong average tendency to ignore informational redundancies masks a
considerable heterogeneity.
37 Further extending the estimations to allow for four types of subjects does not lead to noteworthy
changes of the spirit of our results. These estimations break the rational type up into a fully and almost fully
naïve type.
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Table 2.11. Results of finite mixture model
Model parameters Goodness of fit
Model Type χ σ w (%) LL AIC BIC
K = 1 k = 1












K = 3 k = 2





47 subjects, standard errors (clustered at the subject level) in parentheses. All es-
timations exclude a few extreme outliers, which are likely due to typing mistakes:
For each task and individual, an observation is set to missing if the implicit normal-
ized belief satisfies |b˜ ji |> 10 (see eq. (2.3)). This resulted in the exclusion of 4 (out
of 462) observations.
Appendix 2.D Details for Individual Robustness Treatments
2.D.1 Design
The design of the robustness treatments closely followed the one in the baseline treat-
ments, with the exceptions discussed in the main text. Table 2.12 provides details on all
ten belief formation tasks, including true states, signal draws, and reports of the inter-
mediaries. In addition, we again provide the benchmarks of full correlation neglect and
rational beliefs. Note that these theoretical benachmarks are computed assuming full
base rate neglect.
Table 2.12. Overview of the belief formation tasks in the robustness treatment
True Intermed. Intermed. Intermed. Intermed. Intermed. Intermed. Intermed. Rational Correlation
State 1 uncorr. 2 uncorr. 3 uncorr. 4 uncorr. 2 corr. 3 corr. 4 corr. Belief Neglect Belief
-563 -446 -1,374 -1,377 -1,475 -910 -911.5 -960.5 -1,168 -807
-279 44 90 -388 137 67 -172 90.5 -29.25 7.38
-241 249 -699 -139 70 -225 55 159.5 -129.75 59.63
-33 170 21 225 -128 95.5 197.5 21 72 121
-28 248 83 -110 -364 165.5 69 -58 -35.75 106.13
-23 810 -822 -99 409 -6 355.5 609.5 74.5 442.25
38 442 173 58 233 307.5 250 337.5 226.5 334.25
154 314 206 -229 711 260 42.5 512.5 250.5 282.25
548 -73 -559 181 910 -316 54 418.5 114.75 20.88
1,128 1,989 781 440 2,285 1,385 1,214.5 2,137 1,373.75 1,681.38
The reports of intermediaries 1 through 4 in the Uncorrelated condition directly reflect the draws of computers A-D. The report of in-
termediary 1 in the Correlated condition equals the report of intermediary 1 in the Uncorrelated treatment. The rational benchmark is
computed by taking the average of the signals of computers A-D, i.e., assuming full base rate neglect. The correlation neglect bench-
mark is given by the average of the reports of intermediaries 1-4 in the Correlated condition, i.e., also assuming full base rate neglect.
Note that defining the rational belief assuming base rate neglect has no consequences for our treatment comparison. Also note that
subjects faced the ten rounds in randomized order, which was identical across treatments.
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Table 2.13. Correlation neglect by belief formation task, robustness treatments
True Rational Correlation Median Belief Median Belief Ranksum Test
State Belief Neglect Belief Uncorr. Treatment Correlated Treatment (p-value)
-563 -1,168 -807 -1,168 -912.5 0.0189
-279 -29.25 7.38 -29.25 20 0.0031
-241 -129.75 59.63 -126.25 13 0.0052
-33 72 121 72.25 78.5 0.8456
-28 -35.75 106.13 -35.35 36.25 0.0006
-23 74.5 442.25 75 208.5 0.0009
38 226.5 334.25 224.5 226.5 0.0202
154 250.5 282.25 250.5 262.5 0.2133
548 114.75 20.88 115 100 0.1074
1,128 1,373.75 1,681.38 1,373.35 1,412.1 0.0227
See Table 2.12 for details of the computation of the rational and the correlation neglect benchmarks. Note
that subjects faced the ten rounds in randomized order.
2.D.2 Results
Table 2.13 reports the results for all ten belief formation tasks. As can be inferred by
comparing columns (2) and (4), median beliefs in the Uncorrelated condition closely
follow our definition of the “rational” belief, suggesting that subjects indeed fail to take
into account base rates. Median beliefs in the Correlated condition, however, are always
biased away in the direction of the full correlation neglect prediction. For seven out of
ten tasks, beliefs differ significantly at the 5% level (Wilcoxon ranksum test).
Appendix 2.E Details, Hypotheses, and Robustness Checks for
Market Treatments
2.E.1 Derivation of Market Hypotheses
This section derives predictions for our market experiments. In particular, we will high-
light the role of the marginal trader in setting the price in the experimental double-
auction.
2.E.1.1 Basic Set-Up
A market is populated by 4 buyers and 4 sellers. Sellers own 4 assets that they can sell.
Buyers have a monetary endowment that roughly allows them to buy up to 4 goods
at fundamental value, see Appendix 2.E.7.38 The true value of the goods is identical
for all traders, and all traders obtain the same signals about the true value. We denote
individual beliefs about the value of the assets by bsi , i ∈ {1,2, 3,4} for the sellers and
bb j , j ∈ {1,2, 3,4} for the buyers. Likewise, χsi , i ∈ {1, 2,3, 4} denotes individual-level
naïveté for the sellers, and χb j , j ∈ {1,2, 3,4} for the buyers respectively. Without loss of
38 For ease of exposition, in what follows, we will assume that buyers can buy up to four goods at any
price. None of the theoretical predictions hinge on this assumption.
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generality we assume
χs1 ≤ χs2 ≤ χs3 ≤ χs4 and χb1 ≤ χb2 ≤ χb3 ≤ χb4.
Traders are assumed to be risk-neutral, to behave as price-takers and to not learn




4 if p > bsi
{0,1, 2,3, 4} if p = bsi
0 if p < bsi
Likewise, demand of buyer j given price p is denoted by xd j(p), where
xd j(p) =

4 if p < bb j
{0, 1,2, 3,4} if p = bb j
0 if p > bb j
It is well-established that experimental double-auctions converge to the theoretical
perfectly competitive equilibrium. Accordingly, we base our market predictions on the
notion of competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1. A price p, market supply xs =
∑
i xsi and market demand xd =
∑
j xd j
constitute a perfectly competitive equilibrium if xs = xd, xsi ∈ xsi(p),∀i and xd j ∈
xd j(p),∀ j.
2.E.1.2 Homogenous Beliefs
If all traders hold identical beliefs b about the value of the asset, then there are no gains
from trade. In the competitive equilibrium, there will be p = b, and since all traders
will be indifferent between trading and not trading, all possible numbers of trades can
be sustained in equilibrium. Thus, for example, if all traders are rational (χ = 0), the
prediction would be that p = bB = s¯. If on the other hand all traders are fully naïve (χ =
1), then the prediction is that p = bCN = s¯+
3
8(s1 − s¯−1). Thus, prices will be distorted in
the direction of the first signal. For intermediate degrees of naïveté, the price is predicted
to be p = bCN = s¯+
3
8χ(s1 − s¯−1). Trivially, the higher the degree of naïveté in themarket,
the more pronounced the resulting price distortion.
2.E.1.3 Heterogeneous Beliefs
The more interesting and also empirically more relevant case are heterogenous beliefs,
i.e., different degrees of naïveté in the market. The key question is for what compositions
of rational and naïve types equilibrium prices will be distorted and under which condi-
tions rational traders drive prices to the rational level. We focus on signal realizations
where s1 > s¯−1, such that correlation neglect distorts beliefs upwards. It is straightfor-
ward to show that results are symmetric for the opposite case (s1 < s¯−1). It will be useful
to define the following:
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• #rs = number of rational sellers (χ = 0) in a market
• #nb = number of of naïve buyers (χ > 0) in a market
We enumerate three different cases:
1. #rs < #nb
Suppose p = s¯ (rational level). We would have that
xs(p = s¯) ∈ {0, ..., 4 · #rs} and
xd(p = s¯) ∈ {4 · #nb, ..., 16}
Thus, markets do not clear at p = s¯ because xs(p = s¯)< xd(p = s¯). In order to equi-
librate supply and demand, the price must increase such that either naïve buyers
reduce their demand, naïve sellers increase their supply, or both. The equilibrium
price level will depend on the degree of naïveté of the marginal traders. Thus,
prices will overshoot in the direction predicted by correlation neglect, and
s¯ < p ≤ s¯ + 3
8
(s1 − s¯−1)
2. #rs = #nb
For p = s¯, again
xs(p = s¯) ∈ {0, ..., 4 · #rs} and
xd(p = s¯) ∈ {4 · #nb, ..., 16}
Since #rs = #nb there exists a market equilibrium at p = s¯. However, if the price
increases, the market stays in equilibrium, until either the first naïve seller has
incentives to sell or the first naïve buyer no longer has incentives to buy. Thus, there
exists a range of prices (including the rational price) for which the market is in
equilibrium. Importantly, the range is such that, if prices overshoot, they overshoot
in the direction of correlation neglect, and the maximum degree of overshooting
depends on the naïveté of the marginal traders. Specifically,
s¯ ≤ p ≤ min{s¯ + 3
8
χs(#rs+1)(s1 − s¯−1), s¯ + 38χb(4−#nb+1)(s1 − s¯−1)}.
3. #rs > #nb
Again, we start with p = s¯ where
xs(p = s¯) ∈ {0, ..., 4 · #rs} and
xd(p = s¯) ∈ {4 · #nb, ..., 16}
Since #rs > #nb, p = s¯ constitutes a market equilibrium. If we (marginally) in-
crease the price, all rational sellers will want to sell all their assets (xs ≥ 4 ·#rs)
52 | 2 Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation
while only naïve buyers will want to buy (xd ≤ 4 ·#nb), such that supply exceeds
demand. Therefore, the only equilibrium is p = s¯.
2.E.1.4 Summary
In sum, with homogenous beliefs, higher naïveté implies more distorted price levels.
With heterogeneity, the effect of naïveté on prices depends on the composition and over-
all number of naïve traders. While under certain conditions market prices will remain
at the rational level even if some traders are naïve, we have identified different empir-
ically relevant cases where market prices will overshoot in the direction predicted by
correlation neglect. Regardless of the particular case discussed above, the magnitude of
a potential price distortion depends on the degree of naïveté of the marginal traders.
2.E.1.5 Empirical Identification of Marginal Traders
To compute the naïveté of the marginal traders for a given market group and trading
round, we proceed as follows. First, we construct supply and demand curves from the
beliefs subjects stated before trading started by sorting the beliefs of buyers in ascending
and those of sellers in descending order, which gives rise to four pairs of beliefs. We then
identify the lowest belief of a buyer which is still above the belief of the corresponding
seller, i.e., we identify the buyer who is located on the demand curve right above the
supply curve. We then compute the average naïveté of this buyer and the seller who is
located beneath him on the supply curve, to approximate the competitive equilibrium
price, and use it for further analysis as detailed in the main text.
2.E.2 Robustness of Treatment Difference in Market Prices
This section provides a robustness check for our main treatment effect in the market
treatments. To this end, as in the individual treatments, we first provide a visual
representation of our results by plotting kernel density estimates of the market prices
in each of the ten trading periods. As above, for this purpose, we restrict the sample to
market prices which lie within [50 %, 150 %] of the rational belief (on average, this
resulted in the exclusion of one market price per trading period).
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Figure 2.13. Kernel density estimates of market prices (1/2)
Next, we show that the strong treatment difference in price levels is not driven by our
definition of the market price. Table 2.14 provides p-values of Wilcoxon ranksum tests
for the equality of market prices across treatments for two alternative definitions of the
market price. The exposition is akin to Table 2.3 from the main text, but now additionally
defines the market price to be either the median or mean trading price (rather than the
price of the last concluded trade).
2.E.3 Additional Illustrations of Treatment Difference in Prices
This section provides alternative ways to describe the treatment difference in the market
treatments. For this purpose, analogously to the belief normalization, we first normalize
the market price of each round and market group such that it equals the naïveté param-
eter χ, see equation (2.3). We then pool the normalized market prices from all market
groups, trading rounds, and both treatments and regress these prices on a treatment
dummy. Column (1) of Table 2.15 shows that this treatment difference is highly signifi-
cant and large in magnitude. As columns (2) and (3) demonstrate, this treatment effect
operates entirely through beliefs. After conditioning on the beliefs participants stated
before trading started, the treatment effect collapses to zero and becomes insignificant.
These results show that it is indeed subjects’ beliefs which cause the treatment difference
in market prices.
In order to get a visualization of the aggregate treatment difference, we next aggre-
gate the normalized market prices across rounds akin to our procedure in the individual
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Figure 2.14. Kernel density estimates of market prices (2/2)
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Table 2.14. P-values for equality of market prices by trading round for alternative price
definitions
True Market Price ≡
State Last trading price Median trading price Average trading price
10 0.0093 0.0053 0.0075
88 0.0338 0.0200 0.0665
250 0.0113 0.0107 0.0138
732 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
1,000 0.0723 0.1108 0.1681
4,698 0.0085 0.0025 0.0050
7,338 0.6087 0.7042 0.5092
10,000 0.0534 0.0045 0.0014
23,112 0.0007 0.0061 0.0515
46,422 0.0015 0.0003 0.0095
This table provides p-values of Wilcoxon ranksum tests of the equality of market
prices across treatments. For this purpose, for each market group and trading round,
the market price is defined as (i) last trading price, (ii) median price, or (iii) average
price.




1 if correlated 0.32∗∗∗ -0.052 -0.051
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Group-level median belief (χ) 0.75∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.12)
Constant 0.19∗∗∗ 0.040 0.75
(0.04) (0.04) (0.63)
Additional controls No No Yes
Observations 330 330 330
R2 0.05 0.33 0.39
OLS estimates, standard errors clustered at market group.
Observations include all normalized prices from both market
treatments excluding four extreme outliers for which the nor-
malized price satisfies |p ji |> 10. All results are robust to in-
cluding these observations when employing median regres-
sions. Additional controls include fixed effects for each true
state, average age, average monthly disposable income, aver-
age final high school grade, and the proportion of females
within a given group. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
decision making treatments. Specifically, for each market group we use the median nor-
malized market price over the ten rounds to plot the distribution of market prices across
treatments.
Figure 2.15 provides kernel density estimates of these aggregated data. It reveals
a pronounced and statistically significant difference between the two treatment groups
(p-value < 0.0001, Wilcoxon ranksum test). Normalized prices in the Uncorrelated treat-
ment are centered close to zero, confirming the standard result that double-auctions
tend to produce price levels close to fundamentals. Prices in the Correlated treatment,
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however, are centered around 0.6, i.e., prices systematically overshoot in the direction
predicted by correlation neglect.
Again, this treatment difference hinges neither on our aggregation procedure nor on
the definition of the market price. Using three definitions of market prices and two dif-
ferent aggregation procedures (for aggregating the market prices of ten trading rounds
into a single price per market group), Table 2.16 presents the p-value of ranksum tests
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Figure 2.15. Kernel density estimates of median market prices
Table 2.16. P-values of Wilcoxon ranksum tests for equality of aggregated market price between
treatments
Definition of market price:
Aggregation Median Average Last trading
mechanism price price price
Median market price 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Average market price 0.0001 0.0002 0.0054
2.E.4 Time Trend of Market Prices
In our market setup, subjects could learn by observing others as well as through the feed-
back provided at the end of each trading round. If learning played an important role, then
the price distortion should be reduced towards the end of the experiment. However, we
find no evidence for such an effect – neither beliefs nor prices in the Correlated market
treatment show any sign of converging to their counterparts in the Uncorrelated market
treatment. For instance, if we take the last round from all market groups and normalize
the market price (to make it comparable between different orderings of rounds), we still
find a significant treatment difference (p-value = 0.0290, Wilcoxon ranksum test). Sim-
ilarly, Table 2.17 gives an overview of the time trend of market prices. In columns (1)
and (2), we report the results of an OLS regression of all normalized market prices in the
Correlated market treatment on a time trend, which indicate that market prices do not
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converge to rational levels.39 We also show that prices do not converge to their counter-
parts in the Uncorrelated market treatment (columns (3)-(4)). To this end, we take all
normalized market prices and then subtract the normalized market price of the median
market group in that round in the Uncorrelated market treatment. Again, there is no sign
of convergence to the levels in the Uncorrelated treatment. In sum, these results show
that there is no learning across rounds.
Table 2.17. Time trend of market prices in the Correlated market treatment
Dependent variable:
Normalized Normalized market price minus
market price median price in uncorrelated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of trading period -0.018 -0.0091 -0.024 -0.0069
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
True state FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 167 167 167 167
R2 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.05
OLS regressions, standard errors (clustered at market group level) in paren-
theses. Observations include the market prices from all trading rounds in the
correlated market treatment excluding market prices which satisfy |p ji |> 10.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.E.5 Time Trend of Beliefs in Market Experiments
Table 2.E.5 presents the results of OLS regressions of subjects’ (normalized) beliefs in
the Correlated market treatment on a linear time trend. If the market interaction induces
naïve subjects to learn, we should observe a negative coefficient. However, we do not
find any significant effects, regardless of the specification we employ. In column (1),
we include beliefs which satisfy |b ji | ≤ 10, i.e., we only exclude very extreme outliers. In
columns (2)-(5), we use beliefs which satisfy b ji > −1 and b ji < 2, i.e., we focus on beliefs
in a reasonable range, which likely don’t reflect typing errors. Regardless of the sample,
the coefficient on the time trend is small and insignificant, both with and without fixed
effects for a particular market group, individual subjects, and particular true states.
2.E.6 Why Does the Market not Reduce the Bias?
This section discusses potential reasons, why our double-auctionmarket environment did
not eliminate correlation neglect. In short, three reasons in particular could play a role.
First, given that we implemented a common value environment with identical informa-
tion across subjects (but potentially heterogeneous processing thereof), a feature of our
market is that it allows subjects to learn from the behavior of (potentially more rational)
others. For instance, suppose a seller in the correlated environment neglects the corre-
lation and arrives at a belief that the value of the asset is, say, 10. If this seller observes
39 Similar results obtain if we run the corresponding regressions using subjects’ beliefs as dependent
variable.
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Table 2.18. Time trend of normalized beliefs in the Correlated market treatment
Dependent variable: Naïveté χ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of trading period 0.015 -0.0087 -0.0088 -0.0094 -0.0016
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Market FE No No Yes No No
Subject FE No No No Yes Yes
True state FE No No No No Yes
Observations 1404 1241 1241 1241 1241
R2 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.27 0.35
OLS regressions, standard errors (clustered at market group level) in
parentheses. Observations include the market prices from all trading
rounds in the correlated market treatment. In column (1), we only ex-
cluce beliefs which satisfy |b ji |> 10. In columns (2)-(5), we use beliefs
which satisfy b ji > −1 and b ji < 2. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
all buyers offering to buy the asset at, say, 20, this could induce him to reconsider his
valuation of the asset. For instance, that seller might conjecture that he misinterpreted
his signals. In this sense, the existence of even one rational type in a given market group
could in principle debias all other subjects. Furthermore, even if observing others’ trad-
ing behavior does not debias subjects, it might at least reduce their confidence in their
valuation of the good. Both of these channels should attenuate the impact of correlation
neglect on market outcomes. The fact that we do not find evidence for this is consistent
with the idea that people might neglect that the trading behavior of others carries in-
formational content, perhaps akin to the idea of “cursedness” (Eyster and Rabin, 2005;
Eyster et al., 2013) with the twist that there is no heterogeneous private information in
our setup, but rather heterogeneous processing of the same signals.40
Second, the rational types might not be able to bring prices to fundamental values
due to institutional features of our trading environment. In particular, our setup did
not allow the same subject to both buy and sell. Each subject’s influence on the market
price was hence restricted to selling four assets as a seller, and buying a small number
of assets as a buyer. In the data, an average of 3.8 subjects (out of 8) per market group
had a median naïveté parameter of χ ∈ [−.25; .25], implying that these rational subjects
would have needed to trade excessively to bring prices to fundamentals by themselves.
However, third, even if some subjects hold correct beliefs and could in principle bring
prices to fundamentals, they might not be willing to do so. For instance, if the rational
types are slightly risk averse and have some subjective uncertainty over the true state
(as they should), they could attempt to diversify, i.e., hold a mix of both assets and cash.
Indeed, in the data, we see strong evidence of this. For instance, in trading periods in
which correlation neglect predicts underpricing, those subjects with a (median) naïveté
parameter of χ ∈ [−.25; .25] only held a total of 7.7 (out of a total of 16) assets on
average, i.e., the rational subjects do not buy all assets when prices are too low, i.e., when
assets are a bargain. The fact that rational agents seemed to limit their trading activity
40 Alternatively, our empirical pattern is consistent with the idea that people are overconfident about their
ability to process correlations.
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suggests that these types were cautious in fully exploiting their superior knowledge about
the true value of the asset.
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2.E.7 Endowments and Exchange Rates in Market Treatments
Table 2.19. Overview of the ten trading rounds
True state Budget buyer (points) Exchange rate points / euros Fixed costs buyer
10 40 2.67 4
88 450 30 45
250 1,500 100 150
732 3,000 200 300
1,000 5,000 333.33 500
4,698 25,000 1,666.67 2,500
7,338 25,000 1666.67 2,500
10,000 50,000 3,333.33 5,000
23,112 90,000 6,000 9,000
46,422 200,000 13,333.33 20,000
Sellers did not incur any fixed costs. Buyers’ fixed costs amounted to 10 % of the respetive
budget. The relationship between budget and true state was non-constant across rounds. The
exchange rate is computed as budget / 15.
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Appendix 2.F Treatments to Investigate the Mechanisms
Underlying the Bias
2.F.1 Reduced Complexity
In the reduced complexity treatments, we implemented the same basic structure as in
the baseline design, yet there were only 2 independent computer signals and one inter-
mediary. Both the true states and the signals of computer A were identical to the baseline
conditions, while the signal of computer B in the reduced complexity treatments always
equalled the signal of computer C in the baseline condition.41
Table 2.20 provides an overview of each of the ten belief formation tasks, including
median beliefs in the Correlated and the Uncorrelated condition as well as the p-value of
a Wilcoxon ranksum test. In none of the ten tasks is the treatment difference significant
at the 5 % level.
We can again normalize each belief (i.e., compute the naïveté parameter implicit
in a belief) to make it comparable across belief formation tasks.42 Figure 2.16 provides
kernel density estimates of the distributions of the median naïveté parameters in the
Correlated and the Uncorrelated treatment. As visual inspection suggests, beliefs in the
two treatment are statistically indistinguishable from each other (Wilcoxon ranksum
test, p-value = 0.1505). Table 2.21 confirms this result using OLS regressions and also
shows that – unlike in the baseline treatments – there is no difference in response time
between the Correlated and the Uncorrelated treatments. Interestingly, there is also no
relationship between response times and beliefs within the Correlated treatment. While
in the baseline Correlated treatment higher response times are associated with better
beliefs, this association breaks down in the low complexity case, suggesting that at least
a considerable fraction of subjects understood that the report of intermediary 2 already
reflected the rational belief.
41 this was determined randomly.
42 Formally, a normalized belief of individual i in task j of the low-complexity conditions is given by
b˜ ji = χ
j
i =







(s j1 − s j2)
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Table 2.20. Overview of belief formation tasks in the reduced complexity treatments
True Computer Interm. Interm. corr. Correlation Median belief Median belief Ranksum test
state A uncorr. = Rational belief neglect belief Uncorrelated Correlated (p-value)
10 12 10 11 11.5 11 11 0.9808
88 122 68 95 108.5 95 95 0.7141
250 179 288 233.5 206.25 233.5 234 0.2752
732 565 650 607.5 586.25 607 600 0.9184
1,000 1,100 629 869.5 989.75 869.5 870 0.0967
4,698 1,608 4,866 3,237 2,422.5 3237 3237 0.1686
7,338 9,950 11,322 10,636 10,293 10,500 10,636 0.1154
10,000 2,543 6,898 4,720.5 3,631.75 4,720 4,721 0.5180
23,112 15,160 20,607 17,883.5 16,521.8 17,883 17,884 0.3479
46,422 12,340 49,841 31,090.5 21,715.3 31,090.5 31,090 0.7534
The reports of the intermediary in the Uncorrelated condition directly reflect the draw of computer B. The rational belief
is computed by taking the average of the signals of computers A and B. The correlation neglect belief is computed assum-
ing χ = 1, i.e., full correlation neglect. Thus, this benchmark is given by the average of the signal of computer A and the
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Figure 2.16. Kernel density estimates of beliefs in the reduced complexity treatments
Table 2.21. Reduced complexity treatments
Dependent variable:
Median χ Median response time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 if correlated -0.013 -0.013 0.022 0.020
(0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.13)
Constant 0.051∗∗∗ -0.050 0.65∗∗∗ 0.19
(0.02) (0.15) (0.07) (0.44)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 94 93 94 93
R2 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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2.F.2 Treatment Math
Figure 5.11 provides kernel density plots of the median naïveté parameters in treatment
Math as well as the two baseline conditions. As can be inferred, while a minority of
subjects remains fully naïve, a large fraction now states rational beliefs. Table 2.22 pro-
vides an overview of each separate belief formation task and shows that in six out of
ten tasks do beliefs statistically significantly differ betweenMath and the baseline Corre-
lated condition. Notably, in all ten tasks is the median belief closer to the median belief
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Figure 2.17. Kernel density estimates of beliefs in the Math treatment
Table 2.22. Correlation neglect by belief formation task in the Math treatment
True Median Estimate Median Belief Median Belief Ranksum Tests (p-value)
State Uncorr. Correlated Math Correlated Uncorrelated
10 8 9.2 7.75 0.0005 0.8376
88 71.2 88 72 0.1647 0.0132
250 259.75 235.5 260 0.0952 0.2431
732 847 742 853.5 0.0013 0.1470
1,000 999 1,030 975 0.0026 0.4827
4,698 4,810 4,556 4,792.5 0.4880 0.0100
7,338 8,975 9,044.5 8,605 0.3588 0.6475
10,000 7,232 6,750 7,100 0.7424 0.0095
23,112 25,000 21,000 26,215.5 0.0001 0.1732
46,422 38,885.5 32,000 38,500 0.7063 0.3385
See Table 1 for details of the computation of the rational and the correlation neglect benchmarks.
Note that subjects faced the ten rounds in randomized order. The ranksum tests refer to a compari-
son between theMath treatment and the baseline Correlated / Uncorrelated treatment, respectively.
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Figure 2.18. Beliefs in the Correlated, Uncorrelated and Math treatments plotted against the
relative magnitude of the signal of computer A. See the notes of Figure 2.2 for details on the
construction of this figure.
2.F.3 Treatments Intermediaries and Alternating
In the Intermediaries treatment, subjects went through the same ten belief formation
tasks as in the Correlated treatment, but subjects’ attention was steered towards the cor-
relation by including (i) the paragraph provided in the main text and (ii) by repeating
the visual representation of the information structure both at the end of the instructions
and on subjects’ decision screens. In the Alternating treatment, attention was shifted in a
more indirect way, by varying the information structure (correlated versus uncorrelated)
between rounds. This was again made rather salient to subjects since they were asked to
pay special attention to the prevailing scenario and to consider the corresponding impli-
cations. In the main text, we presented aggregated results from these treatments; now,
we detail the results from each of the separate tasks by comparing the corresponding
beliefs with those in the baseline Correlated condition.
Table 2.23 summarizes the results from the different belief formation tasks for both
treatments. The table provides rational and full correlation neglect beliefs for all ten
tasks, as well as median beliefs from the Correlated treatment, the Intermediaries treat-
ment and the Alternating treatment. In addition, p-values of Wilcoxon ranksum tests,
testing for differences between Intermediaries and the Correlated treatment, as well as
between Alternating and the Correlated treatment, are provided. First note that, in all ten
rounds, beliefs in the Intermediaries treatment are closer to the rational belief compared
to the Correlated treatment. However, in five rounds, beliefs do not differ from each other
statistically at the 5 % level. Likewise, in all five rounds of the Alternating treatment in
which correlated information was provided, beliefs are closer to the rational belief rela-
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tive to the Correlated treatment. However, again, this difference is only significant in two
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Figure 2.19. Beliefs in the Correlated, Uncorrelated and Alternating treatments plotted against
the relative magnitude of the signal of computer A. See the notes of Figure 2.2 for details on the























Table 2.23. Correlation neglect by belief formation task: Intermediaries and Alternating treatments
Intermediaries Treatment Alternating Treatment
True Rational Correlation Median Belief Median Belief Ranksum Tests (p-value) Median Belief Ranksum Tests (p-value)
State Belief Neglect Belief Correlated Treatment Intermediaries Treatment Correlated Uncorrelated Alternating Treatment Correlated Uncorrelated
10 7.75 9.88 9.2 8 0.0367 0.2782 8 0.0224 0.4304
88 71.25 96.63 88 72.25 0.0051 0.3173 77.7 0.1182 0.0064
250 259.75 219.38 235.5 260 0.0751 0.5258 260 0.0193 0.9386
732 853.15 709.13 742 850 0.0030 0.5815
1,000 974.75 1,042.38 1,030 979 0.0039 0.4959
4,698 4,810 3,209 4,556 4,787.5 0.2980 0.0774
7,338 8,604.5 9,277.25 9,044.5 8,727.5 0.2433 0.2558
10,000 7,232.25 4,887.63 6,750 6,950 0.8716 0.0027 7,000 0.2128 0.1040
23,112 26,331 20,745.5 21,000 25,399.7 0.0001 0.5951
46,422 38,910.5 25,625 32,000 35,894 0.4624 0.0920 37,750 0.4055 0.3011
See Table 1 for details of the computation of the rational and the correlation neglect benchmarks. Note that subjects faced the ten rounds in randomized order. The ranksum
tests refer to a comparison between the baseline Correlated (Uncorrelated) treatment and the Intermediaries / Alternating treatments, respectively.
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2.F.4 High Stakes Conditions
In the high-stakes conditions, we implemented the same procedure as in the baseline con-
ditions using a different incentive scheme. For all ten belief formation tasks, the results
in these treatments are virtually identical to those in the baseline conditions. Figure 2.20
provides kernel density estimates of the median naïveté parameters (see equation (2.3))
in the baseline and high-stakes conditions, which suggest that beliefs in these treatments
are almost indistinguishable from each other. As Figure 2.21 shows, median beliefs in
each task are sometimes marginally closer to the rational benchmark than in the base-
line treatment, and sometimes further away. Detailed results for each belief formation
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Figure 2.21. Beliefs in the baseline Correlated and Uncorrelated as well as the Correlated high
stakes treatments plotted against the relative magnitude of the signal of computer A. See the
notes of Figure 2.2 for details on the construction of this figure.
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2.F.5 Multiply Treatment
In treatment Multiply, the intermediaries 1-3 each received one signal and multiplied it
by 1.5. Table 2.24 presents an overview over all ten belief formation tasks. For reference,
the table provides the rational as well as the face value prediction. As can be inferred,
in all ten tasks are median beliefs in Multiply very close to those from the baseline Un-
correlated condition. In consequence, none of the tasks exhibits a significant treatment
difference compared to the benchmark treatment. Figure 2.22 visualizes this result by
plotting median normalized beliefs (median naïveté parameters) forMultiply. The large
spike around zero indicates that virtually all subjects behave approximately rational in
this context.
The OLS regressions presented in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.27 show that be-
liefs in Multiply are indeed significantly less biased compared to those in the Correlated
treatment (a comparison between the two treatments can be facilitated by computing
naïveté parameters). In addition, subjects in Multiply took substantially longer to solve
the tasks. Notice that this pattern is consistent with the idea that, once people notice the
“bias” in the information structure, they successfully correct for it and hence need more
time to do the necessary calculations.
Table 2.24. Overview of belief formation tasks in the Multiply treatment
True Rational Face value Median belief Median belief Ranksum test
state belief belief Uncorrelated Multiply (p-value)
10 7.75 10.125 8 8.3 0.3755
88 71.25 91.625 71.2 71.25 0.8233
250 259.75 367.25 259.75 260 0.8085
732 853.25 1209.25 847 805 0.8747
1,000 974.75 1,323.375 999 1,000 0.3054
4,698 4,810 7,014 4,810 4,818 0.8474
7,338 8,604.5 11,663 8,975 8,750 0.3097
10,000 7,232.25 10,530.5 7,232 7,100 0.3959
23,112 26,331 37,601.5 25,000 23,000 0.2270
46,422 38,910.5 56,823.25 38,885.5 38,573.75 0.9525
The rational belief is computed by taking the average of the signals of computers A
through D. The face value belief is given by (sA+ 1.5sB + 1.5sC + 1.5sD)/4. Note that
subjects faced the ten rounds in randomized order. The ranksum tests refer to a com-
parison between the baseline Uncorrelated and the Multiply treatments.
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Figure 2.22. Kernel density estimates of median naïveté parameters in Multiply and the
Uncorrelated treatment. Naïveté parameters are computed akin to the procedure in eq. (2.3)
2.F.6 Face Value Treatment
In treatment Face Value, the computers A-D generated the same sets of signals as in
the baseline conditions, while the intermediaries 1-3 computed the same averages as in
the baseline Correlated treatment. Table 2.25 presents an overview of the value of X in
each task and the resulting messages of machines M1 through M3. Further notice that
this treatment allows the separate computation of rational, correlation neglect, and face
value benchmarks.
To illustrate the results, Figure 2.23 compares kernel density estimates of the belief
distributions between the Face value treatment and the two baseline treatments. The left
panel depicts median normalized beliefs (median naïveté parameters) for tasks in which
face value bias coincides with the rational prediction of zero. The right panel displays
median normalized beliefs for tasks in which face value bias and correlation neglect
make opposite predictions, i.e., after normalization the face value prediction is (−1) and
the correlation neglect prediction is 1. In both panels, the belief distribution in the Face
value treatment is closest to the belief distribution in the baseline Correlated treatment
and clearly differs both from beliefs in the Uncorrelated treatment as well as from the
face value predictions.43 A Wilcoxon ranksum test confirms that beliefs in Face value
significantly differ from those in the Uncorrelated condition (p = 0.0086), but not from
those in the baseline Correlated treatment (p = 0.3670).44 Thus, even in a treatment in
which face value bias makes a prediction different from correlation neglect, we identify
significant evidence for people’s neglect of correlations.
Table 2.26 presents an overview of the corresponding results for all separate belief
formation tasks. Beliefs in Face value typically closely follow beliefs in the baseline Corre-
43 If anything, beliefs are slightly less rational in Face value. It is conceivable that some subjects immedi-
ately noticed that the messages of the machines are biased due to X and, once they understood this, stopped
to reflect upon potential further problems in the data-generating process.
44 Beliefs in Face value do not significantly differ between tasks in which face value predicts zero or (-1),
providing further evidence for the low explanatory power of a simple face value bias.
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Figure 2.23. Kernel density estimates of median normalized beliefs in the Face value treatment,
compared with those from the baseline Correlated and Uncorrelated conditions. The left panel
illustrates the five tasks in which the face value belief equals the rational belief, while the right
panel depicts the five tasks in which the face value belief makes the opposite prediction
compared to correlation neglect (relative to the rational belief). To ease readability, the
densities exclude (4 / 3, respectively) subjects with median normalized belief of less than (-2).
All statistical tests include these outliers.
lated condition, suggesting that subjects do not fall prey to a simple face value heuristic,
but instead extract X from the reports of the machines. In consequence, in the vast ma-
jority of tasks, beliefs significantly differ between the Uncorrelated and the Face value
treatments in the direction predicted by correlation neglect, while the comparison be-
tween Face value and the baseline Correlated treatment is usually far from significant.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.27 confirms this finding using OLS regressions. In
addition, columns (3) and (4) show that response times are substantially higher in Face
value compared to the baseline Correlated condition. This reflects the fact that in this
treatment virtually all subjects engage in some computations to debias the messages
(almost everybody corrects for X), while in the baseline Correlated treatment some part
of subjects does not debias messages in any way before computing averages.
Table 2.25. Overview of the belief formation tasks, Face Value treatment
True
X
Machine Machine Machine Rational Correlation Face Value
State M1 M2 M3 Belief Neglect Belief Belief
10 -6 4.5 5 0 7.75 9.88 5.38
88 -34 72 61 30 71.25 96.63 71.13
250 54 291 288 282 259.75 219.38 259.88
732 192 898 800 1,150 853.25 709.13 853.13
1,000 -90 995 780 1,015 974.75 1,042.38 974.88
4,698 4,269 8,693 7,506 7,836 4,810.00 3,209.00 6410.75
7,338 -1,794 3,783 8,842 9,153 8,604.50 9,277.25 7,931.75
10,000 3,126 9,788 7,847 8,752 7,232.25 4,887.63 7,232.13
23,112 14,895 33,378 32,779 46,351 26,331.00 20,745.50 31,916.75
46,422 35,427 57,681 66,518 72,244 38,910.50 25,625.25 52,195.50
The rational benchmark is computed by taking the average of the signals of computers A-D. The correla-
tion neglect benchmark is given by the average of the reports of computer A and intermediaries 1-3, i.e.,
by extracting X from the reports of the machines. The face value belief is given by the average of the mes-
sages of computer A and machines M1-M3. Note that subjects faced the ten rounds in randomized order.
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Table 2.26. Correlation neglect by belief formation task, Face value treatment
True Rational Correlation Face Value Median Belief Median Belief Ranksum Tests (p-value)
State Belief Neglect Belief Belief Face Value Correlated Correlated Uncorrelated
10 7.75 9.88 5.38 9 9.2 0.6455 0.0840
88 71.25 96.63 71.13 85 88 0.2197 0.0341
250 259.75 219.38 259.88 240 235.5 0.5761 0.0184
732 853.15 709.13 853.13 757.3 742 0.0978 0.2098
1,000 974.75 1,042.38 974.88 1,020 1,030 0.5013 0.1839
4,698 4,810 3,209 6410.75 3,742.7 4,556 0.5341 0.0001
7,338 8,604.5 9,277.25 7,931.75 8,800 9,044.5 0.0646 0.0473
10,000 7,232.25 4,887.63 7,232.13 5,669 6,750 0.5459 0.0001
23,112 26,331 20,745.5 31,916.75 21,229 21,000 0.3034 0.0937
46,422 38,910.5 25,625 52,195.50 29,574 32,000 0.3210 0.0012
See Table 2.25 for details of the computation of the rational, correlation neglect, and face value benchmarks. The ranksum
tests refer to a comparison between the face value treatment and the Correlated (Uncorrelated) treatment, respectively.
Note that subjects faced the ten rounds in randomized order.
Table 2.27. Beliefs and response times in Multiply and Face value
Face value treatment Multiply treatment
Dependent variable:
Median χ Median response time Median χ Median response time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 if Face value treatment -0.14 -0.20 1.06∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.22) (0.21)
1 if Multiply treatment -0.61∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.23) (0.23)
Constant 0.62∗∗∗ 0.69 1.38∗∗∗ 0.27 0.62∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 1.17
(0.07) (0.42) (0.15) (0.97) (0.07) (0.32) (0.15) (1.03)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 90 88 90 88 93 91 93 91
R2 0.01 0.05 0.20 0.31 0.40 0.40 0.05 0.12
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations include all subjects from the baseline Correlated
and the Face value treatments (columns (1)-(2)), and from the baseline Correlated and theMultiply treatments (columns
(3)-(4)). In columns (1)-(2), the dependent variable is median normalized beliefs (naïveté parameters), while in
columns (3)-(4) it is median response time. Additional controls include age, gender, monthly disposable income, and
marital status fixed effects. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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2.F.7 Treatments Structure and Messages
Following the literature, we define face value bias as excessive focus on the salient mes-
sages relative to the underlying data-generating process. Thus, as a second test of the
idea of face value bias, we implement two treatments in which we direct subjects’ atten-
tion towards the data-generating process. If subjects indeed take all messages at face
value because they do not attend to the information structure, these treatments should
be effective in debiasing subjects. The corresponding treatments Structure and Messages
were identical to the baseline Correlated condition, except that we provided a hint both
at the end of the instructions and on subjects’ decision screens.
Treatment Structure: Hint for solving the task: You can only solve this prob-
lem correctly if you have understood the structure which generates your infor-
mation.
Treatment Messages: Hint for solving the task: The intermediaries do not
generate estimates themselves.
Arguably, these hints steer subjects’ attention towards the underlying data-generating
process relative to the visible messages. However, the nudges do not tell subjects on
which specific features they ought to focus. 96 subjects participated in these treatments
(47 each) and earned 10.60 / 12.90 euros on average, respectively.
Result 9. Exogenous shifts in subjects’ attention towards the data-generating process as a
whole do not debias subjects.
Figure 2.24 depicts the distributions of median normalized beliefs. Both nudges had a
rather small and overall statistically insignificant effect on subjects’ behavior. While both
belief distributions appear to undergo a small shift, a Wilcoxon ranksum test indicates
that median beliefs still exhibit correlation neglect compared to the Uncorrelated treat-
ment (p = 0.0134 for Structure and p = 0.0039 forMessages). In addition, beliefs do not
statistically differ from those in the baseline correlated condition (p = 0.1618 for Struc-
ture and p = 0.3783 for Messages). Table 2.28, we present the corresponding analyses
for all ten separate belief formation tasks. We again present the rational and correlation
neglect benchmarks and contrast beliefs from the nudge treatments with those in the
Uncorrelated and Correlated baseline conditions. The results show that, in both salience
treatments, in the large majority of tasks do beliefs significantly differ from those in the
Uncorrelated condition, while only in at most two tasks do beliefs become more rational
compared to the baseline Correlated condition. Thus, while it appears that these treat-
ments might have had a small positive effect on behavior, they were not nearly sufficient
to debias the majority of subjects. Unreported results also show that these treatments
produce beliefs which are statistically significantly more biased than beliefs in Interme-
diaries and Alternating.
In sum, in contrast to what face value bias would predict, alerting subjects to the
















Table 2.28. Correlation neglect by belief formation task: Structure and Messages treatments
Structure Treatment Messages Treatment
True Rational Correlation Median Belief Median Belief Ranksum Tests (p-value) Median Belief Ranksum Tests (p-value)
State Belief Neglect Belief Correlated Treatment Structure Treatment Correlated Uncorrelated Messages Treatment Correlated Uncorrelated
10 7.75 9.88 9.2 9 0.3057 0.0627 9 0.0788 0.2179
88 71.25 96.63 88 80 0.4202 0.0016 75 0.1197 0.0618
250 259.75 219.38 235.5 260 0.0486 0.6772 250 0.2761 0.0950
732 853.15 709.13 742 785 0.0336 0.5772 800 0.0265 0.3160
1,000 974.75 1,042.38 1,030 1,020 0.7908 0.0380 1,020 0.6603 0.1242
4,698 4,810 3,209 4,556 4,750 0.4790 0.0225 4,454.22 0.9751 0.0025
7,338 8,604.5 9,277.25 9,044.5 9,251.25 0.8360 0.9357 9,284.25 0.4196 0.4912
10,000 7,232.25 4,887.63 6,750 5,555 0.2892 0.0001
23,112 26,331 20,745.5 21,000 20,133 0.2862 0.0003 21,600 0.5462 0.0055
46,422 38,910.5 25,625 32,000 38,000 0.2561 0.5898 33,158 0.8087 0.0213
See Table 1 for details of the computation of the rational and the correlation neglect benchmarks. Note that subjects faced the ten rounds in randomized order. The
ranksum tests refer to a comparison between the baseline Uncorrelated (Correlated) treatment and the Structure / Messages treatments. Note that, in the Structure treat-
ment, we lost all observations for the true state of 10′000 due to a programming error.
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Figure 2.24. Kernel density estimates of median normalized beliefs in the Structure and the
Messages treatments, each compared with median normalized beliefs in the baseline Correlated
and Uncorrelated treatments
Appendix 2.G Correlation Neglect in Newspaper Articles
2.G.1 Overview
In our main experiments, we deliberately designed an abstract decision environment
which allowed tight control over (subjects’ knowledge of) the data-generating process.
To show the robustness of our findings, we now make use of a naturally occurring corre-
lation in an informational context with which many subjects are familiar, i.e., extracting
information from newspaper articles.
In the experiment, a new set of subjects had to estimate the growth of the German
economy in 2012. For this purpose, subjects were provided with (shortened) real news-
paper articles discussing and summarizing growth forecasts and were asked to give an
incentivized estimate. Employing the same identification strategy as in our main experi-
ment, we again study two main treatments, one in which information is correlated and
one in which it is not. In the correlated treatment, subjects received two articles. The first
article discussed a joint forecast from April 2012, which is determined in a cooperation
of several German research institutes, thus aggregating information from the participat-
ing institutions. It predicted that the German economy would grow at a rate of 0.9 %
in 2012. The other article discussed a forecast of one particular institute from March
2012 that predicted a growth rate of 1.3 %. Importantly for our purposes, this institute
also participated in the joint forecast. Consequently, the information from that institute
is already incorporated in the joint forecast, implying that the two articles are correlated.
This correlation was in principle known (or easy to detect), since the article reporting
the joint forecast clearly stated all participating institutes. In the control condition, we
merely supplied the joint forecast. Since the individual forecast is incorporated in the
joint one, the joint forecast is a sufficient statistic of mean beliefs, implying that this
treatment removes the correlation, yet keeps the informational content identical.
The results show that even in this rather naturalistic setting subjects exhibit a sub-
stantial degree of correlation neglect. In the control condition, the median estimate
was 0.82 %, while it was 0.28 percentage points higher in the correlated treatment
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(p-value < 0.0001, Wilcoxon ranksum test). This finding emphasizes the robustness of
correlation neglect with respect to the familiarity of the belief formation task and sug-
gests that people exhibit the bias even in natural informational environments - while
subjects may not frequently be required to predict GDP growth as such, the type of in-
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Figure 2.25. Kernel density estimates of beliefs in the two main newspaper treatments
2.G.2 Procedural Details
Overall, 151 subjects participated in the baseline experiments described above. 59 sub-
jects took part in additional treatments (see below). Sessions were conducted using pa-
per and pencil in the BonnEconLab at the end of different and unrelated experiments.
Treatments were randomized within session. In the conditions involving two articles, the
order of the articles was randomized. The study took five minutes on average. At the end
of each session, one subject was randomly selected for payment. He was asked to write
his address on an envelope and was reminded that his earnings will be sent to him as
soon as the official growth figures are available. Earnings were 10 euros if the estimate
turned out to be correct. For every 0.1 percentage point deviation, 1 euro was deducted.
Negative earnings were not possible. The randomly selected subjects earned 7.30 euros
on average.
2.G.3 Potential Concerns and Additional Treatments
There are five potential concerns with respect to our design. First, one could argue that
the difference between the joint forecast of 0.9 % and the forecast of 1.3 % is informative
because it indicates a high variance of forecasts. This variance in turn might allow infer-
ence about the signal precision of the participating institutes. Consequently, subjects in
the correlated condition could put lower weight on the forecasts (relative to their own
prior) when determining their estimate. Notice, however, that even if subjects actually
went through this kind of inference, this would not explain our treatment difference. The
estimates in our control condition reveal that subjects’ priors were on average actually
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slightly below the joint forecast of 0.9 %. Thus, lower weight on the joint forecast in the
updating process would not lead to estimates that are closer to 1.3 %.
A further potential concern might be that information from the second article is infor-
mative if subjects think that the forecast of the institute that is discussed in this article is
not appropriately incorporated in the joint forecast. This does not seem plausible. How-
ever, to further address this issue, we asked a subset of subjects (N = 56) at the end of
the experiment if they had the suspicion that this is actually the case. Only seven subjects
(12.5 %) indicated such a concern. Our findings remain unchanged if we only consider
those 23 subjects which explicitly stated that this was not a concern (p-value = 0.0209,
Wilcoxon ranksum test).45
Third, subjects could interpret the mere presentation of the article discussing the
forecast of 1.3 % as an indication that the article has to be of informational value. We
addressed this concern by introducing an additional treatment (N = 59), which is iden-
tical to the correlated treatment except that it contains a second incentivized question
which relates to labor market information provided in the article discussing the 1.3 %
forecast.46 Thus, there was a natural reason for the presence of the second article, which
was unrelated to the question about GDP growth. Results suggest that this type of effect
does not drive our results. Estimates in this treatment are almost identical to those in
the standard correlated condition and significantly different from those in the control
condition (p-value < 0.0001, Wilcoxon ranksum test).
Fourth, the two forecasts were published one month apart from each other. This is
unproblematic, however, since the joint forecast was released at the later date. Thus, the
timing as such provided no reason for subjects to place any weight on the 1.3 % forecast.
Fifth, it is possible that many subjects are not used to extracting information from
newspapers, thus contradicting the purpose of our study as reflecting a more natural
belief formation context. In order to ensure that this is not the case, we asked subjects at
the end of the experiment whether they regularly read the newspaper, and whether they
are interested in economics or economic questions. 57 percent of subjects stated that they
“regularly” or “very regularly” read the newspaper. Also, 53 percent stated that they were
“interested” or “very interested” in economic questions. Our treatment difference remains
unchanged when we only consider subjects who regularly read the newspaper and who
are interested in economic topics (N = 74), p-value < 0.0001, Wilcoxon ranksum test.
2.G.4 Newspaper Articles and Instructions
2.G.4.1 Paper-Based Instructions
Please read the following newspaper article(s). Please then think about how much the
German economywill grow in 2012. Below you can indicate your estimate. Your payment
will depend on how close your estimate is to the actual growth of the German economy.
45 The precise wording of the question is: “Do you think that one of the research institutes (e.g. the IWH)
was not adequately taken into account in the preparation of the joint forecast? Yes / No / Don’t know”
46 The precise wording of this second incentivized question is: “Please also think about whether the Insti-
tute for Economic Research Halle (IWH) predicts a positive development of the labor market. Below you can
indicate your answer by ticking “Yes” or “No”. You get 7 euros for a correct answer and 0 euros otherwise.”
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Maximum earnings are 10 euros - for every 0.1 percentage deviation, 1 euro will be
deducted (negative earnings are not possible).
Your estimate: The growth of the German economy in 2012 will be (in percent): ...
2.G.4.2 Newspaper Articles (translated into English)
Manager-Magazin, 14.03.2012
IWH increases growth forecast
The German economy seems to be gaining speed. According to the Institute for Economic
Research Halle, the short period of economic weakness is over. Thus, the researchers increase
their growth forecast for Germany significantly.
OnWednesday, the institute in Halle announced that it expects the German economy
to grow by 1.3 % this year. According to the IWH experts, the risks relating to the debt
and trust crisis in Europe have been slightly reduced. Both the world economy and the
German economy are said to have started significantly better into 2012 than was pro-
jected in autumn 2011. According to the IWH, the positive economic development will
also affect the labor market.
Welt Online, 19.04.2012
Leading economic research institutes say German economy is in upswing
According to leading economic research institutes, the German economy is in up-
swing. In their joint “Spring 2012” forecast, published on Thursday, the institutes forecast
a growth of the German economy of 0.9 %.
According to the researchers, the biggest “down-side risk” for the future remains
to be the debt and trust crisis in the Euro area. While the remarkable measures of the
European Central Bank relieved stress in the banking system, they are not more than a
gain of time.
The forecast is prepared by the Ifo Institute in Munich, the ETH Zurich, the ZEW
Mannheim, the Institute for Economic Research Halle, Kiel Economics, IHS Vienna, and
the RWI Institute in Essen.
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3
What You See Is All There Is?
3.1 Introduction
In forming economic, social, and political beliefs, people frequently need to process infor-
mation that is selected in favor of their prior views: whenever an individual’s information
induces them to enter some environment, other people in this context are likely to be
selected based on similar information. Thus, people’s local information sample tends to
reinforce their initial beliefs. For instance, if people believe a certain profession (or grad-
uate program!) to be particularly meaningful, they enter a corresponding work environ-
ment and update beliefs by communicating with co-workers; if adolescents believe the
returns to tertiary education to be high, at universities they find themselves surrounded
by people with similarly rosy beliefs; if voters perceive the Republican candidate to be
promising for economic prospects, they predominantly attend Republican election gath-
erings to support their favorite candidate. In all of these contexts, other people are likely
to be selected based on the same respective mechanism, implying that people tend to
be disproportionately connected to those with similar views, a phenomenon commonly
referred to as (belief-based) homophily (McPherson et al., 2001). While in the above
cases selection problems emerge indirectly because people with similar information tend
to enter the same environments, in other contexts people may even intentionally opt
for selected information sources. For example, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) develop
a model to show that consumers rationally prefer to obtain signals from information
sources that are biased towards their own beliefs because accordance with one’s priors
indicates higher quality of the source. Consistent with this, the empirical evidence sug-
gests that people indeed consume political news and sort into social circles based on
their ex ante views (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011; Pew Research Center, 2014).
Regardless of whether assortative matching on information is intentional or coinci-
dental, a key implication of this phenomenon for belief updating is that A needs to infer
B’s information from the fact that B is not part of A’s immediate informational environ-
ment, i.e., to draw an inference from something A does not see. For instance, if B does not
? For helpful discussions and comments I thank Doug Bernheim, Stefano DellaVigna, Thomas Dohmen,
Tilman Drerup, Armin Falk, Ulrike Malmendier, Muriel Niederle, Frederik Schwerter, Andrei Shleifer, David
Yang, and Florian Zimmermann. Financial support through the Center for Economics and Neuroscience
Bonn is gratefully acknowledged.
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attend university, then perhaps he received a private signal indicating that the return to
education is low. If people neglect such homophily-driven selection effects, their beliefs
will be biased in the direction of their immediate social environment, giving rise to popu-
lar concerns about “echo chambers” driving belief polarization across social groups (see,
e.g., Sunstein, 2009; Bishop, 2009; Pariser, 2011, for narratives along these lines).1
However, despite the abundance of information-based selection effects in economic
and social life, little is known empirically about the implications of homophily or selected
information for the evolution of beliefs. In this paper, I provide the first systematic inves-
tigation of these issues by focusing on people’s cognitive limitations in processing the
associated selection problem. The inquiry is based on the following set of questions: at
the most fundamental level, do people appreciate that their local communication net-
work might form a non-representative sample of the available information, so that they
should not base their beliefs on “what they see”? If people do not adequately process this
problem, what are the precise and possibly heterogeneous updating heuristics they em-
ploy? If people differ in their capacity to deal with the selection problem, then how does
the interaction of different updating types shape individual and group-level beliefs? And
finally, what are the cognitive roots of selection neglect and how does the bias relate to
other errors in statistical reasoning that people exhibit in social learning environments?
To address these questions, this paper provides experimental evidence for five key
facts. First, on average, people neglect the selection problem induced through homophily.
Second, subjects exhibit systematic heterogeneity in updating rules: people either fully
account for homophily or do not adjust for it at all. Third, when subjects with hetero-
geneous updating rules interact, little learning takes place, hence generating persistent
disagreement among people with different belief formation rules. Fourth, limited atten-
tion is a key driver of the bias. Fifth, selection neglect is strongly correlated with another
error people exhibit in social learning environments, i.e., the neglect of double-counting
problems.
The empirical investigation starts by providing clean evidence for people’s neglect of
selection effects in information sources. Identifying such a bias is challenging in that it
requires not only exogenous variation in sample selection mechanisms, but also that peo-
ple know the data-generating process, i.e., that they can understand the properties of the
signals they do not have access to due to the selection problem. To achieve this goal, this
paper proposes a novel individual decision-making experimental design in which subjects
have to estimate an unknown continuous state of the world and are paid for accuracy. In
the beginning, a participant as well as five computer players each obtain a private signal
over the state, and then select into one out of two groups based on whether the signal is
relatively high or low. Thus, the two groups exhibit strong information-based homophily.
Subjects are then provided with the option to update their beliefs by communicating with
a subset of the computer players. This communication stage follows a simple and known
selection rule: whenever subjects do not communicate with a given computer player, that
player must have entered the opposite group. Thus, in this treatment, subjects predomi-
nantly talk to those with similar signal realizations and have to infer the expected signal
1 In yet other cases, people might wish to select certain information sources for hedonic reasons. This
is not the focus of this paper. For work on motivated reasoning see, e.g., Brunnermeier and Parker (2005),
Bénabou (2013), Eil and Rao (2011), and Möbius et al. (2014).
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of those players they “do not see” from the fact that these players entered the other
group. Using computer players with known decision and communication rules ensures
that subjects know the process generating the data. To cleanly identify selection neglect,
in a between-subjects design, I also implement a control treatment in which subjects ob-
tain signals of the same objective informational content as those in the main treatment
condition, yet without the presence of a selection effect. I find that beliefs significantly
differ across the two treatments because a substantial fraction of people in the treatment
group act as if the signals they see constitute all available information. Thus, average be-
liefs in the selected treatment are systematically biased in favor of people’s prior belief
(their private signal), implying that these subjects earn lower financial rewards. These re-
sults illustrate how selection neglect may generate irrational path-dependence in beliefs:
whenever a given belief induces people to select into some environment, the resulting
local information sample is likely to be biased and – due to selection neglect – reinforces
the belief upon which the selection decision was made. In consequence, beliefs within a
given group tend to be too extreme, akin to common notions of belief polarization across
groups.
In a second step, I characterize the precise and potentially heterogeneous updating
rules people employ. To this end, I estimate an individual-level naïveté parameter which
pins down subjects’ updating rules in relation to Bayesian rationality. The distribution
of updating types follows a pronounced bimodal pattern: subjects either fully account
for the selection effect or do not adjust for it at all. The underlying individual-level data
are strongly clustered around these two extreme belief formation types, emphasizing
that different subjects employ fundamentally different belief formation rules. This bi-
modal type distribution contrasts with conceptualizations of bounded rationality as a
continuous process which gives rise to many different levels of naïveté. In particular, in
processing selection, a considerable fraction of people appears to follow a particularly
simple heuristic of full neglect.2
The striking bimodal type distribution raises the immediate question of how people
revise their beliefs when they meet others who hold different beliefs despite symmetric
information. Do naïfs learn by observing the beliefs of their more rational counterparts?
Alternatively, do the rational types revise their beliefs after learning that the majority
holds different views? Or does neither type adapt their beliefs, implying persistent belief
heterogeneity?While the present paper studies these questions in the context of selection
neglect, the corresponding insights may well be relevant for bounded rationality-driven
disagreement more generally. After all, to date, there is no systematic evidence on how
people with heterogeneous updating rules interact, learn from each other, and theorize
about others’ errors, even independent of the particular bias under study. Rather, previ-
ous work has typically focused on individual belief formation in isolation. Accordingly,
I investigate how people revise their beliefs when they interact with different updating
rules, under common knowledge of symmetric information. This question comes in two
complementary variants. First, if people can choose whom to communicate with (e.g.,
to seek advice), do they prefer those that share their own updating rule? For example,
2 These findings are conceptually distinct from, yet potentially related to the pronounced type hetero-
geneity established in experimental analyses of strategic sophistication (e.g., C. F. Camerer et al., 2004;
Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006; Crawford et al., 2013; Fragiadakis et al., 2013).
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if naïfs preferred to listen to other naïfs, that would imply a form of entrenchment in
irrational beliefs. Second, how do naïfs and rationals respond if they are (exogenously)
confronted with belief heterogeneity in spite of symmetric information?
I begin the corresponding analysis by showing through two additional treatment vari-
ations that when given the explicit choice to obtain access to the beliefs of one out two
candidate advisors, subjects overwhelmingly pick the advisor with whom they share the
same updating rule, so that little belief convergence takes place.3 In a second step, I
exogenously confront subjects with disagreement. To this end, subjects first state a be-
lief in one of the belief formation tasks from the baseline selected treatment. Then, they
are provided with the beliefs of two other randomly selected subjects who had access
to exactly the same information. This procedure generates groups of subjects whose be-
liefs reflect disagreement. Finally, beliefs are elicited again. I find that both rationals and
naïfs have a strong tendency to trust their own assessment of the available information,
rather than that of their peers. Only once the opposing evidence becomes unanimous,
do the naïve types start adjusting towards the rational benchmark; in contrast, rational
subjects very rarely revise their beliefs in the naïve direction. Taken together, both under
endogenous and exogenous selection of communication partners does communication
fail to induce meaningful convergence towards a consensus, suggesting that the bound-
edly rational processing of information may generate persistent disagreement.4 While
these results hold in the context of selected information, the corresponding insights may
well apply more broadly in contexts in which people with heterogeneous updating rules
interact. In this respect, the findings have a natural relationship to models of informa-
tion aggregation. For example, network analysis often focuses on the aggregation of dis-
persed private information, e.g., the existence and properties of a consensus belief or
the speed of convergence (e.g., Golub and Jackson, 2010, 2012; Acemoglu et al., 2010,
2011; Müller-Frank, 2013). The findings from this paper suggest that an additional prob-
lem of reaching a consensus in society might be the heterogeneous processing of signals,
rather than private information per se.
In a final step, I explore the cognitive mechanisms underlying the striking bimodal-
ity in selection neglect. Understanding these mechanisms provides insights into potential
ways to formalize the bias, and also allows insights about the types of environments that
are more likely to give rise to selection neglect in applied settings. I begin by establishing
a strong correlation between subjects’ naïveté and their cognitive skills as proxied for
by academic achievement in high school. To better understand why and how low cogni-
tive skills produce selection neglect, I conceptualize belief formation in this context as a
stylized two-step process (also see Enke and Zimmermann, 2015). First, people need to
notice the systematic holes in their information sample; second, they need to mathemat-
ically back out the expected signals they do not see from the fact that they induced the
respective computer players to enter a particular group. Which of these two steps do sub-
jects struggle with, and why? I provide evidence that limited attention plays a key role
in generating the inferential naïveté. First, through an incentivized follow-up question, I
verify that subjects are in principle capable of computing simple conditional expectations
3 See Schotter (2003) and Çelen et al. (2010) for studies on decision making under advice.
4 These findings could be related to studies of overconfidence, see, e.g., C. Camerer and Lovallo (1999)
or Burks et al. (2013).
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when explicitly asked to do so, hence suggesting that for a majority of people the bias
is not rooted in mathematical problems, but rather in subjects’ excessive focus on “what
they see”. To bolster this interpretation, I conduct an additional treatment variation, in
which subjects’ attention is nudged towards the computer players they do not communi-
cate with. This treatment greatly reduces the fraction of naïfs, again showing that many
participants are capable of drawing correct inferences once they focus on thinking about
the selection problem. These findings on the importance of subjects’ focus also explain
the strong bimodality in subjects’ naïveté types. In particular, identifying the systematic
holes in one’s local information sample appears to introduce a binary threshold into the
belief formation process: subjects either attend to the holes in their data and (fully)
adjust for them, or they do not.
As emphasized by prior work, belief formation in networks is not only complicated by
selection effects, but also by informational redundancies, i.e., potential double-counting
problems (DeMarzo et al., 2003; Eyster and Rabin, 2010, 2014; Eyster et al., 2015). Enke
and Zimmermann (2015) show experimentally that – similarly to the present paper –
the individual-level distribution of naïveté with respect to double-counting problems is
roughly bimodal, and attentional nudges to focus on the mechanics generating the re-
dundancy have large effects on beliefs. Given these similarities between selection and
correlation neglect, I re-invite subjects in the selected condition and ask them to solve
a belief formation task with partially redundant signals. The resulting distribution of
individual-level naïveté is highly correlated with individual’s propensity to neglect selec-
tion effects, conditional on proxies for cognitive ability. Thus, neglecting double-counting
and selection problems is both correlated within subjects and can be attenuated using
the same treatment variation, hence suggesting that these biases in how people form
beliefs in social networks might share common cognitive foundations. As argued by, e.g.,
Fudenberg (2006), studying the micro-foundations and inter-relationships of biases is
important to provide conceptual inputs into models which seek to unify erroneous up-
dating processes.
This paper ties into several literatures. The results on people’s neglect of selection
effects as induced by homophily provide direct evidence for the naïveté assumption un-
derlying Golub and Jackson’s (2012) investigation of belief dynamics in homophilous
networks.5 While a small set of contributions experimentally studies the evolution of be-
liefs in dynamic interactive network setups (e.g., Möbius et al., 2013; Chandrasekhar
et al., 2015), these papers do not aim at identifying people’s neglect of selection effects,
the precise heuristics people employ, the underlying cognitive mechanisms, and how
heterogeneous updating types interact.6 In consequence, in two recent surveys, Möbius
et al. (2014) and Choi et al. (2015) explicitly call for more systematic experimental in-
vestigations of the precise updating rules underlying people’s behavior in networks. The
findings in this paper contribute to the networks literature by uncovering a novel belief
bias as it arguably applies to a broad class of network problems, by providing the first
systematic investigation of how people update their beliefs when they are confronted
5 Also see Currarini et al. (2009) and Glaeser and Sunstein (2009).
6Grimm and Mengel (2014) show that higher homophily leads to slower convergence in experimental
networks. However, in these experiments, subjects have no information about potential selection effects, so
that the paper cannot address how people attempt to deal with homophily.
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with belief heterogeneity that is not driven by private information, and by showing that
two conceptually distinct errors in statistical reasoning in networks may be fruitfully
modeled as representing the same underlying cognitive process.
The focus on identifying individual-level updating rules also makes this paper part of
the experimental literature on boundedly rational belief updating and learning. Recent
empirical contributions include Charness et al. (2010), Andreoni and Mylovanov (2012),
and Brocas et al. (2014). Theoretical work on the relationship between attention and be-
lief formation includes models of rational inattention (Caplin et al., 2011; Caplin and
Dean, forthcoming) as well as models of heuristics (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010; Bor-
dalo et al., 2015; Schwartzstein, 2014).7 Rabin and Schrag (1999) provide a model of
confirmation bias, which is an error distinct from selection neglect.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 studies the individual-
level processing of selected information. Section 3.3 analyzes the evolution of beliefs in
interactive environments. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 investigate the mechanisms underlying
selection neglect and its relationship to correlation neglect. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Selection Neglect in Information Sources
3.2.1 Experimental Design
Studying belief updating in homophilous environments requires (i) an abstract task that
allows to flesh out people’s cognitive limitations and rules out affective reasons for hold-
ing certain beliefs, (ii) full control over the data-generating process, (iii) exogenous
manipulation of the degree of homophily, (iv) a control condition that serves as bench-
mark for updating in the absence of selected information, and (v) incentive-compatible
belief elicitation. Most importantly, however, a clean identification requires subjects’ full
knowledge of the data-generating process, i.e., a setup in which we know that subjects
can in principle understand the statistical properties of those signals they do not see
due to the selection mechanism. The present between-subjects design accommodates all
these features.
The key idea of the design is to construct two sets of signals which result in the
same Bayesian posterior, where one information structure introduces a selection ef-
fect through information-based homophily. Subjects were asked to estimate an ex ante
unknown state of the world µ and were paid for accuracy. First, the computer gen-
erated µ; to this end, the computer drew 15 times with replacement from the set
X = {50, 70,90, 110,130, 150}. The average of these 15 draws then constitued the true
state. Second, the computer generated six signals about the state. Let Y denote the set
of 15 numbers that determine the state. The computer generated six signals s1,...,6 by
randomly drawing from Y , without replacement. Thus, ex ante, each signal is indepen-
7 In a paper with a different focus than the present one, Esponda and Vespa (2015) study belief forma-
tion under endogenous sample selection when the process generating the data is deliberately left unknown
to subjects. Similarly, Brenner et al. (1996), Schkade et al. (2007), and Koehler and Mercer (2009) investi-
gate updating under selected information using non-incentivized qualitative questionnaires on hypothetical
scenarios, in which again the data-generating process is unknown.
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dently and uniformly distributed over the set X . Note that there is residual uncertainty
over µ even conditional on having access to all signals.
In the course of the experiment, a subject interacted with five computer players
(called players I-V). The experimental task consisted of two stages. First, a subject as
well as each of the five computer players privately observed one of the six signals and se-
lected into a group based on the respective signal, which introduces homophily. Second,
subjects communicated with the computer players and stated a belief over µ.
Specifically, in the first stage, subjects had to decide upon their group membership
(blue or red group) based on their signal. As detailed below, the payoff structure was
such that subjects earned higher profits as member of the blue group if µ < 100 and of
the red group provided that µ > 100. Given this payoff structure, it was rather obvious
for subjects which group to enter, and I show below that subjects indeed almost always
entered the red group if their private signal was larger than 100 and the blue group
otherwise. The five computer players similarly decided on their group membership using
a known decision rule, i.e., these players opted for the blue (red) group if their private
signal was smaller (higher) than 100. Notice that after this first stage, the two groups
exhibit strong information-based homophily.
In the second stage, subjects communicated with (some of) the computer players
to gather additional information about the state, i.e., subjects obtained the private sig-
nals of some computer players. The only difference between the Selected and the Control
treatment consisted of the information subjects received from the computer players. In
the Selected treatment, subjects talked to all computer players in their own group, but
at least with three computers. Thus, for instance, if a subject’s group contained only one
computer player, they obtained the signal of that player and of two randomly chosen
players from the other group. If a subject’s group contained four players, a subject com-
municated (only) with these four. It was made clear to subjects that whenever they did
not talk to a particular player, it would have to be that this player entered the opposite
group. Thus, subjects could easily infer the number of players in each group. Note that
given the simplified discretized uniform distribution over the signal space, it was rather
straightforward for subjects to infer which types of signals they were missing. This pro-
vides a crucial input into a design attempting to identify selection neglect, because it
ensures that subjects can in principle understand the statistical properties of the sig-
nals they do not have access to – after all, if people cannot possibly know which signals
they are missing, it is difficult to speak of “selection neglect”. In particular, in this setup,
whenever a subject was in the red (blue) group, a missing signal was a 70 (130), in
expectation.
In the Control condition, participants received the same signals as subjects in the Se-
lected treatment, but additionally obtained a coarse version of the signals of the computer
players that subjects in the selected condition did not communicate with. Specifically, if
the signal of these additional computer players was in {50, 70,90}, the respective player
communicated 70 to the subject, while if the signal was in {110, 130,150}, the computer
communicated 130. Given that these coarse messages equal the expected signal condi-
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Table 3.1. Overview of the experimental tasks
True Private Observed Observed Observed Observed Unobserved Unobserved Rational Naïve
State signal Signal A Signal B Signal C Signal D Signal E Signal F Belief Belief
92.66 130 110 90 70 – 50 90 90.00 100.00
106.00 130 130 150 110 – 90 50 110.00 130.00
112.67 50 70 150 130 – 110 110 110.00 100.00
85.93 110 130 110 70 – 70 90 93.33 105.00
98.00 90 70 70 90 90 130 – 90.00 82.00
95.33 130 90 150 90 – 50 70 100.00 115.00
107.33 70 90 90 110 – 110 150 103.33 90.00
Notes. Overview of the belief formation tasks in order of appearance. The categorization into observed and unobserved mes-
sages applies to the case in which subjects follow their private signal, i.e., opt for the red group if their signal was larger than
100, and for the blue group otherwise. Subjects in the Selected treatment observed only their own signal as well as the “observed”
messages. Subjects in the Control condition additionally had access to a coarse version of the “unobserved” messages, i.e., if the
corresponding signal was less than 100, they saw 70, and if the signal was larger than 100, they saw 130. See Section 3.2.2 for
a derivation of the rational and naïve belief benchmark.
tional on group membership, the informational content of the Selected and the Control
treatments is identical.8
Subjects completed seven independent tasks without feedback in between. All sub-
jects solved the same tasks, summarized in Table 3.1. For instance, in the first task, sub-
jects’ private signal was 130, so that the optimal choice in the first decision was to opt for
the red group. Here, subjects in the Selected condition would meet three computer play-
ers that obtained signals 110, 90, and 70, i.e., subjects communicated with one player
from their own red group and two from the blue group. The remaining two computer
players received private signals of 50 and 90, respectively. While subjects in the Selected
condition did not communicate with these players, those in the Control condition re-
ceived coarse versions of these signals, i.e., 70 and 70.
Four features of this experimental environment are worth noting. First, the procedure
induced homophily, i.e., a selected information sample akin to the examples discussed in
the introduction. In particular, a subject’s initial belief (induced through the private sig-
nal) and the subsequent group entry decision determined their communication structure
in the sense that the sample of communication partners consisted predominantly of com-
puters that obtained similar signals. Second, subjects’ knowledge that they would talk
to every computer player in their own group allowed participants to infer which types
of observations they were missing. For example, if a subject was in the blue group and
one computer did not talk to them, they knew that this computer had opted for the red
group. Third, drawing signals from a simplified discretized uniform distribution ensures
that computing the conditional expectation of the missing signals is rather straightfor-
ward and can be done, e.g., by choosing the middle option conditional on being above
or below 100. Finally, the full data-generating process was exogenous and known to sub-
jects. Given that the other players were simulated by computers, subjects knew how to
interpret the computers’ messages and group entrance decisions.
8 The control condition not only reminds people of the selection problem, but also computes the condi-
tional expectations of the missing signals. An alternative design choice would have been to just tell people
that, e.g., “computer player XY entered the red group”. I chose to tell subjects the conditional expectation
because this eliminates the entire selection problem, also in terms of the underlying mathematics. In any
case, I verify below that the large majority of subjects are indeed themselves capable of computing this
conditional expectation.
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A comprehensive set of control questions ensured that subjects understood the key
aspects of the process generating their data. Most importantly, subjects were asked what
they knew about a computer player’s private signal if they were in the red group, but
did not communicate with that computer player, i.e., that this computer player must
have obtained a private signal of less than 100 and hence opted for the blue group. Only
once subjects had correctly solved all post-instruction questionnaire items could they
proceed to the main tasks.9 In the belief formation stage, all beliefs were restricted to be
in [0, 200] by the computer program. Appendix F contains the experimental instructions
and control questions.10
The experiments were conducted at the BonnEconLab of the University of Bonn and
computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). 78 student subjects participated in these
two treatments (48 in Selected and 30 in Control) and earned an average of 11.60 euros
including a 4 euros show-up fee. After the written instructions were distributed, sub-
jects had 15 minutes to accommodate themselves with the task. Upon completion of the
control questions, subjects entered the first task. Each task consisted of two computer
screens. On the first one, subjects were informed of their private signal and decided
which group to enter. On the second screen, participants received the computer play-
ers’ signals and stated a point belief. Both decisions were financially incentivized, in
expectation: in total, subjects took 14 decisions (seven on which group to enter and
seven belief statements), one of which was selected for payment, which constitutes the
best incentive mechanism in such a setup (Azrieli et al., 2015). The probability that
a belief was randomly selected for payment was 80%, while a group membership was
chosen with probability 20%. Beliefs were incentivized using a quadratic scoring rule
with maximum variable earnings of 18 euros, i.e., variable earnings in a given task j
equalled pi j = max{0;18− 2× (b j − t j)2}, where b denotes the belief and t the state.
Across the seven tasks, the average financial incentives to hold rational (relative to fully
naïve) beliefs were roughly 12 euros, i.e., the marginal incentives to be rational were
large. Payments for the group entrance decision were 12 euros if the subject opted for
the red (blue) group when µ > 100 (µ < 100), and 2 euros otherwise, i.e., subjects had
incentives to opt for the red (blue) group if their signal was high (low).
3.2.2 Hypotheses
Given true state µ=
∑15
k=1 mk
15 , for mk ∈ {50,70, 90,110, 130,150} with probability
1/6 each, the signals si = mk for some k and i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} are unbiased. In what
follows, I will distinguish between signals and messages. Given a set of six sig-
nals, the messages are given by ri = si if a subject communicates with the com-
puter player who obtained the respective signal and ri = ; otherwise. Let N de-
note the number of messages a subject actually sees, i.e., the number of communi-
9 The control questions followed a multiple choice format, with 3-4 questions per screen. Thus, trial-and-
error was very cumbersome. Moreover, the BonnEconLab has a control room in which the experimenter can
monitor the decision screens of all experimental subjects. Thus, whenever a subject appeared to have prob-
lems in answering the control questions, an experimenter approached the subject, clarified open questions
(if any) and excluded the subject from the experiment if they did not appear to understand the instructions.
10 The instructions can also be accessed at https://sites.google.com/site/benjaminenke/.
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cation partners. In the present setup, E(si|computer player in red group) = 130 and
E(si|computer player in blue group) = 70. Given the messages, a Bayesian agent would






l=N+1 E[sl |computer player in blue or red group] + E[m] × 9
15
(3.1)
where si denotes an observed signal and sl an unobserved one. The second term in the
numerator denotes the expectation of a signal conditional on the signal recipient entering
a certain group. The third term in the numerator reflects the base rate E[m] = 100.
However, starting with Grether (1980), a long stream of research has shown that people
tend to neglect the base rate, especially in continuous-signal setups like the present one
(Enke and Zimmermann, 2015). I thus define an alternative “rational” benchmark (in





l=N+1 E[sl |computer player in blue or red group]
6
(3.2)
That is, in the language of this paper, the rational benchmark ignores the base rate,
but takes into account the systematic holes among the messages. None of the results in
this paper will depend on this normalization; it only serves to illustrate the precise distri-
bution of individual-level naïveté in processing selected information. Without assuming
base rate neglect, any estimator for the naïveté parameter would be severely biased if
people actually neglect the base rate (as they do, see below).
Now imagine that people neglect the selection problem, so that theymerely base their
beliefs on “what they see”. Let χ ∈ [0,1] parameterize the degree of naïveté with respect
to selection such that χ = 1 implies full selection neglect. I then define a selection neglect
posterior bSN as weighted average between the rational belief bR and a fully naïve belief
bN , which consists of averaging all N visible signals:




= bR + χ
6 − N
6
(s¯ − E[sl |computer player in blue or red group]) (3.3)
where s¯ ≡ 1/N∑Ni=1 si denotes the average visible signal. That is, this selection ne-
glect belief consists of a linear combination of the rational and the fully naïve belief. It
is very flexible in that it allows for an arbitrary amount of naïveté χ, rather than just
the two extreme benchmarks of rational beliefs or full neglect. In the results to be devel-
oped below, I will place special emphasis on identifying the distribution of this naïveté
parameter.
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Table 3.2. Overview of beliefs across tasks
True Private Rational Naïve Median Belief Median Belief Median p-value
State Signal Belief Belief Control Treatment Selected Treatment belief bias (Ranksum test)
92.66 High 90.00 100.00 90.00 100.00 10.00 0.0091
106.00 High 110.00 130.00 110.00 128.00 18.00 0.0001
112.67 Low 110.00 100.00 110.00 108.00 -2 0.0333
85.93 High 93.33 105.00 93.15 105.00 11.85 0.0001
98.00 Low 90.00 82.00 90.00 85.00 -5 0.0409
95.33 High 100.00 115.00 100.00 107.50 7.50 0.0001
107.33 Low 103.33 90.00 103.00 91.50 -11.50 0.0178
Notes. Overview of the estimation tasks in order of appearance. See Table 3.1 for details on the signals in each task as
well as the computation of the rational and the naïve benchmarks. High (low) private signals are defined as signals above
(below) 100.
Hypothesis 3. Assuming that χ > 0 (and N < 6), subjects’ beliefs in the Selected condition
are too high relative to the Control condition if the average of the visible signals is higher
than the expected signal of the non-visible signals, and vice versa.
This hypothesis says that the beliefs of naïve subjects will be upward biased if their
private signal is higher than 100, so that subjects opt for the red group, implying that
they will also see all other high signals (s > 100), but not all low signals.
3.2.3 Results
Result 10. Beliefs significantly differ across treatments in the direction predicted by se-
lection neglect. Consequently, beliefs in the Selected condition exhibit irrational path-
dependence and are too extreme relative to the rational benchmark.
Table 3.2 presents an overview of the results in each of the seven independent be-
lief formation tasks. For ease of comparison, I provide the benchmarks of full selection
neglect and rational beliefs, respectively. First note that, across tasks and treatments, vir-
tually all subjects always enter the group that corresponds to their private signal realiza-
tion.11 Regarding subjects’ beliefs, the results show that, reassuringly, (median) beliefs
in the Control condition follow the rational prediction very closely, suggesting that the
experimental setup was not systematically misconstrued by subjects: in the absence of
homophily, people state rational beliefs. In the Selected treatment, however, median be-
liefs are always distorted away from the rational benchmark towards the full selection
neglect belief. In all seven tasks do beliefs significantly differ across treatments at the 5%
level (Wilcoxon ranskum test).12
To grasp the most basic implication of this belief bias, compare the second and sev-
enth column of Table 3.2: whenever subjects’ private signal is high (s > 100), the belief
bias is positive. Conversely, when the initial private signal is low, the belief bias turns out
negative. Thus, in essence, neglecting homophily-driven selection effects implies a form
of irrational path-dependence: given a high prior belief (private signal), people select
11 In total, in only 15 out of 546 group choice decisions did a subject enter the “wrong” group. In what fol-
lows, I exclude the beliefs from these particular subject-task combinations. All results are robust to including
these observations or to entirely excluding subjects that entered the wrong group at least once.
12 Appendix 3.B.1 visualizes the full distribution of beliefs in each task.
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Figure 3.1. Relationship between actual and predicted belief bias. The x-axis represents the
difference between the fully naïve and the rational belief as defined in Section 3.2.2. The y-axis
represents the difference between the median belief in a given task and the rational prediction.
Each dot represents a treatment-task combination. The figure provides evidence for
path-dependence in treatment Selected: provided a high prior belief (private signal), the belief
bias is positive and conversely.
into an environment which on average “reinforces” their prior views, if selection is not
appropriately taken into account. Thus, beliefs in the red and blue group end up being
too extreme (on average), akin to common notions of belief polarization across groups.
Figure 3.1 visualizes this pattern. To construct this figure, for each true state, I compute
the difference between the median belief in a given treatment and the rational predic-
tion, and plot the resulting belief bias against the difference of the full selection neglect
and the rational belief. Each observation represents one treatment-task combination. By
construction of the figure, the rational prediction is a flat line at zero (no belief bias) and
the full selection neglect prediction has a slope of one. Note that the x-axis assumes a
positive value whenever subjects obtained a high signal and hence entered the red group:
in this case, they mostly talked to computer players with high signals, resulting in a pos-
itive predicted belief bias. Conversely, if subjects received a signal below 100, the x-axis
assumes a negative value. Figure 3.1 then shows that beliefs in Control follow the ratio-
nal prediction very closely, but those in Selected are substantially upward (downward)
biased depending on subjects’ initial signal.
The large bias in statistical reasoning implies significantly lower earnings of sub-
jects in the Selected condition. The expected profit from all seven belief formation tasks
(i.e., the average hypothetical profit from each belief) is 5.00 euros in the Selected con-
dition and 10.50 euros in the Control treatment, a statistically significant difference
(p < 0.0001). Actual profits, which are partly based on subjects’ group membership and
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include the show-up fee, are also significantly different from each other (13.70 vs. 10.10
euros, p = 0.0628, Wilcoxon ranksum test).
While these results show that subjects in the Selected condition do not adjust for
the homophilous communication structure on average, such aggregate analyses reveal
neither the precise quantitative degree to which subjects neglect selection nor the corre-
sponding distribution of types. For instance, it is conceivable that all subjects intuitively
adjust for the selection problem, but do not go “far enough” in debiasing their sample. On
the other hand, the data might exhibit strong heterogeneity in the extent to which people
can solve the problem. To investigate this issue, I proceed by estimating the individual-
level naïveté parameter χ ∈ [0, 1] in equation (3.3) i.e., I quantify the extent to which a
subject’s beliefs reflect rational (χ = 0), fully naïve (χ = 1), or intermediate values. As a
simple and transparent approach, for each subject and belief formation task, I compute
the naïveté inherent in a belief and then employ the median of these seven naïveté values
for further analysis.
Result 11. In the Selected treatment, subjects’ naïveté regarding the selection problem ex-
hibits a strongly bimodal type distribution: people either fully take selection into account or
do not adjust for it at all.
The left panel of Figure 3.2 plots the distribution of median naïveté parameters for
both the Selected and the Control condition. While beliefs in the Control condition are
on average rational, as indicated by the large mass around zero, beliefs in the Selected
condition exhibit a strongly bimodal distribution. While roughly 40% of participants are
approximately rational (χ = 0), the majority fully neglects the selection problem.13 To
show that the strong bimodality of types is not an artifact of the aggregation procedure
of the seven beliefs per subject into one naïveté parameter, the right panel of Figure 3.2
depicts the distribution of the implied naïveté in all individual-level beliefs, i.e., seven
beliefs per subject. Again, the data exhibit two large spikes at zero and one, respectively.
Thus, subjects do not frequently partially adjust for selection (in particular when
decision noise is taken into account). These results are noteworthy because they suggest
that subjects’ beliefs do not just reflect recklessness; rather, a considerable fraction
of beliefs reveals that subjects approached the updating problem in a fundamentally
mistaken way and exactly computed the fully naïve solution of χ = 1. I will return to
this issue in Section 3.4 when investigating the cognitive mechanisms underlying the
bias.
13 Appendix 3.B.2 shows that subjects’ beliefs exhibit substantial consistency across tasks.
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Figure 3.2. Distribution of naïveté in the Selected and the Control treatment. The left panel plots
kernel density estimates of the median naïveté of each individual in both treatments (48 and 30
obs., respectively), while the right panel illustrates the distribution of naïveté implied in all
individual-level beliefs in the Selected treatment (336 obs.).
3.3 Learning Through Interaction
The previous results highlight a pronounced heterogeneity in beliefs as arising from the
presence of different updating types. However, the question of how different belief for-
mation rules interact in shaping individual and societal beliefs has neither been adressed
in theoretical nor in empirical research thus far, regardless of whether the context is se-
lection neglect or another bias. Do the naïve types learn by observing the beliefs of their
more rational counterparts? Alternatively, do the rational types revise their beliefs after
observing that the majority holds different views? Or does neither type adapt their be-
liefs, implying persistent belief heterogeneity? To keep the setup as simple as possible, I
ask how people revise their beliefs when they interact with potentially different updat-
ing rules, provided that everybody knows that everyone got the same signals. Studying
this question comes in two complementary variants. First, if people can choose whom
to communicate with (e.g., to seek advice), do they prefer those that share the same
updating rule? Second, how do naïfs and rationals respond if they are (exogenously)
confronted with belief heterogeneity in spite of symmetric information?
3.3.1 Seeking Advice – Endogenous Communication
In a first step, I examine where people tend to seek advice when given the choice. To in-
vestigate this issue, I implemented treatment Advice, which constitutes a simple variation
of the Selected treatment. Subjects first completed three of the tasks in Selected so as to
enable me to determine their naïveté χ. Then, they were unexpectedly interrupted by a
computer screen which informed them that in the subsequent four tasks they would get
access to the decisions of subject Y or Z (“advisors”) prior to making their own decisions.
More precisely, subjects would see the group entrance decision of the respective ad-
visor (red or blue), then enter a group themselves, and finally observe the belief of the
chosen advisor on the belief formation decision screen, along with the signals of the
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computer players.14 The instructions clarified that the two potential advisors completed
the same seven tasks a few weeks earlier while having access to the same information.
In other words, participants knew that the two candidate advisors obtained the same
private signal and communicated with the same computer players as subjects in Advice,
implying symmetric information between advisors and advisees. In order to be able to
make an informed choice between Y and Z , subjects were provided with a computer
screen which contained all decisions from the first three tasks of themselves as well as of
Y and Z .15 Thus, subjects could evaluate how their own decisions compared to those of
the potential advisors. Y and Z were selected such that one of them was fully naïve in all
seven tasks and the other one rational in all tasks.16 All subjects in Advice had access to
the same two candidate advisors. After subjects had chosen their preferred advisor, they
completed an additional four tasks. 59 subjects took part in this treatment, which lasted
50 minutes and yielded average earnings of 10.80 euros including a 6 euros show-up
fee.17
In this treatment, subjects usually faced the beliefs of an advisor who stated similar
beliefs to themselves and of another advisor who reported different beliefs. A perhaps
natural conjecture is that the rational types understand that they are rational and hence
choose the rational subject as advisor so as to reduce cognitive effort in the remaining
four tasks, or to double-ckeck their own calculations against random computational er-
rors. On the other hand, rational subjects may be uncertain about whether they pursued
the correct problem-solving approach. Even more so, two competing hypotheses come to
mind regarding the naïve subjects. First, just like the rational types, the naïfs may believe
that they are rational and hence opt for the naïve advisor for the reasons discussed above.
Second, however, the naïfs may have an intuitive feeling that their problem-solving strat-
egy is somehow incorrect even though they weren’t able to work out the correct solution
themselves. Then, seeing someone state different beliefs may lead subjects to assume
that (for whatever reason) this must be the correct solution.
Result 12. Subjects overwhelmingly choose advisors whose decisions reflect their own belief
formation rule. Thus, under endogenous communication, beliefs between the rational and
naïve types do not converge in a meaningful way.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.3 show marginal effects at means in probit esti-
mations of subjects’ choice of advisor on their (median) naïveté parameter. Both with
and without additional controls, higher naïveté is significantly associated with a higher
14 Subjects saw the advisor’s belief provided that the subject opted for the same group as the advisor. This
restriction was put in place so as to ensure that subjects had no strategic incentives to opt for a group that
contradicted their private signal.
15On this screen, the labeling of Y and Z and their location on the screen (left / right) were randomized
across sessions. To investigate differences between fast and slow reasoning, I implemented two conditions
in which subjects could not make a decision until 30 or 90 seconds after they had entered the “advisor
choice” decision screen. The corresponding results are very similar, so I pool the data in what follows.
16No deception was used in the experimental instructions. In particular, the instructions informed sub-
jects that Y and Z were two participants in a previous session, but it was never indicated that they were
drawn at random.
17 The show-up fee in all “interaction” treatments was 6 euros because they took slightly longer than the
treatments reported above.
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Table 3.3. Naïveté and choice of advisor
Dependent variable:
1 if chose naïve advisor
Treatment Advice Treatment Advice only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Median naïveté in first three tasks 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 59 58 60 58
Probit estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The table reports partial
effects at means. The base rate for the choice of the naïve advisor is 52.5% in Advice
and 58.3% in Advice only. Additional controls include age, gender, log monthly
income,marital status fixed effects, and high school grades. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
probability of choosing the naïve advisor. The left panel of Figure 3.3 illustrates these
results by splitting the sample into subjects with χ ≤ 0.5 (“rationals”) and χ > 0.5
(“naïfs”). Here, the raw difference in the fraction who chose the naïve advisor is 39
percentage points, a statistically highly significant difference (p = 0.0030, two-sample
test of proportions).18
Robustness and Extension
In treatment Advice, subjects have the option of choosing an advisor who states the same
beliefs as them. It is conceivable that the naïve subjects seek advice in an assortative
manner not because they believe that the naïve advisor is right, but rather because they
may feel good if someone confirms their own assessments. Likewise, it is possible that
the naïve types feel that their problem-solving strategy is incorrect, yet that they have
no way of assessing how much better the strategy of the rational subject is. After all, if
subjects only understand that they got it wrong, but do not know how to adequately
solve the problem, they may not know whether the advisor who states different beliefs
is actually superior.
In order to address these issues, I implemented treatment Advice only. This condition
was identical to Advice except for three variations. First, in the advisor selection phase,
subjects were not provided with the advisors’ decisions from the first three tasks. Rather,
subjects in Advice onlywere presented with the advisors’ decisions in two belief formation
tasks from the baseline Selected condition which subjects in Advice only did not complete
themselves. That is, out of the seven tasks in Selected, subjects in Advice only completed
three tasks without advice, twowith advice, and two not at all. Accordingly, whenmaking
their decision among the advisors, they could not compare their own beliefs to the ones
of the advisors (where again one advisor was essentially fully rational and one fully
18 Subjects’ propensity to choose an advisor of the their own type may depend on their confidence. To
investigate this issue, I make use of a qualitative question that was asked after the first three tasks, i.e., before
the choice of the advisor was introduced: “On a scale from 1 (not certain at all) to 10 (very certain), how
certain are you that your previous estimates (and the underlying strategy) were correct?”. In Appendix 3.E,
I discuss this variable and its relationship to subjects’ decisions in detail. I find that there is a moderate,
statistically significant, correlation between subjects’ naiïveté and their confidence (ρ = −0.16, p = 0.0227).
However, the relationship between subjects’ confidence and their choice of advisor is weak at best, for both
rationals and naïfs.
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Figure 3.3. Fraction of naïve and rational subjects that chose the naïve advisor. The left panel
illustrates the results from treatment Advice and the right panel those in treatment Advice only.
In both panels, subjects are split according to whether their median naïveté χ in the first three
tasks was larger or smaller than 0.5.
naïve). Rather, they had to work through the two tasks which they did not complete
themselves in order to be able to assess the respective belief statements of the advisors.
Second, and relatedly, subjects were told that the advisors’ decisions would be the only
piece of information in the subsequent tasks. In other words, in the remaining two tasks,
subjects neither saw their own private signal nor did they communicate with any of the
computer players. Thus, once they had chosen an advisor, subjects were essentially left
only with following the group entrance decisions and belief statements of the chosen
advisor. Importantly, note how these two changes to the design ensure that subjects
indeed choose the advisor whom they assess to be superior, rather than someone whom
they suspect to confirm their own assessments; after all, subjects did not state any beliefs
when the advisors did, so that such affective reasons could play no role. Third, and finally,
the instructions explicitly stated that one of the advisors solved all problems correctly.
Thus, if the naïve types conjectured that their own strategy was wrong, they should
immediately pick the rational advisor, even if they did not understand how the rational
advisor developed their beliefs. 60 subjects participated in this treatment and earned
11.40 euros on average.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.3 present the results, while the right panel of Fig-
ure 3.3 provides a graphical illustration. In short, the results are even stronger than those
in Advice. Again, there is a strong and significant relationship between subjects’ naïveté
and their propensity to choose the naïve advisor. For instance, when I again split the
sample into subjects with χ ≤ 0.5 and χ > 0.5, the difference in the fraction who chose
the naïve advisor is 62 percentage points (p < 0.0001, two-sample test of proportions).
In sum, across both treatments, subjects choose advisors in an assortative manner. I
proceed by visualizing the resulting belief patterns, pooled across treatments Advice and
Advice only. Figure 3.4 depicts the distribution of naïveté implied in all beliefs subjects
stated when they had access to an advisor, partitioned by subjects’ inherent naïveté type
(as determined by the first three tasks without advice). The figure reveals that little belief
convergence took place through the introduction of the advisors: themajority of rationals
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still states approximately rational beliefs, while the majority of naïfs remains naïve.19
This suggests that, if people can choose whom to communicate with, pronounced belief
heterogeneity may persist over time. Notably, this pattern obtains in the absence of he-
donic motives, but rather because people talk to those they believe to have the correct
problem-solving approach. At the same time, the relationship between subjects’ beliefs
with and without advice ought to be interpreted with care because subjects chose these
advisors themselves. The following section discusses how subjects respond when they












Distribution of naïveté with advice
Figure 3.4. Distribution of decisions in the last four tasks (i.e., with advice), conditional on
subjects’ naïveté type in the first three tasks. Rationals are defined as χ ≤ 0.5 and naïfs as
χ > 0.5. The histograms exclude observations outside [-1,1.5].
3.3.2 Exogenously Induced Disagreement
In a second step, I investigate how the different types respond in their updating behavior
once they are forced to listen to those with different beliefs. To analyze this issue, I
implemented treatment Exogenous. Here, subjects again solved the seven tasks from the
Selected treatment. The treatment consisted of two steps. First, subjects solved three
tasks by themselves, which again allowed me to compute an out-of-sample measure of
individual’s naïveté to predict their subsequent behavior. In the remaining four tasks,
subjects first again stated a belief.20 Then, they were shown the beliefs of two other
randomly drawn subjects (“senders”) from the same experimental session. This random
19 Appendix 3.C further analyzes the relationship between subjects’ inherent naïveté, their choice of
advisor, and the subsequent belief patterns.
20 In these four tasks, subjects did not decide on their group membership. Rather, the computer decided
for them that whenever their private signal was higher (lower) than 100, they entered the red (blue) group.
This was done to ensure that subjects indeed had symmetric information.
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matching was not constant across tasks. Rather, in each task, subjects saw the beliefs of
two new (and potentially different) randomly drawn subjects. Importantly, all subjects
not only solved the same tasks, they also had access to the same information, and the
presence of symmetric information was made clear to participants. Subjects were then
asked to state a second belief. To ensure that laziness does not affect the findings, subjects
had to explicitly type in this second belief, rather than, e.g., confirm their first guess. 96
subjects took part in this condition and earned 11.60 euros on average.
I again normalize the data across tasks by computing the naïveté χ that is implied in
each belief. The analysis begins by investigating the raw correlation between the naïveté
implied in subjects’ first and second beliefs in each of the four tasks, i.e., the beliefs
before and after they saw the beliefs of the two senders. I focus on cases in which the
first belief of the receiver differs from the beliefs of at least one sender in a meaningful
way; after all, studying how people revise their beliefs necessitates the presence of at
least partial disagreement. I define disagreement as a binary variable which equals one
iff the receiver’s belief differs from the belief of at least one sender in the sense that the
implied naïveté of the receiver is χ ≤ 0.5 and that of at least one sender χ > 0.5, or vice
versa. Despite this disagreement, Figure 3.5 shows that pre- and post-communication
beliefs exhibit a strong raw correlation (ρ = 0.86), providing a first piece of evidence
that subjects’ final belief was largely based on their own assessment of the available
information, rather than the senders’ beliefs. If subjects had predominantly revised their
beliefs, the sophisticated types should have adjusted upwards in Figure 3.5, while the
naïve types should have adjusted downwards. While the figure shows that the majority
of adjustments indeed go in the expected direction, the large majority of people rarely
revises their beliefs.
To provide a different perspective on this issue, I proceed by investigating how sub-
jects revised their beliefs as a function (i) of the number of senders who state opposing
views, and (ii) of the receiver’s type; after all, rational and naïve types may differ in
how they respond to others’ solutions. Figure 3.6 presents histograms of subjects’ belief
revisions as a consequence of the senders’ reports. To construct a measure of belief revi-
sion, I compute by how much closer the receiver’s post-communication beliefs are to the
average beliefs of the two senders, expressed as percentage of the pre-communication
disagreement (measured as simple difference between the receiver’s pre-communication
belief and the two senders’ average pre-communication belief). Thus, the belief revision
measure describes by how much receivers altered their belief in response to the senders’
beliefs, relative to how much they could have changed their beliefs given the senders’
reports.
The figure provides an overview of belief revisions conditional on the receivers’ up-
dating type as well as on the number of senders whose beliefs significantly depart from
the receiver’s belief. To this end, I again use a coarser version of the naïveté parameter
χ by calling receivers rational if both their (out-of-sample) median naïveté parameter
from the first three tasks and the naïveté implied in the first belief of the respective tasks
satisfy χ ≤ 0.5.21 I define naïfs analogously with χ > 0.5. For instance, the top left panel
21 I use both the out-of-sample measure and the first belief to classify subjects to ensure that I do not
falsely classify them as, e.g., rational merely because they (perhaps due to random errors) stated a rational
belief in the respective task. Appendix 3.D.3 reports robustness checks.
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Figure 3.5. Raw correlation between the naïveté χ implied in first and second beliefs (ρ = 0.86).
To construct this figure, subjects’ pre- and post-communication naïveté is rounded to multiples
of 0.05. The ball size then represents the number of observations in the respective bin. The
scatter only includes observations for which there was at least partial disagreement, see the
main text for details. Appendix 3.D.2 illustrates the raw correlation including the cases in which
there was agreement. To ease readability, the scatter excludes 21 (out of 271) observations for
which the implied naïveté of at least one belief is outside [-.5,1.5].
shows the belief adjustment of rational subjects who were confronted with one rational
and one naïve sender.
The figure reveals that, consistent with the pattern reported above, subjects over-
whelmingly abstain from adjusting their beliefs in response to the senders’ assessments.
When the senders report mixed beliefs (one rational and one naïve), the vast majority of
both rationals and naïfs sticks with their own assessment, as indicated by the large spikes
at belief revisions of 0%.22 Thus, for instance, seeing one deviating response does not
induce naïfs to reconsider their solution strategy. On the other hand, when subjects see
two consistent beliefs that contradict their own estimate, the updating behavior differs
markedly across types. While a large majority of rationals does not adjust their beliefs at
all (see the top right panel), most naïfs start moving towards the rational senders (bot-
tom right panel). This suggests that the rationals know that they are right, while at least
some naïfs exhibit doubts once the evidence becomes sufficiently strong.
To analyze the preceeding patterns more rigorously, in column (1) of Table 3.4, I
regress the naïveté χ implied in subjects’ second belief (i.e., the belief subjects stated
after they saw the beliefs of the senders) on the naïveté implied in subjects’ first belief,
for each subject and task. Column (2) regresses subjects’ second belief on the average
naïveté of the two senders.23 Results show that, on average, subjects react only very
22 These results may be related to studies of overconfidence (e.g., C. Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Burks
et al., 2013).
23 I employ the average naïveté of the two senders for expositional convenience only. All results are robust
to using the two measures separately.
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weakly to the beliefs of their peers. While their own assessment of the available evidence
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Belief revision (in % of previous disagreement)
Naïfs
Figure 3.6. Magnitude of belief revisions. Each histogram denotes the belief revision between the
first and second belief (expressed as percent of the difference between the first belief and the
average belief of the two senders) conditional on the type of the subject (top / bottom panel)
and on the composition of the senders. The top left panel shows the adjustment of rational
subjects who face the beliefs of one naïve and one rational sender, while the top right panel
illustrates the rational types’ belief revision if they faced two naïfs. The bottom left panel depicts
the adjustment behavior of naïfs when they faced one rational and one naïve belief, while the
right panel illustrates adjustment in case of two rational senders. For a given subject and task, a
subject (“receiver”) is classified as rational if both the out-of-sample median naïveté parameter
from the first three tasks and the first belief statement in the respective task are “rational” (i.e.,
χ ≤ 0.5), and analogously for naïfs (χ > 0.5). Very similar results obtain when I define rationals
and naïfs exclusively based on the out-of-sample naïveté measure or exclusively based on the
first belief in the respective task, see Appendix 3.D.3. Adjustments > 100% and < 0% are
excluded to ease readability (7 out of 185 obs.).
100 | 3 What You See Is All There Is
plain a miniscule 4.8%. Column (4) investigates whether the weight subjects put on
other people’s beliefs depends on the degree of agreement among the senders. To this
end, I regress subjects’ naïveté on the previously discussed variables as well as on (i)
the degree of disagreement among the senders, and (ii) an interaction of the degree of
disagreement with the average naïveté of the senders. Disagreement is defined as the ab-
solute difference between the naïveté implied in the beliefs of the two senders. Results
show that, consistent with intuition, subjects indeed place higher weight on the beliefs of
their peers if disagreement is smaller: the negative and statistically significant interaction
coefficient says that higher disagreement leads to a lower weight on the senders.
Columns (5)-(8) and (9)-(12) break these patterns down between rationals and naïfs.
Notably, as suggested by Figure 3.6, the rational subjects’ post-communication beliefs
are not significantly correlated with the average naïveté of the senders, see columns
(6)-(8). In addition, consistent with the visual evidence presented above, rationals never
respond to the beliefs of their peers, regardless of whether they exhibit agreement or
not. In contrast, naïfs partly respond to others’ beliefs, albeit to a rather small extent:
the variance in subjects’ beliefs that can be explained by the beliefs of their peers is
only 17.6% (column (10)), compared to 42.3% for their own pre-communication beliefs
(column (9)).
Appendix 3.D.5 investigates learning over time. In particular, it is conceivable that
those naïve subjects who revised their beliefs according to the beliefs of the senders state
more rational beliefs in subsequent tasks. However, this is not the case, perhaps suggest-
ing that while some subjects intuit that their strategy is incorrect, they are incapable of
developing a better strategy themselves.
Result 13. People have a strong propensity to trust their own assessment of the available
evidence, rather than that of their peers. In consequence, hearing other people’s beliefs does
not induce meaningful convergence to a consensus.
3.4 Cognitive Mechanisms
The strongly bimodal distribution of naïveté appears puzzling at first. What exactly
is it about the belief formation task in the Selected treatment that some subjects fully
misconstrue, while others fully take it into account? What are the deep origins of
the bias, given that explicit disagreement rarely induces naïfs to reconsider their
beliefs? Understanding the mechanisms underlying the neglect of selection problems is
important for at least two reasons. First, from the perspective of theory, understanding
mechanisms supports efforts to formalize the bias, or to provide unifying theoretical
accounts of different updating errors. Second, the presence or quantitative importance
of selection neglect might well depend on environmental features, so that utilizing the
idea of selection neglect in applied work rests on an understanding of what exactly it is
that people fail to take into account when processing selected information.
The Role of Cognitive Skills








Table 3.4. Influence of others
Dependent variable: Naïveté implied in second belief
Full sample Rationals Naïfs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Naïveté in first belief 0.75∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)
Avg. naïveté of senders 0.24∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.078∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
Disagreement among senders 0.060∗ -0.023 0.17∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
Avg. naïveté × disagreement of senders -0.066∗∗∗ -0.054 -0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Constant 0.072∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.040 -0.013 0.057∗∗∗ -0.0024 0.11∗ 0.12∗ 0.23∗ 0.76∗∗∗ -0.11 -0.17
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13)
Task FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 382 382 382 382 134 134 134 134 121 121 121 121
R2 0.770 0.048 0.796 0.801 0.543 0.015 0.589 0.608 0.423 0.176 0.595 0.642
OLS estimates, robust standard errors (clustered at subject level) in parentheses. For a given subject and task, a subject (“receiver”) is classified as rational if both the
out-of-sample median naïveté parameter from the first three tasks and the first belief statement in the respective task are “rational” (i.e., χ ≤ 0.5), and analogously for
naïfs (χ > 0.5). Since some subjects’ type switched between the out-of-sample naïveté parameter and the first belief statement in the respective task, the sum of rationals
and nai¨fs does not equal the total number of subjects. Very similar results obtain when I define rationals and naïfs exclusively based on the out-of-sample naïveté measure
or exclusively based on the first belief in the respective task, see Appendix 3.D.4. All regressions exclude extreme outliers with |χ|> 3; the results are robust to including
these outliers when employing median regressions. Disagreement among senders is defined as the absolute difference between the naïveté implied in the senders’ beliefs. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.5. Selection neglect and cognitive ability
Dependent variable: Median χ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High school grades -0.31∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)




1 if female -0.20 -0.17
(0.14) (0.14)
Log [Monthly income] -0.074 -0.063
(0.09) (0.08)
Constant 0.65∗∗∗ 0.41 0.94∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.51
(0.07) (0.63) (0.10) (0.07) (0.62)
Marital status FE No Yes No No Yes
Observations 48 48 48 48 48
R2 0.291 0.416 0.195 0.363 0.446
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. High school grades are the
z-score of the unweighted average of the z-scores of subjects’ overall high school
GPA and their final math grade. The conditional expectation item is coded as 1 (0)
if a subject answered 130 (anything else) on the follow-up question. Response time
in minutes. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
tion neglect, columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.5 present the results of OLS regressions
of each subject’s median naïveté parameter on their cognitive skills, as proxied for by
achievement in high school. This score is constructed as first factor of a subject’s over-
all high school GPA (which in Germany serves as primary university entrance criterion)
and their final math grade in high school. The results show that high cognitive ability
participants are significantly less likely to commit selection neglect, conditional on other
sociodemographics.
While this result illustrates that the bimodal distribution of selection neglect is driven
by cognitive skills, it leaves open the question of which dimension of cognitive skills the
naïve types aremissing. Relative to the control treatment, the selected treatment requires
subjects to engage in two steps of reasoning:
1. Noticing the systematic holes: Subjects need to notice that they are missing a sys-
tematic subset of the available information.
2. Computing conditional expectations: Conditional on noticing the selection problem,
subjects need to correctly back out the missing signals, i.e., to compute the
expected signal conditional on group membership of the respective computer
player.
Computing Conditional Expectations
To investigate subjects’ capability of computing conditional expectations in this context,
the experiment contained an incentivized follow-up question that was asked of every
subject in the Selected treatment after they had finished the seven belief formation tasks.
This question reads as follows:
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In the course of this experiment, in total, you did not communicate with five
computer players because you were part of the blue group, while these computer
players opted for the red group. Based on this information, please estimate
which signals these players in the red group have gotten, on average. You will
receive an additional 2 euros if your guess is exactly right, 50 cents if your
estimate is off by at most five, and nothing otherwise.
In essence, the question asks subjects to compute the conditional expectation of a
signal. The left panel of Figure 3.7 plots the distribution of participants’ estimates. About
two thirds of all subjects correctly computed the correct conditional expectation of 130.
Columns (3)-(4) of Table 3.5 show that these subjects perform significantly better in
solving the belief formation task relative to those who provided a different response:
according to the OLS estimates, correctly answering this follow-up question is associated
with a reduction of estimated naïveté of 0.5.
At the same time, even those subjects that did not answer 130 did understand that
the signals of the computer players must have been larger than 100, on average: only 2
out of 48 subjects provided a response below 100, suggesting that subjects understood
the experimental setup and were capable of making qualitatively appropriate inferences
from the behavior of the computer players. In particular, if subjects had attributed no
informational content to the computer players’ group choice, they should have guessed
100 (the prior). In addition, as the right panel of Figure 3.7 shows, there is substantial
heterogeneity in subjects’ naïveté in the belief formation tasks even conditional on cor-
rectly answering the conditional expectation question. The left subpanel shows that the
vast majority of subjects who provided a response larger than 100, but did not answer
130, exhibit full selection neglect (χ = 1). This is remarkable in that if subjects under-
stand the direction (even if not the magnitude) of the signals they do not see, they should
at least partially adjust from full selection neglect. However, they don’t.
Even more puzzling, those subjects that provided exactly the correct response of 130
(depicted in the right subpanel), also exhibit strong heterogeneity in their naïveté. While
the fraction of rational subjects is higher in this subgroup, many people still fully neglect
the selection problem in the belief formation tasks. These findings emphasize that being
able to compute the correct conditional expectation is not sufficient to develop unbiased
beliefs. Thus, the roots of selection neglect seem to be more than purely mathematical,
but rather rooted in how subjects approach the problem in the first place.
Identifying the Problem: Subjects’ Focus
The results presented so far show that the majority of subjects is capable of drawing (at
least qualitatively) correct inferences from the computer players’ group entrance deci-
sions once they are explicitly prodded to do so, and to back out the signals they do not
see. At the same time, these same subjects often exhibit (full) naïveté in the face of the
full belief formation problem. This suggests that when people face complex updating
problems, they fail to even think about the existence and properties of the information
sources they do not directly interact with, akin to a “what you see is all there is” heuristic
(Kahneman, 2011). Indeed, the follow-up question might well be interpreted as steering
subjects’ focus towards the computer players in the other group. Do subjects correctly
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Figure 3.7. The left panel plots the distribution of responses to the follow-up question in the
Selected treatment. The right panel illustrates the distribution of nav¨eté conditional on providing
a response of larger than 100, but different from 130 (left subpanel), and conditional on
answering exactly 130 (right subpanel).
solve the entire belief formation problem if they are nudged to focus on what they don’t
see?
To address this question, I implemented treatment variation Salience. This condition
exogenously shifted subjects’ focus towards the holes in their information samples, al-
beit without instructing them what to do about these holes. To this end, the treatment
provided a hint both at the end of the instructions and on subjects’ decision screens:24
HINT about the solution: Also think about the computer players you do not
communicate with!
Arguably, this hint alerts subjects to reflect upon the missing computer players and
the information they have gotten. At the same time, the treatment does not manipu-
late subjects’ mathematical skills or their motivation to solve the problem. 48 subjects
participated in this treatment and earned 11.60 euros on average.
The left panel of Figure 3.8 provides kernel density plots of subjects’ median naïveté
in this Salience treatment compared to the two baseline treatments, while the right panel
plots the distribution of naïveté implied in all individual-level beliefs. As visual inspection
suggests, this treatment had a large effect on subjects’ beliefs relative to the Selected
condition (p = 0.0009, Wilcoxon ranksum test), and reduced the fraction of naïfs by
60%.25 Notably, in this condition, most subjects did not adjust partially from full to partial
naïveté; rather, they develop beliefs which exactly reflect χ = 0. This is in line with the
findings from the conditional expectation follow-up item: once people are prodded to
actively think about the computer players they do not see, most are capable of drawing
24 The quote provided in the main text applies to subjects’ decision screen. To avoid confusion on the part
of participants, the hint at the end of the instructions read as: “HINT about the solution: When you estimate
the number X, always also think about the computer players you do not communicate with!”
25 Appendix 3.E.1 provides a detailed analysis of the seven separate belief formation tasks, which confirms
the findings from the aggregate analysis: in six out of seven tasks do beliefs significantly differ between
Salience and Selected.
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Figure 3.8. Distribution of naïveté in the Selected, Control, and Salience treatments. The left
panel plots kernel density estimates of the median naïveté of each individual in all three
treatments (48, 48, and 30 obs., respectively), while the right panel illustrates the distribution of
naïveté implied in all individual-level beliefs in the Salience treatment (336 obs.).
appropriate inferences and to recognize the selection mechanism upon which the initial
group entrance decision was based.26
Taken together, the findings on the cognitive step of paying attention to and identify-
ing the systematic holes in one’s information sample provide an intuitive explanation for
the striking bimodality in subjects’ types. In other contexts, bounded rationality (in the
sense of costs of thinking) is often considered as a continuous concept in the sense that
different people might exhibit any value of naïveté between zero and one. In contrast,
the type of belief formation problem discussed in this paper appears to have a strong
threshold logic, that is driven by subjects’ focus: people either attend to the holes in
their data and (fully) adjust for them, or they do not.
Result 14. Selection neglect is significantly associated with cognitive ability. While the ma-
jority of subjects appear to possess the mathematical skills necessary to adjust for the selec-
tion problem at least in a qualitatively correct manner, many people do not pay attention
to the systematic holes in their information sample: Exogenously shifting subjects’ focus to-
wards the information sources they do not directly interact with debiases a large fraction of
participants.
3.5 Relationship to Correlation Neglect
Forming beliefs in network environments is frequently complicated not only by selection
problems, but also by double-counting problems that arise through correlated informa-
tion sources (DeMarzo et al., 2003; Eyster and Rabin, 2010, 2014). For instance, if A talks
to B and C and both have previously communicated with D, A runs the risk of double-
counting D’s information. As Enke and Zimmermann (2015) have shown experimentally,
26 Indeed, this treatment did not affect subjects’ ability to compute conditional expectations per se: in the
follow-up question, the distribution of guesses is statistically indistinguishable from that in the Selected treat-
ment (p = 0.3810, Wilcoxon ranksum test), suggesting that the positive effect of this treatment variation
can indeed be attributed to a shift in attention rather than increased mathematical skills.
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many people neglect these redundancies and hence fall prey to double-counting the sig-
nals of well-connected information sources.
Are the neglect of informational redundancies and selection effects conceptually re-
lated?27 Answering this question is important because identifying common cognitive
underpinnings of belief biases might allow theorists to develop unifyingmodels of bound-
edly rational belief formation in network environments, based on primitives such as lim-
ited attention (see, e.g, the discussion in Fudenberg, 2006). Indeed, there are two strong
ex ante reasons to study the relationship between correlation and selection neglect in
particular, rather than between selection neglect and other updating errors. First, both
biases arguably have some of their most powerful implications in social network or other
social learning environments. Second, the results in Enke and Zimmermann (2015) pro-
vide a first indication for a possible relationship between the two errors: using a treat-
ment intervention akin to the Salience treatment, they established that prodding subjects
to actively think about the mechanics that generate the correlation in their setup, debi-
ased a large fraction of subjects.
To further delve into the relationship between the two mistakes, I re-invited all sub-
jects from the Selected treatment to take part in a follow-up study, and 32 out of 48 agreed
to participate at least two weeks after the first experiment and earned 12.00 euros on
average. In this follow-up experiment, subjects solved five of the tasks used by Enke and
Zimmermann (2015) to establish the neglect of redundancies in information sources.
While Appendix 3.F contains details on these experiments, the basic idea can be grasped
from Figure 3.9. Subjects again had to estimate a hypothetical true state; computers A-D
generated unbiased iid signals about the state and transmitted these to the subject and
the intermediaries as depicted in Figure 3.9. The intermediaries, which were simulated
by computers, computed the average of the signals they have access to, and transmitted
that average to the subject. Thus, subjects were at the risk of double-counting the signal
of computer A because all messages contained that signal. On the other hand, given that
subjects knew the signal of computer A, being rational only required them to back out













Figure 3.9. Correlation neglect information structure
27 Formally, selection and correlation neglect are related because both homophily and informational re-
dundancies can be formalized as introducing correlated error terms into the signals people have access
to (Glaeser and Sunstein, 2009). Nevertheless, the biases apply to two distinct problems, one of non-
representative samples and one of double-counting certain signals.
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Table 3.6. Selection neglect and correlation neglect
Dependent variable: Median χ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Median correlation neglect naïveté 0.35∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.27∗∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
High school grades -0.097 -0.064 -0.17∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
1 if conditional exp. correct -0.31∗∗ -0.29∗ -0.20
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
Constant 0.40∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 1.48∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.86)
Additional controls No No No No Yes
Observations 32 32 32 32 32
R2 0.202 0.227 0.279 0.290 0.432
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. High school grades are the z-
score of the unweighted average of the z-score of subjects’ overall high school GPA
and their final math grade. The conditional expectation item is coded as 1 (0) if a
subject answered 130 (anything else) on the follow-up question. Additional controls
include age, gender, log monthly income, and marital status fixed effects. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Result 15. Subjects’ naïveté in updating from selected signals is significantly correlated
with their propensity to neglect redundancies in information sources.
The five belief formation tasks again allow the derivation of an individual-level
naïveté parameter, i.e., subjects’ propensity to adjust for the double-counting problem.
To investigate the relationship between the two belief biases, Table 3.6 reports the re-
sults of OLS estimations of subjects’ (median) selection neglect naïveté parameter on
their (median) correlation neglect naïveté. Results show that the two types of naïveté are
strongly and significantly correlated, even conditional on academic achievement and per-
formance in the conditional expectation follow-up question, see columns (2) through (5).
The raw Pearson correlation between the naïveté parameters is ρ = 0.45, p = 0.0099.
Appendix 3.F.3 visualizes this relationship. Taken together, neglecting selection effects
and neglecting redundancies is correlated within subject, and essentially the same treat-
ment variation can be employed to switch both biases on and off. This provides a first
indication that two important updating biases in social networks – though conceptually
distinct – share common cognitive foundations based on limited attention, and might
hence be fruitfully modeled in a unified way.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper has provided an analysis of how people form beliefs in the presence of
homophily-driven selection effects, both individually and when interacting with others.
I conclude by discussing two potential applications and extensions of the findings. First,
the most straightforward implication of the neglect of homophily-driven selection effects
is that it tends to reinforce the belief patterns upon which the original group entry de-
cision was based. In this sense, the experimental results are consistent with popular
concerns that belief-based segregation might produce increased polarization (Sunstein,
2009; Bishop, 2009; Pariser, 2011). Crucially, this paper shows that such a pattern can
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arise in the absence of motivated reasoning or wishful thinking, but rather only due to
people’s cognitive limitations in dealing with homophilous information samples.
Second, the present paper has also shown that the strong type heterogeneity in up-
dating from selected sources may have predictable consequences for belief heterogeneity
in society. In particular, two complementary sets of findings suggest that people need not
necessarily learn from each other. First, people tend to select advisors or communication
partners based on whether they process information in the same way as they do. Second,
even when forced to consider the views of people with different updating rules do many
people judge their own problem-solving strategy to be correct. While these results were
obtained in the context of selection problems, they may nevertheless apply to boundedly
rational belief formation more broadly. If true, this raises the intriguing conjecture that
part of the large belief heterogeneity observed in field data may not be due to private
information per se, but rather due to heterogeneous updating rules in combination with
people’s tendency to disproportionately trust their own assessment of the available evi-
dence. An interesting question is under which conditions the result that people do not
learn from others holds. For instance, it may be that naïfs start learning from rationals if
the latter have a chance (and incentives) to explain to naïfs how and why their strategy
is incorrect.
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Appendix 3.A Treatment Overview
Table 3.7. Treatment overview
Treatment # of subjects Session length (mins) Ave earnings (euros)
Selected 48 50 10.10
Control 30 50 13.70
Salience 48 50 11.60
Advice 59 50 10.80
Advice only 60 50 11.40
Exogenous 96 70 11.60
Appendix 3.B Details for Individual Belief Formation Treatments
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Figure 3.10. Distribution of beliefs by task (1/2). To ease readability, the plots exclude extreme
outliers whose distance to both the fully naïve and rational benchmarks is larger than 20.
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Figure 3.11. Distribution of beliefs by task (2/2). To ease readability, the plots exclude extreme
outliers whose distance to both the fully naïve and rational benchmarks is larger than 20.
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3.B.2 Consistency of Beliefs Across Tasks
This section investigates the consistency with which subjects in Selected exhibit a
certain degree of naïveté across tasks. To this end, I define a set of potential types
χ = −0.5,−0.4,−0.3, . . . , 1.5. Then, for each individual and each χ, I count the number
of beliefs which reflect naïveté in [χ − 0.1,χ + 0.1]. Denote the number of beliefs in
this interval as nχ . Finally, I take the maximum over all nχ , for each individual. This
maximum represents the number of beliefs that exhibit a certain degree of consistency
in the sense that they are within a rather small interval around some degree of naïveté.
Figure 3.12 presents a histogram of this measure, which reveals that almost 70% of all
subjects state at least three consistent beliefs. Thus, overall, subjects’ responses reflect a
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Figure 3.12. Number of consistent beliefs in treatment Selected.
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Appendix 3.C Additional Results for Treatments Advice and
Advice only











-.5 0 .5 1 1.5
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kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.2000
Median naïveté in Advice and Advice only
Figure 3.13. Distribution of median naïveté in the first three tasks (i.e., without advice). The
densities excluce observations outside [-.5,1.5].
3.C.2 Distribution of Naïveté and Choice of Advisor
Table 3.8 analyzes beliefs in the tasks in which subjects had access to the advisor. Results
show that subjects’ implied naïveté in these tasks is strongly correlated with their choice
of advisor, conditional on their inherent naïveté as measured in the first three tasks.
Figures 3.14 and 3.15 depict the distribution of naïveté implied in all beliefs in the
tasks where subjects in Advice and Advice only had access to an advisor. The figures
are partitioned by subjects’ inherent naïveté type as determined in the first three tasks
without advice.
Figures 3.16 and 3.17 provide an overview of the naïveté implied in subjects’ beliefs
with and without advice, conditional on their choice of advisor. That is, compared to
the figures described in the preceeding paragraph, the figures are not conditional upon
subjects’ inherent naïveté, but instead conditional on their choice of advisor.
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Table 3.8. Endogenous advice and naïveté
Dependent variable:
Median naiveté in last tasks
Treatment Advice Treatment Advice only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Median naïveté in first three tasks 0.38∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.055
(0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06)
1 if chose naïve advisor 0.70∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.14)
Constant 0.26∗∗∗ 0.085 -0.00011 0.24∗∗∗ -0.063 -0.090
(0.08) (0.09) (0.45) (0.08) (0.04) (0.41)
Additional controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 59 59 59 60 60 60
R2 0.358 0.448 0.608 0.228 0.555 0.614
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls include age, gender,
high school grades, marital status fixed effects, and log monthly income. See Table 3.5. ∗ p < 0.10,












Distribution of naïveté in Advice conditional on type
Figure 3.14. Distribution of decisions in the last four tasks (i.e., with advice), conditional on
subjects’ naïveté type in the first three tasks. Rationals are defined as χ ≤ 0.5 and naïfs as
χ > 0.5. The histograms exclude observations outside [-1,1.5].












Distribution of naïveté in Advice only conditional on type
Figure 3.15. Distribution of decisions in the last four tasks (i.e., with advice), conditional on
subjects’ naïveté type in the first three tasks. Rationals are defined as χ ≤ 0.5 and naïfs as
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Distribution of naïveté in Advice conditional on advisor
Figure 3.16. Distribution of decisions in the last four tasks (i.e., with advice), conditional on
subjects’ naïveté type in the first three tasks. Rationals are defined as χ ≤ 0.5 and naïfs as
χ > 0.5. The histograms exclude observations outside [-1,1.5].
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Distribution of naïveté in Advice only conditional on advisor
Figure 3.17. Distribution of decisions in the last four tasks (i.e., with advice), conditional on
subjects’ naïveté type in the first three tasks. Rationals are defined as χ ≤ 0.5 and naïfs as
χ > 0.5. The histograms exclude observations outside [-1,1.5].
Appendix 3.D Extensions and Robustness Checks for Treatment
Exogenous
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Figure 3.18. Distribution of median naïveté in the first three tasks (i.e., without seeing the beliefs
of others). The density excluces observations outside [-.5,1.5].
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Figure 3.19. Distribution of decisions in the last four tasks (i.e., when seeing the beliefs of others).
The left panel depicts the distribution of initial beliefs (before seeing the beliefs of the senders),
and the right panel the distribution of post-communication beliefs. The histograms exclude
observations outside [-.5,1.5].
3.D.2 Raw Correlation Between Pre- and Post-Communication Beliefs
Figure 3.20 presents the raw correlation between the first and second belief in the last
four tasks in treatment Exogenous, regardless of whether the receiver’s belief differs from
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Figure 3.20. Raw correlation between the naïveté χ implied in first and second beliefs (ρ = 0.90).
To construct this figure, subjects’ pre- and post-communication naïveté is rounded to multiples
of 0.05. The ball size then represents the number of observations in the respective bin. To ease
readability, the scatter excludes 30 (out of 384) observations for which the implied naïveté of at
least one belief is outside [-.5,1.5].
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3.D.3 Robustness Checks for Adjustment Patterns
In the main text, rationals and naïfs were defined through a combination of the out-of-
sample naïveté measure derived from the first three tasks as well as the first belief in
the respective task. Figures 3.21 and 3.22 show that very similar patterns obtain when
I classify subjects exclusively based on the out-of-sample measure or based on the first
belief in the respective task.
3.D.4 Extensions and Robustness Checks for Regressions
Table 3.9 provides a robustness check on the effect of initial naïveté and naïveté of the
senders in determining final naïveté (as implied in the second belief in each task). While
the main text classified rationals and naïfs by making use of both the out-of-sample
naïveté measure from the first three tasks and the naïveté implied in the respective first
belief, I now classify subjects based on either of these naïveté measures. The results are
unchanged.
Table 3.10 presents an extensions for this types of analysis. In particular, I investigate
whether subjects tend to place lower weight on the beliefs of the senders if subjects are
not very confident. As column (5) shows, however, no significant relationship emerges.
Columns (6)-(15) show the robustness of this finding among the sub-samples of rationals
and naïfs, respectively.
3.D.5 Do Subjects Who Revise Their Beliefs Learn?
It is conceivable that those naïve subjects who substantially revise their beliefs become
less naïve in subsequent tasks. This could happen, for example, if subjects learn from
the beliefs of more rational subjects. Table 3.11 presents the results of OLS regressions
of subjects’ naïveté in a given task on the degree of adjustment towards the rational
belief in the previous task, conditional on the initial naïveté in the previous task. In these
analyses, the sample is restricted to naïve subjects, i.e., to those participants whose out-
of-sample median naïveté parameter from the first three tasks is larger than 0.5. Results
show that those subjects who strongly revise their beliefs do not become more rational
over time. This suggests that some subjects may feel that their own problem-solving is
incorrect, but have no superior way of solving the problem themselves.
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Belief revision (in % of previous disagreement)
Naïfs
Figure 3.21. Magnitude of belief revisions. Each histogram denotes the belief revision between
the first and second belief (expressed in terms of units of naïveté) conditional on the type of the
subject (top / bottom panel) and on the composition of the two senders. The top left panel
shows the adjustment of rational subjects who face one naïve and one rational belief, while the
top right panel illustrates the rational types’ belief revision if they faced two naïfs. The bottom
left panel depicts the adjustment behavior of naïfs when they faced one rational and one naïve
belief, while the right panel illustrates adjustment in case of two rational senders. For a given
subject and task, a subject (“receiver”) is classified as rational if the out-of-sample median
naïveté parameter from the first three tasks is “rational” (i.e., χ ≤ 0.5), and analogously for naïfs
(χ > 0.5). Adjustments > |1| are excluded to ease readability.
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Belief revision (in % of previous disagreement)
Naïfs
Figure 3.22. Magnitude of belief revisions. Each histogram denotes the belief revision between
the first and second belief (expressed in terms of units of naïveté) conditional on the type of the
subject (top / bottom panel) and on the composition of the two senders. The top left panel
shows the adjustment of rational subjects who face one naïve and one rational belief, while the
top right panel illustrates the rational types’ belief revision if they faced two naïfs. The bottom
left panel depicts the adjustment behavior of naïfs when they faced one rational and one naïve
belief, while the right panel illustrates adjustment in case of two rational senders. For a given
subject and task, a subject (“receiver”) is classified as rational if the first belief statement in the
respective task is “rational” (i.e., χ ≤ 0.5), and analogously for naïfs (χ > 0.5). Adjustments > |1|

















Table 3.9. Influence of others: Robustness to classification of rationals and naiïfs
Dependent variable: Naïveté implied in second belief
Classification based on out-of-sample naïvete parameter Classification based on first belief in task
Full sample Rationals Naïfs Rationals Naïfs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Naïveté in first belief 0.75∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09)
Avg. naïveté of senders 0.24∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.068 0.098∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05)
Constant 0.072∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.040 0.059∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ -0.021 0.091∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ -0.012 0.055∗∗∗ 0.028 0.048 0.19∗ 0.71∗∗∗ -0.15
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10)
Task FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 382 382 382 176 176 176 206 206 206 219 219 219 163 163 163
R2 0.770 0.048 0.796 0.707 0.026 0.739 0.751 0.100 0.787 0.531 0.009 0.555 0.432 0.162 0.600
OLS estimates, robust standard errors (clustered at subject level) in parentheses. In columns (4)-(9), aor a given subject and task, a subject (“receiver”) is classified as rational if the
out-of-sample median naïveté parameter from the first three tasks is “rational” (i.e., χ ≤ 0.5), and analogously for naïfs (χ > 0.5). In columns (10)-(15), the classification is based on the
first belief in the respective task. All regressions exclude extreme outliers with |χ|> 3; the results are robust to including these outliers when employing median regressions. Disagreement










Table 3.10. Influence of others: Extensions
Dependent variable: Naïveté implied in second belief
Full sample Rationals Naïfs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Naïveté in first belief 0.75∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
Avg. naïveté of senders 0.24∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.078∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.16 0.32∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.13) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.15)
Disagreement among senders 0.060∗ -0.023 0.17∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
Avg. naïveté × disagreement of senders -0.066∗∗∗ -0.054 -0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Confidence -0.0022 -0.0096 0.0042
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Avg. naïvete of senders × confidence -0.018 -0.012 -0.032
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Constant 0.072∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.040 -0.013 0.059 0.057∗∗∗ -0.0024 0.11∗ 0.12∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.76∗∗∗ -0.11 -0.17 -0.13
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16)
Task FE No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 382 382 382 382 382 134 134 134 134 134 121 121 121 121 121
R2 0.770 0.048 0.796 0.801 0.800 0.543 0.015 0.589 0.608 0.603 0.423 0.176 0.595 0.642 0.605
OLS estimates, robust standard errors (clustered at subject level) in parentheses. For a given subject and task, a subject (“receiver”) is classified as rational if both the out-of-sample median naïveté parameter
from the first three tasks and the first belief statement in the respective task are “rational” (i.e., χ ≤ 0.5), and analogously for naïfs (χ > 0.5). Very similar results obtain when I define rationals and naïfs
exclusively based on the out-of-sample naïveté measure or exclusively based on the first belief in the respective task, see Table 3.9. All regressions exclude extreme outliers with |χ|> 3; the results are
robust to including these outliers when employing median regressions. Disagreement among senders is defined as the absolute difference between the naïveté implied in the senders’ beliefs. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3.11. Belief adjustment and learning
Dependent variable:
Naïveté implied in first belief
(1) (2)
Naïveté in previous task 0.26∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09)




1 if female 0.34∗∗∗
(0.10)




Task FE No Yes
Observations 156 156
R2 0.133 0.428
OLS estimates, robust standard errors (clustered at subject
level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Appendix 3.E Subjects’ Confidence
To investigate the relationship between subjects’ decisions and their confidence in their
own problem-solving strategy, I make use of a qualitative question that was asked after
the first three tasks, i.e., before the choice of the advisor was introduced: “On a scale
from 1 (not certain at all) to 10 (very certain), how certain are you that your previous
estimates (and the underlying strategy) were correct?”
Table 3.12 presents the results of OLS estimations of subjects’ confidence on their
characteristics. The regressions pool subjects from treatments Advice, Advice only, and
Exogenous, because these treatments proceeded in an essentially identical fashion before
the confidence question was asked, i.e., subjects completed three tasks from the Selected
condition by themselves. Results show that subjects’ naïveté is not significantly correlated
with their confidence, despite the relatively large sample size. Men andwealthier subjects
are more likely to express higher confidence in their beliefs.
Table 3.13 analyzes the relationship between subjects’ confidence and their choice
of advisor, for both rationals and naïfs. Results show that measured confidence is only
weakly related to the choice of advisor for both types. If anything, more confident naïfs
are more likely to choose the rational advisor.
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Table 3.12. Correlates of confidence
Dependent variable: Confidence
(1) (2) (3)
Median naïveté in first three tasks -0.36∗ -0.40∗∗ -0.31∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
Constant 6.24∗∗∗ 6.10∗∗∗ 4.12∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.28) (1.49)
Treatment FE No Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes
Observations 215 215 215
R2 0.024 0.041 0.119
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. Additional con-
trols include age, gender, log monthly income, marital status fixed ef-
fects, and high school grades. See Table 3.5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
Table 3.13. Confidence and choice of advisor
Dependent variable: 1 if chose naïve advisor
Rationals Naïfs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Confidence -0.12 -0.13 -0.11 -0.27∗
(0.13) (0.18) (0.09) (0.16)
Constant -0.23 -0.58 1.77∗∗∗ 1.53
(0.83) (2.15) (0.63) (2.09)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 52 52 67 67
Pseudo R2 0.030 0.142 0.030 0.284
Probit estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. Additional
controls include age, gender, log monthly income, marital status
fixed effects, and high school grades. See Table 3.5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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3.E.1 Details for “Salience” Treatment
Table 3.14. Overview of beliefs across tasks
True Median Belief Median Belief Median Belief p-value (Ranksum) p-value (Ranksum)
State Control Treatment Selected Treatment Salience Treatment Salience vs Control Salience vs Selected
92.66 90.00 100.00 90.00 0.2664 0.0522
106.00 110.00 128.00 114.165 0.0308 0.0031
112.67 110.00 108.00 110.00 0.0302 0.7844
85.93 93.15 105.00 95.00 0.0077 0.0149
98.00 90.00 85.00 90.00 0.7228 0.0584
95.33 100.00 107.50 100.00 0.4535 0.0052
107.33 103.00 91.50 103.15 0.8328 0.0125
Notes. Overview of the estimation tasks in order of appearance. See Table 3.1 for details on the signals in each task as well
as the computation of the rational and the naïve benchmarks.
Appendix 3.F Details for Correlation Neglect Follow-Up Study
3.F.1 Experimental Design
The design is taken from Enke and Zimmermann (2015). Subjects were asked to estimate
a hypothetical true state µ, where I induced a prior belief by informing subjects that
µ would be drawn from N (0; 250,000). Computers A-D generated four unbiased iid
signals about µ by drawing from sh ∼N (µ; 250,000).
Intermediary 1 observed the signal of Computer A and transmitted it to subjects. The
intermediaries 2 to 4 observed both the signal of computer A and of computers B to D,
respectively, and then reported the average of these two signals. Since subjects knew
the signal of Computer A, they could extract the other independent signals from the
intermediaries’ reports.
As in the experiments designed to identify selection neglect, this treatment features
an exogenous data-generating process wich is fully known to subjects. Control questions
ensured that subjects understood the mechanics of this process. No feedback was pro-
vided between the five independent tasks. Earnings were computed through a quadratic
scoring rule with maximum earnings of 12 euros: pi= max{0; 12− 0.01× (Belief −
True state)2}. These experiments lasted 40 minutes on average, and subjects earned
an average of 12.30 euros including a 7 euros show-up fee.
Table 3.15 presents details on the belief formation tasks as well as median beliefs
in each task. As can be inferred from the rightmost column, median beliefs are always
between the rational and the full correlation neglect benchmark.
3.F.2 Computation and Distribution of Naïveté Parameters
Given the known data-generating process, one can again define and measure an
individual-level naïveté parameter. As in the case of selection neglect, I assume full base
rate neglect for this purpose, which is bolstered by the findings in Enke and Zimmermann
(2015). The individual-level naïveté parameter is then computed as follows:
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Table 3.15. Overview of correlation neglect tasks
True Computer Computer Computer Computer Rational Correlation Median
State A B C D Belief Neglect Belief Belief
-241 249 -699 -139 70 -129.75 59.63 0.00
-563 -446 -1,374 -1,377 -1,475 -1,168 -807 -1,000
38 442 173 58 233 226.5 334.25 250.00
1,128 1,989 781 440 2,285 1,373.75 1,681.38 1373.75
-23 810 -822 -99 409 74.5 442.25 257
Notes. Overview of the correlation neglect estimation tasks in order of appearance. See Section 3.F.2 for the
derivation of the rational and the full correlation neglect benchmarks.
Subjects observed s1 and s˜h = (s1 + sh)/2 for h ∈ {2,3, 4}. When prompted to esti-
mate µ, a rational decision maker would extract the underlying independent signals
from the s˜h and compute the mean Bayesian posterior as bB =
∑4
h=1 sh/4. However, now
suppose that the decision maker suffers from correlation neglect, i.e., he does not fully
take into account the extent to which s˜h reflects s1, but rather treats s˜h (to some extent)
as independent. Call such a decision maker naïve and let his degree of naïveté be pa-
rameterized by χ ∈ [0,1] such that χ = 1 implies full correlation neglect. A naïve agent
extracts sh from s˜h according to the rule
sˆh = χ s˜h + (1 − χ)sh = sh + 12χ(s1 − sh)
where sˆh for h ∈ {2, 3,4} denotes the agent’s (possibly biased) inference of sh. He thus










where s¯ = (
∑4
h=1 sh)/4 and s¯−1 = (
∑4
h=2 sh)/3.
Rearranging yields an individual- and task-specific naïveté parameter:
χ =
8 × (bCN − s¯)
3 × (s1 − s¯−1)
For each individual, I then define their overall naïveté as the median χ across all
tasks. Figure 3.23 plots the distribution of (median) naïveté in the follow-up study. As
in Enke and Zimmermann (2015), this distribution exhibits a bimodal structure with
some fraction of subjects fully accounting for the double-counting problem and others
approximately fully ignoring the partial redundancy.
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Figure 3.23. Distribution of median naïveté in correlation neglect task.

















-.5 0 .5 1
Naïveté in selection task
Figure 3.24. Raw correlation between selection and correlation neglect median naïveté
parameters (ρ = 0.44).
4
The Precision of Expectations Data and
the Explanatory Power of Economic
Models?
4.1 Introduction
Stock market expectations are among the most important primitives of economic portfo-
lio choice models. With the recent emergence of large-scale datasets including subjective
expectations, researchers have begun to incorporate them into empirical models of in-
vestor behavior. While the results have been by and large encouraging, working with
subjective beliefs data has proved challenging. First, many researchers are troubled by
the apparent pervasiveness of measurement error in subjective expectations data. For
example, stated beliefs often cluster at focal points (Kleinjans and van Soest, 2014)
and many respondents’ answers violate even the most basic laws of probability (Man-
ski, 2004; Hurd et al., 2011). Second, the association between subjective beliefs and
stockholding decisions tends to be statistically significant, but usually rather small in
magnitude (AmeriksEtAl2016; Hurd, 2009).
In this paper, we propose a reconciliation of these two facts. Our point of departure
is that different households are likely to employ different thought processes to arrive
at their financial decisions. For some people, the canonical economic model of form-
ing a choice rule by combining preferences and beliefs about future states of the world
will be a good approximation. Others, however, could take their decisions very differ-
ently. For example, almost half of the Dutch population report that they mostly rely on
the advice of family, friends, or professionals when it comes to important financial deci-
sions (von Gaudecker, 2015). Likewise, as emphasized by large literatures in behavioral
? We would like to thank the team of CentERdata, especially Miquelle Marchand, for their help in the
data collection process, Philipp Kloke and Lukas Wendlik for able research assistance, Bas van Heiningen
for help in recording the introductory screencast, as well as Jürgen Maurer for sharing and explaining the
code used in Maurer et al. (2010) that forms the basis of ours. Seminar participants at the Max Planck In-
stitute for Research on Collective Goods, at Queen’s University, at the Mannheim meeting of Young German
Microeconometricians, at Tilburg University, and at the Strasbourg conference in honor of François Laisney
provided helpful comments.
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finance and cognitive psychology, households may take financial decisions intuitively
(BinswangerSalm2014; Kahneman, 2011) or employ simple rules of thumb (Ameriks
and Zeldes, 2004).
The presence of such alternative decision modes can produce the patterns observed
in the data. First, individuals who do not base their decisions upon beliefs have little
reason to frequently reflect upon the evolution of the stock market. Thus, they will likely
maintain only rudimentary, diffuse, and unstable expectations. In consequence, when
prodded to state these expectations in surveys, their answers will lack precision: they
will be error-ridden, inconsistent, and exhibit large variation across survey instruments.
Second, preferences and beliefs will have little explanatory power for portfolio decisions
as they do not enter the decision-making process of all individuals. For example, neither
preferences nor beliefs will explain variation in the behavior of people who exclusively
rely on a rule of thumb to arrive at their financial decisions. In combination, these ob-
servations imply our research hypothesis. The responsiveness of financial decisions to
variation in subjective expectations and other primitives of economic models should be
high for individuals whose stated beliefs exhibit high precision. Beliefs and preferences
should induce only very little variation in financial decisions for people with imprecise
expectations measures.
To explore the channel of heterogeneous choice rules and motivate our empirical
strategy, Section 4.3.1 presents a simple economic model of stock market participa-
tion that clarifies the roles of expectations, preferences, and transaction costs. In Sec-
tion 4.3.2, we discuss in detail why a variety of alternative decision modes imply that
individuals have low incentives to frequently reflect upon their beliefs about the future
evolution of the stock market.
Section 4.3.3 lays out our econometric approach. The above arguments suggest that
the explanatory power of our model of stock market participation will vary across individ-
uals. To empirically incorporate this particular form of heteroskedasticity, we estimate
a Klein and Vella (2009) semiparametric double index model. In this model, the first
index contains the primitives of our theoretical model (such as beliefs and preferences),
while the second index includes quantitative and qualitative indicators for the precision
of measured beliefs. Both indices include further controls and may interact in a fully
nonparametric fashion to obtain predicted stockholding probabilities.
Section 4.2 describes the dataset that we collected specifically for this study. The data
contain individual-level information on stock market participation, subjective belief dis-
tributions, risk preferences, as well as a variety of quantitative and qualitative proxies
for the precision of subjective expectations from a large probability sample of the Dutch
population. Section 4.4 presents the results of our empirical application. We demonstrate
that changes in primitives of the economic model induce large variation in stock market
participation if expectations measures are precise. If their precision is low, however, the
effect of changes in beliefs and preferences on stockholdings is close to zero. We perform
a number of variations on this theme and show that the results hold up in several differ-
ent specifications. We then demonstrate the usefulness of our modeling approach for the
analysis of less detailed data by estimating a specification with variables that are com-
monly available or inexpensive to collect. In particular, we show that restricting ourselves
4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics | 131
to a simple measure of expectations and purely qualitative proxies for the precision of
expectations measures yields a similar, yet less pronounced overall pattern.
Our findings suggest that imprecision in measured beliefs should not necessarily be
treated as a standard case of measurement error, which needs to be corrected through,
e.g., improved measurement devices or multiple measurements (Wansbeek and Meijer,
2000). While many of the symptoms of diffuse and unstable expectations are observa-
tionally equivalent to measurement error, they do not reflect erroneous reporting, but
rather the structure of the expectations. Our results hence suggest that individual-level
variation in the precision of measured expectations might be informative about economic
mechanisms of interest. To bolster this interpretation, we conclude in Section 4.5 by dis-
cussing why our findings are unlikely to be driven by traditional notions of measurement
error in subjective beliefs.
4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data stem from the Dutch LISS study (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social
Sciences), which regularly administers Internet surveys and experiments to a panel of
households comprising a probability sample drawn from the population register kept by
Statistics Netherlands.
Implementing our empirical strategy requires data on individual stock market par-
ticipation, subjective beliefs and risk aversion, proxies for the degree of imprecision in
individual responses, and a rich set of sociodemographic covariates. Only the latter are
present in the LISS panel by default. In order to obtain measures for the main quantities
of interest, we implemented a series of incentivized experiments and survey questions in
August and September of 2013. We restricted our experiments to households with finan-
cial wealth in excess of 1,000€ to focus on respondents with substantial incentives to
think about portfolio allocations. To increase turnout, we also included individuals who
refused to answer questions about their exact amount of wealth. Within households, we
selected the financial decision maker. In total, 2,125 individuals completed both survey
waves. After dropping observations with missing data, we are left with a final sample of
2,072 observations.
4.2.1 Outcome Variable: Stock Market Participation
LISS routinely collects detailed data on respondents’ financial background, including
information on asset ownership. To ensure the relevance of elicited beliefs for current
portfolio allocations, we asked respondents to update their information on asset holdings
in August 2013. For this purpose, we asked them whether they had any type of bank or
savings account and/or investments (stocks, bonds, funds, or options). Our outcome vari-
able is a binary index that equals 1 if the respective respondent held any investments, and
0 otherwise. A quarter of the households in our sample holds risky assets (cf. Table 4.1).
This is in the range of values reported for the Netherlands from other datasets and earlier
periods (Alessie et al., 2004; van Rooij et al., 2011). In particular, using an administra-
tive dataset from the Netherlands, KnoefEtAl2015 report almost exactly the same rate
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of stock market participation, providing reassuring evidence for the data quality of our
main outcome variable.
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Statistic Index
Mean Std. Dev. Model Subj. Data Prec.
Holds risky assets 0.25
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 -1.18 8.10 ×
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 2.01 6.19
Subjective beliefs: µsav. acc.t+1 3.18 4.89
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 6.25 4.01 ×
Risk aversion 0.00 1.00 ×
Absolute difference between belief measures 11.20 13.57 ×
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate 0.54 0.23 ×
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate 0.36 0.24 ×
Experimental tasks difficult 0.49 0.33 ×
Experimental tasks obscure 0.31 0.25 ×
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.27 × ×
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.27 × ×
Financial wealth missing 0.18 × ×
Net income > 2500 € 0.46 × ×
Net income missing 0.07 × ×
High education 0.38 × ×
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.30 × ×
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.34 × ×
Age > 65 0.29 × ×
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. Variables related to the confidence in return estimates,
task difficulty, and task obscurity are scaled to range between 0 and 1. Risk aversion is the stan-
dardized average of 3 standardized risk aversion proxies. We omit standard deviations of binary
variables. The number of observations is 2,072.
4.2.2 Variables Entering the Economic Model Index
Subjective Expectations. In August 2013, we asked respondents to describe their ex-
pectations about the one-year return of the Amsterdam Exchange Index (AEX). We em-
ployed a variation of the ball allocation procedure developed by Delavande and Rohwed-
der (2008), which was explicitly designed for usage in Internet experiments. For each
individual, the procedure yields an 8-binned histogram for the expectation of the AEX’s
one-year return. Using the resulting 7 points on the cumulative distribution function, we
follow Hurd et al. (2011) and fit a log-normal distribution to obtain individual-level mea-
sures for µriskyt+1 and σ
risky
t+1 . Because our theoretical framework requires expected excess
returns, we also asked respondents for a point estimate of the return of a one-year invest-
ment into a standard savings account as the most prevalent safe asset. Section 4.A.1.1
of the Internet Appendix contains detailed descriptions of both procedures.
Recent research in the experimental economics literature has shown that financial
incentives induce more truthful reporting of beliefs in tasks like ours (see, for example,
Palfrey andWang, 2009; Gächter and Renner, 2010;Wang, 2011). In order to incentivize
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subjects, we employed the binarized scoring rule of Hossain and Okui (2013) which is
incentive-compatible for a wide range of utility functions. As is common practice with
large samples like ours, we randomly selected one in ten subjects for actual payment.
The maximum earnings per selected subject were 100 € and average earnings equaled
39.66 € conditional on being selected for payment in September 2014.
We relegate a detailed presentation of summary statistics of the belief measures to
Section 4.A.1.1 of the Internet Appendix and only discuss some notable features at this
point. First, the cross-sectional patterns in our data resemble findings in previous lit-
erature (e.g., Manski, 2004; Hurd, 2009; Hurd et al., 2011), e.g., we find that male,
richer, and better educated respondents tend to hold more optimistic expectations. Sec-
ond, though our respondents expect a positive AEX return on average, their expectations
are rather pessimistic relative to the AEX’s historical return distribution: the mean sub-
jective expectation implied by the distribution is 2.01%, while the AEX returned 7.89%
(5.93% inflation-adjusted) on average since 1993. This discrepancy between subjective
expectations and historic returns aligns with existing results in the literature, in particu-
lar those in Hurd (2009) regarding the AEX. In addition, as Figure 4.9 in Section 4.A.1.1
of the Internet Appendix shows, our participants tend to place lower probabilities on
extreme returns than what has historically been observed. Finally, and in contrast to the
relative pessimism we observe for the AEX, the mean expected return for the savings ac-
count, 3.18%, exceeds the rates actually offered at the time of the survey (roughly 1%)
by a substantial percentage. In our empirical analyses, we employ the difference between
the expected mean return for the AEX and the expected return for the savings account
as the empirical analog of the expected excess return.
Risk Preferences. In September 2013, we elicited risk preferences by asking respon-
dents to complete a variant of the “Preference Survey Module”, which was developed
in Falk et al. (2014) to measure economic preference parameters in large-scale surveys.
We further describe it in Section 4.A.1.3 of the Internet Appendix. Respondents first pro-
vided a qualitative self-assessment of their willingness to take risks in general and in the
financial domain. They then made choices in a series of hypothetical binary lottery tasks.
In our main analysis, we employ the average of the three measures’ standardized values.
Transaction costs. We include several variables to empirically model the impact of
transaction costs on stock market participation decisions. We focus on variables that
proxy for variation in transaction costs in the form of either monetary or information
costs. If monetary expenses of stock market participation are to some degree fixed—
e.g., because banks charge a constant amount for setting up and keeping an investment
account—then these costs will be less relevant for wealthy households. We therefore
include net household income and financial wealth in the economic index to control for
variation in the relevance of monetary transaction costs. If comprehension of the basic
functioning of the stock market comes with information costs, then these costs will be
lower for more numerate and cognitively able households. Both vary with educational
attainment and age (McArdle et al., 2011), which we include as further controls.
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4.2.3 Variables Entering the Subjective Data Precision Index
Several quantitative and qualitative measures serve to capture the precision of subjective
expectations data. We employ variables for (i) the consistency with which participants
report their expectations, (ii) the confidence they express in their own beliefs, and (iii)
their self-assessment concerning both difficulty and clarity of our survey tasks. On top
of such direct proxies, we also include the variables entering transaction costs. Indeed,
it is difficult to argue for exclusion restrictions in one direction or another for education,
income, financial wealth, or age.
In September 2013, one month after eliciting the distribution of beliefs, we asked
the same set of respondents to provide a point estimate for the one-year ahead return
of the AEX. As a quantitative proxy for the precision of households’ expectations, we
compute the absolute difference between the response to this question and the mean
belief from the ball allocation task. We conjecture that large discrepancies between the
two estimates indicate that a household entertains only diffuse expectations and is thus
unlikely to employ them in actual decision-making.1
The first two qualitative proxies relate to the confidence respondents have in their
own estimates. Following the elicitation of the point estimates for the expected returns
of the AEX and the savings account, we asked respondents to use a slider interface to
express their confidence in their own belief on a scale from 0 to 10, where larger val-
ues corresponded to more confidence. We conjecture that respondents maintaining only
imprecise expectations will have little faith in their own estimates. For our analysis, we
scale answers to both questions to the unit interval.
Both in August and September 2013, we asked subjects to use five-point scales to
indicate how clear they found the task descriptions and how simple they considered the
belief elicitation itself. We expect that respondents who do not have an elaborate belief
distribution find it hard to understand and to complete the tasks. For both questions, we
aggregate the responses for August and September and we scale the resulting variables
to the unit interval to create two further proxies.
The Internet Appendix provides a more detailed description and further summary
statistics of all proxies. The pairwise correlations between task simplicity, clarity, and the
two confidence variables are all positive, whereas all of them are negatively correlated
to the absolute difference between the two belief measures. Notably, all of the prox-
ies’ correlations to sociodemographic variables conform to our prior expectations. For
example, the correlations suggest that highly educated households or households with
higher net income entertain more precise expectations, resembling previously-found pat-
terns regarding inconsistent survey responses or item non-response (Manski, 2004; Hurd,
2009).
1We are not aware of changes in the economic environment between the two surveys that could have
induced people to systematically and substantially revise their beliefs. Between August and September 2013,
the AEX varied little with closing prices between 362.93 and 382.58.
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4.3 Motivation and Empirical Strategy
We develop our empirical strategy in three steps. First, we characterize a household’s
portfolio choice problem by means of a simple economic model. We then explain in
detail why we conjecture that the degree to which this model serves as an adequate
description of the decision-making process varies across households and why we expect
that variation in the precision of subjective expectations can be exploited to capture this
adequacy. In the third step, we present our econometric strategy to implement these
ideas.
4.3.1 A Simple Economic Model of Stock Market Participation
Our depiction of households’ portfolio choice behavior in an economic model follows
Campbell and Viceira (2002). We assume that the household maximizes a power utility
function defined over next period’s expected financial wealth Et [Wt+1] by allocating
fractions of period-t wealth to one safe and one risky asset. If the household can neither
short the risky asset nor leverage his position in it, the optimal risky asset share θ opt
solves:









s.t. 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
Risk aversion and a household’s beliefs about the returns of the two assets determine the
optimal decision. Denote a household’s expected return for the safe asset by µsafet+1 and
assume that the household’s expectations for the risky asset’s return can be described by a
log-normal distribution with mean µriskyt+1 and standard deviationσ
risky
t+1 . When returns are









. Thus, the maximization problem can be rewritten as:














s.t. 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
where lower case letters are logarithms. Using a first-order Taylor series approximation,
next period’s log wealth can be written as:
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At plausible parameter values of γ, the optimal risky asset share will be positive when
estimates based on historical return data are used to proxy households’ expectations for
µsafe,µrisky, and σrisky. However, studies on stock ownership find that a large fraction
of the population does not participate in the stock market (e.g., Haliassos and Bertaut,
1995). Arguably the most prominent explanation for why households abstain from par-
ticipation is the existence of broadly defined transaction costs (Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002).
These transaction costs are likely to vary with household characteristics. If participation
comes with fixed monetary costs, for example, wealthy households will be more likely to
invest in risky assets, since for them the fixed costs are spread over larger investments. If
information costs play an important role, transaction costs will be lower for numerate re-
spondents who are quicker to grasp the basic functioning of the stock market. We assume
that the variables affecting transaction costs can be modeled by observable household
characteristics X ta; denote the resulting transaction costs by f (X ta).
We now combine the optimal risky asset share (4.1), transaction costs, and random
influences " in a simple random utility model of stock market participation:
Y ≡ I {θ > 0} =
¨




t+1 − µsafet+1,σriskyt+1 ,γ
 − f (X ta) > "
0 otherwise.
(4.2)
According to (4.2), the probability of participating in the stock market will depend on
the mean and variance of beliefs over the risky asset, the expected risk-free rate, risk aver-
sion, variables proxying transaction costs, and the stochastic properties of ". If the latter
was normally distributed, one could estimate (4.2) by means of a standard Probit model.
Estimators that make minimal distributional assumptions but enable the researcher to
recover marginal effects still require " to either be homoskedastic or have a very particu-
lar form of heteroskedasticity (Klein and Vella, 2009). If our conjecture about a varying
explanatory power of θ opt − f (X ta) is correct, this will be reflected in a form of het-
eroskedasticity that violates these assumptions. In particular, the variance of " will vary
with the precision of beliefs in a form that is unknown a priori.
4.3.2 Putting the Precision of Subjective Data to Productive Use
The model combines effortful reasoning about future states of the world with personal
risk tolerance to form a choice rule. While such behavior is at the heart of economic
thinking, it will only adequately describe the decision process of a part of the population.
The behavioral finance and cognitive psychology literatures have proposed a number
of alternative decision modes. For example, almost half of the Dutch population report
that they mostly rely on the advice of family, friends, or professionals when it comes
to important financial decisions (von Gaudecker, 2015). Other households may take
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decisions intuitively (BinswangerSalm2014; Kahneman, 2011) or employ simple rules
of thumb like holding an equity share of 100 minus age (see, e.g., the discussion in
Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004).
Many of these alternative decision processes, however, do not require households
to frequently reflect about the future evolution of the stock market. As a consequence,
we suggest that households who rely on such decision processes will only maintain very
rudimentary, possibly diffuse or even unstable expectations. Eliciting such expectations
will lead to imprecise, inconsistent, and error-ridden measurements even when using the
same survey instrument at different points in time. Likewise, such respondents should
find tasks related to belief elicitation rather difficult and the confidence they express in
their estimates should be low.
Indeed, these patterns closely resemble the measurement issues that have been doc-
umented in the vast literature on subjective expectations of stock market developments
(see the excellent overviews in Manski (2004) and Hurd (2009)). For example, when
asked for their expectations about the future of the stock market, respondents frequently
violate basic laws of probability or they provide focal point answers such as 50:50
(BinswangerSalm2014; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2000; Manski, 2004; Hurd, 2009; Bruine
de Bruin and Carman, 2012; Kleinjans and van Soest, 2014). In addition, non-response
tends to be concentrated among sub-groups who do not follow the development of the
stock market (Hurd, 2009), suggesting that stating beliefs requires significant cognitive
effort for people who are not accustomed to reflecting upon the stock market.2
Previously, such patterns have frequently been interpreted as cases of measurement
error (see, e.g., the discussion in Manski, 2004). However, while often observationally
equivalent to measurement error, the semantics of imprecise expectations is very dif-
ferent from the contexts in which measurement error is usually studied. In the case of
variables like past income, savings, or consumption, measurement error arises because of,
e.g., imperfect recall (Hoderlein andWinter, 2010) or incongruent definitions of precisely
defined “true” non-stochastic quantities. In the case of subjective expectations, however,
we conjecture that the precision and meaningfulness of expectation measures reflects
the structure of beliefs itself. In consequence, when attempting to predict household in-
vestment behavior, the degree of precision should be informative about the relevance of
expectations in the decision process. Specifically, we hypothesize that measures indica-
tive of more precise expectations should be associated with an increase in the explanatory
power of expectations for variation in portfolio decisions.
In sum, different pieces of evidence suggest that part of the population holds only
imprecise subjective stock market beliefs. We propose that this imprecision contains in-
formational content that will allow us to uncover heterogeneity in choice behavior. In
particular, we suggest that the degree of imprecision will allow us to evaluate to which
extent households’ stock market participation decisions are adequately described by the
simple model discussed above.
2 Similar patterns of imprecisemeasurements have been documented for risk preferences. von Gaudecker
et al. (2011) and Choi et al. (2014) show that for respondents with high socio-economic status, sequences
of lottery decisions are much more consistent with flexible parametric utility functions and the general-
ized axiom of revealed preferences, respectively. Put differently, risk preference parameters are much more
precisely measured for these subgroups.
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4.3.3 Econometric Specification
In econometric terms, a consequence of varying precision in expectations measures is
that " in (4.2) will be heteroskedastic, i.e., its variance will increase as subjective expec-
tations become noisier. Depending on the precise decision-making process, it may also
have group-specific means different from zero. For example, the most prevalent advice
by family and friends seems to be non-participation in the stock market (von Gaudecker,
2015). For the group of individuals who follow this advice, participation rates will be low
even if θ opt − f (X ta) takes on positive values on average. To capture these consequences,
we require an econometric specification where the predictions of the choice model (4.2)
interact with the extent of precision in subjective expectations data in a flexible way. The
double index binary choice model of Klein and Vella (2009) is ideally suited for the struc-
ture of our problem. The model obtains an estimate of the probability of stock market
participation by nonparametrically combining two linear indices.
We first aggregate µriskyt+1 −µsafet+1,σriskyt+1 ,γ, and X ta into one vector Xmod; Xmodβmod
approximates our choice model from 4.3.1.3 We will refer to Xmodβmod as the economic
model index in what follows. A second vector X sdp contains the variables related to the
subjective data’s precision. These will be quantitative and qualitative indicators as well as
covariates that we would expect to influence the “propensity to use economic reasoning”;
we allow the latter to overlap with the transaction cost proxies included in the economic
model index. Accordingly, we refer to X sdpβ sdp as the subjective data precision index.





 Xmodβmod, X sdpβ sdp = h Xmodβmod, X sdpβ sdp (4.3)
This structure is directly related to (4.2) in that the subjective data precision index fur-
ther parameterizes ", i.e., the random component is systematic to some extent. The func-
tion h(·, ·) provides a nonparametric link mapping the indices for the economic model
and subjective data precision into stock market participation probabilities.
To attain identification (up to location and scale) of the parameters βmod and β sdp,
we require that at least one continuous variable per index is excluded from the other in-
dex. In each index, we normalize the coefficients on one of these variables. The resulting
model satisfies the form in A5 of Klein and Vella (2009) without requiring reparame-
terization. Under assumptions given in Klein and Vella (2009)—mainly smoothness of
h(·, ·) and compact support of the covariates—the probability to participate in the stock
3We also experimented with calculating (4.1) and including it alongside X ta. This led to numerical
difficulties as the covariance matrix of the two indices was near-singular for a wide range of parameter







. The latter is likely responsible for the numerical problems; it is also the reason why
we use the standard deviation of beliefs instead of the variance.
4 Klein and Vella (2009) frame their discussion in terms of an estimator for a single-equation binary
response model with dummy endogenous variable when no instruments are present. A first application that
applies it directly to two indices is given in Maurer (2009).
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 Xmodβmod, X sdpβ sdp = fY=1 Xmodβmod, X sdpβ sdp · P Y = 1
f
 
Xmodβmod, X sdpβ sdp
 ,
(4.4)
where f (·) denotes the unconditional density of the bivariate index and fY=1(·) its den-
sity conditional on participation in the stock market. Kernel density estimators for these
quantities are obtained under a multi-stage local smoothing procedure to achieve a suffi-





























where τˆi denotes a smooth trimming function ensuring that densities do not become









N to its true value. While the parameter values do not allow for a direct
interpretation, various quantities of interest like average partial effects can be computed
with little effort.
In sum, when it comes to generating choice behavior, our empirical model allows
for a flexible interplay between traditional economic parameters and proxies for their
precision. In particular, it will allow an analysis of how marginal changes in model pa-




Table 4.2 presents parameter estimates for the coefficients of the main specification. In
the economic model index, we normalize the coefficient on µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 to 1, thus
expressing the remainder of βmod relative to subjective excess return expectations. In
the subjective data precision index, we set the coefficient on the absolute difference
between the belief measures to -1. Larger values in this index would thus be interpreted
as indicative of more precise data. As we will discuss in detail below, the link function
h(·, ·) is (close to) monotonically increasing in the economic model index as well as in
the subjective data precision index. This allows us to infer the direction of partial effects
from the coefficient estimates.
The coefficients in both indices are estimated with reasonable precision; their signs
and relative magnitudes are plausible given the aforementioned shape of the link func-
tion and the scaling of the variables (see Table 4.1). In particular, all variables with exclu-
sion restrictions have the expected signs and most of them are significant. The economic
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Table 4.2. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.76 0.29 · ·
Risk aversion -7.90 1.78 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 59.04 27.55
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 29.23 21.97
Experimental tasks difficult · · 54.88 19.70
Experimental tasks obscure · · 15.25 18.21
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 20.16 5.93 -19.00 21.21
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 42.73 9.14 -91.51 36.79
Financial wealth missing 30.06 7.28 -58.24 27.80
Net income > 2500 € 7.32 2.65 28.48 11.48
Net income missing -6.37 4.14 -4.85 12.86
High education 3.52 2.96 -63.59 19.18
30 < Age ≤ 50 11.78 5.55 22.90 16.86
50 < Age ≤ 65 7.24 5.53 -16.56 15.15
Age > 65 -0.45 5.23 -22.80 16.33
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The table shows coefficient estimates for the double index binary choice
model of Klein and Vella (2009); see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description. The dependent variable is a household’s
stock market participation decision, a binary variable equalling 1 in case the household reports holding any investments,
and 0 otherwise. Columns 2 and 3 present estimates of the coefficients and standard errors for the variables contained
in the economic model index. Columns 4 and 5 present estimates for the variables contained in the subjective data
precision index. In the first index, we normalize the coefficient of the mean excess return to 1, whereas we normalize
the coefficient on the absolute difference between the belief measures to -1 in the second index.
model index increases in the level of the expected excess returns; it decreases in the
standard deviation of returns and in risk aversion. The subjective data precision index
increases with all 4 qualitative proxies and, by construction, decreases with the absolute
difference between the belief measures.
Both indices vary significantly with a number of the common covariates. For exam-
ple, financial wealth is positively related to both indices. This is consistent with wealthy
households facing lower transaction costs, while at the same time having stronger in-
centives to form an opinion about stock market developments. Interestingly, education
seems to mostly work through the subjective data precision index, but it has little impact
on the economic model index.
For presenting the results of semi- and nonparametric methods, it is particularly
important to clarify the support of the data, which in our case refers to the two indices.
Figure 4.1 shows a contour plot of the joint density of the estimated indices. We limit the
area of Figure 4.1 and of all subsequent plots to the rectangle spanned by the 5%− 95%
quantiles of the marginal distributions of both indices. With a correlation coefficient of
0.63, the indices are characterized by a pronounced positive correlation. Note that this
correlation does not arise purely mechanically due to the previously noted influence of
wealth on both indices – in a model that drops all variables common to both indices
(described in the next section), we find the same pattern.
The left panel of Figure 4.2 plots the link function h(·, ·), i.e., the predicted probabil-
ity of stock market participation, for varying levels of the economic model and subjective
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.
Figure 4.1. Joint density of the two indices
data precision indices. Three features of the plot stand out: First, predicted stock market
participation rates vary substantially, ranging from single-digit values to more than 70%.
Second, participation rates in general increase monotonically in both the index for the
economic model and the subjective data precision index. Third and most importantly,
the effects are highly non-linear and interact strongly. In particular, stock market partic-
ipation is much more responsive to changes in the economic model’s ingredients at high























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision index. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index (43 and 223). Ranges are limited to the interval
between the 5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.2. Predicted probability to hold risky assets
To illustrate the last point more clearly, the second panel in Figure 4.2 extracts two
slices from the first panel. The solid line shows the average response of stock market
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participation to variation in the model index at the 90%-quantile of the subjective data
precision index. There is a pronounced gradient in the middle region, causing predicted
risky asset participation to rise from just below 20% to 70%. The dashed line plots the
same relation for the 10%-quantile of precision in subjective data. Again, predicted stock
market participation varies in the economicmodel index as expected, but to amuch lesser
extent. In particular, even for the highest levels of the economic model index, the pre-
dicted probability of participation does not rise above 30%. The discrepancy in shapes of
the two lines highlights the importance of precision in subjective data in understanding
the relationship between the primitives of economic models and choices.
We calculate average partial effects to quantify the dependence between individ-
ual covariates and stock market participation probabilities. In Table 4.3, we show how
changes in covariates affect participation through either the economic model or subjec-
tive data precision index. We also show the combined effect that operates through both
indices simultaneously. To calculate average partial effects, we increase continuous vari-
ables by one standard deviation. For binary variables, we assign individuals in the left-out
category a value of 1.
For the variables solely included in the economic model index, the average partial
effects of expected excess return and risk aversion are somewhat larger than the effect
of a change in the expected standard deviation of returns. An increase in the expected
excess return by one standard deviation is associated with an increase of 3.4 percent-
age points in the probability to hold investments. Comparable increases in the expected
standard deviation and risk aversion reduce the predicted participation rate by 1.4 and
3.8 percentage points, respectively. In the subjective data precision index, a one standard
deviation increase in the absolute difference between the two belief measures reduces
predicted participation by 1.4 percentage points. Increases in either of the 4 remain-
ing proxies by one standard deviation increase the propensity to participate by between
0.4 and 2 percentage points. If one thinks of the different proxies in terms of a factor
structure, varying the underlying factor would likely yield effects of the same order of
magnitude as for beliefs or risk aversion.
The effects of financial wealth tend to work through both indices, increasing the
propensity to participate in the stock market through the economic model index as well
as the subjective data precision index. In contrast, education seems to affect participation
mainly through the subjective data precision index.
In sum, this section indicates that respondents’ beliefs and risk attitudes are indeed
predictive of economic choices. However, the extent to which this is the case varies
strongly in the population. Hence, precision in the primitives of the economic model
can be used to uncover heterogeneity in its explanatory power.
4.4.2 Robustness
To illustrate the robustness of our results to alternative specifications of both the eco-
nomic model and the subjective data precision index, we now present an overview of a
number of additional analyses. Section 4.B of the Internet Appendix contains all tables,
figures, and additional information.
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Table 4.3. Average partial effects
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.034 · 0.034
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.014 · -0.014
Risk aversion -0.038 · -0.038
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.014 -0.014
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.014 -0.014
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.007 -0.007
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.019 -0.019
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.004 -0.004
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.099 0.017 0.098
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.247 0.119 0.373
Financial wealth missing 0.171 0.068 0.219
Net income > 2500 € 0.037 -0.028 0.009
Net income missing -0.031 0.005 -0.027
High education 0.017 0.080 0.098
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.055 -0.025 0.025
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.035 0.020 0.054
Age > 65 -0.002 0.027 0.019
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The table presents average partial effects of the Klein and Vella (2009) model;
see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description. The effects are calculated for a change of 1 standard deviation in continuous
variables. For binary variables, we calculate the effect of assigning individuals in the left-out category a value of 1.
No transaction cost proxies. Our main specification includes several covariates that
proxy transaction costs. Some of them—financial wealth in particular—have strong ef-
fects on stock market participation through both the economic model index and the sub-
jective data precision index. To investigate whether the predicted interactions between
the economic model and imprecise measures are driven by these sociodemographics only,
we estimate one specification without all of the corresponding proxies, i.e., we only in-
clude beliefs, risk preferences, and subjective data precision proxies. Except for lower
predicted levels of stock market participation at high values of the model index, the
overall results on h(·, ·) look very similar. Naturally, the partial effects increase.
Mean beliefs only. In this specification, we restrict the model index to consist of
expected excess returns only, which gives it an interpretable scale. Section 4.B.2 of the
Internet Appendix shows that the gist of our main results is present even in this stripped-
down version. The relationship between beliefs and stock market participation is essen-
tially flat at the 10th percentile of the subjective data precision index, while the proba-
bility to hold stocks doubles along the beliefs distribution at the 90th percentile of the
subjective data precision index. This doubling is concentrated around expected excess
returns of zero, whereas the relationship is flat at both extremes of the beliefs distri-
butions. The pattern illustrates the usefulness of our semiparametric approach; typical
parametric models such as Logit or Probit would yield the steepest gradient to lie at the
right tail of the index’ support instead of the center.
Additional covariates.We also check the other extreme and employ a “kitchen-sink”-
type approach, including binary variables for gender, having children, and being married
in both indices along with the variables from our main specification. It turns out, however,
that none of these is significantly associated with either the index of the economic model
or the subjective data precision index. In consequence, their inclusion does not affect our
results.
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Discarding individuals with missing data on financial wealth. In our main speci-
fication, we included dummies for financial wealth terciles and for whether information
on financial wealth was missing. Since wealth is among the strongest drivers of stock
market participation in our model, it is possible that inclusion of respondents with miss-
ing information on portfolio value affects our results. To address this concern, we es-
timate our main specification only with respondents who provided all components of
financial wealth. The results are very similar. In particular, the shape of h(·, ·) is virtually
unchanged. Some of the average partial effects of beliefs and preferences slightly change
in magnitude, but all of them qualitatively confirm the main results.
Alternative belief measure.We showed ourmain results using stated beliefs over the
future development of the Amsterdam Exchange Index (AEX). While it is plausible that
expectations over a composite index with high media exposure are a good proxy for “the”
risky asset in ourmodel, it is still conceivable that our results are biased due to this specific
choice. We therefore elicited the same set of belief variables for the future stock return
of Philips N.V., one of the largest publicly traded companies of the Netherlands. As one
would expect for a single stock with additional idiosyncratic risk, average partial effects
relating to the moments of the belief distribution become weaker. The general shape of
the link function and the essence of the remaining results, however, is unchanged.
Disaggregated risk aversion measures. By averaging over three distinct variables,
we employed a particularly simple aggregation procedure for the risk aversion measure
used in our main analysis. When including the three variables separately in the model
index, aversion to risk in financial matters emerges as its most important component
(Section 4.B.10 of the Internet Appendix). The remainder of our results is not affected.
Interaction between risk aversion and subjective uncertainty. The main specifica-
tion contains risk aversion and the standard deviation of the subjective belief distribution
as separate variables. To investigate whether increased subjective uncertainty is more
important for relatively risk averse subjects, we estimate an additional specification in-
cluding their interaction in the economic model index. The results in Section 4.B.13 of
the Internet Appendix closely resemble those for the main model, and they indicate that
the effect of subjective uncertainty does not vary with risk aversion.
Raw returns instead of excess returns. Our theoretical framework suggests em-
ploying subjective expected excess returns to predict stock market participation. As dis-
cussed in Section 4.2, our subjects are simultaneously rather pessimistic about the future
returns of the market and relatively optimistic about those of a standard savings account.
In consequence, a large fraction of our sample expects negative excess returns. While this
feature of our data is in line with previous literature, we estimate an additional specifi-
cation replacing expected excess returns with expected returns to assess the robustness
of our results. They are essentially unaffected.
Financial literacy. As mentioned above, a lack of financial literacy may lead sub-
jects to base their participation decision not on expectations about risk and return but
on alternative rationales. To assess how our results relate to variation in the respondents’
levels of financial literacy, we ran an additional survey in October 2014. In this survey, we
asked subjects a set of questions to determine their familiarity with basic financial con-
cepts (Section 4.B.15 of the Appendix contains the exact wording). We then used their
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responses to create binary variables (1 = false answer, 0 = correct answer) and included
them in a new specification as additional covariates in both indices. As Section 4.B.15 of
the Appendix shows, our results remain robust. In addition and in confirmation of our
results, most of the average partial effects of the precision proxies are of similar magni-
tude as in our main specification, suggesting that the precision proxies we employ do
not merely pick up a lack of financial literacy.
Alternative ways of calculating the moments of belief distributions. We arrived
at our individual-level measures of µAEXt+1 and σ
AEX
t+1 by fitting log-normal distributions
to respondents’ stated cumulative distribution functions. We obtain very similar results
when we estimate the moments assuming uniformly distributed expectations within bins
(Section 4.B.11 of the Internet Appendix) or when we follow Bellemare et al. (2012) in
approximating each respondent’s distribution using a spline interpolation method (Sec-
tion 4.B.12).
Alternative ways of calculating the absolute difference between belief measures.
We constructed a quantitative proxy for imprecise measures as the absolute difference
between the point estimate and the mean of the subjective belief distribution. Some
subjects, however, may have had the mode or median in mind when providing a point
estimate (Delavande and Rohwedder, 2011). Sections 4.B.3 and 4.B.4 of the Internet
Appendix show that we obtain quantitatively and qualitatively very similar results when
we define the absolute difference based on the median or mode of the belief distribution.
To give respondents the benefit of the doubt, Section 4.B.5 estimates one specification
where we pick the moment (mean, median, mode) of the belief distribution that mini-
mizes the absolute difference to the point estimate. Again, our findings are not affected.
4.4.3 Specification with Less Customized Data
Our analyses employ very detailed data on respondents’ stock market expectations based
on an incentivized Online Experiment. Our proxies for the precision of expectations in-
clude a quantitative variable derived from repeated belief measurements and several
qualitative indicators. In many surveys, asking for information this detailed is either im-
possible or impractical. We now evaluate the applicability of our empirical approach to
situations with less customized data.
In the model index, we replace the mean of the log-normal belief distribution derived
from the ball allocation task by individuals’ point estimates. We drop the standard devia-
tion of beliefs and use aversion towards risks in general instead of our composite variable
(see Section 4.A.1 of the Internet Appendix for a detailed description of all measures).
In the subjective data precision index, we only keep the answers to the qualitative ques-
tions which asked respondents about the difficulty and clarity of our survey. We retain
all sociodemographic covariates. We then re-run our main analyses using this limited set
of variables.
Figure 4.3 illustrates that the main results for this model are broadly similar to those
of our main specification.5 As the left panel indicates, the predicted probability of holding
risky assets strongly varies with both model indices. Importantly, we find strong variation
5 Section 4.C of the Internet Appendix provides the full set of figures and tables for this model with
reduced data requirements.























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for
the 10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. These estimations are based on a limited
set of variables. Ranges are limited to the interval between the 5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal
distributions.
Figure 4.3. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, specification with less customized data
in the gradient of the economic model even with these much coarser data: While the
probability of investing in the stock market is sensitive to changes in the economic model
index at high values of the data precision index, the relationship is essentially flat for low
levels. The average partial effects in Table 4.4 again suggest that beliefs and willingness
to take risks positively affect stock market participation. The same holds for the precision
proxies. All magnitudes are roughly similar to our main specification.
Table 4.4. Average partial effects, specification with less customized data
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs (direct question): Log expected excess return 0.033 · 0.033
Aversion to risks in general -0.029 · -0.029
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.034 -0.034
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.009 -0.009
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.086 0.029 0.102
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.063 0.338 0.396
Financial wealth missing 0.105 0.100 0.204
Net income > 2500 € 0.026 -0.009 0.017
Net income missing -0.112 0.067 -0.057
High education -0.004 0.119 0.115
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.102 -0.091 0.014
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.054 0.013 0.071
Age > 65 -0.039 0.068 0.025
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The table presents average partial effects of the Klein and Vella (2009) model with a limited
number of variables. The effects are calculated for a change of 1 standard deviation in continuous variables. For binary variables, we
calculate the effect of assigning individuals in the left-out category a value of 1.
These results entail two consequences: On the one hand, they suggest that imprecise
measures will also interfere with our understanding of stock market participation deci-
sions when working with simple measures of beliefs and risk preferences. On the other
hand, they suggest that our empirical approach to making productive use of imprecise
measures of this kind does not seem to rely on very detailed data to work.
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4.5 Discussion and Conclusions
Attempts to measure subjective stock market expectations have dramatically increased
over the last two decades. By and large, the results have been encouraging, but obvi-
ous signs of poor data quality remain for large fractions of the population regardless of
particular survey devices (Manski, 2004; Hurd, 2009; Kleinjans and van Soest, 2014).
When these measures have been employed to predict portfolio choice behavior (e.g.,
Hurd and Rohwedder, 2011; Hurd et al., 2011; Kézdi and Willis, 2011; Hudomiet et al.,
2011; Huck et al., 2014), significant correlations in the expected direction have emerged.
Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that these are not of the magnitude economists might
have hoped for. For example, the abstract of AmeriksEtAl2016 notes that “estimated
risk tolerance, expected return, and perceived risk have economically and statistically
significant explanatory power for the distribution of stock shares. Relative to each other,
the magnitudes are in proportion with the predictions of benchmark theories, but they
are all substantially attenuated.” In this paper, we have explored a mechanism that can
explain both facts. We have argued that differences in the “propensity to use economic
reasoning” may drive heterogeneity in the precision of subjective expectations data and
explain why the explanatory power of portfolio choice models has been moderate on
average.
While the idea of heterogeneous decision rules is certainly not new
(BinswangerSalm2014; e.g., Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; Kahneman, 2011, among
many others), we are the first to suggest that the degree of precision in subjective
expectations data can be used to uncover such heterogeneity. To explore this link
empirically, we have used a semiparametric double index model due to Klein and Vella
(2009) on a dataset specifically collected for this purpose. Our results show that stock
market participation reacts strongly to the primitives of an economic model (preferences,
beliefs, and transaction costs) when subjective data are measured with high precision.
When measurement precision is low, there is hardly any reaction at all. This pattern
obtains in a wide variety of specification choices, including a setting where we restrict
ourselves to variables that are available in many datasets.
A key implication of our findings is that “low quality” of subjective beliefs data should
not be treated as a standard measurement error problem, because the strong variation in
the precision or meaningfulness of expectations measures actually reflects behaviorally
relevant heterogeneity in choice behavior, rather than erroneous reporting. Three pieces
of evidence lend further support to our interpretation of the results as reflecting heteroge-
neous decision modes rather than attenuation bias resulting from standardmeasurement
error. First, if we were dealing with standard versions of measurement error in beliefs
(e.g., due to carelessness of some respondents in filling out the survey), taking averages
of multiple measurements with uncorrelated idiosyncratic variation should increase the
predictive power of expectations. A simple exercise shows that such a pattern does not
obtain in our data. We run OLS regressions of stock market participation on convex com-
binations of our two belief measures (the results are unchanged if we add controls). In
Section 4.D of the Internet Appendix, we show that the maximum R2 is reached close to
the point where all the weight is on the mean from the ball allocation task. Hence, adding
the second measure hardly helps at all. Second, in all our specifications the likelihood to
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participate in the stock market was lower for households entertaining imprecise expec-
tations. This suggests that the patterns we found do not merely reflect attenuation bias
due to respondents’ carelessness or differential effort when responding to the belief ques-
tions. If some subjects gave random answers which were uncorrelated with portfolio al-
locations, participation rates should be the same on average. Third, ArmantierEtAl2015
show related patterns for subjective inflation expectations in an experimental setting –
financially literate individuals react much more strongly to their expectations than oth-
ers. Similarly, in an experimental portfolio choice problem, Huck et al. (2014) show that
the investment behavior of less sophisticated households is less responsive to exogenous
changes in incentives.
Our method is applicable to a wide range of settings where subjective data are
used, as long as the dataset contains some individual-level information on the preci-
sion or meaningfulness of the respective variables. For example, we noted above that the
precision of individual-level risk preference parameters obtained from experiments via
revealed-preference paradigms varies tremendously in heterogeneous populations (von
Gaudecker et al., 2011; Choi et al., 2014). We have shown how the individual-level preci-
sion in data on structural parameters can be used when these parameters are employed
to explain economically interesting outcomes. Doing so should help dampen the hostility
of economists to subjective data (Manski, 2004) that has arisen largely because of per-
ceived data quality. We have turned this argument around and shown that once there is
direct information on data precision at the individual level, it can be used to learn about
the economic mechanism of interest.
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Appendix 4.A Extended data description
4.A.1 Variable definitions and descriptives
4.A.1.1 Subjective expectations of stock market returns
AEX return - Ball allocation task. In August 2013, we asked respondents to describe
their expectations for the one-year return of the Amsterdam Exchange Index (AEX). To
elicit the full distribution of individual expectations, we employed a variation of the
procedure presented in Delavande and Rohwedder (2008), which was explicitly de-
veloped for usage in Internet experiments and pays particular attention to the cogni-
tive burden placed on heterogeneous subject pools. We asked respondents to imagine
that they invested 100 € into an exchange traded AEX index fund today and to think
about the likely value of this investment in one year. To aid respondents’ thinking pro-
cess and ensure comprehension of the task, the instructions clarified what an index
fund is and provided an explicit formula for the value of the investment in one year
(value in a year = 100 €- 0.30 € (fees) + change in the AEX index).
The figure shows the final step of the belief eliciation procedure. Respon-
dents used the slider above to allocate 100 balls to the 8 bins below. The
figure shows both the remaining balls and the number of balls assigned to
each return interval in the previous steps.
Figure 4.4. Visual interface to elicit belief distribution (final step)
We then provided respondents with a visual interface that employed an iterative pro-
cedure to allow them to state their beliefs as accurately as possible (see Figure 4.4). To
familiarize subjects with the visual interface, we showed them an introductory video be-
fore asking them for their beliefs about the stock market. The video used the example of
expected annual rainy days in London to describe the intuition behind the ball allocation
procedure and guided subjects through the controls of the interface.
In the first step of the iterative procedure, the interface presented all possible values
of the investment as two intervals, [0, 100] and (100,∞). We asked participants to use
a slider to allocate 100 balls to indicate their relative confidence that the final value of
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the investment would fall into either of these intervals. We then split up the interval
(100,∞) into (100, 105] and (105,∞), and we asked subjects to re-allocate the balls
from the previous interval to this finer grid. This procedure continued successively un-
til subjects had distributed all balls into 6 interior bins covering intervals of 5 € each
and two exterior bins covering the intervals [0, 85] and (115,∞). Figure 4.5 shows the
resulting distribution of balls for each interval expressed in terms of expected returns.
While the exterior bins contained only a small number of balls for the large majority














































Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The picture shows Kernel density
estimates of the distribution of probabilites for each of the 8 return intervals.
Figure 4.5. Distribution of probabilities within bins
The iterative procedure provides an intuitively simple way of eliciting beliefs and
the resulting distribution of balls lends itself to a straightforward interpretation as a his-
togram. One of its desirable properties is that it does not ask respondents for cumulative
probabilities. In contrast, standard survey questions based on the elicitation of points
on a cumulative probability distribution often yield logically inconsistent responses due
to frequent monotonicity violations. This regularly forces researchers to discard large
amounts of data, thereby potentially introducing severe selection effects into the empir-
ical analyses (see, e.g., Manski, 2004; Hurd et al., 2011).
To obtain estimates of the mean and variance of individual belief distributions, we
employ a procedure similar to Hurd et al. (2011). We first cumulated the number of
balls each respondent assigned to the bins to arrive at a discrete cumulative distribution
function. We then used the 7 interior boundary points (b) and the associated values of
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over µ andσ, our estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the repondent’s belief
distribution. On average, respondents expect a mean return of 2.01% and a standard
deviation of 6.25%. Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of estimated mean returns and the
distribution of estimated standard deviations. As is evident from the two distributions,
subjects have very heterogenuous expectations regarding both the expected return of the
AEX as well as its expected standard deviation.








Subjective beliefs for AEX return: µt+1








Subjective beliefs for AEX standard deviation: σt+1
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure 4.6. Distribution of expected mean and standard deviation of returns
To financially incentive the task, we used the binarized scoring rule of Hossain and
Okui (2013). Subjects could either earn 100€ or 0€, depending on their stated beliefs,
the actually realized value of a 100 € investment into the AEX after one year, and the
outcome of a random draw. For each subject, we computed the sum of the squared de-




(bi − 100× 1i)2, where 1i equalled 1 if the realized value of the investment
fell into bin i and 0 otherwise. We then drew a random number from U[1, 20.000]. If that
random number turned out to be larger (smaller) than the sum of squared deviations,
the participant received 100 (0) €.
AEX return - One-shot estimate. In September 2013, we asked our full set of re-
spondents for a second, this time non-incentivized, estimate of the one-year return of
the AEX using a one-shot question similar to those commonly employed in large-scale
surveys:
Please consider the Dutch stock market. The AEX index aggregates the stock
prices of many of the largest Dutch companies. Now consider an investment
fund tracking the AEX index, i.e. this investment exactly moves up and down
with the AEX after subtracting rather small fees. If you invested 100 € in such
a fund today, the amount of money you would have in a year from now will be:
value in a year = 100 € − 0.30 € (fees) + change in the AEX index
What do you think will be this value in a year from now? Please type in your
estimate (in Euros).
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Figure 4.7 shows the distribution of expected returns implied by subjects’ responses
to this question. With an average expected return of 4.76%, subjects’ point estimates are
more optimistic than themean estimates from the visual task. As is often the case in large-
scale representative surveys, we observe a number of outliers in the unrestricted point
estimates. Many of these are likely due to typing mistakes or lack of comprehension.
Thus, before calculating returns, we winsorize the point estimates at the values of a
100€ investment into the AEX at the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles of its historical return
distribution (49.6 € and 151.3 €). This affected 99 responses.







Subjective beliefs (direct question): Expected return
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure 4.7. Distribution of one-shot estimates for return of AEX
Joint distribution. Figure 4.8 shows the joint distribution of the mean estimate from
the visual task and the direct estimate from the one shot question. With standard devi-
ations of 6.19% and 17.47%, respectively, the distribution of mean estimates from the
visual task is substantially less dispersed than the distribution of direct estimates.





















Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure 4.8. Joint distribution of both average belief measures
4.A Extended data description | 155
Comparison to historical distribution of AEX returns. Figure 4.9 plots the histor-
ical distribution of (inflation-adjusted) AEX returns alongside the average probabilities
expected by our sample respondents. Respondents considered returns at both ends of the
spectrum of the intervals we provided, i.e., in excess of +15% as well as below −15%,
far less likely than what has historically been observed. For example, while our average
repondent expects less than a 1 in 20 chance of observing returns below −15%, the

































































Subjective and empirical AEX distribution
Subjective probability
Empirical frequency
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure 4.9. Expected and historical distribution of AEX
Alternative belief measure - Philips N.V. As part of the survey in August 2013, we
also asked our respondents to use the visual interface to express their beliefs for the
future development of Philips N.V., one of the largest publicly traded companies of the
Netherlands. Figure 4.10 shows the distributions of the mean and standard deviation
our respondents expect, calculated in the same manner as the moments of the belief
distribution for the AEX. The median respondent expects a mean return of 1.534% for
Philips, only minimally different from the median expectation of 1.562% for the AEX.
The joint density in Figure 4.12 shows that the correlation between the mean beliefs
for both assets is fairly high (ρ = 0.36). The correlation between the expected standard
deviations is of similar magnitude (ρ = 0.35).
Figure 4.11 compares the average probabilities expected by our sample respondents
to the historical distribution of (inflation-adjusted) Philips returns. Similar to the results
presented in Figure 4.9 for the expected returns of the AEX, we see that respondents
consider extreme returns for Philips much less likely than what has historically been
observed.
In September, we also asked respondents for a one-shot estimate for the return of
Philips alongside their one-shot estimate for the return of the AEX. Figure 4.13 shows
the distribution of their answers.
Return to savings account - One-shot estimate. In August 2013, we asked respon-
dents for an estimate of the return of a one-year investment into a standard savings
account:
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Subjective beliefs for Philips return: µt+1








Subjective beliefs for Philips standard deviation: σt+1
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.

































































Subjective and empirical Philips distribution
Subjective probability
Empirical frequency
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure 4.11. Expected and historical distribution of philips
Suppose you invested 100€ into a standard savings account with a large Dutch
bank. Then, in a year from now, the total amount of money you would have
will be:
value in a year = 100 € + interest payments
What do you think will be this value in a year from now? Please type in your
estimate (in Euros).
To ensure comprehension of the question, the computer screen also contained a link
with more detailed information and the example of a savings account with Rabobank
(Rabo SpaarRekening). Figure 4.14 shows the distribution of savings estimates. Some-
what surprisingly, subjects’ average return estimate for the savings account is 3.35% and
thus larger than their average estimate for the AEX in the visual task, though it is smaller
than the average point estimate for the AEX. Similar to the one-shot AEX estimates, we
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Figure 4.12. Joint density of mean beliefs for AEX and Philips








Subjective beliefs Philips (direct question): Expected return
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure 4.13. Distribution of one-shot estimates for return of philips
winsorize point estimates for the savings account at the 5 and 95% percentiles of the
sample distribution before calculating returns.
4.A.1.2 Proxies for the precision of subjective data
Our rich data allow us to employ a number of different variables to proxy for the precision
of subjective data. We use 5 proxies in total, 1 based on the consistency in stated beliefs,
2 based on subjects’ confidence in their estimates, and 2 based on the subjects’ perception
of our survey.
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Subjective beliefs for return of savings account: µt+1
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure 4.14. Distribution of one-shot estimates for savings account
Consistency in beliefs. As discussed in Section 4.A.1.1, we used the survey in
September 2014 to ask our full set of respondents for a second estimate of the one-
year return of the AEX. We use the absolute difference between the response to this
question and the mean belief from the visual task as a quantitative proxy for the preci-
sion of subjective data. Figure 4.15 shows a histogram of the absolute differences. On
average, subjects’ second estimate deviates from the mean estimate from the visual task
by a considerable margin, 11.20 percentage points. This seems particularly large when
compared to the average expected standard deviation of returns from the ball allocation
task (6.25%). Note that these differences are not artifacts of the method we employ to
estimate mean beliefs. Other methods, which we describe in Sections 4.B.11 and 4.B.12
of this appendix, yield very similar results.










Absolute difference between belief measures
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure 4.15. Distribution of absolute differences between mean belief in visual task and point
estimate
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Confidence in estimates. Following the elicitation of the point estimates for the
expected returns of the AEX and the savings account, we asked respondents how certain
they felt about their responses:
Please use the slider to indicate how certain you are that the value in a year will
equal your estimate. 0 indicates “not certain at all” and 10 means “absolutely
certain”.
We conjecture that respondents with little confidence in their own estimates (e.g., be-
cause they know that they did not expendmuch cognitive effort into developing their pre-
diction) provide estimates that are noisy and hence not very predictive of actual choices.
Figure 4.16 shows histograms for the answers to both questions. Respondents seem to
be on average less confident in their estimates for the return of the AEX as compared to
their estimates for the saving account. For the empirical analyses, we invert the responses
so that larger values correspond to a lack of confidence and scale the resulting variables
to range between 0 and 1.











Confidence in AEX return estimate











Confidence in sav. acc. return estimate
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure 4.16. Distribution of slider values for confidence in estimates
Difficulty. Following the survey in August 2013 and September 2013, we asked sub-
jects to use five-point scales to indicate how difficult they considered the preceding belief
elicitation task. We conjecture that answers by respondents who found it very hard to
detail their stock market expectations are likely to exhibit a high variability. Figure 4.17
shows the distribution of the average of the responses in both surveys. Respondents vary
greatly in their assessment of the tasks’ difficulties. While some considered it simple, oth-
ers seemed to find the task very demanding. We scale the average to range between 0
and 1 for our empirical analysis.
Clarity. In August 2013 and September 2013, we also asked subjects to use five-point
scales to indicate how vague/obscure they found our questions. We expect that limited
comprehension of the task on the side of respondents will lead to noisier measures of
expectations. Figure 4.18 shows a histogram of the average response to this question in
both surveys. For the empirical analysis, we also scale the average to range between 0
and 1.
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure 4.17. Distribution of assessments of difficulty








Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure 4.18. Distribution of assessments of obscurity
4.A.1.3 Risk preferences
We use a composite variable to measure risk aversion. To construct this variable, we
ask respondents two questions on their self-assessed willingness to take risks and we
elicit one quantitative measure based on hypothetical lottery choices. In our empirical
analyses, we use the average of the standardized values of all three measures to proxy
for risk aversion, suitably coded so that larger values of individual variables as well as
well as the composite variable correspond to larger values of risk aversion.
Risk questions. The subjective self-assessments directly ask for an individual’s will-
ingness to take risks, both in general terms and in financial matters:
“Different people have different opinions and characteristics. We are interested
in how you describe yourself. In general, to what extent are you willing to take
risks? You can answer this question by clicking somewhere on the slider (0-10).”
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“And, in general, to what extent are you willing to take risks in financial mat-
ters? You can answer this question by clicking somewhere on the slider (0-10).”
Risk lottery. We derive a quantitative measure of risk aversion from a series of five
interdependent hypothetical binary lottery choices, a format commonly referred to as
the “staircase procedure”. In each of the questions, participants had to decide between a
50/50 lottery to win 300 €or nothing and a varying safe payment. The questions were
interdependent in the sense that the choice of a lottery resulted in an increase of the
safe amount being offered in the next question, while the choice of the safe payment
resulted in a decrease of the safe amount in the next question. For instance, the fixed
payment in the first question was 160 €. In case the respondent chose the lottery, the
safe payment increased to 240 €in the second question. In case the respondent chose
the safe payment, the next question’s fixed payment was reduced to 80 €. By adjusting
the fixed payment according to previous choices, the questions allow for a relatively
fine quantitative assessment of an individual’s attitudes towards risk. With 32 possible
outcomes evenly spaced between 0 and 320 €, the procedure can in principle pin down
a respondent’s certainty equivalent to a range of 10 euros. Because of the task’s abstract
nature and our heterogeneous subject pool, we accompanied each lottery decision with
a visual representation of the current lottery to ensure comprehension, see Figure 4.19.
The above variables resemble the variables developed for the “Preference SurveyMod-
ule” in Falk et al. (2014) to measure economic preference parameters in large-scale sur-
veys. Falk et al. (2014) use an experimental validation procedure to select behaviorally
valid survey items to measure economic preferences. Dohmen et al. (2011) show that re-
sponses to our qualitative survey items correlate with many risky field choices, including
stockholdings. Thus, even though the questions we asked were not financially incen-
tivized, they are known to be behaviorally valid and were explicitly developed for the
purpose of large-scale studies like ours.
In Figure 4.20, we show histograms of the indiviual components as well the composite
variable. There is substantial variation in the answers to all three questions. In the lottery
task, most of our subjects end up with estimated certainty equivalents below 160 €,
suggesting that the majority of our subjects is risk averse.
4.A.1.4 Transaction cost proxies / sociodemographics
Portfolio value. LISS collects detailed information on the value of a respondent’s finan-
cial assets. To calculate an estimate of the total value of a respondent’s portfolio, we sum
the amounts held as investments and those in the bank, which we set to 0 in case the
household reported negative values. LISS allows respondents to provide either continu-
ous or interval statements for each category of assets. To calculate the overall portfolio
value, we replace categorical answers by the midpoint of the respective interval. For ex-
ample, we set an answer like “7.500 to 10.000 €” to 8.750 €. For all respondents, we
use the most detailed level of information available. For investments, LISS asks both for
the aggregate value of investments as well as for the value of the subcategories (stocks,
funds, and other investments). We use the more detailed data if available, and we use
the answer to the aggregate question otherwise.
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The figure shows the visual interface accompanying one of the lottery decisions.
Figure 4.19. Graphical illustration of hypothetical lottery choice











Willingness to take risks in general










Willingness to take financial risks







Certainty equivalent in staircase lottery task











Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure 4.20. Distribution of risk aversion components and aggregate variable
Employing the resulting estimate of a respondent’s portfolio value, we create categor-
ical variables for each of the sample’s portfolio value terciles. Some respondents prefer
4.A Extended data description | 163
not to answer the questions concerning their financial situation, so we create one more
binary variable for missing portfolio values.
Net household income. Using LISS’s information, we create a binary variable for net
household income in excess of 2.500 €, the median income of households providing an
answer to the income question. We create a further dummy for households with missing
values for income (≈ 7% of the sample).
Education. LISS asks respondents for the highest educational degree. In our main
estimation, we include a dummy variable for respondents who either report having a
university degree or higher vocational education.
Age. Using LISS’s data on birthyears, we create binary variables for several different
age groups (31 to 50, 51 to 65, and for respondents older than 65).
4.A.2 Correlations







































































































































































































































Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1 -0.19 -0.11 -0.21 -0.16 -0.24 -0.17 -0.18 0.00 0.18 0.13 0.15 -0.02 0.09 -0.03
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 · 1 0.01 0.25 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.08 -0.03 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.00
Risk aversion · · 1 0.06 0.33 0.22 0.20 0.13 -0.00 -0.07 -0.12 -0.16 -0.09 0.01 0.14
Abs. diff. between belief measures · · · 1 0.13 0.23 0.08 0.11 -0.05 -0.20 -0.14 -0.19 -0.01 -0.06 0.05
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · · · 1 0.52 0.23 0.20 -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 -0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.04
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · · · · 1 0.24 0.28 -0.07 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.07 -0.04 0.12
Experimental tasks difficult · · · · · · 1 0.48 0.01 -0.04 -0.13 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 0.18
Experimental tasks obscure · · · · · · · 1 -0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.05 -0.07 0.13
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] · · · · · · · · 1 -0.37 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.05
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) · · · · · · · · · 1 0.20 0.17 -0.13 0.14 0.05
Net income > 2500 € · · · · · · · · · · 1 0.23 0.10 0.03 -0.10
High education · · · · · · · · · · · 1 0.05 -0.01 -0.10
30 < Age ≤ 50 · · · · · · · · · · · · 1 -0.47 -0.42
50 < Age ≤ 65 · · · · · · · · · · · · · 1 -0.46
Age > 65 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 1
Significant correlations (p < 0.01) printed in bold.
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4.A.3 Correlates of beliefs
Table 4.6 presents regressions of various measures of expectations on sociodemographic
covariates. In column (1), the dependent variable is the mean belief from the ball allo-
cation task, in column (2) it is the corresponding standard deviation, and column (3)
employs the point estimate of the return of a savings account.
Table 4.6. Beliefs and sociodemographics
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 2.066∗∗∗ 6.811∗∗∗ 5.739∗∗∗
(0.504) (0.350) (0.610)
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] -0.018 -0.536∗∗∗ -0.476
(0.313) (0.199) (0.319)
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 1.035∗∗∗ -0.739∗∗∗ -0.927∗∗∗
(0.330) (0.212) (0.290)
Financial wealth missing -1.058∗∗∗ -0.122 0.099
(0.379) (0.256) (0.410)
Net income > 2500 € 0.476∗ 0.040 -0.357
(0.254) (0.161) (0.249)
Net income missing 0.284 0.015 -1.281∗∗∗
(0.445) (0.331) (0.472)
High education 0.695∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗ -1.131∗∗∗
(0.237) (0.155) (0.218)
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.357 -0.044 -1.092∗
(0.475) (0.336) (0.624)
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.224 -0.363 -2.332∗∗∗
(0.485) (0.342) (0.596)
Age > 65 -0.618 -0.129 -1.762∗∗∗
(0.498) (0.342) (0.619)
Female -1.397∗∗∗ 0.262∗ 1.251∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.157) (0.237)
Married -0.034 -0.041 -0.561∗∗
(0.253) (0.165) (0.249)
Has children 0.230 -0.244 0.078
(0.272) (0.185) (0.280)
Observations 2,108 2,108 2,125
Adj. (pseudo) R2 (%) 5.6 1.2 6.6
The left-hand variable in column (1) is the mean return from the visual task.
In column (2), it is the standard deviation of returns in the visual task. Column
(3) includes the estimate for the return of the savings account as the left-hand
variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Appendix 4.B Robustness checks
4.B.1 No transaction cost proxies
Table 4.7. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, model without transaction cost proxies
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.75 0.24 · ·
Risk aversion -4.56 1.00 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · -4.19 11.51
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 56.04 20.68
Experimental tasks difficult · · 34.09 10.31
Experimental tasks obscure · · 10.06 10.68
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text. The model excludes
all transaction cost proxies (financial wealth, net income, education, age).
Table 4.8. Average partial effects, model without transaction cost proxies
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.065 · 0.065
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.031 · -0.031
Risk aversion -0.046 · -0.046
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.034 -0.034
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · 0.002 0.002
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.035 -0.035
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.029 -0.029
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.006 -0.006
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text. The model excludes
all transaction cost proxies (financial wealth, net income, education, age).
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.






















































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.22. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, model without transaction cost proxies
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4.B.2 Mean beliefs only
Table 4.9. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, model with mean beliefs and proxies for the subjective data precision only
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 11.54 10.07
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 80.10 25.04
Experimental tasks difficult · · 26.35 8.74
Experimental tasks obscure · · 12.40 10.75
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in themain text. Themodel excludes the
standard deviation in beliefs, risk preferences, and all transaction cost proxies (financial wealth, net income, education,
age).
Table 4.10. Average partial effects, model with mean beliefs and proxies for the precision of
subjective data only
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.036 · 0.036
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.036 -0.036
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.007 -0.007
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.051 -0.051
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.023 -0.023
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.008 -0.008
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text. The model excludes the
standard deviation in beliefs, risk preferences, and all transaction cost proxies (financial wealth, net income, education,
age).
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.
Figure 4.23. Joint density of the two indices, model with mean beliefs and proxies for the
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Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.24. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, model with mean beliefs and proxies for
the precision of subjective data only
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4.B.3 Redefining errors as absolute difference between modal belief in visual
task and point estimate
Table 4.11. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, errors as absolute difference between modal belief and point estimate
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.77 0.28 · ·
Risk aversion -7.87 1.78 · ·
Abs. difference between mode and point estimate · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 60.84 28.24
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 30.90 23.03
Experimental tasks difficult · · 55.71 20.27
Experimental tasks obscure · · 16.45 18.93
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 20.67 5.90 -21.50 22.73
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 43.61 9.13 -96.15 39.00
Financial wealth missing 30.58 7.22 -62.04 29.49
Net income > 2500 € 7.32 2.64 29.37 11.87
Net income missing -6.61 4.20 -4.51 13.37
High education 3.82 2.99 -65.17 19.85
30 < Age ≤ 50 11.66 5.62 23.98 17.60
50 < Age ≤ 65 7.47 5.60 -16.23 15.69
Age > 65 -0.46 5.28 -22.68 16.91
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text, except that we include
the absolute difference between the modal belief in the visual task and the point estimate in the subjective data precision
index.
Table 4.12. Average partial effects, errors as absolute difference between modal belief and point
estimate
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.034 · 0.034
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.014 · -0.014
Risk aversion -0.037 · -0.037
Abs. difference between mode and point estimate · -0.013 -0.013
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.013 -0.013
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.007 -0.007
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.018 -0.018
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.004 -0.004
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.100 0.018 0.100
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.248 0.120 0.375
Financial wealth missing 0.171 0.070 0.220
Net income > 2500 € 0.037 -0.028 0.009
Net income missing -0.032 0.005 -0.028
High education 0.018 0.079 0.098
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.054 -0.025 0.024
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.036 0.018 0.053
Age > 65 -0.002 0.026 0.018
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text, except that we include the
absolute difference between the modal belief in the visual task and the point estimate in the subjective data precision index.
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.

























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.26. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, errors as absolute difference between
modal belief and point estimate
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4.B.4 Redefining errors as absolute difference between median belief in visual
task and point estimate
Table 4.13. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, errors as absolute difference between median belief and point estimate
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.32 0.37 · ·
Risk aversion -9.72 2.28 · ·
Abs. difference between median and point estimate · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 115.67 34.37
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 51.37 25.51
Experimental tasks difficult · · 17.71 14.73
Experimental tasks obscure · · 29.37 19.82
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 27.28 7.96 -16.97 18.30
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 56.30 12.23 -83.30 34.01
Financial wealth missing 39.10 9.92 -70.00 29.08
Net income > 2500 € 8.39 3.27 30.60 11.39
Net income missing -7.66 5.66 -0.88 14.65
High education 21.97 5.42 12.66 11.56
30 < Age ≤ 50 21.86 7.76 34.14 18.12
50 < Age ≤ 65 18.10 7.02 -2.87 15.61
Age > 65 9.16 6.51 2.34 16.60
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text, except that we include the
absolute difference between the median belief in the visual task and the point estimate in the subjective data precision index.
Table 4.14. Average partial effects, errors as absolute difference between median belief and
point estimate
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.031 · 0.031
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.005 · -0.005
Risk aversion -0.037 · -0.037
Abs. difference between median and point estimate · -0.013 -0.013
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.025 -0.025
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.012 -0.012
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.005 -0.005
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.006 -0.006
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.100 0.020 0.095
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.254 0.116 0.368
Financial wealth missing 0.163 0.100 0.241
Net income > 2500 € 0.035 -0.023 0.012
Net income missing -0.030 0.001 -0.029
High education 0.101 -0.011 0.090
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.086 -0.037 0.049
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.071 0.003 0.078
Age > 65 0.035 -0.002 0.036
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text, except that we include the
absolute difference between the median belief in the visual task and the point estimate in the subjective data precision index.
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.28. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, errors as absolute difference between
median belief and point estimate
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4.B.5 Redefining errors as minimum of absolute differences between mean,
median, and modal belief in visual task and point estimate
It is possible that respondents differ in their understanding of our question for a point
estimate of the AEX.While somemay think that this corresponds to a question concerning
the expected mean, others may think we are asking for the expected mode or median.
To give respondents the benefit of the doubt when calculating the absolute error, we
also estimate one specification where we base the latter calculation on the moment that
minimizes the absolute difference. That is, for each respondent we select the moment
(mean, mode, median) that is absolutely closest to the mean from the ball allocation task.
Based on this moment, we then calculate the absolute difference in beliefs that enters
the subjective data precision index.
Table 4.15. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, errors as absolute difference between median belief and point estimate
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.70 0.31 · ·
Risk aversion -8.83 1.89 · ·
Minimal abs. diff. between point estimate and lognormal mean/mode/median · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 73.33 24.74
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 57.76 20.41
Experimental tasks difficult · · 34.64 16.66
Experimental tasks obscure · · 16.76 16.51
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 24.60 6.77 -12.17 17.26
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 51.21 10.39 -66.89 30.30
Financial wealth missing 35.75 8.09 -50.18 23.42
Net income > 2500 € 7.32 2.80 32.85 10.70
Net income missing -7.17 4.10 -2.59 12.33
High education 5.80 3.16 -52.62 17.77
30 < Age ≤ 50 14.84 6.41 34.28 6.87
50 < Age ≤ 65 11.74 5.91 0.02 nan
Age > 65 3.44 5.62 -11.36 nan
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text, except that we include the minimum of the absolute
differences between the mean, median, or modal belief in the visual task and the point estimate in the subjective data precision index.
Table 4.16. Average partial effects, errors as absolute difference between median belief and
point estimate
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.035 · 0.035
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.013 · -0.013
Risk aversion -0.041 · -0.041
Minimal abs. diff. between point estimate and lognormal mean/mode/median · -0.012 -0.012
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.016 -0.016
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.013 -0.013
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.011 -0.011
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.004 -0.004
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.105 0.012 0.105
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.278 0.081 0.367
Financial wealth missing 0.184 0.060 0.225
Net income > 2500 € 0.036 -0.027 0.010
Net income missing -0.034 0.002 -0.032
High education 0.027 0.058 0.086
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.071 -0.036 0.033
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.057 -0.000 0.060
Age > 65 0.017 0.011 0.026
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text, except that we include the minimum of the absolute
differences between the mean, median, or modal belief in the visual task and the point estimate in the subjective data precision index.
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.





















































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.30. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, errors as absolute difference between
median belief and point estimate
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4.B.6 Additional covariates
Table 4.17. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, model with additional covariates
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.80 0.28 · ·
Risk aversion -7.83 2.07 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 51.54 26.19
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 37.05 24.08
Experimental tasks difficult · · 52.54 18.38
Experimental tasks obscure · · 16.92 17.82
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 19.96 6.24 -18.44 18.62
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 42.37 9.73 -87.41 31.09
Financial wealth missing 30.13 7.82 -57.80 24.63
Net income > 2500 € 8.70 2.81 23.25 10.90
Net income missing -6.65 4.03 -6.53 12.74
High education 2.31 3.16 -62.53 17.41
30 < Age ≤ 50 12.06 6.05 18.98 18.35
50 < Age ≤ 65 7.78 6.21 -21.00 16.74
Age > 65 1.20 6.25 -27.94 18.28
Female -0.57 2.69 0.12 8.34
Married -4.21 2.53 11.37 8.83
Has children 3.65 3.24 5.12 9.45
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text, except for the female,
marriage, and having children dummies.
Table 4.18. Average partial effects, model with additional covariates
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.034 · 0.034
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.015 · -0.015
Risk aversion -0.037 · -0.037
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.014 -0.014
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.012 -0.012
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.010 -0.010
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.019 -0.019
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.004 -0.004
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.099 0.017 0.097
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.245 0.119 0.369
Financial wealth missing 0.172 0.073 0.224
Net income > 2500 € 0.044 -0.025 0.019
Net income missing -0.032 0.007 -0.026
High education 0.011 0.083 0.095
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.057 -0.022 0.029
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.038 0.026 0.062
Age > 65 0.006 0.035 0.035
Female -0.003 -0.000 -0.003
Married -0.019 -0.013 -0.032
Has children 0.017 -0.006 0.011
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text, except for the female,
marriage, and having children dummies.
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.32. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, model with additional covariates
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4.B.7 Expected return instead of expected excess return
Table 4.19. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, expected returns instead of expected excess returns
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.78 0.31 · ·
Risk aversion -6.75 1.90 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 45.85 23.05
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 31.25 22.13
Experimental tasks difficult · · 47.26 15.93
Experimental tasks obscure · · 12.89 15.44
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 17.94 5.66 -6.43 18.80
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 37.84 9.73 -66.29 28.44
Financial wealth missing 26.49 7.67 -39.04 22.69
Net income > 2500 € 6.59 2.64 21.50 9.34
Net income missing -5.26 4.08 -5.65 12.90
High education 2.36 3.34 -55.43 15.69
30 < Age ≤ 50 10.69 4.97 19.31 13.88
50 < Age ≤ 65 5.36 4.67 -16.10 13.15
Age > 65 -1.69 4.77 -24.45 15.26
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text, except that we replace
the expected excess return with the expected return.
Table 4.20. Average partial effects, expected returns instead of expected excess returns
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 0.029 · 0.029
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.016 · -0.016
Risk aversion -0.036 · -0.036
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.017 -0.017
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.013 -0.013
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.010 -0.010
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.020 -0.020
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.004 -0.004
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.105 0.008 0.096
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.251 0.109 0.370
Financial wealth missing 0.176 0.059 0.217
Net income > 2500 € 0.036 -0.028 0.009
Net income missing -0.028 0.008 -0.022
High education 0.012 0.089 0.103
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.054 -0.026 0.020
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.029 0.024 0.052
Age > 65 -0.010 0.037 0.019
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text, except that we replace
the expected excess return with the expected return.
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.





















































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.34. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, expected returns instead of expected
excess returns
180 | 4 The Precision of Expectations Data and the Explanatory Power of Economic Models
4.B.8 Discarding individuals with missing data on financial wealth
Table 4.21. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, sample restricted to individuals with available information on financial wealth
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.88 0.42 · ·
Risk aversion -10.58 2.81 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 46.82 30.49
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 14.32 24.68
Experimental tasks difficult · · 33.68 18.29
Experimental tasks obscure · · 17.07 19.59
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 24.74 8.33 -5.17 19.45
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 49.20 13.27 -40.53 28.97
Net income > 2500 € 6.61 3.98 24.29 13.32
Net income missing -10.30 9.50 -19.90 14.46
High education -2.11 4.85 -41.00 16.02
30 < Age ≤ 50 11.71 11.40 29.88 25.23
50 < Age ≤ 65 1.32 9.20 -7.56 18.05
Age > 65 -6.13 8.52 -19.20 18.63
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text. The model excludes
respondents with missing information on financial wealth.
Table 4.22. Average partial effects, sample restricted to individuals with available information on
financial wealth
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.032 · 0.032
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.015 · -0.015
Risk aversion -0.046 · -0.046
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.021 -0.021
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.017 -0.017
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.005 -0.005
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.018 -0.018
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.006 -0.006
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.062 0.008 0.069
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.281 0.088 0.376
Net income > 2500 € 0.029 -0.039 -0.010
Net income missing -0.045 0.033 -0.018
High education -0.009 0.081 0.071
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.045 -0.051 -0.011
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.006 0.015 0.020
Age > 65 -0.027 0.038 0.005
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text. The model excludes
respondents with missing information on financial wealth.
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.
Figure 4.35. Joint density of the two indices, sample restricted to individuals with available























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.36. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, sample restricted to individuals with
available information on financial wealth
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4.B.9 Alternative belief measure
Table 4.23. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, Philips instead of AEX
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µPhilipst+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σPhilipst+1 -0.46 0.66 · ·
Risk aversion -13.34 4.28 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in Philips return estimate · · -4.23 19.85
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 30.53 21.08
Experimental tasks difficult · · 53.43 22.43
Experimental tasks obscure · · 23.76 18.50
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 35.09 15.64 -15.97 28.14
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 47.02 18.59 -93.15 40.58
Financial wealth missing 47.19 17.60 -42.95 30.99
Net income > 2500 € 29.20 10.29 54.77 19.75
Net income missing -6.90 10.85 14.75 21.40
High education 19.24 8.62 -12.21 14.50
30 < Age ≤ 50 36.39 16.06 47.14 24.06
50 < Age ≤ 65 26.42 12.10 3.42 19.88
Age > 65 7.96 9.47 -5.80 19.26
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text, except for the belief
measures pertaining to Philips N.V..
Table 4.24. Average partial effects, Philips instead of AEX
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µPhilipst+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.025 · 0.025
Subjective beliefs: σPhilipst+1 -0.005 · -0.005
Risk aversion -0.042 · -0.042
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.026 -0.026
Lack of confidence in Philips return estimate · 0.002 0.002
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.011 -0.011
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.027 -0.027
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.009 -0.009
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.119 0.020 0.106
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.168 0.214 0.377
Financial wealth missing 0.168 0.074 0.221
Net income > 2500 € 0.108 -0.076 0.021
Net income missing -0.022 -0.023 -0.045
High education 0.068 0.021 0.090
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.121 -0.077 0.043
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.089 -0.006 0.088
Age > 65 0.026 0.011 0.037
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text, except for the belief
measures pertaining to Philips N.V..
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.38. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, Philips instead of AEX
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4.B.10 Disaggregated risk aversion measures
Table 4.25. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, separate risk measures
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.82 0.43 · ·
Aversion to risks in general 4.69 2.12 · ·
Aversion to financial risks -15.09 3.50 · ·
Risk aversion index based on staircase lottery task -0.34 1.38 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 9.41 13.00
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 20.12 12.18
Experimental tasks difficult · · 0.68 7.37
Experimental tasks obscure · · 21.56 9.24
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 23.88 6.74 6.29 9.62
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 44.25 11.30 -28.19 13.78
Financial wealth missing 35.36 8.47 -10.65 10.83
Net income > 2500 € 7.08 3.23 7.34 3.92
Net income missing -6.27 5.27 5.52 5.75
High education 17.67 5.67 26.77 5.55
30 < Age ≤ 50 15.37 7.04 12.49 13.51
50 < Age ≤ 65 15.08 6.87 13.12 13.84
Age > 65 4.92 6.08 1.92 13.09
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text, except for the disaggre-
gated risk aversion measure.
Table 4.26. Average partial effects, separate risk measures
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.041 · 0.041
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.016 · -0.016
Aversion to risks in general 0.024 · 0.024
Aversion to financial risks -0.070 · -0.070
Risk aversion index based on staircase lottery task -0.001 · -0.001
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.024 -0.024
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.003 -0.003
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.008 -0.008
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.000 -0.000
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.009 -0.009
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.121 -0.018 0.091
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.273 0.091 0.367
Financial wealth missing 0.205 0.035 0.234
Net income > 2500 € 0.037 -0.010 0.027
Net income missing -0.031 -0.009 -0.039
High education 0.104 -0.016 0.079
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.076 -0.017 0.061
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.074 -0.018 0.058
Age > 65 0.023 -0.002 0.022
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text, except for the disaggregated
risk aversion measure.
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.
























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.40. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, separate risk measures
4.B.11 Moments of the belief distribution calculated using uniformly
distributed expectations within bins
The simplest way to approximate the individual-specific distribution of beliefs is to as-
sume that respondents’ expectations are uniformly distributed within bins. To calculate
moments under this assumption, we need to assign values to the outer bounds of the
exterior bins. We fix these bounds at the value a 100 € investment would have had at
the 2.5% and 97.5% percentile of the AEX’s historical return distribution, 49.6 € and
151.3 €. We then compute the moments of the distribution assuming that the balls are
uniformly distributed within each of the resulting 8 intervals.
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Table 4.27. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, moments of beliefs calculated assuming uniform distributions within bins
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs (uniform): Expected excess return 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs (uniform): Expected standard deviation -0.74 0.23 · ·
Risk aversion -7.05 1.51 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 58.17 25.87
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 23.64 20.32
Experimental tasks difficult · · 53.21 18.67
Experimental tasks obscure · · 13.07 16.20
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 17.85 5.29 -13.48 19.58
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 39.32 8.07 -77.99 31.32
Financial wealth missing 26.61 6.31 -49.33 24.11
Net income > 2500 € 6.81 2.40 27.39 10.55
Net income missing -5.45 3.98 -6.40 13.14
High education 3.76 2.81 -57.88 17.96
30 < Age ≤ 50 11.07 5.21 22.30 16.27
50 < Age ≤ 65 7.16 5.19 -15.00 14.77
Age > 65 -0.28 4.91 -22.52 15.93
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text, except for the way of calculating
moments of beliefs.
Table 4.28. Average partial effects, moments of beliefs calculated assuming uniform distributions
within bins
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs (uniform): Expected excess return 0.040 · 0.040
Subjective beliefs (uniform): Expected standard deviation -0.016 · -0.016
Risk aversion -0.037 · -0.037
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.014 -0.014
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.014 -0.014
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.006 -0.006
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.018 -0.018
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.003 -0.003
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.096 0.013 0.095
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.252 0.105 0.367
Financial wealth missing 0.166 0.061 0.209
High education 0.020 0.074 0.094
Net income > 2500 € 0.038 -0.027 0.012
Net income missing -0.029 0.007 -0.023
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.059 -0.024 0.028
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.039 0.018 0.056
Age > 65 -0.002 0.026 0.019
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text, except for the way of calculating
moments of beliefs.
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.42. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, moments of beliefs calculated assuming
uniform distributions within bins
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4.B.12 Moments of the belief distribution calculated using piecewise cubic
Hermite interpolating splines
We also approximate individual belief distributions using piecewise cubic Hermite inter-
polating splines, very similar to the method proposed in Bellemare et al. (2012). For each
respondent, we first calculate a discrete cumulative distribution function by successively
summing the probabilities assigned to each of the 8 bins. The method is less sensitive
to the assumptions concerning the support of the exterior bins, so we fix these at more
conservative values (the minimum and maximum of the AEX’s historical return distribu-
tion over a calendar year, i.e., 47.0 € and 176.9 €). We then use a Hermite spline to
connect the 9 points on the resulting CDF. The spline interpolates the CDF between each
pair of neighboring points by a monotonically increasing cubic polynomial, whose first
derivative at each of the 7 interior points coincides with the respective first derivative of
the polynomial in the next-higher interval. We employ the resulting estimate of an indi-
vual’s belief distribution to calculate the mean and standard deviation of the individual’s
return estimate.6
Table 4.29. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, moments of beliefs calculated by approximating the distribution using splines
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs (Splines): Expected excess return 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs (Splines): Expected standard deviation -0.72 0.17 · ·
Risk aversion -7.06 1.45 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 58.86 26.59
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 24.09 22.15
Experimental tasks difficult · · 53.36 18.37
Experimental tasks obscure · · 11.37 16.88
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 19.71 5.19 -3.03 21.04
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 41.11 7.29 -67.26 31.56
Financial wealth missing 28.65 6.01 -38.22 25.19
Net income > 2500 € 6.92 2.45 27.05 10.76
Net income missing -6.25 3.94 -8.91 13.18
High education 4.02 2.92 -58.32 18.18
30 < Age ≤ 50 11.09 5.53 22.70 16.60
50 < Age ≤ 65 7.82 5.53 -12.51 14.04
Age > 65 0.39 5.28 -21.39 15.08
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text, except for the way of calculating
moments of beliefs.
6We use the SciPy functions scipy.interpolate.PchipInterpolator to fit the splines and
scipy.integrate.quad to calculate their moments.
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Table 4.30. Average partial effects, moments of beliefs calculated by approximating the
distribution using splines
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs (Splines): Expected excess return 0.042 · 0.042
Subjective beliefs (Splines): Expected standard deviation -0.020 · -0.020
Risk aversion -0.037 · -0.037
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.014 -0.014
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.013 -0.013
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.006 -0.006
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.018 -0.018
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.003 -0.003
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.107 0.003 0.099
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.264 0.091 0.369
Financial wealth missing 0.179 0.048 0.212
High education 0.021 0.074 0.096
Net income > 2500 € 0.039 -0.026 0.013
Net income missing -0.034 0.009 -0.026
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.059 -0.024 0.029
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.043 0.015 0.056
Age > 65 0.002 0.025 0.021
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text, except for the way of calculating
moments of beliefs.





























Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.
Figure 4.43. Joint density of the two indices, moments of beliefs calculated by approximating the
distribution using splines























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.44. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, moments of beliefs calculated by
approximating the distribution using splines
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4.B.13 Including interaction between risk aversion and subjective uncertainty
Expected subjective uncertainty may be more relevant for stock market participation
decisions of respondents who are more risk averse. To assess this possibility, we add the
interaction between σAEXt+1 and the standardized measure of risk aversion to the economic
model index.
Table 4.31. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, including interaction between risk aversion and subjective uncertainty
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.74 0.28 · ·
Risk aversion -8.44 2.62 · ·
Interaction: σAEXt+1 ∗Risk Aversion 0.10 0.32 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 59.66 27.71
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 27.91 22.05
Experimental tasks difficult · · 54.12 19.71
Experimental tasks obscure · · 15.22 18.49
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 20.55 5.93 -18.61 21.44
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 42.92 9.10 -90.32 36.99
Financial wealth missing 30.47 7.23 -57.56 28.02
Net income > 2500 € 7.38 2.67 28.63 11.42
Net income missing -6.88 4.23 -5.31 12.76
High education 3.23 3.06 -63.40 19.11
30 < Age ≤ 50 11.83 5.54 23.37 16.80
50 < Age ≤ 65 6.95 5.43 -17.24 15.04
Age > 65 -0.71 5.13 -23.19 16.18
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text, adding the interaction
between the standard deviation of subjective beliefs and the standardized measure of risk aversion.




































Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.
Figure 4.45. Joint density of the two indices, including interaction between risk aversion and
subjective uncertainty
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Table 4.32. Average partial effects, including interaction between risk aversion and subjective
uncertainty
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.034 · 0.034
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.014 · -0.014
Risk aversion -0.041 · -0.041
Interaction: σAEXt+1 ∗Risk Aversion 0.004 · 0.004
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.014 -0.014
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.014 -0.014
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.007 -0.007
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.019 -0.019
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.004 -0.004
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.101 0.017 0.099
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.248 0.119 0.374
Financial wealth missing 0.173 0.069 0.222
Net income > 2500 € 0.037 -0.029 0.009
Net income missing -0.034 0.006 -0.029
High education 0.015 0.081 0.097
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.055 -0.025 0.024
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.034 0.021 0.053
Age > 65 -0.004 0.028 0.019
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text, adding the interaction























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.46. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, including interaction between risk
aversion and subjective uncertainty
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4.B.14 Dropping confidence, task obscurity, and task difficulty
Table 4.33. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, dropping confidence, task obscuiry, and task difficulty
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.64 0.36 · ·
Risk aversion -7.42 1.98 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 21.36 6.50 -2.02 20.38
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 45.66 11.12 -31.95 33.81
Financial wealth missing 34.53 8.80 9.26 27.58
Net income > 2500 € 4.31 3.36 18.46 9.43
Net income missing -7.14 5.04 -17.76 10.46
High education 10.62 5.68 -34.22 15.14
30 < Age ≤ 50 8.05 7.19 33.45 14.45
50 < Age ≤ 65 9.89 5.32 5.30 10.49
Age > 65 0.91 4.85 -16.13 13.16
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text.
Table 4.34. Average partial effects, dropping confidence, task obscuiry, and task difficulty
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.047 · 0.047
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.015 · -0.015
Risk aversion -0.044 · -0.044
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.008 -0.008
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.115 0.002 0.109
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.320 0.036 0.377
Financial wealth missing 0.230 -0.008 0.205
Net income > 2500 € 0.027 -0.009 0.017
Net income missing -0.043 0.009 -0.037
High education 0.067 0.029 0.097
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.050 -0.023 0.027
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.061 -0.005 0.058
Age > 65 0.006 0.012 0.015
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text.
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.



























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.48. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, dropping confidence, task obscuiry, and
task difficulty
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4.B.15 Including financial numeracy questions in both indices
In October 2014, we asked respondents three questions to determine their familiarity
with basic financial concepts:
Question 1 - Simplest numeracy: Suppose you have 100 euros on a savings
account with an annual interest rate of 2 per cent. How much will you have
on the savings account after five years, assuming you leave the money in this
account?
• More than 102 Euros
• Less than 102 Euros
• Exactly 102 Euros
• Do not know
Question 2 - Interest compounding: Suppose you have 100 euros on a
savings account with an annual interest rate of 20 per cent and you never
withdraw any money or interest. How much will you have after five years in
total?
• More than 200 Euros
• Less than 200 Euros
• Exactly 200 Euros
• Do not know
Question 3 - Inflation: Suppose the interest rate on your savings account is
1 per cent per year and inflation is 2 per cent per year. After one year, how
much will you be able to buy with the money in the account?
• Less than today
• More than today
• Exactly the same as today
• Do not know
For each question, we create a binary variable and set it to 1 in case the subject
provided the correct response, and to 0 otherwise. We include all variables as additional
covariates in both indices.
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Table 4.35. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, including financial numeracy questions as additional covariates
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.41 0.62 · ·
Risk aversion -12.90 3.90 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 53.53 38.39
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 30.25 34.70
Experimental tasks difficult · · 44.95 28.22
Experimental tasks obscure · · 32.41 24.52
Financial numeracy: Simplest numeracy question false 6.89 7.57 15.33 23.21
Financial numeracy: Interest compounding question false -14.20 6.63 -8.30 16.91
Financial numeracy: Inflation question false -21.70 9.36 5.24 19.05
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 37.62 12.86 -30.47 37.33
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 69.97 21.22 -98.42 69.58
Financial wealth missing 56.29 17.89 -66.61 57.08
Net income > 2500 € 14.28 6.07 36.44 19.32
Net income missing -17.80 8.69 -12.58 16.55
High education -0.20 7.96 -68.85 32.35
30 < Age ≤ 50 24.28 11.30 21.81 23.82
50 < Age ≤ 65 12.54 11.19 -23.89 21.58
Age > 65 -2.80 9.51 -43.84 26.63
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text. We add binary variables describing
whether subjects correctly answered 3 distinct questions related to basic financial numeracy.
Table 4.36. Average partial effects, including financial numeracy questions as additional
covariates
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.023 · 0.023
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.004 · -0.004
Risk aversion -0.038 · -0.038
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.015 -0.015
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.013 -0.013
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.008 -0.008
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.017 -0.017
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.009 -0.009
Financial numeracy: Simplest numeracy question false 0.019 -0.018 0.001
Financial numeracy: Interest compounding question false -0.045 0.010 -0.036
Financial numeracy: Inflation question false -0.069 -0.006 -0.074
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.114 0.028 0.112
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.249 0.132 0.378
Financial wealth missing 0.196 0.079 0.251
Net income > 2500 € 0.044 -0.039 0.004
Net income missing -0.054 0.015 -0.041
High education -0.001 0.095 0.094
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.069 -0.024 0.040
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.037 0.030 0.066
Age > 65 -0.009 0.056 0.041
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text. We add binary variables describing
whether subjects correctly answered 3 distinct questions related to financial numeracy.
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.
























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.50. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, including financial numeracy questions as
additional covariates
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Appendix 4.C Specification with less customized data
This section reports the results for the specification with less customized data described
in Section 4.4.3 of the main text. As discussed in there, we restrict the specification to
(i) the point estimate of AEX returns, (ii) one qualitative question to elicit risk attitudes,
(iii) two simple qualitative proxies for the precision of subjective data, and (iv) sociode-
mographics.
Table 4.37. Coefficient estimates for the economic model index and the subjective data precision
index, specification with less customized data
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs (direct question): Log expected excess return 1.00 · · ·
Aversion to risks in general -14.58 3.95 · ·
Experimental tasks difficult · · 1.00 ·
Experimental tasks obscure · · 0.35 0.32
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 39.87 16.70 -0.36 0.47
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 28.69 28.48 -2.20 0.65
Financial wealth missing 50.20 20.85 -0.94 0.54
Net income > 2500 € 12.87 11.47 0.08 0.24
Net income missing -55.81 18.94 -0.61 0.39
High education -1.86 16.34 -0.96 0.32
30 < Age ≤ 50 56.42 20.71 0.94 0.49
50 < Age ≤ 65 26.02 15.74 -0.12 0.32
Age > 65 -19.28 16.09 -0.57 0.34
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.2 in the main text. The model only includes the point
estimate as measure of beliefs, a qualitative question to elicit risk attitudes, and two qualitative proxies for the precision of subjective
data.
Table 4.38. Average partial effects, specification with less customized data
Model Imprecision of Measured Expectations Combined
Subjective beliefs (direct question): Log expected excess return 0.033 · 0.033
Aversion to risks in general -0.029 · -0.029
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.034 -0.034
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.009 -0.009
Financial wealth ∈ (10000 €, 30000 €] 0.086 0.029 0.102
Financial wealth ∈ (30000 €,∞) 0.063 0.338 0.396
Financial wealth missing 0.105 0.100 0.204
Net income > 2500 € 0.026 -0.009 0.017
Net income missing -0.112 0.067 -0.057
High education -0.004 0.119 0.115
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.102 -0.091 0.014
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.054 0.013 0.071
Age > 65 -0.039 0.068 0.025
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. All variables as described in Table 4.3 in the main text. The model only includes the point
estimate as measure of beliefs, a qualitative question to elicit risk attitudes, and two qualitative proxies for the precision of subjective data.
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Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices of the
Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 4.3.3 for a detailed description.























































































Subjective data precision at 10th  percentile Subjective data precision at 90th  percentile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock market
participation for varying levels of the economic model and subjective data precision indices. The right panel
plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic model index for the
10 and 90% quantiles of the subjective data precision index. Ranges are limited to the interval between the
5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
Figure 4.52. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, specification with less customized data
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Appendix 4.D Can we correct for measurement error using
multiple measures?
This section provides some tentative evidence that attempting to correct for measure-
ment error in subjective beliefs through multiple measures is of little help. To this end,
Figure 4.53 presents the R2 of an OLS regression of a stock market participation dummy
on various linear combinations of two belief measures: (i) the mean belief constructed
from the ball allocation task and (ii) the point estimate. The figure shows that – contrary
to what one would expect if repeated measurements reduce measurement error – the
variance explained is maximized by putting almost maximal weight on the belief from
the ball allocation task. This suggests that traditional methods of correcting for measure-
ment error do not apply in the case of subjective beliefs.
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Figure 4.53. Variance explained in stockholdings by different linear combinations of two belief
measures
5
The Nature and Predictive Power of
Preferences: Global Evidence?
5.1 Introduction
This paper presents the Global Preference Survey (GPS), a novel and unique globally
representative dataset. The data include measures of risk preference, time preference,
positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust that we collected for 80,000 individ-
uals, drawn as representative samples in each of 76 countries. The coverage of countries
spans all continents, a broad set of cultures, a wide range of development levels, and rep-
resents about 90 percent of both the world’s population and global income, making the
data also representative across countries. The underlying survey measures were selected
and tested through a rigorous ex ante experimental validation procedure involving real
monetary stakes, so that the survey items have a demonstrated ability to capture actual
heterogeneity in state-of-the-art experiments with financial incentives (Falk et al., 2015).
To ensure comparability of preference measures across countries, the elicitation followed
a standardized protocol that was implemented through the professional infrastructure
of the Gallup World Poll. Monetary stakes related to the elicitation involved comparable
values in terms of purchasing power across countries, and the survey items were cul-
turally neutral and translated using state-of-the-art procedures. In addition, pre-tests in
22 countries of various cultural heritage revealed the broad applicability of our survey
items. In consequence, the resulting dataset provides an ideal basis for the first system-
atic investigation of the distribution, determinants, and predictive power of preferences
around the world.
Using these data, we provide evidence for several novel findings, both at the country
and at the individual level. First, for each of the six traits, we document a substantial
variation not just across individuals, but also across entire countries. Second, we show
that this cross-country heterogeneity is at least partly systematic and follows pronounced
economic, geographic and cultural patterns. All preferences are significantly associated
? For valuable comments and discussions we are grateful to Doug Bernheim, Johannes Hermle, Benedikt
Herrmann, Fabian Kosse, Andrei Shleifer, and seminar participants at Caltech, Konstanz, and UC San Diego.
Ammar Mahran provided oustanding research assistance.
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with important country-level variables including per capita income, democracy, inequal-
ity, redistributive policies, religion, and geographic or climatic variables. Third, the var-
ious preference measures are correlated, giving rise to distinct “preference profiles” of
groups of countries. Fourth, in spite of the substantial between-country variation, most
of the total individual-level variation in all preferences is due to within-country hetero-
geneity. Fifth, investigating the structure of this individual-level variation, we find that
in the world population as a whole, all of the preferences are systematically related to
individual characteristics. For instance, women tend to be less patient and more risk
averse, and exhibit stronger social predispositions, than men. Patience is hump-shaped
in age, while risk taking as well as positive and negative reciprocity are lower for older
people. Self-reported cognitive skills positively correlate with patience, risk taking, and
all social preferences. Sixth, we provide evidence of heterogeneity across countries un-
derlying the strong average patterns of the individual-level correlates of preferences in
the world population as a whole. We show that while some relationships between prefer-
ences and sociodemographics (such as between risk aversion and gender) are common to
almost all cultures, others appear more culturally or institutionally specific. For example,
patience and positive reciprocity exhibit a hump-shaped relationship with age in devel-
oped countries that is almost entirely absent in developing nations. Seventh, we show
that individual-level preferences are also significantly correlated with household income,
subjective perceptions of safety and health, as well as religious affiliation. Eighth, we ex-
amine the predictive power of preference heterogeneity for economic behaviors. Around
the world, patient individuals are more likely to save and have higher educational attain-
ment; more risk tolerant individuals are more likely to become self-employed and to be
smokers; and social preferences are highly predictive of a broad range of prosocial be-
haviors and outcomes such as donating, volunteering time, assisting strangers, helping
friends and relatives, or family structure. Finally, we shed light on the cultural origins
of the global preference variation by making use of information on language structure:
people who speak languages that do not require an explit coding of the future are more
patient, positively reciprocal, trusting, and altruistic, both across and within countries.
Our analysis provides the first systematic assessment of the nature and explanatory
power of preference heterogeneity around the world. The underlying data are, however,
well-suited for a much broader research agenda on the determinants and implications
of certain preference profiles. Going forward, the data lend themselves to investigations
both at the micro- and the macro-level. At the micro level, several studies have examined
individual-level preference heterogeneity and the corresponding correlates, like gender,
in specific samples and cultures (see, e.g., Barsky et al., 1997; Frederick, 2005; Croson
and Gneezy, 2009; Dohmen et al., 2008, 2010, 2011). However, the previous lack of
data has prevented systematic investigations of the cultural specificity of such findings,
an issue that is relevant for understanding the cultural or biological mechanisms through
which individual characteristics like age or gender might shape preferences. Our results
highlight some cases in which generalizing beyond single countries can be particularly
misleading, because it ignores the country and population specificity of such effects. At
the same time, the data show how some relationships are close to universal. Likewise,
while previous work has provided evidence that preferences are predictive of important
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economic decisions, it has been an open question whether preferences are uniformly pre-
dictive of behaviors across cultures and institutional backgrounds, and to which extent
they shape heterogeneity in life outcomes.1
The GPS data may also prove valuable for research in cultural economics and polit-
ical economy (Guiso et al., 2006; Fernández, 2011; Alesina and Giuliano, forthcoming;
Giuliano and Nunn, 2013). To date, empirical research into the roots of cross-country
variation in preferences has been impeded by a lack of appropriate measures and repre-
sentative sampling; contributions on the cross-country heterogeneity in preferences have
typically made use of small and non-representative samples in a limited set of countries
(Roth et al., 1991; Henrich et al., 2001; Herrmann et al., 2008). Accordingly, researchers
interested in the determinants and implications of cultural variation have considered
variables such as female labor force participation, fertility, individualism, and future-
orientation (Giuliano, 2007; Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Gorodnichenko and Roland,
2011; Alesina et al., 2013; Chen, 2013; Alesina et al., forthcoming; Galor and Özak,
2014), but have not studied the preference component of culture. The data of the GPS,
which feature 80,000 individuals from various cultural backgrounds, are likely to pro-
duce new insights in this direction.
Apart from such micro-level analyses, the representative cross-country nature of our
data also permits an investigation of the relationships of preferences to aggregate eco-
nomic and social outcomes across countries, which to date is uncharted territory.2 Mo-
tivated by the strong and systematic correlations reported in this paper, the preference
data may be used both in an attempt to explain cross-country differences in aggregate
outcomes, and in controlling for preference differences when interest lies in identifying
other relationships.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present the
Global Preference Survey dataset. In Section 5.3, we describe the nature of cross-country
variation in preferences. Section 5.4 studies the relationship between preferences and
individual characteristics, while Section 5.5 investigates the relationships between pref-
erences and behaviors. In Section 5.6, we analyze the relationship between preferences
and language structure. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Dataset
5.2.1 General Data Characteristics
The Global Preference Survey (GPS) is a new globally representative survey designed
to measure respondents’ time preferences, risk preferences, social preferences, and trust.
1 Time preference correlates with outcomes ranging from savings to Body Mass Index (Ventura, 2003;
Kirby and Petry, 2004; Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006; Eckel et al., 2005; Chabris et al., 2008; Tanaka et al.,
2010; Meier and Sprenger, 2010; Sutter et al., 2013; Golsteyn et al., 2014). Risk preferences are related
to various risky decisions, including being self-employed, migrating, and holding risky assets (See, e.g.,
Barsky et al., 1997; Bonin et al., 2007; Guiso and Paiella, 2008; Dohmen et al., 2011). Social preferences
are correlated with cooperative behaviors in various aspects of life including in the workplace (Dohmen
et al., 2009; Rustagi et al., 2010; Carpenter and Seki, 2011; Kosfeld and Rustagi, 2015).
2 An exception is the burgeneoing literature on the importance of trust, see, e.g., Knack and Keefer
(1997), Guiso et al. (2009), and Algan and Cahuc (2010).
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The GPS data were collected within the framework of the Gallup World Poll, which sur-
veys representative population samples in a large number of countries about social and
economic issues on an annual basis. In 2012, we added the GPS to the World Poll’s
questionnaire in 76 countries, so that the survey items were fielded through the existing
professional infrastructure of one of the world’s leading global survey companies. Four
noteworthy features characterize the preference data: (i) representative population sam-
ples within each country, (ii) geographical and economic representativeness in terms of
countries covered, (iii) a rigorous experimental validation and selection procedure of the
underlying survey items, and (iv) a standardized data collection protocol across coun-
tries. We discuss these features in the following; in addition, Appendix 5.A contains an
extensive documentation of the data-collection process as well as additional details on
the survey measures.
First, we measure preferences in large representative population samples in each
country.3 The median sample size was 1,000 participants per country, in 76 countries
all over the world.4 In total, we collected preference measures for more than 80,000
participants worldwide. Respondents were selected through probability sampling; ex-
post representativeness of the data can be achieved using weights provided by Gallup.5
In sum, our data allow for valid inferences about the distribution of preferences in each
country as well as about between-country differences in preferences.
Second, the data are characterized by geographical representativeness in terms of
the countries being covered. The sample of 76 countries is not restricted to Western
industrialized nations, but covers all continents, various cultures, and different levels of
development. Specifically, our sample includes 15 countries from the Americas, 25 from
Europe, 22 from Asia and Pacific, as well as 14 African countries, 11 of which are Sub-
Saharan. This set of countries covers about 90% of both the world population and global
income.
Third, we designed, tested, and selected the survey items of the GPS using a rigor-
ous ex-ante experimental validation and selection procedure (for details see Falk et al.,
2015). While items in international surveys are frequently designed based on introspec-
tive arguments of plausibility or relevance, our items are the result of an explicit formal
selection procedure, which also ensures that the resulting measures are predictive of
actual preferences as measured through state-of-the-art experiments. Arguably, such an
ex-ante validation of survey items constitutes a significant methodological advance over
the ad-hoc selection of questions for surveys. As detailed in Falk et al. (2015), in the
validation procedure, experimental subjects completed incentivized choice experiments
to measure their preference parameters, and also answered a large battery of candidate
survey questions. For each preference, those survey items that jointly perform best in pre-
dicting the financially incentivized behavior were selected to form the preference survey
3Data sets that contain preference measures for several countries typically come from small- or medium-
scale surveys or experiments and are based on student or other convenience samples (e.g., Wang (2011),
Rieger et al. (forthcoming), Vieider et al. (2015), Vieider et al. (2014).
4Notable exceptions include China (2,574 obs.), Haiti (504 obs.), India (2,539 obs.), Iran (2,507 obs.),
Russia (1,498 obs.), and Suriname (504 obs.).
5 These weights are constructed to render the observations representative in terms of age, gender, in-
come, education, and geographic location.
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module.6 Thus, the module does not only consist of survey questions that predict be-
havior, but is composed of the best behavioral predictors out of a large set of candidate
measures.
In a next step, the GPS was developed for implementation in the Gallup World Poll.
To this end, Gallup conducted pre-tests in 22 countries of various cultural heritage, in
order to ensure the implementability of the module in the available survey time of 7 to 8
minutes, and to test whether respondents of culturally and economically heterogeneous
background understand and interpret the items adequately (see Appendix 5.A.3 for de-
tails). Other measures taken to ensure that the survey items were comparable across
cultures included: (i) translation of all items back and forth in an iterative process using
Gallup’s regular translation scheme, and (ii) calibration of monetary values used in the
survey questions according to median household income for each country.7 Finally, the
interviews for the World Poll 2012 took place face-to-face or via telephone by profes-
sional interviewers. Thus, the survey items were fielded in a comparable way using a
standardized procedure across countries.
5.2.2 Preference Measures
For each preference, we obtain a final individual-level measure by weighing responses
to multiple survey items using the weights obtained from the experimental validation
procedure. These weights are based on an OLS regression of observed behavior in the
financially incentivized experiments on the respective survey measures Falk et al. (see
2015, for details). We first standardize individual-level responses to all items (i.e., com-
pute z-scores) and then weigh these standardized responses using the OLS weights to
derive the best predictor of observed experimental behavior. Finally, for ease of interpre-
tation, each preference measure is again standardized at the individual level, so that, by
construction, each preference has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in the
individual-level world sample.
The GPS contains twelve items which are summarized in Table 5.1. For most prefer-
ences, the set of questions consists of a combination of qualitative items, which are more
abstract, and quantitative questions, which put the respondent into precisely defined
hypothetical choice scenarios.8
6We excluded quantitative measures that require long and complex instructions, or which had shorter
alternative quantitative measures that were close substitutes, from the set of candidate measures before the
item selection procedure was conducted.
7 As a benchmark, we used the monetary amounts in Euro that were offered in the validation study
in Germany. Since monetary amounts used in the validation study with the German sample were round
numbers to facilitate easy calculations (e.g., the expected return of a lottery with equal chances of winning
and losing) and to allow for easy comparisons (e.g., 100 Euro today versus 107.50 in 12 months), we
also rounded monetary amounts in all other countries to the next “round” number. While this necessarily
resulted in some (very minor) variations in the real stake size between countries, it minimized cross-country
differences in the understanding the quantitative items due to difficulties in assessing the involved monetary
amounts.
8Under certain assumptions, the quantitative items allow the computation of quantitative measures such
as a CRRA coefficient or an internal rate of return.
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5.2.2.0.1 Patience. Our measure of patience is derived from the combination of re-
sponses to two survey measures, one with a quantitative and one with a qualitative
format. The quantitative survey measure consists of a series of five interdependent hypo-
thetical binary choices between immediate and delayed financial rewards, a format com-
monly referred to as “staircase” (or “unfolding brackets”) procedure (Cornsweet, 1962).
In each of the five questions, participants had to decide between receiving a payment
today or larger payments in 12 months:
Suppose you were given the choice between receiving a payment today or a
payment in 12 months. We will now present to you five situations. The payment
today is the same in each of these situations. The payment in 12 months is
different in every situation. For each of these situations we would like to know
which one you would choose. Please assume there is no inflation, i.e., future
prices are the same as today’s prices. Please consider the following: Would you
rather receive amount x today or y in 12 months?
The immediate payment x remained constant in all subsequent four questions, but
the delayed payment y was increased or decreased depending on previous choices (see
Appendix 5.A.6.1 for an exposition of the entire sequence of binary decisions). In essence,
by adjusting the delayed payment according to previous choices, the questions “zoom in”
around the respondent’s point of indifference between the smaller immediate and the
larger delayed payment and make efficient use of limited and costly survey time. The
sequence of questions has 32 possible ordered outcomes. In the international survey,
monetary amounts x and y were expressed in the respective local currency, scaled rel-
ative to median household income in the given country. Notably, this measure not only
resembles standard experimental procedures of eliciting time preferences, but it is also
precisely defined, arguably making it less prone to culture-dependent interpretations.
This makes the quantitative patience measure well-suited for a multinational study like
the present one.
The qualitative measure of patience is given by the respondents’ self-assessment re-
garding their willingness to wait on an 11-point Likert scale, asking “how willing are
you to give up something that is beneficial for you today in order to benefit more from
Table 5.1. Survey items of the GPS
Preference Item Description Weight
Patience
Intertemporal choice sequence using staircase method 0.71
Self-assessment: Willingness to wait 0.29
Risk taking
Lottery choice sequence using staircase method 0.47
Self-assessment: Willingness to take risks in general 0.53
Positive Self-assessment: Willingness to return a favor 0.48
reciprocity Gift in exchange for help 0.52
Negative Self-assessment: Willingness to take revenge 0.37
reciprocity Self-assessment: Willingness to punish unfair behavior towards self 0.265
Self-assessment: Willingness to punish unfair behavior towards others 0.265
Altruism
Donation decision 0.54
Self-assessment: Willingness to give to good causes 0.46
Trust Self-assessment: People have only the best intentions 1
Notes. See Appendix 5.A.6 for the wording of the questions and Appendix 5.A.7.2 for a discussion
of the weights.
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that in the future?” As discussed above, the two items were first standardized and then
combined linearly to form the final measure of patience, which was then standardized
again at the individual level in the world sample. The quantitative measure obtained a
weight of 71%.
5.2.2.0.2 Risk Taking. Risk preferences were also elicited through a series of related
quantitative questions as well as one qualitative question. Just as with patience, the
quantitative measure consists of a series of five binary choices between a fixed lottery
and varying sure payments, hence making use of the advantages of precisely defined,
quantitative survey items in culturally and economically heterogeneous samples:
Please imagine the following situation. You can choose between a sure payment
of a particular amount of money, or a draw, where you would have an equal
chance of getting amount x or getting nothing. We will present to you five
different situations. What would you prefer: a draw with a 50 percent chance
of receiving amount x , and the same 50 percent chance of receiving nothing, or
the amount of y as a sure payment?
The questions are again interdependent in the sense that the choice of the lottery
results in an increase of the sure amount being offered in the next question, and vice
versa. Appendix 5.A.6.2 contains an exposition of the entire sequence of survey items.
The qualitative item asks for the respondents’ self-assessment of their willingness to take
risks on an eleven-point scale (“In general, how willing are you to take risks?”). This
qualitative subjective self-assessment has previously been shown to be predictive of risk-
taking behavior in the field in a representative sample (Dohmen et al., 2011) as well
as of incentivized experimental risk-taking across countries in student samples (Vieider
et al., 2014). The qualitative item and the outcome of the quantitative staircase measure
were combined through roughly equal weights.
5.2.2.0.3 Positive Reciprocity. People’s propensity to act in a positively reciprocal way
was also measured using one qualitative item and one question with a quantitative com-
ponent. First, respondents were asked to provide a self-assessment about how willing
they are to return a favor on an 11-point Likert scale. Second, participants were pre-
sented a choice scenario in which they were asked to imagine that they got lost in an
unfamiliar area and that a stranger – when asked for directions – offered to take them to
their destination. Participants were then asked which out of six presents (worth between
5 and 30 euros in 5 euros intervals) they would give to the stranger as a “thank you”.
These two items receive roughly equal weights.
5.2.2.0.4 Negative Reciprocity. Negative reciprocity was elicited through three self-
assess-ments. First, people were asked how willing they are to take revenge if they are
treated very unjustly, even if doing so comes at a cost (0-10). The second and third item
probed respondents about their willingness to punish someone for unfair behavior, either
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towards themselves or towards a third person.9 This last item captures prosocial punish-
ment and hence a concept akin to norm enforcement. These three items receive weights
of about one third each.
5.2.2.0.5 Altruism. Altruism was measured through a combination of one qualitative
and one quantitative item, both of which are related to donation. The qualitative ques-
tion asked people how willing they would be to give to good causes without expecting
anything in return on an 11-point scale. The quantitative scenario depicted a situation
in which the respondent unexpectedly received 1,000 euros and asked them to state how
much of this amount they would donate. These two items were weighted about equally.
5.2.2.0.6 Trust. To measure trust, we used one item, which asked people whether they
assume that other people only have the best intentions (Likert scale, 0-10).10
5.2.3 Further Variables of Interest
The GPS data include a wide range of individual-level background variables which can
be linked to the preference measures. These background variables include the core items
of the Gallup World Poll such as (i) extensive sociodemographic information (e.g., age,
gender, family structure, country of birth, religious affiliation, location of residence, or
migration background including country of origin), (ii) a variety of self-reported behav-
iors and economic outcome variables including income, educational attainment, savings,
labor market decisions, health, and behavior in social interactions, and (iii) opinions
and attitudes about issues such as local and global politics, local institutional quality,
economic prospects, safety, or happiness. We also elicited a self-reported proxy for cog-
nitive skills by asking people to assess themselves regarding the statement “I am good at
math” on an 11-point Likert scale. Finally, the data contain regional identifiers (usually at
the state or province level), hence allowing for cross-regional analyses within countries.
5.3 Cross-Country Analysis
The analysis begins with an investigation of the heterogeneity of preferences around
the world. Figure 6.1 shows how the country averages for each (standardized) prefer-
ence compare to the world average. The figure reveals that preferences vary substan-
tially across countries, by at least one standard deviation for each preference (see figure
notes on color coding).11 Most country differences displayed in Figure 5.1 are statisti-
9 In the original validation study, the second and third item were collapsed into one question which
asked people how willing they are to punish others, without specifying who was treated unfairly (Falk et al.,
2015). However, in the cross-country pre-test, a number of respondents indicated that this lack of specificity
confused them, so that we broke this survey item up into two questions. Accordingly, the weights for deriving
an individual-level index of negative reciprocity are determined by dividing the OLS weight for the original
item by two.
10Given the existence of the World Values Survey data, we can perform a first plausibility check on our
data by showing that our trust measure is correlated with the WVS data (ρ = 0.53, p < 0.01).
11 Appendix 5.A.8 provide an alternative way to visualize the heterogeneity, with histograms of prefer-
ences at the country and individual levels.
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Patience Risk taking
Positive reciprocity Negative reciprocity
Altruism Trust
Figure 5.1.World maps of preferences. In each figure, white denotes the world average. Darker
blue indicates higher values of a given trait, while darker red colors indicate lower values, all of
which are measured in standard deviations from the world mean. Grey indicates missings.
cally significant. Calculating t-tests of all possible (2,850) pairwise comparisons for each
preference, the fraction of significant (1-percent level) country differences are: 78% for
risk, 83% for patience, 80% for altruism, 81% for positive reciprocity, 79% for negative
reciprocity, and 78% for trust, respectively.
To provide a complementary perspective on the geographic and cultural variation in
aggregate preferences, Figures 5.9a and 5.9b in Appendix 5.C group countries into six
world regions: Western and “Neo” Europe (i.e., the US, Canada, and Australia), Former
Communist Eastern Europe, Asia, North Africa and Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and
Southern America. For each region, we present two scatter plots which illustrate the dis-
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tribution of patience, risk taking, negative reciprocity, and “prosociality”12 within each
region, relative to the world mean of the respective preference. Populations in Western
and “Neo” Europe tend to be substantially more patient than the world mean. In fact,
all of the ten most patient countries in the world are either located in Western Europe
or part of the English-speaking world, with the Northern European countries exhibiting
particularly high levels of patience. Western European countries are also notable for neg-
ative reciprocity; eight out of the ten most negatively reciprocal countries are located in
Europe. Three of the five most negatively reciprocal countries in our sample – Turkey,
Greece, and South Korea – have been found in previous research (Herrmann et al., 2008)
to be particularly prone to retaliatory (anti-social) punishments in incentivized social
dilemma games.
To the East, the former communist Eastern European countries are on average rather
risk averse and not very patient, but the patterns are less clear compared to their West-
ern European counterparts. Similar patterns obtain for East and South Asia, where most
populations except the Confucian ones (China, Japan, South Korea) are relatively impa-
tient.
Middle Eastern and North African populations have in common relatively high lev-
els of risk tolerance and low levels of patience. Prosociality and negative reciprocity of
this group of countries are fairly diverse. Notably, all of the ten most risk tolerant coun-
tries in our sample are located in the Middle East or Africa; in addition, all sub-Saharan
populations are on average less prosocial than the world mean and are rather impatient.
Finally, in the Southern Americas, most populations appear impatient. They also have
low levels of negative reciprocity and intermediate values in risk taking and prosocial-
ity. In sum, these results highlight that different types of preferences are spatially and
culturally concentrated.
To begin to open the black box of cross-country variation in preferences, we proceed
by relating preferences to country-level characteristics. In a first step, we seek to under-
stand which fraction of the between-country variation can be explained by commonly
employed variables that are plausibly exogenous to preferences. To this end, Figure 5.2
plots the R-squared of OLS regressions of each preference on a set of variables which
proxy for geography, climate, diversity, and religion. Geography includes distance to the
equator, longitude, and the fraction of the population at risk of contracting malaria; cli-
mate includes average precipitation and average temperature as well as the fraction of
the population living in the (sub)-tropics; diversity includes ethnic and religious fraction-
alization as well as linguistic diversity (Fearon, 2003); and religion includes the share
of the population adhering to catholic, protestant, muslim, buddhist, hinduist, or jewish
beliefs.
As Figure 5.2 shows, the variance explained by categories differs, and it differs by
preference. For example, geography explains 20% of the variation in patience, but is
largely unrelated to risk. Climate, by contrast, is strongly related to both preferences. The
diversity indices explain more than a quarter of the varience in patience, but virtually
no variation in altruism or positive reciprocity. Religion shares explain a considerable
12Given the high correlations between altruism, positive reciprocity, and trust (see below), we define
prosociality as the unweighted average of these three measures. Very similar results obtain if we run a
factor analysis and use the first factor of the three measures.


































































Figure 5.2. Cross-country variance explained. The figures plot the R2 of an OLS regression of the
respective preference on absolute latitude, longitude, and the fraction of the population at risk
of contracting malaria (geography), average temperature, average precipitation and the fraction
of the population living in the (sub)-tropics (climate), religious and ethnic fractionalization as
well as linguistic diversity (diversity), and the share of protestants, catholics, muslims, jews,
hinduists, and buddhists (religion), as well as all of these variables. All figures contain 73
countries. See Appendix 5.D for the regression coefficients and Appendix 5.I for details on all
covariates.
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fraction of the variation in patience and trust, but little of the other social preferences.
All variables in combination can account for between 26% and 53% of the between-
country variation in preferences, with patience generally exhibiting the highest share of
variance explained. Appendix 5.D presents the regression coefficients underlying each
figure.
In a next step, we study the correlations between preferences and country-level out-
comes or characteristics which may be endogenous to preferences. Table 5.2 presents
Pearson correlations between all preferences and a set of economic, political, and health
variables.13 Overall, the country-level preference measures vary systematically with im-
portant aggregate economic and social outcomes. In particular, we find that a popula-
tion’s average patience is strongly correlated with the degree of economic and institu-
tional development, as exemplified by high income per capita, a high democracy index,
and high average life expectancy at birth. Average risk taking exhibits significant corre-
lations with a set of variables which are connected to the “riskiness” of the respective
economic, social, and health environment. Risk tolerant populations are those with low
life expectancy, high economic inequality, low redistribution, low labor protection, and
more intentional homicides. Thus, overall, risk averse populations seem to be more pro-
tected and have stronger social safety nets, consistent with the view that the riskiness of
the overall environment is influenced by, or influences, people’s risk attitudes.
Regarding social preferences, positive reciprocity tends to be higher in environments
with high life expectancy and in countries with low crime. Populations with strong neg-
atively reciprocal inclinations are richer, have lower inequality, redistribute more, and
exhibit lower numbers of homicides. Finally, trust is positively correlated with national
income, but not with democracy. Higher inequality and a higher homicide rate are as-
sociated with lower trust. These intriguing correlations raise the question of whether
preferences might shape, be shaped by, or co-evolve with cross-country variation in de-
velopment, inequality, or institutions, pointing towards an important direction for future
research.
While various preferences exhibit economic and geographic patterns, preferences
may also be correlated amongst each other, giving rise to country-level preference pro-
files. To investigate the relationship among different preferences, Table 5.3 shows Pear-
son correlations of preferences together with levels of significance.14 The significant cor-
relations indicate that preferences are not distributed independently of one another. One
set of traits that goes together is risk tolerance and patience, as shown by the positive
and statistically significant correlation at the country level. This is in spite of the special
case of Sub-Saharan African countries, which tend to be risk seeking and impatient, as
discussed above.15 Another grouping of positively correlated traits involves prosociality,
i.e., the traits of positive reciprocity, altruism and trust. While trust constitutes a belief
rather than a preference, all of these traits share in common that they describe positive
behavioral dispositions towards others. The correlation between altruism and positive
13 Computing Spearman rank correlations yields very similar results.
14 The results are similar when computing Spearman correlations.
15 Excluding African countries, the positive correlation between risk taking and patience increases to 0.30,
while other correlations remain largely the same. The correlation between the staircase risk and patience






Table 5.2. Pairwise correlations between preferences and country-level variables
Log [GDP Democracy Life Gini Redistribution Labor Log [# of
p/c PPP] index expectancy coefficient (% of GDP) regulation homicides]
Patience 0.630∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.064 0.512∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.459∗∗∗
Risk taking -0.103 -0.167 -0.394∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗ -0.228∗ -0.367∗∗ 0.210∗
Positive reciprocity 0.078 -0.051 0.284∗∗ -0.217 0.111 0.066 -0.231∗∗
Negative reciprocity 0.230∗∗ 0.091 0.212∗ -0.291∗∗ 0.264∗∗ 0.002 -0.400∗∗∗
Altruism -0.091 -0.227∗ 0.075 0.011 -0.204∗ -0.058 -0.051
Trust 0.282∗∗∗ -0.089 0.382∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗ 0.144 0.188 -0.266∗∗
Observations 76 74 76 50 70 56 76
Notes. Pairwise Pearson correlations between average preferences and other variables at country level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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reciprocity is particularly high, and trust also tends to be higher where people are posi-
tively reciprocal. This is intuitive as it is hard to imagine stable and high levels of trust
in environments absent positive reciprocity, i.e., trust rewarding behaviors.16 Despite be-
ing related to the social domain, negative reciprocity is not at all correlated with proso-
ciality. We report the correlation structure among preferences at the individual level in
Appendix 5.B.
Evidence that preference dispositions vary substantially across countries does not im-
ply that cross-country or cultural differences are the primary source of preference varia-
tion in the world. Table 5.4 shows results from a total variance decomposition, which re-
veals that the within-country variation in preferences is actually larger than the between-
country variation, an observation that varies only minimally by preference. Part of the
within-country variation might reflect measurement error, so that the variation in true
preferences is overstated.17 However, the available evidence on the size of test-retest cor-
relations and measurement error suggests that it is highly unlikely that measurement
error alone produces the fact that within-country variation dominates between-country
variation, see Appendix 5.H for details.
The relative importance of within-country variation does not imply that country
differences are negligible or irrelevant. It does, however, suggest that individual charac-
teristics contribute relatively more to the formation of human preferences than national
borders.
Table 5.3. Pairwise correlations between preferences at country level
Patience Risk taking Pos. reciprocity Neg. reciprocity Altruism Trust
Patience 1
Risk taking 0.231∗∗ 1
Positive reciprocity 0.0202 -0.256∗∗ 1
Negative reciprocity 0.262∗∗ 0.193∗ -0.154 1
Altruism -0.00691 -0.0155 0.711∗∗∗ -0.132 1
Trust 0.186 -0.0613 0.363∗∗∗ 0.160 0.272∗∗ 1
Notes. Pairwise Pearson correlations between average preferences at country level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
16Given that our survey item for trust measures only the belief-component of trust (as opposed to first-
mover behavior in trust games, which is also affected by risk preferences), the low correlation between trust
and risk taking is consistent with previous within-country findings.
17 In fact, comparing the between- and within-country variation across survey items reveals that the
between-country variation tends to be relatively larger for the quantitative survey items. For example, in
the case of patience, the quantitative staircase procedure exhibits a between-country variation of 15.7%,
while the qualitative patience measure has a between-country variation of 7.3%.
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Table 5.4. Between- vs. within-country variation
Preference
Between-country Within-country
variation (%) variation (%)
Patience 13.5 86.5
Risk taking 9.0 91.0
Positive reciprocity 12.0 88.0
Negative reciprocity 7.0 93.0
Altruism 12.3 87.7
Trust 8.2 91.8
Notes. Results from a variance decomposition in which the
total individual-level variation in the respective preference
is decomposed into the variance of the average preference
across countries and the average of the within-country
variance. Formally, the between-country variation corre-
sponds to the R2 of an OLS regression of all individual-level
observations on a set of country dummies in which all ob-
servations are weighted by the sampling weights provided
by Gallup to achieve (ex post) representativeness.
5.4 Preferences and Individual Characteristics
5.4.1 Age, Gender, and Cognitive Ability
The pronounced within-country heterogeneity calls for a better understanding of the
individual-level determinants of preferences. The analysis focuses on three main char-
acteristics: age, gender and cognitive ability, taking self-reported math skills as a proxy
for the latter.18 Gender, age, and cognitive ability are interesting to study, and have re-
ceived particular attention in previous research on preferences (e.g., Barsky et al., 1997;
Donkers et al., 2001; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Frederick, 2005; Sutter and Kocher,
2007; Dohmen et al., 2010, 2011; Benjamin et al., 2013), for two main reasons. First,
they are associated with important differences in economic outcomes. If preferences vary
with these traits, they could be part of the explanation. Second, these traits are plausi-
bly exogenous to preferences. The previous literature has proposed various mechanisms
through which gender, age, and cognitive ability might be related to preferences, ranging
from biological to purely social (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Dohmen et al., 2011; Ben-
jamin et al., 2013). There is limited knowledge, however, about the relative importance
of these different types of mechanisms. For example, alternative explanations for age
effects include an influence of idiosyncratic historical and cultural environments on the
one hand, to biological aspects of the aging process on the other hand. The ability to ex-
amine how different preferences vary with characteristics across countries with diverse
historical experiences can shed light on such questions.
Table 5.5 reports regressions of each preference on age, age squared, gender and
math skills in the full world sample, conditional on country fixed effects. For each pref-
erence, the second column contains additional covariates to be discussed below. The
18 This proxy may tend to capture the numeracy aspect of cognitive skills. Subjective assessments of
ability are correlated with measured cognitive ability, and have predictive power for academic achievement
(Spinath et al., 2006). While such relative self-assessment might be interpreted in different ways across
countries, we only use self-reported cognitive skills in within-country analyses.
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variables are standardized, so the coefficients show the change in the dependent vari-
able (respective preference) in standard deviation units, for a one unit change in an
independent variable (individual characteristics).
The estimates in table 5.5 reveal that, in the world population as a whole, prefer-
ences vary significantly with gender, age, and cognitive ability. Specifically, for gender,
the strongest relationship is for risk preference: women are relatively more risk averse
than men. Women are also significantly more prosocial, i.e., they tend to be more altru-
istic, positively reciprocal, and trusting, and are less negatively reciprocal. Women are
slightly more impatient than men. In terms of age, the regression results indicate that, on
average: Young individuals are relatively more willing to take risks, and punish; the mid-
dle aged are especially positively reciprocal and patient; the elderly have the strongest
risk aversion and are relatively trusting. Preferences are also significantly related to self-
reported cognitive ability: high cognitive ability individuals are more patient, less risk
averse, more positively and negatively reciprocal, more trusting, and more altruistic.
We next exploit the ability to study the relationship of preferences to characteristics
separately, for 76 different countries, to understand the extent to which the relationship
of preferences to characteristics is culturally specific. Figure 5.3 addresses this question
for gender differences. For each country, we regress each preference on age, age squared,
gender, and cognitive ability. Figure 5.3 plots the resulting (conditional) gender coeffi-
cients. Each dot represents a country, the respective coefficient and the respective level
of significance (green not significantly different from zero, pink at 10, blue at 5, and red
at 1 percent level of significance, respectively). To ease reading, each panel also contains
a horizontal line at zero.
Figure 5.3 shows that greater risk aversion among women is common to most coun-
tries. In 95 percent of countries, the gender coefficient is non-zero and in the direction
of greater risk aversion among women. Of these negative coefficients, 82 percent are
statistically significant at least at the 10-percent level. The gender difference in negative
reciprocity is next in terms of universality: in 89 percent of countries is the female popu-
lation on average less willing to reciprocate negatively thanmen. The impression that the
majority of countries have a similar qualitative relationship between gender and prefer-
ences extends to the other social preferences, although there is more heterogeneity. For
altruism, positive reciprocity, and trust about 79 percent, 71 percent, and 71 percent of
countries have women being more pro-social than men, respectively. Patience is the most
variable in terms of gender differences, but still, 68 percent of countries have non-zero
coefficients of the same sign. These findings show that there are striking commonalities
in terms of how gender and preferences are related, across a large and diverse set of cul-
tural backgrounds. At the same time, there is substantial heterogeneity in the magnitude
of the relationships across countries.
Figure 5.4 explores how the relationship between age and preferences varies across
countries. This figure is divided by whether countries are OECD-members or not, in order
to show some of the most salient cross-country differences: OECD-members exhibit a
hump-shaped pattern for both positive reciprocity and patience, that is almost entirely
absent in non-OECD countries. In Appendix 5.E.1, we also provide the age profiles for







Table 5.5. Correlates of preferences at individual level
Dependent variable:
Patience Risk taking Pos. reciprocity Neg. reciprocity Altruism Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age 0.72∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ -0.083 0.46∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ -0.36∗ -0.18 -0.0060 0.024 0.37∗ 0.071
(0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.16)
Age squared -1.45∗∗∗ -1.34∗∗∗ -1.20∗∗∗ -1.75∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗ -0.69∗∗∗ 0.015 -0.13 0.032 0.24
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.15) (0.15) (0.20) (0.17)
1 if female -0.056∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Subj. math skills 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log [Household income p/c] 0.038∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.051∗∗∗ -0.013∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Subj. law and order index 0.058∗∗∗ 0.044∗ 0.021 -0.066∗∗ 0.037∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Subj. health index 0.097∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
1 if christian -0.082∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
1 if muslim -0.13∗∗ -0.098∗∗ -0.0000071 -0.11∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
1 if hinduist -0.12∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 0.0091 -0.18∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
1 if buddhist 0.10 -0.19∗∗∗ 0.014 -0.062 0.16∗∗ -0.061
(0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.12)
1 if jew 0.40∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.024 0.20∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
1 if other religion -0.00022 -0.18∗∗∗ -0.028 -0.060 0.14∗∗ 0.0053
(0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
Constant -0.37∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗ -0.67∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 78501 58479 78445 58437 78869 58733 77521 57731 78632 58532 77814 57952
R2 0.165 0.154 0.167 0.185 0.128 0.121 0.112 0.114 0.135 0.130 0.111 0.100
Notes. OLS estimates, standard errors (clustered at country level) in parentheses. Coefficients are in terms of units of standard deviations of the respective preference (relative
to the individual world mean). For the purposes of this table, age is divided by 100. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
218 | 5 The Nature and Predictive Power of Preferences: Global Evidence
Figure 5.3. Gender correlations separately by country. Each panel plots the distribution of gender
correlations. That is, for each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and
its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting gender coefficients as well as their
significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized
(z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients. Green dots indicate countries
in which the gender correlation is not statistically different from zero at the 10% level, while red
/ blue / pink dots denote countries in which the effect is significant at the 1% / 5% / 10% level,
respectively. Positive coefficients imply that women have higher values in the respective
preference.
5.4 Preferences and Individual Characteristics | 219
Eastern Europe, Asia, North Africa and Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern
America. These figures show that patience and positive reciprocity have hump-shaped
age profiles mainly in Western and Neo Europe, but also reveal that age profiles for
altruism are variable across world regions. By contrast, the age profiles for risk taking,
negative reciprocity, and trust are more universal.19
Figure 5.4. Age profiles by OECD membership. The figures depict the relationship between
preferences and age conditional on country fixed effects, gender, and subjective math skills.
These are augmented component plus residuals plots, in which the vertical axis represents the
component of the preference that is predicted by age and its square plus the residuals from the
regression in the second column of Table 5.5. The horizontal axis represents age, winsorized at
83 (99th percentile).
Intuitively, the relationship between cognitive ability and preferences might not be as
strongly tied to socially constructed roles as gender, or age, andmight hence have an even
more universal relationship to preferences independent of cultural background. Indeed,
we find that self-reported cognitive ability is related to each preference in a strikingly
similar way across countries. For every preference, at least 93 percent of countries have
the same qualitative relationship between the preference and cognitive ability, for all
preferences. Similarly to Figure 5.3, Appendix 5.E.2 shows graphs of the cognitive ability
coefficients, by preference and country.
In sum, the findings reveal that there are at least some mechanisms linking prefer-
ences to gender, age, and cognitive ability that are universal features of humans, possibly
due to biological or psychological mechanisms. At the same time, the results also show
a significant amount of variation in the quantitative magnitude and sometimes even the
direction of relationships with individual characteristics. Thus, the results provide an
important caveat to studies on more specific samples, which sometimes produce highly
variable or even contradictory results.
5.4.2 Further Correlates of Preferences
The analysis proceeds by investigating the relationship between preferences on the one
hand and income, religious affiliation, physical health, and subjective safety perceptions,
19 Similar results on the (partially non-linear) age profiles and their relationship to the degree of devel-
opment obtain when we depict the age profile for all 76 countries separately; these figures are available
upon request.
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on the other hand. While these characteristics and attitudes are not as exogenous to
preferences as age, gender, and cognitive ability, they might nevertheless plausibly affect
the formation of preferences.
Health and safety perceptions are evaluated using two indices that Gallup provides
by aggregating several survey items. For example, the subjective law and order index
includes a question on whether respondents recently had money or property stolen. The
subjective health index makes use of an item asking people whether they have health
problems that are atypical given their age, among others (see Appendix 5.I for details).
The results are reported in columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10), and (12) of Table 5.5.
The table shows that household income is positively correlated with all preferences, but
not with trust. Subjective perceptions of law and order are positively correlated with
patience and trust, and negatively associated to negative reciprocity. One possible in-
terpretation is that if people feel safe, they trust others more and are more willing to
postpone financial rewards. Negative reciprocity might be less prevalent if an individual
believes institutions already provide mechanisms for strong formal sanctions. Previous
work finds that retaliatory punishment is more pronounced in countries where people
perceive the rule of law as weak (Herrmann et al., 2008).
Subjective physical health perceptions are positively correlated with all traits, ex-
cept for negative reciprocity. Turning to religious affiliation, the regressions investigate
the correlation between six religion dummies (christian, muslim, hinduist, buddhist, jew,
other), taking seculars as baseline category. Again note that the religious affiliation co-
efficients are entirely identified from within-country variation in religious denomination
and preferences. We find a very consistent pattern: relative to seculars, christians, mus-
lims, and hinduists are less patient, more risk averse, less negatively reciprocal as well
as more altristic and trusting. Similar patterns hold for buddhists. Jews, on the other
hand, are more patient, altruistic, and trusting, and have strong negatively reciprocal in-
clinations. Overall, these results suggest that, relative to atheists, being religious of any
denomination tends to be associated with relatively high risk aversion, high values on
the prosocial dimensions altruism and trust, and low negative reciprocity (albeit with a
few notable exceptions).
5.5 Preferences and Individual Behaviors
We now turn to investigating the relationships of preferences to individual behaviors
and outcomes. Understanding the relationship between our preference measures and
individual-level economic and social decisions is important in two respects. First, such
analyses provide insights into the role of heterogeneity in underlying preference param-
eters for generating observed choice behavior, on a global scale. Second, it allows us to
evaluate the meaningfulness and behavioral relevance of our items in a culturally and
economically highly heterogeneous sample.20
20 Throughout this section, the respective dependent variables are sometimes only available for a subset
of countries because the respective question was not part of Gallup’s core questionnaire.
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5.5.1 Accumulation Decisions
We evaluate the explanatory power of the GPS patience measure by relating it to the
accumulation of physical and human capital. Table 5.6 presents estimates of OLS regres-
sions of different outcomes on patience. Columns (1) and (2) display the results of a
linear probability model, in which we employ as dependent variable a binary indicator
for whether the respondent saved in the previous year. Patience is correlated with savings
behavior both with and without country fixed effects, and conditional on socioeconomic
covariates such as age, gender, income, cognitive ability, and religion. The point estimate
implies that a one standard deviation increase in patience is associated with a roughly
20% increase of the probability of saving relative to the baseline probability of 26.7%.
Columns (3) and (4) establish that patience is also significantly related to educational
attainment; these estimates are based on a three-step categorical variable (roughly: pri-
mary, seondary, and tertiary education).21
In Appendix 5.F.1, we show that the significant relationship between our patience
variable and accumulation processes is not driven by only a few countries. Specifically,
by plotting the distribution of point estimates and their significance level across countries,
we show that the coefficient of patience is positive in the more than 90% of countries for
both savings and education, and mostly statistically significant. For instance, the corre-
lation between patience and education is in most cases statistically significant at least at
the 5% level in 74% of all countries.
5.5.2 Risky Choices
To investigate whether risk preferences are related to important risky decisions in life,
we build on previous within-country findings, which have found a relationship of risk
attitudes to self-employment and health behavior (Dohmen et al., 2011). As columns (5)
and (6) of Table 5.6 establish, our preference measure predicts actual self-employment
both across and within countries. The same pattern holds when considering individuals’
intention to start their own business, conditional on not being self-employed (columns
(7)-(8)).
Columns (9) and (10) relate risk preferences to the respondent’s smoking intensity,
measured on a three-point scale (never, occasionally, and frequently). We find that more
risk-tolerant people aremore likely to smoke, both with andwithout country fixed effects,
and conditional on a large set of covariates. Appendix 5.F.1 shows that the correlations
between risk preferences and labor market or health decisions are not restricted to a
particular set of countries. Rather, risk preferences are related to risky behaviors in a
qualitatively similar way around the world, although quantitative magnitudes of the
relationships do vary. For example risk taking is significantly positively related to planned


































Table 5.6. Patience and accumulation decisions, risk preferences and risky choices
Dependent variable:
Accumulation decisions Risky choices
Saved last year Education level Own business Plan to start business Smoking intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Patience 0.050∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Risk taking 0.031∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.023∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.025 0.99∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 2.55∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.26) (0.12) (0.09) (0.31)
Age squared -0.21 -1.83∗∗∗ -1.54∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗∗ -2.86∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.25) (0.12) (0.10) (0.31)
1 if female -0.0010 -0.016 -0.053∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03)
Subj. math skills 0.012∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log [Household income p/c] 0.11∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ -0.0072∗∗ -0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Constant 0.27∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.038 0.38∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Religion FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 15260 14459 79357 69272 72839 62985 57072 51489 15309 14490
R2 0.011 0.132 0.030 0.329 0.008 0.104 0.011 0.120 0.005 0.198
OLS estimates, standard errors (clustered at country level) in parentheses. For the purposes of this table, age is divided by 100. Saved last year is
a binary indicator, while education level is measured in three categories (roughly elementary, secondary, and tertiary education, see Appendix 5.I).
Self-employment and planned self-employment are binary, while smoking intensity is measured in three categories (never, occasionally, frequently). ∗







Table 5.7. Social preferences and social interactions
Dependent variable:
Donated Volunteered Helped Sent money / goods Voiced opinion Have friends / relatives In a
money time stranger to other individual to official I can count on relationship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Altruism 0.064∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.0079 0.016∗∗∗ 0.0048 0.0013
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Positive reciprocity 0.0055 -0.00037 -0.000074 0.0049 0.035∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.0021 -0.0025 0.015∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.0072∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Negative reciprocity 0.0040 -0.0042 -0.0033 -0.0035 -0.0026 -0.0032 0.011∗∗ 0.0051 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.0037 -0.0034 -0.00074
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age 0.62∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗ 5.58∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.16)
Age squared -0.47∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -1.00∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ -5.42∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17)
1 if female 0.013∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.00057 -0.045∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Subj. math skills 0.0091∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0091∗∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0091∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log [Household income p/c] 0.031∗∗∗ 0.0042 0.021∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.32∗∗∗ -0.022 0.22∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05)
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Religion FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 58229 53439 58213 53430 55991 53226 56253 53559 55944 53174 65986 59209 77881 68176
R2 0.020 0.192 0.012 0.089 0.028 0.093 0.012 0.124 0.006 0.062 0.003 0.118 0.002 0.218
OLS estimates, standard errors (clustered at country level) in parentheses. For the purposes of this table, age is divided by 100. See Appendix 5.I for details on all dependent variables. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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5.5.3 Social Interactions
We analyze the relationships of the social preference measures to behaviors and out-
comes in the social domain.22 Table 5.7 summarizes the results. Columns (1)-(8) show
that altruism is significantly related to a broad range of prosocial behaviors including do-
nating, volunteering time, helping strangers, or sending money or goods to other people
in need. Across the different behavioral categories, the point estimate is very consistent
and implies that an increase in altruism by one standard deviation is correlated with
an increase in the probability of engaging in prosocial activities of 3.5–6.5 percentage
points, which corresponds to an increase of roughly 15–20% compared to the respective
baseline probabilities.23 Positive reciprocity is a significant correlate of helping people
in need (columns (5) through (8)), perhaps a manifestation of generalized reciprocity
in the sense that reciprocal people who have been helped before are also willing to help
others. In contrast, the negative reciprocity variable is virtually uncorrelated with all of
the prosocial activities in the first eight columns. As columns (9) and (10) show, however,
negative reciprocity is a significant predictor of whether people are willing to voice their
opinion to a public official.
Columns (11) through (14) examine the relationship between social preferences and
respondents’ family and friendship status. We find that more altruistic and more posi-
tively reciprocal people are more likely to have friends they can count on when in need,
and that positive reciprocity correlates with being in a relationship.24
The overall pattern in Table 5.7 highlights that preferences are predictive of a wide
range of behaviors in the social domain and that the preference measures are of suffi-
ciently high quality to discriminate between different types of social behavior. As Ap-
pendix 5.F.1 shows, these relationships are not restricted to a small set of countries, but
instead hold for most countries separately. For instance, the correlation between altruism
and donating is statistically significant at the 5% level in 80% of all countries.
In sum, all of the GPS preference measures are significantly related to a broad range
of economic and social behaviors in a way one would intuitively expect. This indicates
that preference heterogeneity is important for understanding variation in economic out-
comes worldwide. In addition, the fact that the correlations are qualitatively similar
across cultural backgrounds and development levels provides reassuring evidence that
the GPS survey items do indeed capture the relevant underlying preferences even in a
very heterogeneous sample in terms of cultural background and economic development.
In this sense, the correlations provide an important out-of-context validation check for
the survey module.
21 Appendix 5.F.2 presents robustness checks on all results in this section using (ordered) probit estima-
tions.
22 Since trust constitutes a belief rather than a preference, we do not incorporate it in the discussion here.
However, all results are robust to controlling for trust.
23 These baseline probabilities are 31.8%, 21.6%, 48.3%, and 23.7%, repectively (see Table 5.7 for the
order of variables).
24 Also see Dohmen et al. (2009).
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5.6 The Cultural Origins of Preference Variation
The previous analyses have documented a large amount of preference heterogeneity both
across and within countries. An immediate question is whether this variation has deep
cultural origins. While heterogeneity in different preferences may have myriad of poten-
tially different historical or cultural sources, we conclude the paper by drilling deeper
into the potential cultural origins of preference differences. We focus on one particular
proxy for cultural variation, i.e., linguistic features. Language has been used as proxy
for cultural variation in many previous studies (e.g., Fearon, 2003; Desmet et al., 2009,
2012; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2015). In deriving specific testable hypotheses on the re-
lationship between preferences and linguistic or cultural variation, we follow the work of
Chen (2013) and investigate the relationship between economic preferences and a struc-
tural feature of languages called future-time reference (FTR). As discussed in detail by
Chen (2013), languages differ in whether or not they require people to grammatically
mark future events: some languages require people to explicitly distinguish between
present and future by making use of constructions such as “I will go to school tomor-
row” (strong FTR), while others allow speakers to talk about the future in present tense
(weak FTR). Chen (2013) argues that strong FTR languages may make the future feel
more distant, potentially resulting in less future-oriented behavior. In empirically testing
this proposition, he develops a binary FTR classification of languages and shows that –
both across and within countries – people who speak weak FTR languages save more,
are less likely to smoke, and have better health.25
Building on this insight, we investigate the relationship between preferences and
future-time reference. Our analysis serves two purposes. First, our patience measure al-
lows for a direct replication and extension of Chen’s results on future-oriented behavior.
In particular, our patience measure arguably constitutes a more fundamental and direct
proxy for how people trade off current and future rewards than, e.g., medical obesity.
Second, our data allow for a systematic investigation of whether the cultural trait cap-
tured by FTR is also related to other preferences rather than just time preference. In
particular, it is conceivable that people for whom the future seems less distant are more
likely to invest resources today to reap social benefits in the future. Thus, traits that are
related to cooperation, repeated interaction, and reputation building should be more
pronounced in weak FTR languages. Our data on positive reciprocity, trust, and altru-
ism provide natural candidates for such an investigation. Our analysis proceeds in two
steps. First, we investigate the relationship between average preferences and FTR at the
country level. Then, we exploit within-country variation in preferences and FTR.
5.6.1 Cross-Country Evidence
To study the relationship between preferences and FTR, we employ Gallup’s interview
language as a proxy for the language respondents speak in their daily lives.26 We apply
Chen’s classification of languages to our dataset, which results in a set of 55 coded lan-
25 Sutter et al. (2014) show that the same relationship exists for children in a bilingual city in Italy.
26 Correspondence with Gallup suggests that, naturally, in some countries interview language is an im-
perfect proxy for the language people are most familiar with. Thus, proxying people’s daily language with
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guages. In addition, we were able to code an additional four languages ourselves using
the methodology outlined in Chen (2013).27 In sum, we have access to 59 classified lan-
guages for a total of 75,224 respondents.28 All results are robust to only making use of
the languages coded by Chen.
After classifying each respondent, we compute the country-level fraction of people
whose language corresponds to weak as opposed to strong FTR. Then, we regress average
preferences in a given country on this fraction. To take into account that we can classify
only a subset of respondents in some countries (making the fraction speaking weak FTR
languages a less precise estimate of the true population counterpart), our regressions
weigh all observations by the fraction of people whose language can be classified. Thus,
countries in which we can classify a larger fraction of respondents receive higher weight,
as should be the case from a measurement error perspective.29
Table 5.8 presents the results. For each preference, we report two specifications, one
without covariates and one with control variables commonly employed in cross-country
regressions, i.e., continent fixed effects, (log) per capita income, distance to the equator,
longitude, the fraction of the population that is at risk of contractingmalaria, and average
precipitation. Results show that, across countries, weak FTR is significantly correlated
with average patience (columns (1)-(2)). As columns (5)-(6) and (11)-(12) show, similar
patterns obtain for positive reciprocity and trust. In contrast, altruism, risk taking, and
negative reciprocity are not significantly correlated with the fraction speaking weak FTR
languages.
5.6.2 Within-Country Evidence
In a second step of the analysis, we exploit within-country variation in preferences and
FTR. Such analyses are arguably better suited to identify cultural origins of preferences
because they can account for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level.
In many countries in our sample, we observe some variation in interview languages.
However, variation in language does not necessarily mean variation in FTR. In fact, only
in Estonia, Nigeria, and Switzerland (2,925 respondents in total) do interview languages
vary across respondents such that we observe within-country variation in FTR. Thus, we
proceed by regressing individual-level preferences on a dummy for whether a respondent
speaks a weak or strong FTR language, conditional on country fixed effects and age, age
squared, gender, and our cognitive skills proxy. Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11)
of Table 5.9 present the results. Consistent with the cross-country evidence, we find that
individuals speaking weak FTR languages are more patient, more positively reciprocal,
their interview language results in measurement error and hence attenuation bias, which works against
finding statistically significant effects in our analyses.
27 These languages are: Fulfulde (weak FTR), Khmer (strong FTR), Moroccan Arabic (weak FTR), and
Dari (strong FTR). In addition, we changed one of Chen’s classifications after corresponding with him. He
classified Persian as strong FTR, while it is in fact weak FTR. None of our results depend on how we code
Persian.
28We could not classify 23 languages, which are mostly spoken by small minorities (5,113 respondents
in total).
29 Appendix 5.G confirms that virtually identical results are obtained when running unweighted OLS








Table 5.8. Preferences and FTR: Cross-country results
Dependent variable:
Patience Risk taking Pos. reciprocity Neg. reciprocity Altruism Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Fraction of population speaking weak FTR 0.37∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ -0.14∗ -0.0080 0.13∗ 0.16∗∗ -0.024 -0.088 0.043 0.099 0.17∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(0.13) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
Log [GDP p/c PPP] 0.15∗∗∗ 0.032 -0.072∗ 0.058 -0.078∗ -0.00072
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Distance to equator 0.010∗ 0.0017 -0.0069 -0.0081 -0.0022 -0.0072
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Longitude -0.0019 0.0023 0.0022 0.00091 0.0025 -0.000039
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% at risk of malaria 0.25 -0.14 -0.27 -0.13 -0.71∗∗ -0.16
(0.21) (0.23) (0.29) (0.17) (0.27) (0.19)
Average precipitation -0.00024 -0.00092 0.00065 -0.0011 0.0031∗∗ -0.0011
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.055 -1.42∗∗∗ 0.034 -0.041 -0.047 1.39∗∗∗ 0.020 -0.13 -0.049 1.27∗∗ -0.047 0.56
(0.04) (0.51) (0.04) (0.36) (0.05) (0.43) (0.04) (0.50) (0.05) (0.50) (0.04) (0.38)
Continent FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 75 74 75 74 75 74 75 74 75 74 75 74
R2 0.146 0.636 0.031 0.442 0.022 0.253 0.001 0.271 0.002 0.334 0.053 0.408
WLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. All observations are weighted by the fraction of respondents whose language can be classified as weak or strong FTR. The
regressions exclude Haiti for which no respondent could be classified. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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andmore trusting. In addition, these people are also significantlymore altruistic.30 Wedo
not find significant relationships between FTR and risk taking or negative reciprocity. For
each preference, a second column adds further controls, i.e., regional (state or province)
fixed effects, religion fixed effects, household income, health, and subjective institutional
quality. Despite this comprehensive set of covariates, and only exploiting within-region
variation in FTR and preferences, we obtain almost identical results.
In sum, the results at the subnational level closely mirror those obtained in cross-
country analyses, the one exception being altruism.31 Thus, across levels of aggrega-
tion, weak FTR is predictive of higher patience and higher levels of the prosocial traits
positive reciprocity, altruism, and trust. These results are supportive of the hypothesis
that cultural variation might coevolve with preferences. In particular, just as in the case
of the work by Chen (2013), our results lend themselves to two interesting interpreta-
tions. First, speaking a weak FTR language may actually cause patience and cooperation-
enhancing prosociality; second, the historical evolution of linguistic features and the
formation preferences may both be a product of some other very deep cultural trait.
Regardless of the precise interpretation adopted, our results highlight that the contem-
porary preference variation may have very deep historical roots,32 and that the GPS data
are well-suited to identify such effects.
5.7 Discussion, Applications, and Outlook
Many theories about human behavior in economics and other fields assume that a fun-
damental set of preferences drives decision-making of individual agents. These include
preferences about risk, timing of rewards, and in the social domain, reciprocity, altru-
ism, and trust. Despite their importance, empirical evidence on the extent and nature of
preference heterogeneity has been restricted to varying measures available for a limited
set of countries, and typically non-representative samples. This paper has presented the
first assessment of the distribution and nature of these fundamental traits on a globally
representative basis using a novel dataset, which includes behaviorally validated survey
measures of preferences. The findings in this paper are clearly only a first step towards
tapping the potential of the GPS. The cross-cultural dimension of the data and the repre-
sentative sampling design allow entirely new perspectives and levels of analysis. We illus-
trate this by discussing three broad directions for future research: the mechanisms un-
derlying the relationship between preferences and individual characteristics, the deeper
causes of cross-country variation in preferences, and the potential consequences of cer-
tain country-level preference profiles.
First, the data vastly expand the amount of information available for understanding
the relationship between individual-level characteristics and preferences. The precise
30When we restrict the sample to those countries with within-country variation in FTR and regress the
respective preference only on the FTR indicator as well as country fixed effects, the resulting coefficient
is always positive and statistically significat at the 10% level for patience and at the 1% level for positive
reciprocity, trust, and altruism. In Appendix 5.G, we report the coefficient on FTR separately for each country
in which we observe within-country variation.
31Note that the correspondence between within- and across-country results is in no way mechanical, i.e.,
it need not necessarily be the case that individual- and country-level correlations are aligned.
32 As discussed by Chen (2013), variation in future-time reference is at least several hundred years old.
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ways in which the strength and direction of preference differences vary across different
environments, locations, and institutions, may shed further light on the mechanisms un-
derlying preference differences. For example, if gender differences in preferences are cor-
related within countries, this would suggest some deep mechanisms that extend across
preference domains.
Second, there is much more that can be done to investigate the ultimate origins of
the cross-country variation in preference. While our analysis of the relationship between
FTR and preferences has provided a first step in this direction, other cultural proxies or
historical events might likewise generate differences in preferences. For example, other
linguistic structures, such as politeness in pronoun usage (Helmbrecht, 2003), or the role
of gender in the languagemight be related to preference differences (Corbett, 1991). The
correlation structure of preferences may also be informative for understanding the ulti-
mate sources of preference differences. Traits may also coevolve, to the extent that they
are complementary in contributing to evolutionary fitness. In this regard, it is suggestive
that the groupings of positively correlated preferences that we find are plausibly comple-
mentary, in the context of theories about the human ability to sustain cooperation (e.g.,
high patience and strong negative reciprocity).
A third direction for future research is a detailed investigation of the link between
aggregate outcomes and preferences at the country level. Given the previous lack of rep-
resentative preference data, this is completely uncharted territory. Exploring in detail
the many ramifications of preference differences for explaining outcomes is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, to illustrate the potential power of the GPS data in under-
standing cross-country variation in the economic and social domain, we conclude with
two examples. First, a tendency to retaliate could exacerbate conflicts, so that negative
reciprocity may be relevant for explaining the occurrence of conflict or war. Second, a
large body of dynamic theories of comparative development and growth highlight the
crucial role of time preference for aggregate accumulation processes. Consistent with
such theories, in a follow-up paper, Dohmen et al. (2015), we find that patience is not
only predictive of future-oriented decisions and income at the individual level, but also
across regions within countries, and even across entire populations: more patient coun-
tries have higher savings rates, invest more into education as well as into the stock of
ideas and knowledge, grow faster, and are wealthier.
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Appendix 5.A Global Preference Survey
5.A.1 Overview
The cross-country dataset measuring risk aversion, patience, positive and negative reci-
procity, altruism, and trust, was collected through the professional infrastructure of the
Gallup World Poll 2012. The data collection process consisted of three steps. First, an
experimental validation procedure was conducted to select the survey items. Second,
there was a pre-test of the selected survey items in a variety of countries to ensure imple-
mentability in a culturally diverse sample. Third, the final data set was collected through
the regular professional data collection efforts in the framework of the World Poll 2012.
5.A.2 Experimental Validation
To ensure the behavioral validity of the preference measures, all underlying survey items
were selected through an experimental validation procedure (see Falk et al. (2015) for
details). To this end, a sample of 409 German undergraduates completed standard state-
of-the-art financially incentivized laboratory experiments designed to measure risk aver-
sion, patience, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust. The same sample of
subjects then completed a large battery of potential survey items. In a final step, for each
preference, those survey items were selected which jointly performed best in explaining
the behavior under real incentives observed in the choice experiments.
5.A.3 Pre-Test and Adjustment of Survey Items
Prior to including the preference module in the Gallup World Poll 2012, it was tested in
the field as part of the World Poll 2012 pre-test, which was conducted at the end of 2011
in 22 countries. The main goal of the pre-test was to receive feedback on each item from
various cultural backgrounds in order to assess potential difficulties in understanding
and differences in the respondents’ interpretation of items. Based on respondents’ feed-
back and suggestions, minor modifications were made to several items before running
the survey as part of the World Poll 2012.
The pre-test was run in 10 countries in central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) 2 coun-
tries in South-East Asia (Bangladesh and Cambodia), 5 countries in Southern and East-
ern Europe (Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Turkey), 4 countries in the Middle East
and North Africa (Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi-Arabia), and 1 country in East-
ern Africa (Kenya). In each country, the sample size was 10 to 15 people. Overall, more
than 220 interviews were conducted. In most countries, the sample was mixed in terms
of gender, age, educational background, and area of residence (urban / rural).
Participants in the pre-test were asked to state any difficulties in understanding the
items and to rephrase the meaning of items in their own words. If they encountered
difficulties in understanding or interpreting items, respondents were asked to make sug-
gestions on how to modify the wording of the item in order to attain the desired meaning.
Overall, the understanding of both the qualitative items and the quantitative items
was satisfactory. In particular, no interviewer received any complaints regarding difficul-
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ties in assessing the quantitative questions or understanding the meaning of the proba-
bility used in the hypothetical risky choice items. When asked about rephrasing the qual-
itative items in their own words, most participants seemed to have understood the items
in exactly the way that was intended. Nevertheless, some (sub-groups of) participants
suggested adjustments to the wording of some items. This resulted in minor changes to
four items, relative to the “original” experimentally validated items:
1. The use of the term “lottery” in hypothetical risky choices was troubling to some
Muslim participants. As a consequence, we dropped the term “lottery” and re-
placed it with “draw”.
2. The term “charity” caused confusion in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, so it was
replaced it with “good cause”.
3. Some respondents asked for a clarification of the question asking about one’s will-
ingness to punish unfair behavior. This feedback lead to splitting the question into
two separate items, one item asking for one’s willingness to punish unfair behavior
towards others, and another asking for one’s willingness to punish unfair behavior
towards oneself.
4. When asked about hypothetical choices between monetary amounts today versus
larger amounts one year later, some participants, especially in countries with cur-
rent or relatively recent phases of volatile and high inflation rates, stated that their
answer would depend on the rate of inflation, or said that they would always take
the immediate payment due to uncertainty with respect to future inflation. There-
fore, we decided to add the following phrase to each question involving hypothet-
ical choices between immediate and future monetary amounts: “Please assume
there is no inflation, i.e., future prices are the same as today’s prices.”
5.A.4 Selection of Countries
The goal when selecting countries was to ensure representative coverage of the global
population. Thus, countries from each continent and each region within continents were
chosen. Another goal was to maximize variation with respect to observables, such as
GDP per capita, language, historical and political characteristics, or geographical loca-
tion and climatic conditions. Accordingly, the selection process favored non-neighboring
and culturally dissimilar countries. This procedure resulted in the following sample of
76 countries:
East Asia and Pacific: Australia, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, South
Korea, Thailand, Vietnam
Europe and Central Asia: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lithua-
nia, Moldova, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom
Latin America and Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela
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Middle East and North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates
North America: United States, Canada
South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
Sub-Saharan Africa: Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda,
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe
5.A.5 Sampling and Survey Implementation
5.A.5.1 Background
Since 2005, the international polling company Gallup has conducted an annual World
Poll, in which it surveys representative population samples in almost every country
around the world on, e.g., economic, social, political, and environmental issues. The
collection of our preference data was embedded into the regular World Poll 2012
and hence made use of the pre-existing polling infrastructure of one of the largest
professional polling institutes in the world.33
Selecting Primary Sampling Units
In countries in which face-to-face interviews are conducted, the first stage of sampling is
the identification of primary sampling units (PSUs), consisting of clusters of households.
PSUs are stratified by population size and / or geography and clustering is achieved
through one or more stages of sampling. Where population information is available,
sample selection is based on probabilities proportional to population size. If population
information is not available, Gallup uses simple random sampling.
In countries in which telephone interviews are conducted, Gallup uses a random-
digit-dialing method or a nationally representative list of phone numbers. In countries
with high mobile phone penetration, Gallup uses a dual sampling frame.
Selecting Households and Respondents
Gallup uses random route procedures to select sampled households. Unless an outright
refusal to participate occurs, interviewers make up to three attempts to survey the sam-
pled household. To increase the probability of contact and completion, interviewersmake
attempts at different times of the day, and when possible, on different days. If the inter-
viewer cannot obtain an interview at the initially sampled household, he or she uses a
simple substitution method.
In face-to-face and telephone methodologies, random respondent selection is
achieved by using either the latest birthday or Kish grid methods.34 In a few Middle
East and Asian countries, gender-matched interviewing is required, and probability
33 See http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/156923/worldwide-research-methodology.aspx
34 The latest birthday method means that the person living in the household whose birthday among
all persons in the household was the most recent (and who is older than 15) is selected for interviewing.
With the Kish grid method, the interviewer selects the participants within a household by using a table of
random numbers. The interviewer will determine which random number to use by looking at, e.g., how
many households he or she has contacted so far (e.g., household no. 8) and how many people live in the
household (e.g., 3 people, aged 17, 34, and 36). For instance, if the corresponding number in the table is
7, he or she will interview the person aged 17.
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sampling with quotas is implemented during the final stage of selection. Gallup imple-
ments quality control procedures to validate the selection of correct samples and that
the correct person is randomly selected in each household.
Sampling Weights
Ex post, data weighting is used to ensure a nationally representative sample for each
country and is intended to be used for calculations within a country. These sampling
weights are provided by Gallup. First, base sampling weights are constructed to account
for geographic oversamples, household size, and other selection probabilities. Second,
post-stratification weights are constructed. Population statistics are used to weight the
data by gender, age, and, where reliable data are available, education or socioeconomic
status.
5.A.5.2 Translation of Items
The items of the preference module were translated into the major languages of each
target country. The translation process involved three steps. As a first step, a translator
suggested an English, Spanish or French version of a German item, depending on the
region. A second translator, being proficient in both the target language and in English,
French, or Spanish, then translated the item into the target language. Finally, a third
translator would review the item in the target language and translate it back into the
original language. If differences between the original item and the back-translated item
occurred, the process was adjusted and repeated until all translators agreed on a final
version.
5.A.5.3 Adjustment of Monetary Amounts in Quantitative Items
All items involving hypothetical monetary amounts were adjusted for each country in
terms of their real value. Monetary amounts were calculated to represent the same share
of a country’s median income in local currency as the share of the amount in Euro of
the German median income since the validation study had been conducted in Germany.
Monetary amounts used in the validation study with the German sample were “round”
numbers to facilitate easy calculations (e.g., the expected return of a lottery with equal
chances of winning and losing) and to allow for easy comparisons (e.g., 100 Euro today
versus 107.50 in 12 months). To proceed in a similar way in all countries, monetary
amounts were always rounded to the next “round” number. For example, in the quanti-
tative items involving choices between a lottery and varying safe options, the value of
the lottery was adjusted to a round number. The varying safe options were then adjusted
proportionally as in the original version. While this necessarily resulted in some (very
minor) variations in the real stake size between countries, it minimized cross-country
differences in the understanding the quantitative items due to difficulties in assessing
the involved monetary amounts.
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5.A.6 Wording of Survey Items
In the following, “willingness to act” indicates the following introduction:We now ask for
your willingness to act in a certain way in four different areas. Please again indicate your
answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are “completely unwilling to do so” and
a 10 means you are “very willing to do so”. You can also use any numbers between 0 and
10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, like 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
Similarly, “self-assessments” indicate that the respective statement was preceded by
the following introduction: How well do the following statements describe you as a person?
Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10. A 0 means “does not describe me at all”
and a 10 means “describes me perfectly”. You can also use any numbers between 0 and 10
to indicate where you fall on the scale, like 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
5.A.6.1 Patience
1. (Sequence of five interdependent quantitative questions:) Suppose you were given
the choice between receiving a payment today or a payment in 12 months. We will
now present to you five situations. The payment today is the same in each of these
situations. The payment in 12 months is different in every situation. For each of these
situations we would like to know which you would choose. Please assume there is no
inflation, i.e, future prices are the same as today’s prices. Please consider the following:
Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or x Euro in 12 months?
The precise sequence of questions was given by the “tree” logic in Figure S5.5.
2. (Willingness to act:) How willing are you to give up something that is beneficial for
you today in order to benefit more from that in the future?
5.A.6.2 Risk Taking
1. (Similar to self-assessment:) Please tell me, in general, how willing or unwilling you
are to take risks. Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “completely unwilling
to take risks” and a 10 means you are “very willing to take risks”. You can also use
any numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, like 0, 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
2. (Sequence of five interdependent quantitative questions:) Please imagine the fol-
lowing situation. You can choose between a sure payment of a particular amount of
money, or a draw, where you would have an equal chance of getting amount x or get-
ting nothing. We will present to you five different situations. What would you prefer:
a draw with a 50 percent chance of receiving amount x , and the same 50 percent
chance of receiving nothing, or the amount of y as a sure payment? The precise
sequence of questions was given by the “tree” logic in Figure S5.6.
5.A.6.3 Positive Reciprocity
1. (Self-assessment:) When someone does me a favor I am willing to return it.






















































































Figure 5.5. Tree for the staircase time task (numbers = payment in 12 months, A = choice of “100
euros today”, B = choice of “x euros in 12 months”. The staircase procedure worked as follows.
First, each respondent was asked whether they would prefer to receive 100 euros today or 154
euros in 12 months from now (leftmost decision node). In case the respondent opted for the
payment today (“A”), in the second question the payment in 12 months was adjusted upwards to
185 euros. If, on the other hand, the respondent chose the payment in 12 months, the
corresponding payment was adjusted down to 125 euros. Working further through the tree
follows the same logic.
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Figure 5.6. Tree for the staircase risk task (numbers = sure payment, A = choice of sure payment,
B = choice of lottery). The staircase procedure worked as follows. First, each respondent was
asked whether they would prefer to receive 160 euros for sure or whether they preferred a 50:50
chance of receiving 300 euros or nothing. In case the respondent opted for the safe choice (“B”),
the safe amount of money being offered in the second question decreased to 80 euros. If, on the
other hand, the respondent opted for the gamble (“A”), the safe amount was increased to 240
euros. Working further through the tree follows the same logic.
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2. (Hypothetical situation:) Please think about what you would do in the following situ-
ation. You are in an area you are not familiar with, and you realize you lost your way.
You ask a stranger for directions. The stranger offers to take you to your destination.
Helping you costs the stranger about 20 Euro in total. However, the stranger says he
or she does not want any money from you. You have six presents with you. The cheap-
est present costs 5 Euro, the most expensive one costs 30 Euro. Do you give one of the
presents to the stranger as a “thank-you”-gift? If so, which present do you give to the
stranger? No present / The present worth 5 / 10 / 15 / 20 / 25 / 30 Euro.
5.A.6.4 Negative Reciprocity
1. (Self-assessment:) If I am treated very unjustly, I will take revenge at the first occa-
sion, even if there is a cost to do so.
2. (Willingness to act:) How willing are you to punish someone who treats you unfairly,
even if there may be costs for you?
3. (Willingness to act:) How willing are you to punish someone who treats others un-
fairly, even if there may be costs for you?
5.A.6.5 Altruism
1. (Hypothetical situation:) Imagine the following situation: Today you unexpectedly
received 1,000 Euro. How much of this amount would you donate to a good cause?
(Values between 0 and 1000 are allowed.)
2. (Willingness to act:) How willing are you to give to good causes without expecting
anything in return?
5.A.6.6 Trust
(Self-assessment:) I assume that people have only the best intentions.
5.A.7 Computation of Preference Measures
5.A.7.1 Cleaning and Imputation of Missings
In order to efficiently use all available information in our data, missing survey items were
imputed based on the following procedure:
• If one (or more) survey items for a given preference were missing, then the missing
items were predicted using the responses to the available items. The procedure was
as follows:
– Suppose the preference was measured using two items, call them a and b.
For those observations with missing information on a, the procedure was to
predict its value based on the answer to b and its relationship to a, which
was estimated by regressing b on a for the sub-sample of subjects who had
nonmissing information on both, a and b (on the world sample).
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– For the unfolding-brackets time and risk items, the imputation procedure was
similar, but made additional use of the informational content of the responses
of participants who started but did not finish the sequence of the five ques-
tions. Again suppose that the preference is measured using two items and sup-
pose that a (the staircase measure) is missing. If the respondent did not even
start the staircase procedure, then imputation was done using the methodol-
ogy described above. On the other hand, if the respondent answered between
one and four of the staircase questions, a was predicted using a different pro-
cedure. Suppose the respondent answered four items such that his final stair-
case outcome would have to be either x or y. A probit was run of the “x vs.
y” decision on b, and the corresponding coefficients were used to predict the
decision for all missings (note that this constitutes a predicted probability).
The expected staircase outcome was then obtained by applying the predicted
probabilities to the respective staircase endpoints, i.e., in this case x and y. If
the respondent answered three (or less) questions, the same procedure was
applied, the only difference being that in this case the obtained predicted
probabilities were applied to the expected values of the staircase outcome
conditional on reaching the respective node. Put differently, the procedure
outlined above was applied recursively by working backwards through the
“tree” logic of the staircase procedure, resulting in an expected value for the
outcome node.
– If all survey items for a given preference were missing, then no imputation
took place.
• Across the 12 survey items, between 0% and 8% of all responses had to be imputed.
5.A.7.2 Computation of Preference Indices at the Individual Level
For each of the traits (risk preferences, time preferences, positive reciprocity, negative
reciprocity, altruism, and trust), an individual-level index was computed that aggregated
responses across different survey items. Each of these indices was computed by (i) com-
puting the z-scores of each survey item at the individual level and (ii) weighing these
z-scores using the weights resulting from the experimental validation procedure of Falk
et al. (2015). Formally, these weights are given by the coefficients of an OLS regression
of observed behavior in the experimental validation study on responses to the respective
survey items, such that the weights sum to one. In practice, for almost all preferences, the
coefficients assign roughly equal weight to all corresponding survey items. The weights
are given by:
• Patience:
Patience = 0.7115185 × Staircase time + 0.2884815 × Will. to give up sth. today
• Risk taking:
Risk taking = 0.4729985 × Staircase risk + 0.5270015 × Will. to take risks
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• Positive reciprocity:
Pos. reciprocity = 0.4847038 × Will. to return favor + 0.5152962 × Size of gift
• Negative reciprocity:
Neg. reciprocity = 0.5261938/2 × Will. to punish if oneself treated unfairly
+ 0.5261938/2 × Will. to punish if other treated unfairly
+ 0.3738062 × Will. to take revenge
As explained above, in the course of the pre-test, the negative reciprocity survey
item asking people for their willingness to punish others was split up into two ques-
tions, one asking for the willingness to punish if oneself was treated unfairly and
one asking for the willingness to punish if someone was treated unfairly. In order
to apply the weighting procedure from the validation procedure to these items, the
weight of the original item was divided by two and these modified weights were
assigned to the new questions.
• Altruism:
Altruism = 0.5350048 × Will. to give to good causes + 0.4649952 × Hypoth. donation
• Trust: The survey included only one corresponding item.
5.A.7.3 Computation of Country Averages
In order to compute country-level averages, individual-level data were weighted with
the sampling weights provided by Gallup, see Section S 1.5.1. These sampling weights
ensure that our measures correctly represent the population at the country level.
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5.A.8 Histograms by Preference
5.A.8.1 Individual Level
Figure 5.7. Distribution of preferences at individual level. The figure plots the distribution of
standardized preference measures at the individual level. All data are standardized at the level
of the individual in the full sample.
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5.A.8.2 Country Level
Figure 5.8. Distribution of preferences at country level. The figure plots the distribution of
country averages of standardized preferences. All data are standardized at the level of the
individual using the full sample.
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Appendix 5.B Correlations Among Individual-Level Preferences
Table 5.10 reports the correlation structure among preferences at the individual level.
The correlations are computed conditional on country fixed effects to ensure that level
differences in preferences across countries do not spuriously generate the results. At the
same time, the correlation structure without country fixed effects is quantitatively very
similar and is available upon request.
Table 5.10. Partial correlations between preferences at individual level conditional on country
fixed effects
Patience Risk taking Pos. reciprocity Neg. reciprocity Altruism Trust
Patience 1
Risk taking 0.210∗∗∗ 1
Pos. reciprocity 0.084∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 1
Neg. reciprocity 0.112∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 1
Altruism 0.098∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 1
Trust 0.044∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 1
Notes. Pairwise partial correlations between preferences at individual level, conditional on country
fixed effects. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The next step in the analysis shows that the significant individual-level correlations
among preferences in the world sample are not driven by a few outlier countries only.
To this end, Table 5.11 shows the number of countries in which each pair of preferences
is significantly correlated at the 1% level. The results show that in most cases the
correlations are significant in a large fraction of the 76 countries.
Table 5.11. Number of countries in which preferences are significantly correlated
Patience Risk taking Pos. reciprocity Neg. reciprocity Altruism Trust
Patience
Risk taking 71
Pos. reciprocity 40 30
Neg. reciprocity 53 73 19
Altruism 47 50 76 32
Trust 21 24 54 37 62
Notes. Number of countries for which a given pair of preferences is significantly correlated at the 1%
level.
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Appendix 5.C Scatter Plots of Preferences by World Region
Western & Neo Europe
Former Communist Eastern Europe
Asia
Figure 5.9a. Risk, time, and social preferences by world region (1/2). Each subpanel (row) plots
risk taking, patience, negative reciprocity, and prosociality of all countries within a given world
region. The prosociality score is computed as the average of altruism, positive reciprocity, and
trust.
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North Africa & Middle East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Southern Americas
Figure 5.9b. Risk, time, and social preferences by world region (2/2). Each subpanel (row) plots
risk taking, patience, negative reciprocity, and prosociality of all countries within a given world










Appendix 5.D Regressions for Variance Explained Across Countries
Table 5.12. Preferences and geographic, climatic, religious, and diversity variables (1/2)
Dependent variable:
Patience Risk taking Pos. reciprocity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Distance to equator 0.013∗∗∗ 0.0047 -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0040 -0.0024
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Longitude 0.000048 -0.00015 -0.000082 -0.00016 0.0013∗ 0.0017∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% at risk of malaria 0.093 -0.17 0.12 -0.15 -0.44∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.14) (0.20)
Average precipitation 0.00050 0.00035 -0.0033∗∗∗ -0.0027∗∗ 0.0019 0.00095
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average temperature -0.019∗∗ -0.0010 0.0072 0.0067 -0.0022 -0.014
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
% living in (sub-)tropical zones -0.11 -0.069 0.27 0.26 -0.26 0.13
(0.17) (0.23) (0.16) (0.24) (0.21) (0.32)
Linguistic diversity 0.50∗∗ 0.22 0.081 0.20 -0.31 -0.53∗
(0.22) (0.25) (0.28) (0.34) (0.25) (0.29)
Religious fractionalization 0.57∗∗∗ 0.43∗ 0.30∗ 0.41∗∗ -0.22 -0.066
(0.15) (0.24) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.22)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.95∗∗∗ -0.39 0.26 -0.12 0.22 0.62∗∗
(0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.29) (0.18) (0.24)
Constant -0.41∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.00024 -0.31∗∗ -0.45 0.036 0.089 -0.24∗∗ 0.25 0.085 0.14 -0.080 0.049 -0.12 0.068
(0.11) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.44) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.18) (0.40) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.47)
Religion shares No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73
R2 0.267 0.243 0.280 0.377 0.535 0.039 0.196 0.139 0.155 0.339 0.128 0.053 0.039 0.088 0.264









Table 5.13. Preferences and geographic, climatic, religious, and diversity variables (2/2)
Dependent variable:
Neg. reciprocity Altruism Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Distance to equator 0.0029 0.0051 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗ 0.00013 0.00024
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Longitude 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0012 0.0016∗∗ 0.0011 0.0012∗ 0.0012
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% at risk of malaria -0.052 0.060 -0.51∗∗∗ -0.74∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗ -0.29∗∗
(0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14)
Average precipitation -0.00023 -0.00034 0.0016 0.00051 0.00046 -0.00033
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average temperature 0.0040 -0.0014 0.0032 -0.020∗∗ 0.0035 0.0012
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
% living in (sub-)tropical zones -0.21 -0.034 -0.12 0.51∗∗ -0.29 0.069
(0.15) (0.21) (0.17) (0.25) (0.19) (0.29)
Linguistic diversity 0.43∗∗ 0.36 -0.21 -0.31 0.16 -0.14
(0.18) (0.26) (0.25) (0.31) (0.22) (0.24)
Religious fractionalization -0.024 0.20 -0.069 0.34 -0.23 -0.028
(0.13) (0.20) (0.18) (0.21) (0.14) (0.18)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.51∗∗∗ -0.39 0.13 -0.073 -0.27 0.074
(0.17) (0.28) (0.21) (0.29) (0.20) (0.23)
Constant -0.099 0.028 0.11 -0.0023 -0.13 0.35∗∗∗ -0.18 -0.00074 0.073 0.66∗ 0.016 -0.023 0.14∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.32
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.37) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.38) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.36)
Religion shares No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73
R2 0.136 0.081 0.092 0.067 0.284 0.163 0.040 0.009 0.097 0.399 0.174 0.086 0.072 0.242 0.337
Notes. OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix 5.E Individual-Level Characteristics and Preferences
5.E.1 Age Profiles Separately by World Region
Figure 5.10. Age profiles separately by continent.
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5.E.2 Cognitive Ability and Preferences by Country
Figure 5.11. Cognitive ability correlations separately by country. Each panel plots the distribution
of cognitive ability correlations. That is, for each country, we regress the respective preference
on gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting math skill
coefficients as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each
preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients.
Green dots indicate countries in which the cognitive ability effect is not statistically different
from zero at the 10% level, while red / blue / pink dots denote countries in which the effect is
significant at the 1% / 5% / 10% level, respectively. Positive coefficients imply that higher
cognitive ability people have higher values in the respective preference.
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Appendix 5.F Individual-Level Behaviors
5.F.1 Distribution of Coefficients Across Countries
This section shows that the conditional correlations on the relationships between pref-
erences and individual-level behaviors that we reported on the global level in the main
text, are not due to a few outlier countries only. Instead, the results suggest that our
preference measures predict behavior across a broad set of countries. To show this, we
regress the behaviors discussed in Section 5.5 on the respective preference, separately
for each country, and then plot the distribution and statistical significance of the result-
ing coefficients. For instance, the top left panel in Figure 5.12 shows that the positive
correlation between patience and savings holds in virtually all countries in our sample.
While Figure 5.12 reports the results for patience and risktaking, Figure 5.13 visual-
izes the relationships between altruism and behaviors. Finally, Figure 5.14 presents the
correlations between positive and negative reciprocity and the behaviors discussed in
Section 5.5 of the main text.
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Figure 5.12. Correlations separately by country. Each panel plots the distribution of correlations
across countries. That is, for each country, we regress the respective outcome on a preference
and plot the resulting coefficients as well as their significance level. In order to make countries
comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing
the coefficients. Green dots indicate countries in which the correlation is not statistically
different from zero at the 10% level, while red / blue / pink dots denote countries in which the
correlation is significant at the 1% / 5% / 10% level, respectively. Positive coefficients imply that
a higher preference measure is related to a higher outcome measure.
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Figure 5.13. Correlations separately by country. Each panel plots the distribution of correlations
across countries. That is, for each country, we regress the respective outcome on a preference
and plot the resulting coefficients as well as their significance level. In order to make countries
comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing
the coefficients. Green dots indicate countries in which the correlation is not statistically
different from zero at the 10% level, while red / blue / pink dots denote countries in which the
correlation is significant at the 1% / 5% / 10% level, respectively. Positive coefficients imply that
a higher preference measure is related to a higher outcome measure.
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Figure 5.14. Correlations separately by country. Each panel plots the distribution of correlations
across countries. That is, for each country, we regress the respective outcome on a preference
and plot the resulting coefficients as well as their significance level. In order to make countries
comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing
the coefficients. Green dots indicate countries in which the correlation is not statistically
different from zero at the 10% level, while red / blue / pink dots denote countries in which the
correlation is significant at the 1% / 5% / 10% level, respectively. Positive coefficients imply that
a higher preference measure is related to a higher outcome measure.
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5.F.2 Robustness Checks
This appendix reports robustness checks on the relationship between preferences and
behaviors at the individual level. Specifically, while Section 5.5 of the main text reported
the results of OLS estimations, we now re-estimate all specifications using probit or or-


































Table 5.14. Patience and accumulation decisions, risk preferences and risky choices
Dependent variable:
Accumulation decisions Risky choices
Saved last year Education level Own business Plan to start business Smoking intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Patience 0.15∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Risk taking 0.14∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Age 0.021 2.19∗∗∗ 9.23∗∗∗ 5.71∗∗∗ 6.30∗∗∗
(0.76) (0.56) (0.53) (0.43) (0.75)
Age squared -0.63 -4.08∗∗∗ -9.50∗∗∗ -7.50∗∗∗ -7.13∗∗∗
(0.78) (0.54) (0.57) (0.52) (0.72)
1 if female -0.0036 -0.036 -0.27∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -1.32∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.13)
Subj. math skills 0.043∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Log [Household income p/c] 0.36∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗ -0.026
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant -0.61∗∗∗ -2.86∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 4.94∗∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗ -4.18∗∗∗ -1.24∗∗∗ -2.07∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.28) (0.05) (0.18) (0.04) (0.21) (0.06) (0.14) (0.07) (0.17)
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Religion FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 15260 14459 79357 69272 72839 62985 57072 51489 15309 14490
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.122 0.015 0.202 0.009 0.134 0.016 0.170 0.004 0.167
(Ordered) probit estimates, standard errors (clustered at country level) in parentheses. For the purposes of this table, age is divided by 100.
Saved last year is a binary indicator, while education level is measured in three categories (roughly elementary, secondary, and tertiary education,
see Appendix 5.I). Self-employment and planned self-employment are binary, while smoking intensity is measured in three categories (never,





Table 5.15. Social preferences and social interactions
Dependent variable:
Donated Volunteered Helped Sent money / goods Voiced opinion Have friends or relatives In a
money time stranger to other individual to official I can count on in need relationship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Altruism 0.19∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.029 0.066∗∗∗ 0.012 0.0040
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Positive reciprocity 0.015 0.0029 -0.00046 0.017 0.091∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ -0.0071 -0.011 0.053∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Negative reciprocity 0.013 -0.014 -0.0097 -0.0089 -0.0062 -0.0080 0.036∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.0088 -0.00076
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 2.13∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗ -3.76∗∗∗ 16.4∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.29) (0.20) (0.24) (0.27) (0.38) (0.59)
Age squared -1.63∗∗∗ -1.76∗∗∗ -2.47∗∗∗ -1.04∗∗∗ -3.84∗∗∗ 3.11∗∗∗ -15.9∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.30) (0.20) (0.28) (0.30) (0.36) (0.59)
1 if female 0.044∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗ 0.0018 -0.16∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Subj. math skills 0.030∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log [Household income p/c] 0.10∗∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant -0.46∗∗∗ -1.71∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗ -1.09∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.36∗∗ -0.70∗∗∗ -2.19∗∗∗ -0.77∗∗∗ -1.91∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ -0.11 0.21∗∗∗ -2.37∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.12) (0.05) (0.15) (0.04) (0.16) (0.06) (0.14) (0.04) (0.12) (0.06) (0.15) (0.04) (0.15)
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Religion FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 58229 53439 58213 53430 55991 53226 56253 53559 55944 53174 65986 59209 77881 68176
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.161 0.012 0.086 0.020 0.070 0.011 0.115 0.006 0.061 0.004 0.121 0.002 0.174
Probit estimates, standard errors (clustered at country level) in parentheses. For the purposes of this table, age is divided by 100.See Appendix 5.I for details on all dependent variables. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix 5.G Details for Relationship Between Preferences and
FTR
5.G.1 Individual-Level Regressions Separately by Country
Table 5.16. Preferences and FTR: Within-country results
Country Weak FTR Strong FTR Patience Pos. reciprocity Trust Altruism
Estonia Estonian Russian 0.05 0.13∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
Nigeria Yoruba English, Hausa, Igbo -0.08 0.54∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ -0.11
Switzerland German French, Italian 0.17∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
OLS estimates, robust standard errors. The regressions report the coefficient on FTR in univariate
regressions for each country in which we observe within-country variation in FTR. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p <
0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
5.G.2 Country-Level Regressions: Robustness










Table 5.17. Preferences and FTR: Cross-country results
Dependent variable:
Patience Risk taking Pos. reciprocity Neg. reciprocity Altruism Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Fraction of population speaking weak FTR 0.36∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗ -0.11 0.015 0.15∗ 0.17∗∗ -0.018 -0.082 0.061 0.11 0.19∗∗ 0.19∗∗
(0.13) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
Log [GDP p/c PPP] 0.16∗∗∗ 0.032 -0.073∗ 0.052 -0.077∗ -0.0055
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Distance to equator 0.010∗ 0.0015 -0.0078 -0.0054 -0.0033 -0.0057
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Longitude -0.0018 0.0024 0.0021 0.00043 0.0028 0.000065
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% at risk of malaria 0.25 -0.15 -0.33 -0.089 -0.72∗∗∗ -0.092
(0.19) (0.24) (0.28) (0.17) (0.26) (0.19)
Average precipitation -0.00013 -0.00081 0.00055 -0.0010 0.0031∗∗∗ -0.0011
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.067 -1.42∗∗ 0.034 -0.51 -0.053 0.56 0.014 -0.019 -0.043 0.25 -0.058 0.39
(0.04) (0.56) (0.04) (0.45) (0.05) (0.67) (0.04) (0.50) (0.05) (0.61) (0.04) (0.48)
Continent FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 75 74 75 74 75 74 75 74 75 74 75 74
R2 0.141 0.641 0.021 0.381 0.029 0.280 0.001 0.246 0.005 0.356 0.072 0.420
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions exclude Haiti for which no respondent could be classified. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix 5.H Discussion of Measurement Error and Within-
versus Between-Country Variation
In the presence of measurement error, a simple variance decomposition as shown in
Table 2 tends to overstate the relative importance of within-country variation in prefer-
ences. This is because measurement error would be part of the within-country variation,
whereas the aggregation to country averages mitigates measurement error and thus re-
moves this source of variation. This section provides evidence that measurement error is
unlikely to be large enough to drive the result.
To illustrate the impact of measurement error, recall that a simple regression of an
individual-level preference measure M on a matrix of country dummies D yields
M = D′γ + ε
In a setting without measurement error ε would be interpreted as individual specific
effects that are not explained by the variation between countries. The total variance of
M is given by
Var(M) = Var(δ) + Var(ε) + 2cov(δ,ε)
where δ = D′γ. Note that the R2 from a regression of M on the country dummies (i.e.,
Var(δ)/Var(M)) could be interpreted as the between country-variation, i.e., the fraction
of total variation explained by country dummies, if individual effects are unrelated to
country effects.
If, however, the preference measure M measures the true preference parameter P
with error, denoted e, the residual variation of the regression above does not only capture
individual effects. Assume that M is a linear function of P and e, i.e.,
M = P + e,
such that we can rewrite
P + e = δ + ε
The total variance of the preference is hence
Var(P) = Var(δ) + Var(ε) − Var(e),
assuming that ε⊥ δ and e ⊥ ε,δ, P.
The regression model still allows identifying Var(δ), but the share of preference
variation that is truly explained by the between-country variation is no longer given
by the R2, Var(δ)/Var(M), but rather by Var(δ)/Var(P). To assess whether between-
country or within-country effects explain a larger share of total variation, one needs to
compare Var(δ)/Var(P) to Var(ε)/Var(P). Since Var(P) = Var(M)− Var(e), Var(e)
needs to be determined.
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The variance of measurement error, Var(e), is not directly observable, but estimates
of test-retest correlations of relevant preference measures are available which can be
used to gauge the size of Var(e). Based on arguments of plausibility, the variance of
the measurement error does not appear to be large enough to invalidate the claim
that the within-country variation is smaller than the between-country variation. Con-
sider how large the proportion of measurement error in the total variation of M can be,
with between-country effects still explaining a smaller share of variation than individual-
specific effects. Note that between- and within-country variation add up to total vari-
ation in preferences absent measurement error: Var(δ)/Var(P) = 1- Var(ε)/Var(P).
Thus, between-country effects explain a relatively smaller share of total variation if
Var(δ)/Var(P)< 0.50. Letting q with 0< q ≤ 1 be the fraction of measurement er-
ror in M , this condition can be evaluated by scaling up the R2 from a regression of M
on the set of country dummies by 1/(1− q). I.e., if Var(δ)/(Var(M)(1− q))< 0.5, the
between-country variation is smaller than the within-country variation, even accounting
for measurement error.
Take, as an example, the estimate for risk-taking in Table 5.4, for which the regression
of the risk measure on the set of country dummies yields an R2 of 0.09. Solving R2 <
0.5(1− q) for q shows that as long as q < 0.828, the within country variation exceeds
the between country variation. Previous work has shown that the test-retest correlation
of the single components of this particular risk measure is around 0.6 (Beauchamp et
al., 2011). This implies that, in order for measurement error alone to be able to explain
the greater variation of preferences within-country than between-country, measurement
error would have to be twice as large as existing evidence suggests.
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Appendix 5.I Description and Data Sources of Outcome Variables
5.I.1 Individual-Level Variables
5.I.1.0.1 Subjective law and order index. Included in Gallup’s Background data (0-1).
Derived from responses to three questions: “In the city or area where you live, do you
have confidence in the local police force?”; “Do you feel safe walking alone at night in
the city or area where you live?”; “Within the last 12 months, have you had money or
property stolen from you or another household member?”.
5.I.1.0.2 Subjective physical health index. Included in Gallup’s Background data (0-1).
Derived from responses to five questions: “Do you have any health problems that prevent
you from doing any of the things people your age normally can do?”; “Now, please think
about yesterday, from the morning until the end of the day. Think about where you were,
what you were doing, who you were with, and how you felt. Did you feel well-rested
yesterday?”; “Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day yesterday?
How about physical pain?”; “Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the
day yesterday? How about worry?”; “Did you experience the following feelings during a
lot of the day yesterday? How about sadness?”.
5.I.1.0.3 Household income per capita. Included in Gallup’s background data. To cal-
culate income, respondents are asked to report their household income in local currency.
Those respondents who have difficulty answering the question are presented a set of
ranges in local currency and are asked which group they fall into. Income variables
are created by converting local currency to International Dollars (ID) using purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) ratios. Log household income is computed as log (1+ household
income).
5.I.1.0.4 Education level. Included in Gallup’s background data. Level 1: Completed
elementary education or less (up to 8 years of basic education). Level 2: Secondary -
3 year tertiary education and some education beyond secondary education (9-15 years
of education). Level 3: Completed four years of education beyond high school and / or
received a 4-year college degree.
5.I.1.0.5 Subjective self-assessment of math skills. How well do the following state-
ments describe you as a person? Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10. A
0 means “does not describe me at all” and a 10 means “describes me perfectly”. You can also
use any numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, like 0, 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. I am good at math.
5.I.1.0.6 Saved last year. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent saved any
money in the previous year. Included in Gallup’s background data.
5.I.1.0.7 Own business. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent is self-
employed. Included in Gallup’s background data.
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5.I.1.0.8 Plan to start business. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent is
planning to start their own business (only asked of those who are not self-employed).
Included in Gallup’s background data.
5.I.1.0.9 Smoking intensity. Variable capturing how frequently a respondent smokes
(0=never, 1=occasionally, 2=frequently). Included in Gallup’s background data.
5.I.1.0.10 Donatedmoney. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent donated
money in the previous month. Included in Gallup’s background data.
5.I.1.0.11 Volunteered time. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent volun-
teered time to an organization in the previous month. Included in Gallup’s background
data.
5.I.1.0.12 Helped stranger. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent helped
a stranger who needed help in the previous month. Included in Gallup’s background
data.
5.I.1.0.13 Sent help to individual. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent
sent help (money or goods) to another individual in the previous year. Included in
Gallup’s background data.
5.I.1.0.14 Voiced opinion to official. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent
voiced their opinion to a public official in the previous month. Included in Gallup’s back-
ground data.
5.I.1.0.15 Donated money. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent has rel-
atives or friends they can count on to help them whenever needed. Included in Gallup’s
background data.
5.I.1.0.16 In a relationship. Binary variable coded as zero if the respondents is single,
separated, divorced, or widowed, and as 1 if respondent is married or has a domestic
partner. Included in Gallup’s background data.
5.I.2 Country-Level Variables
5.I.2.0.1 Distance to equator, longitude. Source: the CEPII geo database.
5.I.2.0.2 Land suitability for agriculture. Index of the suitability of land for agriculture
based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing de-
gree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological
indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH, taken
from Michalopoulos (2012).
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5.I.2.0.3 Temperature. Average monthly temperature of a country in degree Celsius,
1961-1990, taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013). Data originally based on geospatial av-
erage monthly temperature data for this period reported by the G-ECON project (Nord-
haus, 2006).
5.I.2.0.4 Precipitation. Average monthly precipitation of a country in mm per month,
1961-1990, taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013). Data originally based on geospatial av-
erage monthly precipitation data for this period reported by the G-ECON project (Nord-
haus, 2006).
5.I.2.0.5 Predicted genetic diversity. Predicted genetic diversity of the contemporary
population, adjusted for post-Columbian migration flows and genetic distance between
ethnic groups. See Ashraf and Galor (2013).
5.I.2.0.6 GDP per capita. Average annual GDP per capita over the period 2003 – 2012,
in 2005US$. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
5.I.2.0.7 Democracy index. Index that quanties the extent of institutionalized democ-
racy, as reported in the Polity IV dataset. Average from 2003 to 2012.
5.I.2.0.8 Percentage at risk ofmalaria. The percentage of population in regions of high
malaria risk (as of 1994), multiplied by the proportion of national cases involving the
fatal species of the malaria pathogen, P. falciparum. This variable was originally con-
structed by Gallup and Sachs (2000) and is part of Columbia University’s Earth Institute
data set on malaria. Data taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013).
5.I.2.0.9 Percentage in (sub-)tropical zones. Percentage of area within a country
which forms part of each of the tropical or sub-tropical climatic zones. Data taken from
John Luke Gallup, http://www.pdx.edu/econ/jlgallup/country-geodata.
5.I.2.0.10 Life expectancy. Average life expectancy at birth, average from 2003 to
2012, taken from World Bank Development Indicators.
5.I.2.0.11 Gini coefficient. Average from 2003 to 2012, taken from World Bank Devel-
opment Indicators.
5.I.2.0.12 Redistribution (% of GDP). Government transfers as a fraction of national
income. Average from 2003 to 2012, taken from World Bank Development Indicators.
5.I.2.0.13 Ethnic and religious fractionalization. Indices due to Alesina et al. (2003)
capturing the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the same country
will be from different ethnic (religious) groups.
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5.I.2.0.14 Linguistic diversity. Index due to Fearon (2003) capturing the linguistic di-
versity within a given country, taking into account the structural similarity of languages
using a language tree.
5.I.2.0.15 Labor protection index. Index capturing the rigidity of employment laws
by Botero et al. (2004). Includes data on employment, collective relations, and social
security laws and measures legal worker protection.
5.I.2.0.16 Homicide rate. Numbers of intentional homicides per 100,000 people. Aver-
age 2003–2012, taken from World Bank Development Indicators.
5.I.2.0.17 Religion shares. Source: Barro (2003).
268 | 5 The Nature and Predictive Power of Preferences: Global Evidence
6The Ancient Origins of the Global
Variation in Risk Preferences and
Prosociality?
6.1 Introduction
Preferences over risk, the timing of rewards, and social interactions form the building
blocks of a large class of models in both micro- and macroeconomics. Recently, empiri-
cists have shown that these preferences vary substantially within populations and – in
line with economic models – predict a plethora of individual-level economic decisions
ranging from stock and labor market behavior over savings and schooling choices to vol-
unteering, donating, and cooperating. However, do these preferences also vary across
countries? And if so, what explains this variation, i.e., what are the ultimate determi-
nants of heterogeneity in preferences? Using a novel, globally representative data set
on key economic preferences, this paper seeks to provide an answer to these questions.
Our key contribution is to show that the structure of mankind’s ancient migration out of
Africa and around the globe has had a persistent impact on the between-country distribu-
tion of preferences over risk and social interactions as of today. These findings add to the
emerging literature on endogenous preferences (Fehr and Hoff, 2011) in highlighting
very deep population-level historical events as a key driver in shaping preferences, and
hence also contribute to understanding the ultimate sources of cross-country economic
heterogeneity.
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According to the widely accepted “Out of Africa hypothesis”, starting around 50,000
years ago, early mankind migrated out of East Africa and continued to explore and pop-
ulate our planet through a series of successive migratory steps. Each of these steps con-
sisted of some sub-population breaking apart from the previous colony and moving on to
found new settlements. This pattern implies that some contemporary population pairs
have spent a longer time of human history apart from each other than others. As a result,
the time elapsed since two groups shared common ancestors differs across today’s pop-
ulation pairs. The key idea underlying our analysis is that these differential time frames
of separation might have affected the cross-country distribution of preferences over risk,
time, and social interactions. First, populations that have spent a long time apart from
each other were exposed to differential historical experiences, which could affect risk,
time, and social preferences (Callen et al., 2014; Rao, 2013; Kosse et al., 2014). Second,
due to, e.g., random genetic drift, long periods of separation lead to different population-
level genetic endowments, which might in turn shape attitudes.1 We use a simple model
to show that both of these channels imply the prediction that – on average – populations
that have been separated for a longer time in the course of human history, should also
exhibit more different preference profiles.
To investigate this hypothesis, we use a novel dataset on economic preferences across
countries in combination with proxies for long-run human migration patterns and the re-
sulting temporal distances. As part of the Global Preference Survey (GPS), we collected
survey measures of risk, time, and social preferences (see Falk et al., 2015a). The sample
of 80,000 people from 76 countries is constructed to provide representative population
samples within each country and geographical representativeness in terms of countries
covered. The survey items were selected and tested through a rigorous ex ante experi-
mental validation procedure involving real monetary stakes. The elicitation followed a
standardized protocol that was implemented through the professional infrastructure of
the Gallup World Poll. These data allow the computation of nationally representative lev-
els of risk aversion, patience, altruism, positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, as well
as trust, and hence facilitate the derivation of the absolute difference in a given trait
within a country pair.
We combine these data with three classes of proxies for the temporal patterns of an-
cient population fissions, i.e., proxies for the length of time since two populations shared
common ancestors. (i) First, we employ the FST and Nei genetic distances between
populations, as originally measured by the population geneticists L. Cavalli-Sforza et al.
(1994) and introduced into the economics literature by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009).
As population geneticists have long noted, whenever two populations split apart from
each other in order to found separate settlements, their genetic distance increases over
time due to random genetic drift. Thus, the genetic distance between two populations
is a measure of temporal distance since separation. (ii) Second, we use measures of pre-
dicted migratory distance between contemporary populations, which were constructed
by Ashraf and Galor (2013b) and Özak (2010), respectively. The predicted migratory
distance variable of Ashraf and Galor (2013b) is based on a procedure which exploits
1 Cesarini et al. (2008, 2009, 2012) use a series of twin studies to provide evidence for a genetic effect
on risk, time, and social preferences.
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information on the geographic patterns of early migratory movements and constitutes
a proxy for the predicted length of separation of two populations. The human-mobility-
index measure of Özak (2010), on the other hand, explicitly computes the walking time
between two countries’ capitals, taking into account topographic, climatic, and terrain
conditions, as well as human biological abilities. (iii) Finally, we make use of the observa-
tion that linguistic trees closely follow the structure of separation of human populations
and employ a measure of linguistic distance between two populations as explanatory
variable. In sum, we use various independent sources of data which are known to reflect
the length of separation of populations.
Our empirical analysis of the relationship between preferences and ancient migration
patterns starts by investigating the raw relationship between the absolute difference in
average preferences between two countries and genetic distance, which is known to be
the theoretically most appealing proxy for the length of time since today’s populations
shared common ancestors. Results show that cross-country differences in risk aversion
as well as altruism, positive reciprocity, and trust are all significantly increasing in our
temporal distance proxy. In contrast, differences in patience and negative reciprocity are
largely uncorrelated with temporal distance.
In a second step, we investigate to what extent the relationships between risk and
social preferences and temporal distance are likely to be driven by contemporary environ-
mental conditions, i.e., omitted variables. We establish that the relationships are robust
to an extensive set of covariates, including controls for differences in the countries’ demo-
graphic composition, their geographic position, prevailing climatic and agricultural con-
ditions, institutions, and economic development. In all of the corresponding regressions,
the point estimate is very stable, suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity is unlikely to
drive our results, either (Altonji et al., 2005). Our results also hold when we (i) exclude
observations from the tails of the genetic distance or preference distributions from the
analysis, (ii) split the sample by level of economic development, (iii) restrict the sample
to countries in the Old World, or (iv) make use of information on the precision of the
genetic distance data.
We then proceed by investigating the robustness of our results by employing pre-
dicted migratory and linguistic distance as alternative explanatory variables. In both un-
conditional and conditional regressions, the results closely mirror those established with
genetic distance, and hence highlight that our findings do not hinge on genetic distance
as proxy for temporal distance.
In sum, several proxies for the temporal distance between populations are predictive
of differences in risk and social preferences. In a final step, we provide evidence that
these patterns indeed reflect the accumulation of preference changes over thousands of
years subsequently to the original population breakups, rather than characteristics of the
breakup process, such as selective migration by, e.g., the risk tolerant types. To this end,
we investigate whether today’s country-level preference profiles evolve monotonically
along humans’ migratory route out of East Africa, i.e., whether preferences are corre-
lated with the length of the ancestors’ migratory path. We find that the level of none of
the preference traits exhibits a monotonic relationship with (predicted) migratory dis-
tance from East Africa as derived by Ashraf and Galor (2013b); instead, risk aversion,
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patience, and the prosocial traits are all significantly non-linearly related to migratory
distance. These results suggest that the relationship between temporal distance and pref-
erence differences is not driven by features of the breakup process that persisted until
today, but rather by the accumulation of idiosyncratic shocks over thousands of years.
However, these results also lend themselves to an interpretation in terms of intrapopu-
lation genetic diversity: whenever a sub-population split apart from its parental colony,
those humans breaking new ground took with them only a fraction of the genetic diver-
sity of the previous genetic pool, implying that the total diversity of the gene pool signif-
icantly decreases along human migratory routes out of East Africa. Thus, in essence, our
results say that country-level preference profiles are non-linearly associated with genetic
diversity.
A number of recent contributions argue that the (cultural) diversity caused by long-
run migration thousands of years ago can have aggregate economic effects. Spolaore
and Wacziarg (2009, 2011) find a strong relationship between genetic distance and in-
come differences across countries and posit that lower cultural distance facilitates the
diffusion of knowledge.2 Ashraf and Galor (2013b) and Ashraf et al. (2014) establish a
hump-shaped relationship between national income and genetic diversity and argue that
the non-monotonicity reflects the trade-off between more innovation and lower cooper-
ation that is associated with higher cultural diversity.3 Our paper dovetails with these
contributions as it shows that the genetic variables which proxy for migratory flows in-
deed capture variation in economically important traits.
This paper also forms part of an active recent literature on the historical, biological,
and cultural origins of beliefs and preferences. Chen (2013) and Galor and Özak (2014)
show that future-orientation is affected by a structural feature of languages and historical
agricultural productivity. Tabellini (2008) and an earlier version of Guiso et al. (2009)
relate interpersonal trust to linguistic features and the genetic distance between two
populations. Nunn andWantchekon (2011), Voigtländer and Voth (2012) and Alesina et
al. (2013) establish the deep roots of trust, beliefs over the appropriate role of women in
society, and anti-semitism, respectively. Desmet et al. (2009) and Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2015) show that genetic and linguistic distance correlates with opinions and attitudes
as expressed in the World Values Survey. However, perhaps given the previous lack of
data, this paper is the first contribution to study the origins of cross-country variation in
risk, time, and social preferences.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 6.2, we develop our
hypothesis on the relationship between the structure of migratory movements and pref-
erences, while Section 6.3 presents the data. Section 4.4 discusses our result on the
connection between preference differences and length of separation. Section 6.5 studies
the relationship between preferences and genetic diversity, and Section 3.6 concludes.
2Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010), Spolaore andWacziarg (2014), and Giuliano et al. (2014) analyze
the relationships between genetic distance and individualism, conflict, and bilateral trade.
3 Also see Arbatli et al. (2013) and Ashraf and Galor (2013a).
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6.2 Preferences and the Great Human Expansion
According to the widely accepted theory of the origins and the dispersal of early humans,
the single cradle of mankind is to be found in East or South Africa and can be dated back
to roughly 100,000 years ago (see, e.g., Henn et al. (2012) for an overview). Starting
from East Africa, a small sample of hunters and gatherers exited the African continent
around 50,000-60,000 years ago and thereby started what is now also referred to as
the “great human expansion”. This expansion continued throughout Europe, Asia, Ocea-
nia, and the Americas, so that mankind eventually came to settle on all continents. A
noteworthy feature of this very long-run process is that it occurred through a large num-
ber of discrete steps, each of which consisted of a sub-sample of the original population
breaking apart and leaving the previous location to move on and found new settlements
elsewhere (so-called serial founder effect). The main hypothesis underlying this paper
is that the pattern of successive breakups and the resulting distribution of temporal dis-
tances across populations affected the distribution of economic preferences we observe
around the globe today.
In particular, the series of migratory steps implied a frequent breakup of formerly
united populations. After splitting apart, these sub-populations often settled geograph-
ically distant from each other, i.e., lived in separation. There are at least two channels
through which the length of separation of two groups might have had an impact on
between-group differences in preferences.4
First, if two populations have spent a long time apart from each other, they were sub-
ject to many differential historical experiences. Recent work highlights that economic
preferences are malleable by idiosyncratic experiences or, more generally, by the compo-
sition of people’s social environment (see, e.g., Callen et al. (2014) on risk preferences
or Rao (2013) and Kosse et al. (2014) on prosocial attitudes). Thus, the differential his-
torical experiences which have accumulated over thousands of years of separation might
have given rise to differential preferences as of today.
Second, whenever two populations spend time apart from each other, they develop
different population-level genetic pools due to, e.g., random genetic drift or location-
specific selection pressures. Given that attitudes like risk aversion, trust, and altruism
are transmitted across generations and that part of this transmission is genetic in nature
(Cesarini et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2012), the different genetic endowments induced
by long periods of separation could also generate differential preferences.
To formally illustrate both of these channels (historical experiences and genetic
pools) using a simple example, suppose that there are three contemporary populations,
A, B, and C . Suppose further that the historical migration tree is such that, in t = 0, A, B,
and C formed one population, in t = 1, the union of B and C broke apart from A, and in
t = 2 population C split away from B. Each population i has a scalar-representable pref-
erence endowment x ti , which we normalize to x
0 = 0. In each period, a given population
is subject to a random shock to the preference endowment εti , which we assume to be
independently and identically distributed according to F(·) across time and space, where
4 It is conceivable that differences in preferences are correlated with temporal distance proxies because
of the structure of the population breakups as such, rather than the temporal distances that were caused by
the population breakups. Section 6.5 provides a discussion of this issue.
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F(·) has mean zero. In other words, we assume that the preference endowment is subject
to random drift, which could result from random historical experiences or changes in the
genetic pool (either through random drift or location-specific selection pressures.)
Importantly, note that we make the assumption of random drift only to emphasize
that even random drift would generate the theoretical prediction that longer periods of
separation imply larger differences in preferences, in expectation. Clearly, if preferences
evolved monotonically along the migratory path, then temporal distance ought to be
predictive of preference differences – however, there is no biological principle according
to which the evolution of a scalar-representable trait must follow a monotonic path.
While there are reasons to believe that traits like risk aversion, time preference, or
altruism are subject to local selection pressures, these selection pressures might operate
in differerent directions along the migratory path as groups of humans and their de-
scendants pass through many different environments. Thus, we show here that even the
weakest possible assumption of random idiosyncratic preference changes gives rise to the
hypothesis that longer separation leads to larger differences in preferences, on average.
Specifically, in our empirical regression framework to be presented below, we compare,
e.g., the contemporary absolute difference in preferences between populations A and C
(long separation) with the absolute difference between B and C (short separation):
E[|x2A − x2C | − |x2B − x2C |] = E[|ε1A + ε2A − ε1B,C − ε2C | − |ε1B,C + ε2B − ε1B,C − ε2C |]
= E[|ε1A + ε2A − ε1B,C − ε2C |] − E[|ε2B − ε2C |] > 0
Thus, in expectation, longer separation should lead to larger absolute differences in
preferences, implying a bilateral statement about between-country differences:
Hypothesis. The absolute difference in (average) preferences between two countries
increases in the length of separation of the respective populations in the course of human
history.
6.3 Data
6.3.1 Risk, Time, and Social Preferences Across Countries
Our data on risk, time, and social preferences are part of the Global Preference Survey
(GPS), which constitutes a unique dataset on economic preferences from representative
population samples around the globe. In many countries around the world, the Gallup
World Poll regularly surveys representative population samples about social and eco-
nomic issues. In 76 countries, we included as part of the regular 2012 questionnaire a
set of survey items which were explicitly designed to measure a respondent’s preferences
(for details see Falk et al., 2015a).
Four noteworthy features characterize these data. First, the preference measures
have been elicited in a comparable way using a standardized protocol across countries.
Second, contrary to small- or medium-scale experimental work, we use preference mea-
sures that have been elicited from representative population samples in each country.
This allows for inference on between-country differences in preferences, in contrast to
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existing cross-country comparisons of convenience (student) samples. The median sam-
ple size was 1,000 participants per country; in total, we collected preference measures
for more than 80,000 participants worldwide. Respondents were selected through prob-
ability sampling and interviewed face-to-face or via telephone by professional interview-
ers. Third, the dataset also reflects geographical representativeness. The sample of 76
countries is not restricted to Western industrialized nations, but covers all continents and
various development levels. Specifically, our sample includes 15 countries from the Amer-
icas, 24 from Europe, 22 from Asia and Pacific, as well as 14 nations in Africa, 11 of which
are Sub-Saharan. The set of countries contained in the data covers about 90% of both
the world population and global income. Fourth, the preference measures are based on
experimentally validated survey items for eliciting preferences. In order to ensure behav-
ioral relevance, the underlying survey items were designed, tested, and selected through
an explicit ex-ante experimental validation procedure (Falk et al., 2015b). In this vali-
dation step, out of a large set of preference-related survey questions, those items were
selected which jointly perform best in explaining observed behavior in standard finan-
cially incentivized experimental tasks to elicit preference parameters. In order to make
these items cross-culturally applicable, (i) all items were translated back and forth by
professionals, (ii) monetary values used in the survey were adjusted along the median
household income for each country, and (iii) pretests were conducted in 21 countries of
various cultural heritage to ensure comparability. The preference measures are derived
as follows (see Appendix 5.A and Falk et al. (2015a) for details):5
6.3.1.0.1 Risk Taking. The set of survey items included twomeasures of the underlying
risk preference – one qualitative subjective self-assessment and one quantitative measure.
The subjective self-assessment directly asks for an individual’s willingness to take risks:
“Generally speaking, are you a person who is willing to take risks, or are you not willing to
do so? Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where a 0 means “not willing
to take risks at all” and a 10 means “very willing to take risks”. You can also use the values
in between to indicate where you fall on the scale.”
The quantitative measure is derived from a series of five interdependent hypothetical
binary lottery choices, a format commonly referred to as the “staircase procedure”. In
each of the five questions, participants had to decide between a 50-50 lottery to win x
euros or nothing (which was the same in each question) and varying safe payments y .
The questions were interdependent in the sense that the choice of a lottery resulted in
an increase of the safe amount being offered in the next question, and conversely. For
instance, in Germany, the fixed upside of the lottery x was 300 euros, and in the first
question, the fixed payment was 160 euros. In case the respondent chose the lottery (the
safe payment), the safe payment increased (decreased) to 240 (80) euros in the second
question. In essence, by adjusting the fixed payment according to previous choices, the
questions “zoom in” around the respondent’s certainly equivalent and make efficient use
of limited and costly survey time. This procedure yields one of 32 ordered outcomes. The
subjective self-assessment and the outcome of the quantitative lottery staircase were then
aggregated into a single index which describes an individual’s degree of risk taking.
5 The description of the survey items closely follows the one in Falk et al. (2015a).
276 | 6 The Ancient Origins of the Global Variation in Risk Preferences and Prosociality
6.3.1.0.2 Patience. The measure of patience is also derived from the combination of
responses to two survey measures, one with a quantitative and one with a qualitative
format. The quantitative survey measure consists of a series of five hypothetical binary
choices between immediate and delayed financial rewards. In each of the five questions,
participants had to decide between receiving a payment today or larger payments in 12
months. Conceptually similar to the elicitation of risk preferences, the questions were in-
terdependent in the sense that the delayed payment was increased or decreased depend-
ing on previous choices. The qualitative measure of patience is given by the respondent’s
self-assessment regarding their willingness to wait on an 11-point Likert scale, asking
“how willing are you to give up something that is beneficial for you today in order to
benefit more from that in the future?”.
6.3.1.0.3 Prosociality: Altruism, Positive Reciprocity, and Trust. The GPS includes six
survey items which map into three prosocial traits: altruism, positive reciprocity, and
trust. While these behavioral traits are conceptually distinct, they share in common that
they are commonly associated with “positive” social interactions.
Altruism was measured through a combination of one qualitative and one quantita-
tive item, both of which are related to donation. The qualitative question asked people
howwilling they would be to give to good causes without expecting anything in return on
an 11-point scale. The quantitative scenario depicted a situation in which the respondent
unexpectedly received 1,000 euros and asked them to state how much of this amount
they would donate.
People’s propensity to act in a positively reciprocal way was also measured using
one qualitative item and one question with a quantitative component. First, respondents
were asked to provide a self-assessment about how willing they are to return a favor on
an 11-point Likert scale. Second, participants were presented a choice scenario in which
they were asked to imagine that they got lost in an unfamiliar area and that a stranger –
when asked for directions – offered to take them to their destination. Participants were
then asked which out of six presents (worth between 5 and 30 euros in 5 euros intervals)
they would give to the stranger as a “thank you”.
Finally, to measure trust, people were asked whether they assume that other people
only have the best intentions (Likert scale, 0-10).
6.3.1.0.4 Negative Reciprocity. Negative reciprocity was elicited through three self-
assess-ments. First, people were asked how willing they are to take revenge if they are
treated very unjustly, even if doing so comes at a cost (0-10). The second and third item
probed respondents about their willingness to punish someone for unfair behavior, either
towards themselves or towards a third person.
6.3.2 Proxies for Ancient Migration Patterns
We use various separate but conceptually linked classes of variables to proxy for the
length of time since two populations split apart: (i) Genetic distance, (ii) predicted mi-
gratory distance, and (iii) linguistic distance.




Figure 6.1.World maps of preferences. In each figure, white denotes the world average. Darker
blue indicates higher values of a given trait, while darker red colors indicate lower values, all of
which are measured in standard deviations from the world mean. Grey indicates missings.
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6.3.2.0.1 Genetic Distance Between Countries. First, whenever populations break
apart, they stop interbreeding, thereby preventing a mixture of the respective genetic
pools. However, since every genetic pool is subject to random drift (“noise”) or local
selection pressures, geographical separation implies that over time the genetic distance
between sub-populations gradually became (on average) larger. Thus, the genealogical
relatedness between two populations reflects the length of time elapsed since these pop-
ulations shared common ancestors. In fact, akin to a molecular clock, population geneti-
cists have made use of this observation by constructing mathematical models to compute
the timing of separation between groups. This makes clear that, at its very core, genetic
distance constitutes not only a measure of genealogical relatedness, but also of temporal
distance between two populations.
Technically, genetic distance constitutes an index of expected heterozygosity, which
can be thought of as the probability that two randomly matched individuals will be ge-
netically different from each other in terms of a pre-defined spectrum of genes. Indices
of heterozygosity are derived using data on allelic frequencies, where an allele is a par-
ticular variant taken by a gene.6 Intuitively, the relative frequency of alleles at a given
locus can be compared across populations and the deviation in frequencies can then be
averaged over loci. This is the approach pursued in the work of the population geneticists
L. Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994). The main dataset assembled by these researchers consists
of data on 128 different alleles for 42 world populations. By aggregating differences in
these allelic frequencies, the authors compute the FST genetic distance, which provides
a comprehensive measure of genetic relatedness between any pair of 42 world popula-
tions. Using the same dataset, L. Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) also compute the so-called
Nei distance for all population pairs. While this genetic distance measure has slightly
different theoretical properties than FST , the two measures are highly correlated.
Since genetic distances are available only at the population rather than at the coun-
try level, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) matched the 42 populations in L. Cavalli-Sforza
et al. (1994) to countries.7 Thus, the genetic distance measures we use measure the ex-
pected genetic distance between two randomly drawn individuals, one from each coun-
try, according to the contemporary composition of the population. The key advantage of
the genetic distance data relative to predicted measures of length of separation (see be-
low) is that the measurement and imputation apply to contemporary populations. Thus,
for example, the effects of smaller-scale migratory movements after the human exodus
from Africa on the temporal distance between populations are by construction incorpo-
rated in these measures, while they are much more difficult to capture with theoretical
temporal distance proxies.
6 Such genetic measures are based on neutral genetic markers only, i.e., on genes which are not subject
to selection pressure and only change due to random drift.
7 To this end, the authors used ethnic composition data from Fearon (2003): the data by L. Cavalli-Sforza
et al. (1994) contain information on the groups that were sampled to obtain genetic distance estimates,
and these groups can be matched one-to-one to the ethnic groups that populate countries. Thus, the data
from one group in L. Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) can be assigned to sub-populations in potentially multiple
countries, so that, in principle, even the relatively small number of 42 populations is sufficient to compute
genetic distances between more than 100 countries.
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6.3.2.0.2 Predicted Migratory Distance Between Countries. Rather than physically mea-
sure the genetic composition of populations to investigate their kinship, one can also
derive predicted migration measures (Ashraf and Galor, 2013b; Özak, 2010). Key idea
behind using these variables is that populations that have lived far apart from each other
(in terms of migratory, not necessarily geographic, distance), have usually spent a large
portion of human history apart from each other. Notably, these data are independent
of those on observed genetic distance and thus allow for an important out-of-sample
robustness check.
First, the derivation of the predicted migratory distance variable of Ashraf and Galor
(2013b) follows the methodology proposed in Ramachandran et al. (2005) by making
use of today’s knowledge of the migration patterns of our ancestors. Specifically, Ashraf
and Galor (2013b) obtain an estimate of bilateral migratory distance by computing the
shortest path between two countries’ capitals. Given that until recently humans are not
believed to have crossed large bodies of water, these hypothetical population movements
are restricted to landmass as much as possible by requiring migrations to occur along five
obligatory waypoints, one for each continent. By construction, these migratory distance
estimates only pertain to the native populations of a given pair of countries. Thus, in
contrast to the genetic distance measures, these distance estimates need to be adjusted
to the extent that the contemporary populations in a country pair differ from the na-
tive ones. While this objective is difficult to achive for geographically scattered waves of
temporally very distant events, adjustment for post-Columbian migration flows can be
implemented using the “World Migration Matrix” of Putterman and Weil (2010), which
describes the share of the year 2000 population in every country that has descended from
people in different source countries as of the year 1500. To derive values of predicted mi-
gratory distance pertaining to the contemporary populations, we combine the dataset of
Ashraf and Galor (2013b) with this migration matrix. Thus, the contemporary predicted
migratory distance between two countries equals the weighted migratory distance be-
tween the contemporary populations.8 Thus, this ancestry-adjusted predicted migratory
distance between two countries can be thought of as the expected migratory distance
between the ancestors of two randomly drawn individuals, one from each country. Fur-
ther note that migratory distance and observed genetic distance tend to be highly corre-
lated (Ramachandran et al., 2005). Ashraf and Galor (2013b) exploit this fact by linearly
transforming migratory distance into a measure of predicted FST genetic distance. Our
measure of predicted migratory distance might hence as well be interpreted as predicted
genetic distance. Indeed, the correlation of our predicted (ancestry-adjusted) migratory
distance measure with observed FST is ρ = 0.54.
8 Formally, suppose there are N countries, each of which has one native population. Let s1,i be the
share of the population in country 1 which is native to country i and denote by di, j the migratory distance
between the native populations of countries i and j. Then, the (weighted) predicted ancestry-adjusted
migratory distance between countries 1 and 2 as of today is given by





(s1,i × s2, j × di, j)
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Second, as an additional independent measure of migratory distance, we use the
so-called “human mobility index”-based migratory distance developed by Özak (2010).
This measure is more sophisticated than the raw migratory distance using the five inter-
mediate waypoints in that it measures the walking time along the optimal route between
any two locations, taking into account the effects of temperature, relative humidity, and
ruggedness, as well as human biological capabilities. Given that the procedure assumes
travel by foot (as is appropriate if interest lies in migratory movements thousands of
years ago), the data do not include islands, but assume that the Old World and the
New World are connected through the Bering Strait, over which humans are believed
to have entered the Americas. The original data contain the travel time between two
countries’ capitals, which we again adjust for post-Columbian migration flows using the
ancestry-adjustment methodology outlined above. Thus, this variable measures the ex-
pected travel time between the ancestors of two randomly drawn individuals, one from
each country.
There are strong ex ante reasons to suspect that genetic distance is a more power-
ful proxy for temporal distance than predicted migratory distance. First, the migratory
distance measures are inherently coarse in nature. Second, as indicated above, migra-
tory distance can only be adjusted for the post-1500 mass migratory movements that are
captured in the “World Migration Matrix”, but not for the more diverse migration waves
earlier in history. Analyses using predicted migratory distance measures are hence more
likely to suffer from attenuation bias.
6.3.2.0.3 Linguistic Distance Between Countries. Population geneticists and linguists
have long noted the close correspondence between genetic distance and linguistic “trees”,
intuitively because population break-ups do not only produce diverging gene pools, but
also differential languages. Hence, we employ the degree to which two countries’ lan-
guages differ from each other as an additional proxy for the timing of separation. The
construction of linguistic distances follows the methodology proposed by Fearon (2003).
The Ethnologue project classifies all languages of the world into language families, sub-
families, sub-sub-families etc., which give rise to a language tree. In such a tree, the
degree of relatedness between different languages can be quantified as the number of
common nodes two languages share.9 As in the case of predicted migratory distances,
for each country pair, we calculate the weighted linguistic distance according to the pop-
ulation shares speaking a particular language in the respective countries today.
It is well-know in the population genetics and linguistics literatures that genetic dis-
tance appears to be a higher-quality measure of separation patterns. First, while lan-
guages generally maintain a certain structure over long periods of time, in some cases
9 If two languages belong to different language families, the number of common nodes is 0. In contrast,
if two languages are identical, the number of common nodes is 15. Following Fearon (2003), who argues
that the marginal increase in the degree of linguistic relatedness is decreasing in the number of common
nodes, we transformed these data according to
Linguistic distance = 1 −
√√# Common nodes
15
to produce distance estimates between languages in the interval [0, 1]. We restricted the Ethnologue data
to languages which make up at least 5% of the population in a given country.
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they change or evolve very quickly, for example when the colonial powers brought Indo-
European languages into Africa, or when Arabic was brought to Egypt during the Mus-
lim conquest. Thus, in general, the slow-moving nature of aggregate genetic endowment
makes genetic distance a more robust measure of ancient breakups of populations, also
see the discussion in L. L. Cavalli-Sforza (1997). In addition, any quantitative measure
of linguistic distance suffers from the fact that there is no natural metric on languages.
While language trees are a useful tool to circumvent this problem, they remain coarse
in nature, potentially introducing severe measurement error. Just as with migratory dis-
tance, we hence expect that genetic distance will be a more powerful explanatory vari-
able than linguistic distance.
6.4 Preferences and Temporal Distance
6.4.1 Baseline Results
This section develops our main result on the relationship between differences in prefer-
ences between countries and the temporal distance between the respective populations.
Since temporal distance is an inherently bilateral variable, this analysis will necessitate
the use of a dyadic regression framework, which takes each possible pair of countries
as unit of observation. Accordingly, we match each of the 76 countries with every other
country into a total of 2,850 country pairs and, for each trait, compute the absolute dif-
ference in (average) preferences between the two countries.10 We then relate our proxies
for temporal distance to this absolute difference in preferences between the respective
populations. Our regression equation is hence given by:
|prefi − pref j| = α + β × temporal distance proxyi, j + γi × di + γ j × d j + εi, j
where prefi and pref j represent some average trait in countries i and j, respectively, di
and d j country fixed effects, and εi, j a country pair specific disturbance term.
As is standard practice in dyadic analyses such as in gravity regressions of bilateral
trade, every specification to be presented below will include country fixed effects di and
d j , i.e., a fixed effect for each of the two countries that appears in a country pair obser-
vation to take out any unobservables that are country-specific.11 Heuristically speaking,
with country fixed effects, the regressions do not relate, say, the raw difference in pref-
erences between Sweden and Mexico to the respective raw genetic distance. Rather, the
regression relates the difference in preferences between Sweden and Mexico relative to
Sweden’s and Mexico’s average differences in preferences in all country pairs to their ge-
netic distance, again relative to all other genetic distances involving these two countries.
For instance, if Mexico had very large differences in preferences to all countries, then the
fixed effects would ensure that these uniform large differences are treated as a Mexico-
10 Since the analysis is not directional, each country pair is only used once, i.e., when country i is matched
with country j, j cannot be matched with i, so that the bilateral dataset contains no redundant information.
Due to a lack of data on genetic distance and / or migratory distance, the empirical analyses can only make
use of sub-samples of the total set of 2,850 country pairs.
11 Also see the working paper version of Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009).
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specific effect, rather than attribute them to the bilateral relationships between Mexico
and other countries. Thus, any country-specific factors are netted out of the analysis and
the regression equation indeed estimates the bilateral effect of interest.12
Furthermore, regarding the noise term, because our empirical approach implies that
each country will appear multiple times as part of the (in)dependent variable, we need
to allow for clustering of the error terms at the country-level. We hence employ the two-
way clustering strategy of Cameron et al. (2011), i.e., we cluster at the level of the first
and of the second country of a given pair. This procedure allows for arbitrary correlations
of the error terms within a group, i.e., within the group of country pairs which share the
same first country or which share the same second country, respectively, see Appendix II
of Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009).
Table 6.1 provides the results of OLS regressions of absolute differences in prefer-
ences on genetic distance. Throughout the paper, all regression coefficients (except for
those of binary variables) are expressed in terms of standardized betas, i.e., both the
dependent and the independent variables are normalized into z-scores and the depen-
dent variable is then multiplied with 100, so that the coefficient can be interpreted as
the percent change of a standard deviation in the dependent variable in response to a
one standard deviation increase in the independent variable.
Columns (1) and (2) provide evidence that genetic distance is a significant predictor
of differences in average risk attitudes. In quantitative terms, the standardized beta in-
dicates that a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance is associated with an
increase of roughly 20 percent of a standard deviation in differences in risk attitudes. In
columns (3) through (8), we show that very similar results obtain for all of the proso-
cial traits, i.e., altruism, positive reciprocity, and trust. Given that these three traits are
also positively correlated at the country-level, we keep the subsequent analysis consise
by collapsing the three measures into a simple unweighted average that we refer to as
“prosociality” and report robustness checks using each prososical trait separately in the
Appendix.13
Finally, columns (9)-(10) and (11)-(12) present analogous analyses using patience
and negative reciprocity as dependent variables. The resulting picture is very consistent:
across specifications, the point estimates are positive, but small in magnitude, and sta-
tistically not significant. Thus, in sum, out of our six behavioral traits, four are robustly
significantly related to temporal distance, while the other two are not. The remainder of
this section will formally investigate the robustness of the relationship between temporal
distance and preferences over risk and social interactions.
12 The empirical results suggest that such country fixed effects indeed go a long way in addressing omitted
variable concerns. For instance, in the analyses to be presented below, for patience and negative reciprocity
we sometimes observe statistically significant negative coefficients on the temporal distance proxies, which
we find very hard to interpret. These results entirely disappear with country fixed effects, providing evidence
for the importance of including country fixed effects.
13 The country-level correlations between the three measures range between 0.27 and 0.71, see Falk et al.
(2015a). To derive the prosociality index, we computed a simple unweighted average of altruism, positive








Table 6.1. Preferences and temporal distance
Dependent variable: Absolute difference in average...
Risk taking Altruism Pos. reciprocity Trust Patience Neg. reciprocity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Fst genetic distance 0.19∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.045 0.012
(0.08) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Nei genetic distance 0.17∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.046 0.012
(0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
Observations 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701 2701
R2 0.620 0.617 0.552 0.552 0.522 0.525 0.448 0.442 0.509 0.510 0.481 0.481
OLS estimates, twoway-clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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6.4.2 Conditional Regressions
The argument made in this paper is that the relationship between genetic distance on
the one hand and risk as well as social preferences on the other hand reflects the impact
of ancient migration patterns and the resulting distribution of temporal distances across
populations, rather than contemporary differences in idiosyncratic country characteris-
tics.
We hence proceed by investigating the robustness of the relationship between tempo-
ral distance and risk preferences as well as prosociality through conditional regressions.
Since our dependent variable consists of absolute differences, all of our control variables
will also be bilateral variables that reflect cross-country differences. In essence, in what
follows, our augmented regression specification will be:
|pre fi − pre f j| = α + β × genetic distancei, j + γi × di + γ j × d j + η × gi, j + εi, j
where gi j is a vector of bilateral measures between countries i and j (such as their
geodesic distance or the absolute difference in per capita income). Details on the defini-
tions and sources of all control variables can be found in Appendix 6.E.
We start our analysis by considering the case of risk preferences. To check that our
coefficient of interest does not spuriously pick up the effect of demographic differences
or differential population characteristics, column (2) of Table 6.2 adds to the baseline
specification the absolute differences in average age, proportion of females, religious
fractionalization, and the fraction of the population who are of European descent. This
joint set of covariates reduces the point estimate of genetic distance by only about 10%,
and the coefficient remains statistically significant.
A potential concern with our baseline specification is that it ignores differences in
development and institutions across countries, in particular given that genetic distance
is known to correlate with differences in national income (Spolaore andWacziarg, 2009).
Column (3) of Table 6.2 therefore introduces absolute differences in (log) GDP per capita,
democracy, and a common legal origin dummy. The inclusion of this vector of controls
has no further effect on the genetic distance coefficient.
Recall that our “world map” of risk preferences suggests the presence of geographic
patterns in the distribution of risk attitudes. However, human migration patterns (and
hence temporal distance proxies) are correlated with geographic and climatic variables.
Thus, to ensure that effects stemming from variations in geography or climate are not
attributed to genetic distance, we now condition on an exhaustive set of corresponding
control variables. Column (4) introduces four distance metrics as additional controls into
this regression. Our first geographical control variable consists of the geodesic distance
(measuring the shortest distance between any two points on earth) between the most
populated cities of the countries in a given pair. Relatedly, we introduce a dummy equal to
one if two countries are contiguous. Finally, we also condition on the “distance” between
two countries along the two major geographical axes, i.e., the difference in the distance
to the equator and the longitudinal (east-west) distance. Again, the introduction of these
variables has virtually no effect on the coefficient of genetic distance.
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Table 6.2. Risk taking and genetic distance: Robustness
Dependent variable:
Absolute difference in average risk taking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fst genetic distance 0.19∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
∆ Average age 0.064∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
∆ Proportion female 0.047 0.034 0.026 0.022
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
∆ Religious fractionalization 0.024 0.026 0.021 0.021
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
∆ % Of European descent -0.025 -0.015 -0.0040 -0.0030
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆ Democracy index -0.032∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.041∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆ Log [GDP p/c PPP] -0.075∗∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.066∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log [Geodesic distance] 0.087∗ 0.075∗
(0.04) (0.04)
1 for contiguity -0.046 -0.027
(0.09) (0.09)
∆ Distance to equator -0.078∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
∆ Longitude -0.091∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
∆ Land suitability for agriculture 0.026
(0.03)
∆ Mean elevation 0.040
(0.04)
∆ SD Elevation -0.0087
(0.03)
∆ Ave precipitation 0.025
(0.05)
∆ Ave temperature -0.0057
(0.02)
∆ Log [Area] 0.013
(0.02)
Colonial relationship dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2701 2628 2556 2556 2556
R2 0.620 0.624 0.627 0.630 0.632
OLS estimates, twoway-clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Given that geographic distance as such does not seem to drive our result, we now con-
trol for more specific information about differences in the micro-geographic and climatic
conditions between the countries in a pair. To this end, we make use of information on
the agricultural productivity of land, different features of the terrain, and climatic factors.
As column (4) shows, the inclusion of corresponding controls has no effect on the genetic
distance point estimate. In sum, columns (4) and (5) suggest that the precise migration
patterns of our ancestors, rather than simple shortest-distance calculations between con-
temporary populations, need to be taken into account to understand the cross-country
variation in risk aversion.
Table 6.3 repeats the conditional regressions from Table 6.2 for the case of proso-
ciality. Each column follows the same logic as the corresponding column in Table 6.2.
As columns (1) through (5) show, the relationship between prosociality and genetic
(temporal) distance is robust to this large and comprehensive vector of covariates. Ap-
pendix 6.B.1 shows that very similar results hold for each of the three prosocial traits
separately, i.e., differences in altruism, positive reciprocity, and trust all exhibit signifi-
cant conditional relationships with temporal distance.
In sum, conditioning on a large set of economic, institutional, geographic, climatic,
and demographic variables, the relationships between genetic distance and differences
in risk preferences and prosociality are highly significant. Furthermore, in both cases,
the corresponding point estimate is very robust, suggesting that – in order for omitted
variable bias to explain our results – unobservables would have to bias our results by
much more than the very large and comprehensive set of covariates in our regressions
(Altonji et al., 2005; Bellows and Miguel, 2009).14
Table 6.3. Prosociality and genetic distance: Robustness
Dependent variable:
Absolute difference in average prosociality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fst genetic distance 0.22∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Population controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic and institutional controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Colonial relationship dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Distance controls No No No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No No No Yes
Observations 2701 2628 2556 2556 2556
R2 0.481 0.481 0.490 0.491 0.492
OLS estimates, twoway-clustered standard errors in parentheses. See Table 6.2 for a
complete list of the control variables. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
14 A potential concern is that genetic distance might simply pick up regional effects. Thus, we construct
an extensive set of 28 continental dummies each equal to one if the two countries are from two given
continents. For example, we have a dummy equal to one if one country is from Sub-Saharan Africa and
the other one from North America. When we include this vector of fixed effects, we cannot condition on
country fixed effects any longer because the resulting set of fixed effects would be too extensive to leave
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6.4.3 Sub-Samples and Weighted Least Squares Estimates
Our sample of countries is highly heterogeneous economically. While our analyses al-
ready controlled for differences in per capita income, columns (1) and (4) of Table 6.4
restrict the sample to country pairs which are relatively similar in economic terms, i.e.,
which are below the median absolute difference in per capita income. In this restricted
sample, genetic distance is significantly related to differences in both risk and prosocial
preferences.
In many of the countries furthest from East Africa, the majority of the population
is not indigenous. Our analysis addressed this aspect by employing observed genetic
distance as main explanatory variable, which by construction pertains to contemporary
populations. In addition, all analyses using predicted migratory distance to be presented
below will make use of the ancestry-adjustment procedure to develop a meaningful rep-
resentation of the temporal distance between contemporary populations. Still, to rule
out that the mass migration post-1500 and its effect on temporal distances drives our
results, columns (2) and (5) present the results of an additional robustness check in
which we restrict the sample to countries in the Old World, i.e., we exclude Australia,
the Americas, and the Caribbean. Reassuringly, the results are very similar to the baseline
results.
Up to this point, all of our regressions were conducted using the raw FST genetic
distance. However, since the data on allele frequencies are collected from different sam-
ple sizes across groups, the precision of the measurement varies across country pairs.
Using bootstrap analysis, L. Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) compute standard errors of the
FST genetic distance for each pair. Following the methodology proposed by Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2009), we utilize this information by linearly downweighing each observation
by its standard error (see Appendix 6.C). The results from the corresponding weighted
least squares regression are presented in columns (3) and (6), respectively. The resulting
standardized beta coefficients are highly significant and very similar to those from the
unweighted regressions.
Finally, Appendix 6.B.3 presents an extensive set of robustness checks in which we re-
strict the sample by excluding observations from the left or right tail of the distributions
of genetic distance and risk taking (prosociality). These analyses show that the relation-
ships between differences in risk taking and prosociality on the one hand and genetic
distance on the other hand is not driven by outliers.
6.4.4 Alternative Temporal Distance Proxies
So far, our analysis hasmade use of genetic distance as theoreticallymost appealing proxy
for temporal distance. We now extend our analysis by employing predicted migratory
distance, predicted HMI migratory distance, and linguistic distance as three additional
(and conceptually slightly different) explanatory variables. Columns (1) through (6) of
Table 6.5 describe the relationship between differences in risk preferences and temporal
distance, while columns (7) through (12) analyze the effect of temporal distance on
meaningful variation to identify our coefficient of interest off. Appendix 6.B.2 presents the results, which
are very similar to those using country fixed effects.
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Table 6.4. Robustness: Sub-samples and weighted least squares
Dependent variable: Abs. difference in average...
Risk taking Prosociality
∆ GDP p/c Old ∆ GDP p/c Old
< 50th pct World WLS < 50th pct World WLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fst genetic distance 0.19∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Observations 2475 1653 2701 2475 1653 2701
R2 0.619 0.602 0.613 0.488 0.442 0.488
OLS estimates, twoway-clustered standard errors in parentheses. In columns (1) and (4),
the sample only includes country pairs whose difference in per capita income is below
the median in our sample. In columns (2) and (5), the sample is restricted to countries
in the Old World, i.e., we exclude Australia, the Americas, and the Caribbean. In columns
(3) and (6), all pairwise observations are linearly downweighted by their standard error,
see Appendix 6.C. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
differences in prosociality. For each dependent and explanatory variable, we present two
specifications, one without controls (except for country fixed effects), and one including
the full vector of controls from column (5) in Table 6.2.
Overall, the results provide evidence that the relationship between temporal distance
and preferences extends beyond genetic distance: all proxy variables are positively re-
lated to differences in preferences, showing that our results do not hinge on genetic
distance as proxy for temporal distance.15 At the same time, consistent with increased
measurement error in migratory and linguistic distance, the corresponding standardized
beta coefficients are almost always smaller than the ones of genetic distance discussed
above.16
15 Appendix 6.B.1 shows that very similar results obtain when we use each of the three prosocial traits
altruism, positive reciprocity, and trust separately in the conditional regressions.
16Unreported regressions show that when we use non-ancestry adjusted migratory distance measures in
the regressions (as opposed to the ancestry adjusted variables used throughout this paper), the coefficients
are either not statistically significant, or only marginally so, again suggesting that the precise migration









Table 6.5. Robustness: Alternative temporal distance proxies
Dependent variable: Absolute difference in average...
Risk taking Prosociality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Migratory distance 0.16∗ 0.15 0.15∗∗ 0.22∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09)
HMI migratory distance 0.30∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.20∗∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.06) (0.09)
Linguistic distance 0.089∗ 0.063∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.080∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Population controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Economic and institutional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Colonial relationship dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Distance controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Geographic controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2775 2556 2211 2016 2850 2556 2775 2556 2211 2016 2850 2556
R2 0.617 0.625 0.634 0.641 0.616 0.625 0.479 0.477 0.531 0.531 0.478 0.475
OLS estimates, twoway-clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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6.5 Preferences and the Length of the Migratory Path
The previous section established a bilateral statement: higher temporal distance is associ-
ated with larger differences in preferences. However, the economics literature that makes
use of concepts from population genetics considers not only interpopulation temporal
(genetic) distance, but also intrapopulation genetic diversity (Ashraf and Galor, 2013b).
Whenever a sub-population split apart from its parental colony, those humans breaking
new ground took with them only a fraction of the genetic diversity of the previous ge-
netic pool, intuitively because they were usually small, and hence non-representative,
samples. In consequence, through the sequence of successive fissions (serial founder ef-
fect), the total diversity of the gene pool significantly decreases along human migratory
routes out of East Africa. Ashraf and Galor (2013b) make use of this observation by
constructing a predicted measure of genetic diversity, which is essentially a linear trans-
formation of migratory distance from East Africa. In light of the previous findings, the
question emerges whether the level of a given preference is related to genetic diversity,
i.e., migratory distance from Ethiopia. Understanding this relationship is interesting for
two reasons.
First, Ashraf and Galor (2013b) provide evidence that national per capita income is
hump-shaped in predicted genetic diversity. Thus, an analysis of the relationship between
preferences and genetic diversity might produce insights into whether – or to what extent
– preferences mediate the observed relationship between diversity and income.
Second, analyzing the relationship between the level of preferences and migratory
distance from the cradle of mankind might also shed light on the mechanisms that drive
the patterns reported in Section 4.4. The argument underlying this paper is that the
relationship between temporal distance and preference differences reflects the accumu-
lation of population-specific preference changes (through historical experiences and /
or genetic drift) over thousands of years. However, it is also conceivable that this rela-
tionship is not driven by what happened after the population breakups, but rather by the
structure of the breakups itself. In particular, it may be that the characteristics of the new
founder population systematically differed from those of the parental colony, as would be
the case if, e.g., only the least risk averse types split away. In such a scenario, preferences
would change monotonically along the migratory path out of East Africa, hence mechani-
cally producing the correlation between temporal distance and preference differences.17
If true, this would still leave the main insight of the paper – that the structure and timing
of population breakups in the very distant past have left in the footprint in the contem-
porary global distribution of preferences – intact. At the same time, the interpretation of
this relationship would change slightly.
17 Slightly more subtly, it is also possible that the correlation between temporal distance and preference
differences is driven by a monotonic evolution of the dispersion of the preference pool along the migratory
path out of Africa, akin to the serial founder effect in population genetics: if the dispersion of the prefer-
ence pool decreased monotonically along the migratory path, the differences in preferences between later
founder populations would mechanically be smaller than those between earlier ones because the respec-
tive parental preference pool has lower variation to begin with. To investigate this issue, Appendix 6.D.2
presents regressions which relate the standard deviation of the country-level preference pool to genetic
diversity. Across preferences, the relationship between preference dispersion and genetic diversity is weak.
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Because we only observe preferences today, we cannot evaluate whether such
systematic population breakups actually took place. However, what is sufficient for
our purposes is to investigate whether the results of such systematic breakups are still
visible in the data today and hence potentially drive our result on the relationship
between temporal distance and differences in preferences. To this end, we relate
the level of the preference pool in a given country to the ancestry-adjusted length of
the migratory path of the respective population from Ethiopia Ashraf and Galor (2013b):
prefi = α + β1 × genetic diversityi + β2 × genetic diversity sqri + γ × x i + εi
where prefi is either the average trait in country i, x i is a vector of covariates, and
εi a disturbance term. Note that this regression does not constitute a special case of the
bilateral migratory distance regressions discussed above, because here the dependent
variable is the level of a given preference, rather than the absolute difference to East
Africa, i.e., Ethiopia. Thus, the regressions estimated above do not imply any prediction
on the sign or significance of β1 and β2.
18
Table 6.6 provides an overview of the results. As explanatory variable we employ
predicted genetic diversity as developed in Ashraf and Galor (2013b). Columns (1), (4),
(7), and (10) show that none of our preference variables are significantly linearly related
to genetic diversity. At the same time, as shown in columns (2), (5), and (8), risk tak-
ing, patience, and prosociality all exhibit significant non-linear relationships with genetic
diversity, i.e., risk aversion, patience, and prosociality are all hump-shaped in genetic di-
versity.19 Indeed, Appendix 6.D.1 shows that the non-linear associations between proso-
ciality and genetic diversity also hold for altruism, positive reciprocity, and trust sepa-
rately.20 However, all of these significant non-linearities disappear with the inclusion of
continent fixed effects (columns (3), (6), and (9)).21
These results show that – at least as of today – preferences do not evolve monotoni-
cally along the migratory path out of Africa. This pattern is indicative that the relation-
ship between temporal distance and preference differences is indeed driven by what
happened after the various population breakups, rather than selective breakup patterns
as such.
Ashraf and Galor (2013b) and Ashraf et al. (2014) establish a significant hump-
shaped relationship between per capita income and genetic diversity. The non-linear rela-
18 A special case of the general bilateral regression framework estimated in Section 4.4 would be
|prefi − prefEthiopia| = α + β × genetic diversityi + γ × |x i − xEthiopia| + εi
Since Ethiopia is not included in the Global Preference Survey, we cannot estimate this equation.
19 The linear and squared genetic diversity coefficients are also jointly statistically significant.
20 Again, this hump is not inconsistent with the results presented in Section 4.4 because here the depen-
dent variable is not the absolute difference to Ethiopia.
21 The fact that the non-linear patterns disappear with continent fixed effects is perhaps unsurprising
given that a large fraction of the worldwide variation in genetic diversity is intercontinental rather than
intracontinental in nature, which is a result of major population bottlenecks at key intercontinental way-
points during the “out of Africa” migration process. For instance, in our sample of countries, continent fixed
effects alone explain 66% of the variation in genetic diversity. In addition, our sample size of 74 countries
is substantially smaller than the one in, e.g., Ashraf and Galor (2013b), implying that we have less degrees
of freedom to establish potential non-linear effects also within continents. Consistent with both of these










































Table 6.6. Average preferences and genetic diversity
Dependent variable: Average ...
Risk taking Prosociality Patience Neg. reciprocity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Genetic diversity 2.08∗ -74.1∗∗ 52.9 -1.27 153.0∗∗∗ 76.4 -0.14 127.1∗∗ 73.5 1.47 31.5 -78.4∗
(1.15) (33.86) (60.18) (1.68) (56.60) (64.27) (1.08) (57.46) (56.00) (1.03) (35.86) (42.51)
Genetic diversity sqr. 53.9∗∗ -39.0 -109.3∗∗∗ -54.8 -90.1∗∗ -55.3 -21.3 57.5∗
(24.37) (43.64) (40.07) (46.57) (40.44) (40.55) (25.40) (31.03)
Continent FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
R2 0.038 0.074 0.309 0.009 0.107 0.279 0.000 0.067 0.317 0.023 0.029 0.191
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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tionships between risk, time, and social preferences and genetic diversity hence raise the
question of whether preferences somehow mediate the observed reduced-form relation-
ship between diversity and income. To address this question, Appendix 6.D.3 presents
a set of regressions in which we relate per capita income to genetic diversity and its
quare, and then successively introduce our preference variables as additional covariates.
The results show that the inclusion of all preferences halves the point estimate of both
the linear and the squared genetic diversity term, which is mostly driven by the strong
correlation between patience and per capita income (Falk et al., 2015a). However, while
the genetic diversity coefficients become smaller in magnitude, they remain statistically
highly significant.
6.6 Conclusion
A growing body of empirical work highlights the importance of heterogeneity in risk,
time, and social preferences for understanding a myriad of economic, social, and health
behaviors. This paper takes a first step towards understanding the deep roots of varia-
tion in these preferences across entire populations. Our main contribution is to establish
that a significant fraction of the substantial between-country heterogeneity in risk aver-
sion, altruism, positive reciprocity, and trust has its historical origins in the structure and
timing of very distant ancestral migration patterns, which highlights that if we aim to
understand the ultimate roots of preference heterogeneity, we might have to consider
events very far back in time.
In this respect, this paper did not attempt to shed light on the mechanisms through
which temporal distance might drive preference differences. A priori, the observed pat-
terns are consistent with both differential historical experiences and genetic drift. An
important question for future research is which role socialization practices have played
in these long-run processes.
An interesting question is why the relationship between temporal distance and pref-
erences holds for risk aversion and all of the prosocial traits, but not for patience and
negative reciprocity. A possible conjecture is that the roots of the cross-country variation
in time preferences are more recent in nature, rather than being driven by (the accu-
mulation of) very old historical events. Thus, an important avenue for future research
is to identify the more proximate mechanisms that have shaped the distribution of time
preference and negative reciprocity.
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Appendix 6.A Details on Global Preference Survey





Appendix 6.B Additional Bilateral Regressions
6.B.1 Prosociality Variables Separately
Table 6.7. Prosociality and temporal distance: Robustness
Dependent variable: Absolute difference in average...
Altruism Positive reciprocity Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Fst genetic distance 0.042∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.044 0.044 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Population controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic and institutional controls No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Colonial relationship dummies No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Distance controls No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Geographic controls No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Observations 2701 2628 2556 2556 2556 2701 2628 2556 2556 2556 2701 2628 2556 2556 2556
R2 0.552 0.549 0.551 0.551 0.552 0.522 0.519 0.521 0.523 0.524 0.448 0.449 0.465 0.465 0.467
OLS estimates, twoway-clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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6.B.2 Continent Fixed Effects
Table 6.8. Preferences and temporal distance: Bilateral continent fixed effects
Dependent variable: Absolute difference in average...
Risk taking Altruism Pos. reciprocity Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fst genetic distance 0.17∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.15∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic and institutional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Colonial relationship dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2556 2556 2556 2556
R2 0.318 0.105 0.147 0.207
OLS estimates, twoway-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The regressions do not in-
clude country fixed effects. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
6.B.3 Excluding Tail Observations
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 present the results of regressions in which we restrict the sample
of observations by excluding observations from the left or right tail of the distributions
of genetic distance, risk taking, or prosociality. Specifically, the regressions either utilize
observations below the 90th percentile or above the 10th percentile of the distribution
of a given variable.
Note that location of any given country pair in the distribution of all bilateral vari-
ables may depend on whether country fixed effects are taken into account. For instance,
if country A had very large genetic distances to all but one countries, and an average dis-
tance to country B, then restricting the sample by genetic distance would never exclude
the A− B observation. However, with country fixed effects, this may change, because
(heuristically speaking) the fixed effects for country A take out the relatively large aver-
age genetic distance for country A, implying that the A− B pair has a very small genetic
distance in terms of residuals. Thus, after accounting for country fixed effects, this ob-
servation might get excluded based on the above sample restriction criteria. Thus, we
apply our robustness exercises to both types of distributions, i.e., to the distributions of





Table 6.9. Risk preferences and temporal distance: Excluding small and large values
Dependent variable: Absolute difference in average risk taking
∆ Risk > 10th pct ∆ Risk < 90th pct Genetic dist. > 10th pct Genetic dist. < 90th pct
Raw Residual Raw Residual Raw Residual Raw Residual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fst genetic distance 0.18∗∗ 0.071∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.19∗∗
(0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 2430 2430 2430 2430 2428 2430 2430 2430
OLS estimates, twoway-clustered standard errors in parentheses. In all columns, the sample is restricted to observations
above or below a certain threshold, where the threshold is either computed with or without country fixed effects. For
instance, in columns (1), the sample includes all observations whose absolute difference in risk taking is above the
90th percentile of the distribution of (raw) absolute differences in risk taking. In column (2), the sample includes all
observations whose absolute difference in risk taking is above the 90th percentile of the distribution of residual absolute
differences in risk taking after taking out country fixed effects. That is, we first regress absolute differences in risk
taking on a vector of country fixed effects, compute the residual, and then restrict the sample based on the residuals.
Likewise, in column (7), we restrict the sample to observations below the 90th percentile of the distribution of (raw) Fst
genetic distances, while column (8) applies the 90th percentile to the distribution of genetic distances after accounting
for country fixed effects, i.e., after regressing genetic distance on country fixed effects and computing residuals. All
regressions include country fixed effects: the “raw” regressions are standard fixed effects regressions; the “residual”
regressions are estimated by (i) partialing country fixed effects out of differences in risk taking and genetic distance (on













Table 6.10. Prosociality and temporal distance: Excluding small and large values
Dependent variable: Absolute difference in average prosociality
∆ Social > 10th pct ∆ Social < 90th pct Genetic dist. > 10th pct Genetic dist. < 90th pct
Raw Residual Raw Residual Raw Residual Raw Residual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fst genetic distance 0.20∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 2430 2430 2430 2430 2428 2430 2430 2430
OLS estimates, twoway-clustered standard errors in parentheses. In all columns, the sample is restricted to observations
above or below a certain threshold, where the threshold is either computedwith or without country fixed effects. For instance,
in columns (1), the sample includes all observations whose absolute difference prosociality is above the 90th percentile of the
distribution of (raw) absolute differences in prosociality. In column (2), the sample includes all observations whose absolute
difference in prosociality is above the 90th percentile of the distribution of residual absolute differences in prosociality after
taking out country fixed effects. That is, we first regress absolute differences in prosociality on a vector of country fixed
effects, compute the residual, and then restrict the sample based on the residuals. Likewise, in column (7), we restrict the
sample to observations below the 90th percentile of the distribution of (raw) Fst genetic distances, while column (8) applies
the 90th percentile to the distribution of genetic distances after accounting for country fixed effects, i.e., after regressing
genetic distance on country fixed effects and computing residuals. All regressions include country fixed effects: the “raw”
regressions are standard fixed effects regressions; the “residual” regressions are estimated by (i) partialing country fixed
effects out of differences in prosociality and genetic distance (on the full sample), (ii) restricting the sample, (iii) regressing
residuals on each other. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix 6.C Details for WLS Regressions
Following Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), the regression weights in Table 6.4 were com-
puted as follows:
Weight =
Maximum standard error + 1 − standard error of observation
Maximum standard error
Thus, the regression weights are between zero and one and linearly downweigh ob-













Appendix 6.D Additional Diversity Regressions
6.D.1 Prosocial Traits Separately
Table 6.11. Preferences and genetic diversity: Prosocial traits separately
Dependent variable: Average ...
Altruism Positive reciprocity Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Genetic diversity -1.14 98.3∗∗ 91.2 -1.15 107.2∗∗ 25.8 -0.36 116.5∗∗∗ 43.6
(1.31) (42.84) (57.65) (1.50) (52.75) (65.35) (1.23) (42.37) (40.67)
Genetic diversity sqr. -70.4∗∗ -65.9 -76.7∗∗ -18.7 -82.8∗∗∗ -30.5
(30.46) (41.69) (37.31) (47.64) (30.29) (29.54)
Continent FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
R2 0.009 0.056 0.181 0.009 0.067 0.174 0.001 0.101 0.383






Table 6.12. Preferences and genetic diversity: Prosocial traits separately
Dependent variable: SD in ...
Altruism Positive reciprocity Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Genetic diversity -0.92∗∗ -11.6 -2.89 -0.30 -40.3∗ -10.9 0.019 -17.4 19.2
(0.43) (15.33) (17.54) (0.61) (23.91) (25.57) (0.37) (13.97) (12.74)
Genetic diversity sqr. 7.56 1.53 28.3∗ 7.56 12.4 -13.9
(10.95) (12.60) (16.80) (18.20) (9.97) (9.24)
Continent FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
R2 0.055 0.061 0.194 0.006 0.073 0.245 0.000 0.020 0.276













6.D.2 Diversity and the Dispersion of the Preference Pool
Table 6.13. Preference variability and genetic diversity
Dependent variable: Standard deviation in ...
Risk taking Prosociality Patience Neg. reciprocity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Genetic diversity 0.67∗ -8.30 8.98 -0.56 -24.9 -8.04 -1.09∗ 39.2 -1.65 -0.44 -9.65 23.2
(0.37) (11.08) (14.20) (0.47) (16.80) (19.22) (0.57) (23.57) (23.85) (0.33) (11.45) (16.68)
Genetic diversity sqr. 6.36 -6.63 17.2 5.00 -28.6∗ -0.25 6.53 -17.1
(7.88) (10.29) (11.86) (13.73) (16.83) (17.47) (8.25) (12.22)
Continent FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
R2 0.044 0.050 0.102 0.030 0.071 0.177 0.038 0.075 0.258 0.014 0.019 0.140
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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6.D.3 National Income, Genetic Diversity, and Preferences
Table 6.14. Prosociality and temporal distance: Robustness
Dependent variable: Log [GDP p/c]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Genetic diversity 762.9∗∗∗ 752.9∗∗∗ 779.2∗∗∗ 455.1∗∗∗ 725.0∗∗∗ 341.3∗∗
(195.93) (196.46) (201.82) (149.47) (178.84) (150.80)
Genetic diversity sqr. -542.2∗∗∗ -534.9∗∗∗ -553.9∗∗∗ -323.9∗∗∗ -516.6∗∗∗ -242.2∗∗
(139.55) (139.84) (143.68) (107.29) (127.53) (108.24)






Negative reciprocity 1.21∗∗ 0.57
(0.49) (0.51)
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74
R2 0.137 0.138 0.138 0.444 0.181 0.494
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Appendix 6.E Definitions and Data Sources of Main Variables
6.E.1 Explanatory Variables
6.E.1.0.1 Fst and Nei genetic distance. Genetic distance between contemporary popu-
lations, taken from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009).
6.E.1.0.2 Linguistic distance. Weighted linguistic distance between contemporary
populations. Derived from the Ethnologue project data, taking into account all languages
which are spoken by at least 5% of the population in a given country.
6.E.1.0.3 Predicted migratory distance. Predicted migratory distance between two
countries’ capitals, along a land-restricted way through five intermediate waypoints (one
on each continent). Taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013b).
6.E.1.0.4 HMI migratory distance. Walking time between two countries’ capitals in
years, taking into account topographic, climatic, and terrain conditions, as well as human
biological abilities. Data from Özak (2010).
6.E.2 Covariates
6.E.2.0.1 Average age, proportion female. Computed from Gallup’s sociodemographic
background data.
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6.E.2.0.2 Religious fractionalization. Indices due to Alesina et al. (2003) capturing the
probability that two randomly selected individuals from the same country will be from
different religious / linguistic groups.
6.E.2.0.3 Percentage of European descent. Constructed from the “World Migration
Matrix” of Putterman and Weil (2010).
6.E.2.0.4 Contemporary national GDP per capita. Average annual GDP per capita over
the period 2001 – 2010, in 2005US$. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
6.E.2.0.5 Democracy index. Index that quanties the extent of institutionalized democ-
racy, as reported in the Polity IV dataset. Average from 2001 to 2010.
6.E.2.0.6 Colonial relationship dummies. Taken from the CEPII Geodist database at
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6.
6.E.2.0.7 Geodesic distance, contiguity, longitude, latitude, area Taken from CEPII
GeoDist database. The longitudinal distance between two countries is computed as
Longitudinal distance = min{|longi tudei − longi tude j|, 360 − |longi tudei| − |longi tude j|}
6.E.2.0.8 Suitability for agriculture. Index of the suitability of land for agriculture
based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing de-
gree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological
indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH, taken
from Michalopoulos (2012).
6.E.2.0.9 Mean and standard deviation of elevation. Mean elevation in km above sea,
taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013b). Data originally based on geospatial elevation data
reported by the G-ECON project (Nordhaus, 2006).
6.E.2.0.10 Precipitation. Average monthly precipitation of a country in mm per month,
1961-1990, taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013b). Data originally based on geospatial
averagemonthly precipitation data for this period reported by the G-ECON project (Nord-
haus, 2006).
6.E.2.0.11 Temperature. Average monthly temperature of a country in degree Celsius,
1961-1990, taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013b). Data originally based on geospatial
average monthly temperature data for this period reported by the G-ECON project (Nord-
haus, 2006).
7
Patience and the Wealth of Nations?
7.1 Introduction
Time preference forms a key building block of all intertemporal choice theories. Accord-
ingly, in recent years, economists have begun to measure individuals’ patience and to
empirically relate the resulting preference parameters to economically important behav-
ior. Two insights derived from these efforts are that the elicited preference parameters
correlate with a broad class of economic decisions and outcomes, often consistent with
theories of intertemporal choice, and that time preferences exhibit pronounced hetero-
geneity across samples, but also even within fairly homogenous populations. As a con-
sequence, patience has been stressed as a crucial non-cognitive skill in determining eco-
nomic success, be it on the labor market or generally in life (see Borghans et al., 2008,
for a review).
However, at a more aggregate level, time preference also constitutes a key primitive
of dynamic micro-founded theories of comparative development. Given that any stock
of production factors or knowledge necessarily arises from an accumulation process, a
broad class of models posits that the time preferences of a country’s representative agent
are intimately linked to national income through the accumulation of human and physi-
cal capital as well as productivity improvements. At the same time, empirical evidence on
the importance of global heterogeneity in time preferences for (individual or aggregate)
accumulation processes and development is missing.
The present paper fills this gap by systematically studying the relationship between
time preferences and future-oriented behaviors on a global scale, across individuals, sub-
national regions, and countries. The analysis makes use of a novel data set, the Global
Preference Survey, which constitutes the first comparable data set on time preferences at
the individual level from representative population samples for a large set of countries
all over the world (Falk et al., 2015a). The data contain information on patience for more
than 80,000 individuals from 76 countries. The sample is constructed to provide repre-
? For valuable comments and discussions we are grateful to Daron Acemoglu, Klaus Desmet, Oded Galor,
Luigi Guiso, Robert Hall, Ömer Özak, Felipe Valencia, Nico Voigtländer, Joachim Voth, David Weil, David
Yang, Fabrizio Zilibotti as well as seminar audiences at the 2015 NBER Political EconomyMeeting, Columbia,
IFN Stockholm, Konstanz, Stanford, and UCLA Anderson. Ammar Mahran provided outstanding research
assistance.
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sentative population samples within each country and geographical representativeness
in terms of countries covered. The data contain information on two patience measures.
One measure has a format similar to the standard procedure of eliciting time preferences
in laboratory experiments, i.e., respondents were asked to make a series of hypothetical
binary decisions between receiving monetary rewards today or in the future. The other
measure elicits subjective evaluations of patience. These preference measures were se-
lected and tested through a rigorous ex ante experimental validation procedure involv-
ing real monetary stakes, so that the survey items have a demonstrated ability to capture
actual heterogeneity in intertemporal choice behavior as measured with financial incen-
tives. To ensure comparability of preference measures across countries, the elicitation
followed a standardized protocol that was implemented through the professional infras-
tructure of the Gallup World Poll. Monetary stakes involved comparable values in terms
of purchasing power across countries, and the survey items were culturally neutral and
translated using state-of-the-art procedures. Thus, the data provide an ideal basis for
the first systematic analysis of the relationship between patience and future-oriented
decisions on a global scale.
Our empirical analysis is based on the relationship between patience, accumulation
processes, and income as predicted by a standard micro-founded development frame-
work. For instance, in a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, higher patience implies a higher
propensity to save, a higher steady state level of physical capital and income, as well
as faster growth along the convergence path towards the steady state.1 Likewise, in the
context of human capital theory, patience implies greater incentives to acquire education
(G. S. Becker, 1962; Ben-Porath, 1967). In terms of residual productivity, endogenous
growth theory suggests that higher patience raises the present value of R&D and thus
research intensity and innovation (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).2 It is also
conceivable that higher patience leads to the design of better institutions. For example,
if people face a tradeoff between creating an institutional environment suitable for sus-
tained development and engaging in short-run rent extraction, time preferences will
affect the design of these institutions. The global representativeness of our data allows
us to present the first assessment of the consistency of the correlations predicted by this
large and influential body of theory with the empirical facts.
Given that the dynamic neoclassical development paradigm derives its empirical con-
tent from microeconomic decisions, our empirical analysis starts by investigating the re-
lationship between individual patience, human and physical capital, and income.We find
that, in representative samples around the world, patient people have higher incomes,
save more, have higher educational attainment, and report better health. These results
hold within countries and subnational regions, and conditional on a comprehensive set
of sociodemographic covariates (also see Falk et al., 2015a).
In light of the strong individual-level results, we proceed by considering the relation-
ship between patience, accumulation processes, and income at a more aggregate level
while keeping a subnational perspective. To this end, we exploit variation in average pa-
1Higher patience also implies faster growth in a human capital augmented model (Lucas, 1988).
2 See also Acemoglu (2008) for a comprehensive overview of the role of time preferences for growth. The
relation between income, income growth and patience is reinforced in a setting in which patience increases
with the level of wealth, see, e.g., Strulik (2012).
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tience, average educational attainment, and per capita income across subnational regions
within countries, akin to the approach by Gennaioli et al. (2013). While the correspond-
ing regressions investigate the correlates of patience at an aggregate level, as called for
by dynamic development theories, they also allow us to keep many factors such as the
overall institutional environment constant by including country fixed effects. Consistent
with the individual-level results, we find robust evidence that, within countries, regions
with more patient populations exhibit higher average educational attainment and higher
per capita income.
Building on these subnational results, the main part of the paper analyzes the in-
terplay between patience, the proximate determinants of development, and income at
the country level. We first establish a strong raw correlation between patience and com-
parative development as measured by (log) per capita income. In a univariate regres-
sion, average patience explains about 40% of the between-country variation in income.
This reduced-form relationship is robust across a wide range of regression specifications,
which incorporate controls for many of the deep determinants previously identified in
the empirical literature, such as geography, climate, the disease environment, or anthro-
pological and cultural factors. The result also holds both within each continent sepa-
rately, and when employing alternative definitions of development or national welfare.
We conclude our reduced-form analysis by establishing a significant correlation between
patience and economic growth. Across a large range of base years, patience explains a
considerable fraction of the variation in growth rates both in the medium run (i.e., after
World War II), and in the long run over the last 200 years.
Theory posits that patience affects development through accumulation processes, im-
plying that patience should predict the stocks of the proximate determinants of develop-
ment as well as the corresponding accumulation flows. Our analysis establishes coherent
support for these predictions. For instance, the results reveal that patience explains large
fractions of the cross-country variation in capital stocks, savings rates, educational attain-
ment, education and health expenditure, research and development expenditure, inno-
vative capacity, and institutional quality. These associations hold for alternative proxies,
and are robust to the inclusion of a large and comprehensive vector of controls.
In sum, this paper establishes a coherent pattern of correlations linking patience to
income and the accumulation of productive resources across individuals within regions,
across regions within countries, and across countries. However, measuring time pref-
erences across countries poses the difficulty that observed behavior might also reflect
environmental conditions, raising the question of whether it is “true” or “revealed” pa-
tience that generates our findings. We remain largely agnostic about which particular
component of the observed heterogeneity in the survey instruments generates the re-
sults, because, ultimately, the interest of this paper lies in understanding heterogeneity
in future-oriented decisions both across and within countries, rather than in disentan-
gling whether the sources of this heterogeneity are “innate”. Nonetheless, in the final
part of the paper, we attempt to provide a first empirical assessment of the extent to
which the country-level correlation between patience and per capita income is likely to
be driven by “revealed”, rather than “true”, patience. First, we show that the correlation
between patience and per capita income holds up when conditioning on variables that
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proxy for borrowing constraints, inflation and interest rates, the quality of the institu-
tional environment, life expectancy, educational attainment, or cognitive skills. Second,
we attempt to estimate an “actual” component of patience by purging individual-level
patience of proxies for cognitive skills, education, life expectancy, or the subjectively per-
ceived quality of the institutional environment. Even this cleaned patience variable, once
aggregated up at the country level, correlates with per capita income, suggesting that
at least part of the observed variation in patience across countries has deep roots, as
suggested by recent work of Chen (2013) and Galor and Özak (2014).
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. At the microeconomic level,
a growing set of contributions measure individuals’ patience in usually small and non-
representative samples and empirically relate the resulting preference parameters to
economically important field behaviors (DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005; Chabris et al.,
2008; Tanaka et al., 2010; Castillo et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2013; Meier and Sprenger,
2013; Golsteyn et al., 2014). Our work innovates on this set of contributions by sys-
tematically studying the relationship between individual patience and life outcomes in
representative samples obtained for a large set of countries, and for a diverse set of
outcomes spanning savings, education, health, and income.
At the macro level, our work is the first to empirically investigate the link between
patience, aggregate accumulation processes, and national income. The empirical impor-
tance of human and physical capital as well as productivity has received considerable
attention in the literature Solow (see, e.g., 1957), Glaeser et al. (2004), Caselli and
Feyrer (2007), Erosa et al. (2010), and Manuelli and Seshadri (2014), but – presumably
due to the lack of suitable data – evidence on the link between patience and the aggre-
gate accumulation of these productive resources is missing. In a broader sense, our work
also relates to the recent stream of papers which provide evidence for a set of “deep” de-
terminants of development. These include geography, climate, and diseases (John Luke
Gallup et al., 1999; Diamond, 2005; Olsson and Hibbs Jr, 2005; Alsan, 2015), colonial
history (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Nunn, 2008), policies and institutions (e.g., Hall and
Jones, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2002, 2005), anthropological fac-
tors (Alesina et al., 2003; Ashraf and Galor, 2013), cultural factors such as trust (Knack
and Keefer, 1997; Guiso et al., 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Tabellini, 2010), diversity
(Alesina et al., 2013b), religion (R. J. Barro and McCleary, 2003; Campante and Yana-
gizawa, forthcoming), or cultural distance to the technological frontier (Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2009).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The data and their sources are de-
scribed in Section 6.3. Section 7.3 discusses the individual-level and Section 7.4 the
regional-level results. Section 7.5 presents the reduced-form relationship between pa-
tience and aggregate development and the relation between patience and the proximate
determinants. Section 7.6 discusses the role of actual patience and environmental con-
ditions, while Section 3.6 offers a concluding discussion.
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7.2.1 Survey Procedure
Empirically relating comparative development to patience requires reliable andmeaning-
ful data on time preferences from representative population samples in a broad set of
countries. Ideally, these data should reflect behaviorally relevant heterogeneity in time
preference at the level of the individual. Our data on time preferences around the globe
are part of the Global Preference Survey (GPS), a unique data set on economic prefer-
ences from representative population samples in 76 countries. In many countries around
the world, the Gallup World Poll regularly surveys representative population samples
about social and economic issues. In 76 countries, we included as part of the regular
2012 questionnaire a set of survey items which were explicitly designed to measure a
respondent’s time preferences, risk preferences, social preferences, and trust (for details
see Falk et al., 2015a).
Four noteworthy features characterize these data. First, the preference measures
have been elicited in a comparable way using a standardized protocol across countries.
Second, we use preference measures that have been elicited from representative pop-
ulation samples in each country, in contrast to small- or medium-scale surveys or ex-
periments, which use student or other convenience samples.3 This allows for inferences
about between-country differences in preferences. The median sample size was 1,000
participants per country; in total, we collected preferencemeasures for more than 80,000
participants worldwide.4 Respondents were selected through probability sampling and
interviewed face-to-face or via telephone by professional interviewers.
A third important feature of the data is geographical representativeness in terms of
the countries being covered. The sample of 76 countries is not restricted to Western in-
dustrialized nations, but covers all continents and various levels of development. Specifi-
cally, our sample includes 15 countries from the Americas, 24 from Europe, 22 from Asia
and Pacific, as well as 14 countries in Africa, 11 of which are Sub-Saharan. This set of
countries covers about 90% of the world population and of global income.
Fourth and finally, the preference measures are based on experimentally validated
survey items for eliciting preferences. In order to ensure behavioral relevance of our
measure of time preferences, the underlying survey items were designed, tested, and
selected for the purpose of the GPS through a rigorous ex-ante experimental validation
procedure (for details see Falk et al., 2015b). In this validation step, subjects partic-
ipated in choice experiments that measured preferences using real money. They also
answered large batteries of survey questions designed to elicit preferences. We then se-
lected the survey items that were (jointly) the best predictors of actual behavior in the
experiments, to form the survey module. In order to make these items cross-culturally
applicable, (i) all items were translated back and forth by professionals, (ii) monetary
values used in the survey were adjusted along the median household income for each
country, and (iii) pretests were conducted in 22 countries of various cultural heritage to
3 See, e.g., Wang (2011), Rieger et al. (forthcoming), Vieider et al. (2015), Vieider et al. (2014).
4Notable exceptions include China (2,574 obs.), Haiti (504 obs.), India (2,539 obs.), Iran (2,507 obs.),
Russia (1,498 obs.), and Suriname (504 obs.).
312 | 7 Patience and the Wealth of Nations
ensure comparability. See Appendix 5.A and Falk et al. (2015a) for a description of the
data set and the data collection procedure.
Our measure of patience is derived from the combination of responses to two survey
measures, one with a quantitative and one with a qualitative format. These were the
best predictors of behavior in experiments involving incentivized choices between earlier
versus later rewards with a time delay of 12 months, thereby capturing annual time
discounting. The quantitative survey measure consists of a series of five interdependent
hypothetical binary choices between immediate and delayed financial rewards, a format
commonly referred to as the “staircase” (or “unfolding brackets”) procedure (Cornsweet,
1962). In each of the five questions, participants had to decide between receiving a
payment today or larger payments in 12 months. The wording of the question was as
follows:
Suppose you were given the choice between receiving a payment today or a
payment in 12 months. We will now present to you five situations. The payment
today is the same in each of these situations. The payment in 12 months is
different in every situation. For each of these situations we would like to know
which one you would choose. Please assume there is no inflation, i.e., future
prices are the same as today’s prices. Please consider the following: Would you
rather receive amount x today or y in 12 months?
For example, in the German sample, in the first choice, the immediate payment x
was 100 euros and the delayed payment y was 154 euros. The immediate payment x
remained constant in all subsequent four questions, but the delayed payment y was
increased or decreased depending on previous choices. To illustrate, suppose the respon-
dent chose the immediate payment (the delayed payment) in the first decision. Then
the delayed payment in the second decision was increased (decreased) to 185 (125) eu-
ros (see Appendix 5.A for an exposition of the entire sequence of binary decisions). In
essence, by adjusting the delayed payment according to previous choices, the questions
“zoom in” around the respondent’s point of indifference between the smaller immediate
and the larger delayed payment and make efficient use of limited and costly survey time.
The sequence of questions has 32 possible ordered outcomes which partition the real line
from 100 euros to 218 euros into roughly evenly spaced intervals. In the international
survey, monetary amounts x and y were expressed in the respective local currency, scaled
relative to median monthly household income in the given country.
The qualitative measure of patience is given by the respondents’ self assessment re-
garding their willingness to wait on an 11-point Likert scale. The wording of the question
was as follows:
We now ask for your willingness to act in a certain way. Please indicate your
answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are “completely unwilling
to do so” and a 10 means you are “very willing to do so”. How willing are you
to give up something that is beneficial for you today in order to benefit more
from that in the future?
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Our patience measure is a linear combination of the quantitative and qualitative sur-
vey items, using the weights obtained from the experimental validation procedure.5 As
described in detail in Falk et al. (2015b), the survey items are strongly and significantly
correlated with preference measures obtained from standard incentivized intertempo-
ral choice experiments. The raw correlation between experimental choices and the two
survey items are 0.53 and 0.39, respectively, and both items jointly explain more than
50% of the variation in the experimental choices.6 Moreover, the measures predict ex-
perimental behavior out of sample. As established in Falk et al. (2015a), our patience
measure also correlates with individual-level characteristics (such as cognitive skills) in
a manner that is very similar to the correlations reported in data sets that use financially
incentivized procedures. Arguably, the ex-ante validation of survey items constitutes a sig-
nificant methodological advance over the often ad-hoc selection of questions for surveys
based on introspective arguments of plausibility or relevance. Additionally, the quantita-
tive staircase measure not only resembles standard experimental procedures of eliciting
time preferences, but it is also relatively context neutral and precisely defined, arguably
making it less prone to culture-dependent interpretations. This makes the patience mea-
sure particularly well-suited for a multinational study like the present one.
7.2.2 Summary Statistics
The analysis is based on individual-level patience measures that are standardized, i.e.,
we compute z-scores at the individual level. We then calculate a country’s patience by
averaging responses using the sampling weights provided by Gallup, see Appendix 5.A.
Figure 7.1 depicts the resulting distribution of time preferences across countries, relative
to the world’s average individual level, colored in white. Darker red colors and darker
blue colors indicate less and more patience, respectively, where differences are measured
in terms of standard deviations from the world’s average individual.7 Visual inspection of
the world map of time preferences already suggests the presence of noteable geographic
and economic patterns. In particular, countries in North America and Western Europe
appear considerably more patient than their South American or African counterparts.
The map also illustrates the existence of considerable between-country differences in
patience. The range of the country-averages is 1.7, implying that average patience varies
by 1.7 of a standard deviation (in terms of the total individual-level variation).
5 Specifically, responses to both items were standardized at the individual level and then aggregated
using the following formula:
Patience = 0.7115185 · Staircase measure + 0.2884815 · Qualitative measure.
These weights are based on OLS estimates of a regression of observed behavior in financially incentivized
laboratory experiments on the two survey measures. See Falk et al. (2015a) and Falk et al. (2015b) for
details.
6 The benchmark for this comparison is the explanatory power of a test-retest correlation between two
incentivized elicitations.
7 Appendix 5.A provides histograms of both average patience across countries and individual level pa-
tience.
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Figure 7.1. Distribution of Patience Across Countries
7.2.3 Further Variables of Interest
The GPS includes a broad range of individual-level variables. Apart from sociodemo-
graphic covariates and a self-reported proxy for cognitive skills regarding mathematical
ability, the dataset also contains four variables which allow us to assess the relationship
between patience, future-oriented choices, and income: household income, educational
attainment as a three-step category, a binary indicator for whether the respondent saved
in the previous year, and a binary variable measuring whether the respondent reports
having health problems beyond what is normal given their age. The data also include
a measure of trust that asks for respondents’ self-assessment regarding the statement “I
assume that people have only the best intentions (0-10)”.
For our cross-regional analysis, we make use of the data set of Gennaioli et al. (2013)
which includes regional per capita income as well as average years of education.
At the country level, the empirical analysis incorporates other variables from a variety
of data sources, replicating measures that have been used in various contributions to the
literature. In particular, the analysis makes use ofmacroeconomic variables that are taken
mostly from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators or the Penn World Tables.
Whenever feasible, we use ten-year-averages (usually from 2003 to 2012) to smooth the
data and eliminate variation due tomeasurement error or randomfluctuations. Appendix
7.H contains information on the construction and sources of all variables used in the
empirical analysis.
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7.3 Individual Patience, Accumulation and Income
In line with the perspective taken by micro-founded theories of development, we begin
our empirical analysis by an investigation of heterogeneity in patience and accumula-
tion decisions at the individual level. The purpose of this analysis is twofold. First, the
analysis explores the validity of the theoretical prediction that patience fosters the ac-
cumulation of resources and knowledge, in representative samples across economically
and culturally highly heterogeneous samples. Second, the results provide information as
to whether there are systematic patterns of patience affecting future-oriented decisions
and, ultimately, income that cannot be explained by factors at the regional or national
level, including institutions or the overall health environment.
The analysis is based on Gallup data on household income, savings, educational at-
tainment, health status, and patience and exploits within-country variation in patience
and the respective outcomes in terms of future-oriented decisions. Unfortunately, data
for two of these outcome variables (health and savings) are only available for a subset
of countries.
The results are presented in Table 7.1. For each dependent variable, we report the
results of three OLS specifications, one without any covariates, one with country fixed
effects, and one with regional fixed effects and additional individual-level covariates.
Columns (1) through (3) report the results of OLS regressions of respondents’ house-
hold income per capita on their patience. The estimates document that, both across and
within countries, more patient people tend to earn significantly higher incomes. This pat-
tern holds conditional on a comprehensive vector of individual-level covariates including
age, gender, religion, cognitive skills, and three variables that proxy for the subjectively
perceived quality of the institutional environment (these variables are collected and con-
structed by Gallup, see Appendix 7.H). At the same time, the coefficient of patience
decreases substantially after the inclusion of country fixed effects; we will return to dis-
cussing this issue below.
Columns (3)-(9) consider the accumulation of physical and human capital, i.e., sav-
ings behavior and educational attainment, also see Falk et al. (2015a). Patient individ-
uals save more and invest more into education, within countries and subnational re-
gions, suggesting that accumulation decisions are affected by patience as predicted by
micro-founded theories. Finally, we examine the relationship between time preference
and health by relating a binary index of whether a respondent reports having health prob-
lems to patience. Again, consistent with the predictions of intertemporal choice theories,
patient individuals exhibit better health. In sum, these results represent the first evi-
dence for the relationship of patience with economic well-being as well as accumulation
behavior at the global level, using comparable data elicited in representative samples,
and holding the broader environment (in terms of regional heterogeneity) constant.
7.4 Patience and Development Across Regions
In light of the strong individual-level results, we proceed by incrementally aggregating




















Table 7.1. Individual patience, savings, human capital, and income
Dependent variable:
Log [HH income p/c] Saved last year Education level Health problems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Patience 0.34∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age 0.58∗∗∗ -0.059 1.09∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.20) (0.32) (0.29) (0.09)
Age squared -0.38 -0.056 -1.95∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.30) (0.27) (0.10)
1 if female -0.086∗∗∗ -0.0057 -0.019 0.022∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Subj. math skills 0.035∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ -0.0077∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Subjective institutional quality -0.00042∗ 0.00046 -0.00058∗∗∗ -0.00014∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Confidence in financial institutions 0.042∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.014 -0.028∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Subjective law and order index 0.00058∗∗ 0.00012 -0.000048 -0.00054∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 7.92∗∗∗ 6.47∗∗∗ 5.88∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.00) (0.09) (0.03) (0.00) (0.08) (0.03) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03)
Country FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Regional FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Religion FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 79245 79245 46383 15260 15260 10438 79357 79357 46550 62727 62727 46428
R2 0.051 0.608 0.638 0.011 0.073 0.137 0.030 0.205 0.308 0.006 0.029 0.153
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.607 0.632 0.011 0.072 0.116 0.030 0.205 0.296 0.006 0.028 0.139
OLS estimates, standard errors (clustered at country level) in parentheses. The dependent variable in (4)-(6) is a binary indicator for whether the individual saved last year, in (5)-(6)
it is educational attainment as a three-step category, and in (7)-(9) it is a binary variable capturing whether the respondent reports having health problems that are atypical given their
age. Age is divided by 100. All results in columns (4)-(12) are robust to estimating (ordered) probit models. See Appendix 7.H for a detailed description of all dependent variables. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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tional regions. This is possible since the individual-level data contain regional identifiers
(usually at the state or province level), which allows us to relate the average level of
patience in a subnational region to the level of regional GDP per capita and the average
years of education in a given region from data constructed by Gennaioli et al. (2013). In
total, we were able to match 704 regions from 55 countries across the two data sets.8
While the regional level of analysis pertains to an aggregate view on accumulation
processes and income, the corresponding regression analyses still have the important
advantage of allowing us to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the country-level
by using country fixed effects (Gennaioli et al., 2013). For example, potential concerns
about the role of languages, institutions, and culture for survey responses are less rele-
vant in within-country analyses. The benefits of considering regional data naturally come
at the cost of losing representativeness, since the sampling scheme was constructed to
achieve representativeness at the country level. Given a median sample size of 1,000
respondents per country, in some regions, we observe only a relatively small number of
respondents. In consequence, average regional time preference is estimated less precisely
for some regions. We explicitly take into account the differential precision with which
patience is measured across regions by estimating weighted OLS regressions of regional
(log) GDP per capita or average years of education on regional patience, in which each
observation is weighted by the number of respondents in the respective region. This pro-
cedure ensures that regions with only a small number of respondents receive less weight
in the estimations, as should be the case if more observations imply more precision.9
Table 7.2 reports estimates of these regressions of average education and average
per capita income at the regional level on patience. For both dependent variables, we
estimate a specification without country fixed effects, one with country fixed effects,
and one with additional regional-level covariates (Gennaioli et al., 2013). The results
mirror those established in the individual-level analysis: We find significant relationships
between patience, per capita income, and human capital. These results hold conditional
on country fixed effects (columns (2) and (5)), although again the size of the coefficient
of patience is substantially reduced in the specifications with country fixed effects. At
the same time, controlling for geographic and socio-cultural variables at the region level
does not substantially alter the estimates (columns (3) and (6)). Nevertheless, even in
these specifications, the coefficients of patience on regional income and education are
substantially larger than the coefficients obtained at the individual level. We will return
to this issue in Section 7.6 below.
In sum, heterogeneity in patience is predictive of the accumulation of productive
resources as well as income differences within countries, on a global scale. While these
results are in line with micro- and macroeconomic theories of intertemporal choice, a
crucial question is whether similar patterns also hold across countries.
8 See Appendix 7.E for an overview of the number of regions per country.
9 An alternative route is to restrict the sample to regions for which the number of respondents exceeds
a particular threshold. As Table 7.27 in Appendix 7.F shows, once the sample is restricted by eliminating
regions with ten or less observations, the results are very similar to those reported in the main text.
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Table 7.2. Regional patience, human capital, and income
Dependent variable:
Avg. years of education Log [Regional GDP p/c]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patience 3.34∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.55) (0.17) (0.14) (0.23) (0.07) (0.07)
Temperature -0.050∗∗∗ -0.015
(0.02) (0.01)
Inverse distance to coast 1.36∗∗ 0.67
(0.54) (0.42)
Log [Oil production p/c] -0.11 0.21∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.06)
# Ethnic groups -0.38∗∗ -0.15∗∗
(0.15) (0.06)
Log [Population density] 0.21∗∗ 0.078
(0.10) (0.05)
Constant 7.17∗∗∗ 7.37∗∗∗ 6.53∗∗∗ 8.74∗∗∗ 9.18∗∗∗ 8.66∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.04) (0.67) (0.18) (0.02) (0.37)
Country FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 693 693 676 704 704 687
R2 0.252 0.936 0.957 0.184 0.937 0.950
Adjusted R2 0.251 0.931 0.953 0.183 0.932 0.946
Weighted least squares estimates, observations weighted by number of respondents in
region. Standard errors (clustered at country level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p <
0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
7.5 Patience and Comparative Development: Cross-Country
Evidence
Building on the within-country evidence presented above, the main part of the empirical
analysis considers the relationship between country-level patience, aggregate accumula-
tion processes, and development. We begin our corresponding investigation by providing
evidence for a reduced-form relationship between patience and cross-country develop-
ment, both in terms of contemporary levels of development and regarding income dy-
namics in terms of growth. We then study in detail the relationship between patience
and the accumulation of physical capital, human capital, and productivity.
7.5.1 Patience and Contemporary Development
7.5.1.0.1 Baseline results. The left panel of Figure 7.2 provides a graphical illustra-
tion of the reduced-form relationship between comparative development and patience.
The raw correlation between the log of GDP per capita (measured by averages over the
period 2003-2012) and the patience measure is 0.63, implying that patience alone ex-
plains about 40% of the variation in log income per capita. To appreciate the quantitative
magnitude of this relationship, note that the size of the standardized beta (63%) that
corresponds to the regression line in the figure implies that an increase in patience by
one standard deviation is associated with an increase of almost two-thirds of a standard
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deviation in (log) GDP, which is roughly equivalent to the income difference between
Peru and the United States.10
To investigate the statistical significance and robustness of this relationship, we turn
to multivariate regression analysis. Table 7.3 presents the reduced-form relationship be-
tween comparative development and patience accounting for different sets of covariates.
Column (1) documents the existence of a significant unconditional relationship between
(log) GDP per capita and patience as depicted in the left panel of Figure 7.2. This raw
relationship is statistically highly significant with a t-statistic larger than 10. We proceed
by investigating the robustness of the relation between patience and income to including
various variables corresponding to deep-rooted factors that have been associated with
development. Columns (2) through (4) successively add a large and comprehensive set
of geographic and climatic covariates. Column (2) contains a set of continent fixed ef-
fects as well as a binary indicator for whether the country has ever been colonized in
the past.11 Column (3) contains additional controls for absolute latitude, longitude, the
fraction of arable land, land suitability for agriculture, and the timing of the Neolithic
transition. Column (4) adds average precipitation and temperature as well as the frac-
tions of the population that live in the (sub-) tropics or in areas with the risk of con-
tracting malaria. While the inclusion of this large vector of covariates reduces the the
coefficient of patience by about 30%, the coefficient remains statistically significant and
quantitatively large, with a standardized beta of 38%. Again, the coefficient estimate ob-
tained with country-level data is substantially larger than the coefficient obtained with
regional or individual data, suggesting reinforcing effects at the aggregate level through
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Figure 7.2. Patience and national income. The left panel depicts the raw correlation between log
GDP per capita (purchasing-power parity) and patience (ρ = 0.63), while the right panel contains
a plot conditional on the full set of baseline covariates in column (7) of Table 7.3 (partial
ρ = 0.52, semi-partial ρ = 0.24).
10 The standardized beta measures the change in the dependent variable in % of a standard deviation
given a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable.
11 Following the World Bank terminology, continents are defined as North America, Central and South
America, Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and
South Africa.
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In recent years, the literature on comparative development has argued that deep-
rooted cross-country differences in the diversity of a population – such as genetic, ethnic,
linguistic, or religious diversity – are partly responsible for differences in income (Alesina
et al., 2003; Ashraf and Galor, 2013; Ashraf et al., 2014). In order to ensure that patience
does not merely pick up deep-rooted cross-country differences in the diversity of a popu-
lation, column (5) additionally controls for genetic diversity and its square, as well as for
ethnic fractionalization. While the results for these variables by and large replicate those
of the earlier literature, adding these covariates has little, if any, effect on the coefficient
on patience.
Taken together, the results in columns (2) through (5) indicate that the relationship
between patience and national income is unlikely to merely reflect the effect of other
“deep” causes of comparative development that have received attention in the literature.
The most extensive specification with patience and geographic, climatic, colonial, and
diversity covariates explains more than 80% of the variation in per capita income, but
patience continues to have strong explanatory power for cross-country income differ-
ences, with a partial R2 associated with patience of 27%.12
Starting with Knack and Keefer (1997), it has been argued that social capital, mea-
sured in terms of interpersonal trust, is related to GDP. Column (6) presents the results
of a regression of income on trust as explanatory variable. Consistent with previous find-
ings in the literature based on the trust measure from the World Values Survey, we find
that the GPS trust measure is significantly related to national income. Once we add pa-
tience and other controls in column (7), however, trust is no longer significant, while the
relationship between patience and GDP remains strong. Virtually identical results obtain
if we capture this cultural trait using the standard trust measure from the World Values
Survey. The right-hand panel of Figure 7.2 illustrates the conditional relationship of col-
umn (7).13 Additional robustness checks show that controlling for average risk aversion
(measured similarly to patience, see Falk et al., 2015a), legal origin dummies, religious
and linguistic fractionalization, major religion shares, the fraction of European descent,
the genetic distance to the US, and other geographical variables, does not affect our
main result.14 Throughout this paper, we will employ the specification in column (7) as
baseline set of controls.
7.5.1.0.2 Robustness: Patience and Income in Sub-Samples. Table 7.4 investigates the
robustness of our main reduced-form relationship in various sub-samples. Columns (1)
through (4) analyze whether the relationship between patience and income also pre-
vails within each continent separately. In columns (5) through (8), we split the sample
of countries by the level of development into OECD and non-OECD countries, and by
historical legacy into former colonies and countries that have never been colonized. The
relationship between income and patience is always positive and statistically significant,
despite the rather small sample sizes.
12 The semi-partial R2 is 6%.
13 Following Altonji et al. (2005), the results in Table 7.3 also show that the bias resulting from the
omission of unobserved variables would have to be at least 1.5 times strong as the bias from excluding the
large and comprehensive vector of covariates.
14 See Table 7.22 in Appendix 7.F for details.
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7.5.1.0.3 Robustness: Alternative Measures of Development. Next, we explore
whether patience is also predictive of other measures of material and non-material well-
being than GDP per capita. We employ three alternative measures of development. The
first of these measures is GDP per worker, which is frequently used in growth empirics as
a more useful measure of output than GDP per capita. Instead of confining comparative
development to differences in income or consumption, we also employ two broader mea-
sures of well-being, namely (i) the United Nations Human Development Index, which
combines GDP, years of schooling, and life expectancy, and (ii) subjective statements
about well-being in terms of happiness. Table 7.5 reports the results of regressions of
these dependent variables on our patience variable. Columns (1), (3) and (5) document
that each of the alternative measures of economic development exhibits a strong pos-
Table 7.3. Patience and national income
Dependent variable: Log [GDP p/c PPP]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Patience 2.66∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.32) (0.40) (0.37) (0.41) (0.41)
1 if colonized -0.30 -0.22 -0.44∗ -0.31 -0.39∗
(0.32) (0.34) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23)
Distance to equator 0.021 0.017 -0.014 -0.012
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Longitude -0.0027 0.0043 0.0055 0.0059
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Percentage of arable land -0.027∗∗ -0.016 -0.014 -0.015
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Land suitability for agriculture 0.81 0.12 0.12 -0.094
(0.70) (0.59) (0.58) (0.60)
Log [Timing neolithic revolution] 0.46 0.094 0.22 0.34
(0.49) (0.36) (0.41) (0.41)
Average precipitation 0.0072 0.0023 0.0019
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average temperature 0.077∗∗ 0.051 0.057
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
% living in (sub-)tropical zones -1.53∗∗ -1.31∗ -1.16∗
(0.69) (0.69) (0.63)
% at risk of malaria -1.46∗∗∗ -1.45∗∗∗ -1.49∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.54) (0.51)
Predicted genetic diversity 430.2∗∗ 451.4∗∗
(181.70) (168.86)
Predicted genetic diversity sqr. -308.7∗∗ -324.0∗∗
(132.16) (122.94)




Constant 8.31∗∗∗ 9.30∗∗∗ 4.10 5.74∗ -143.4∗∗ 8.33∗∗∗ -151.8∗∗
(0.14) (0.47) (3.99) (3.37) (62.76) (0.17) (58.15)
Continent FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 76 76 74 74 74 76 74
R2 0.397 0.691 0.730 0.819 0.845 0.079 0.850
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.654 0.671 0.764 0.787 0.067 0.789
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 7.4. Patience and national income in sub-samples
Dependent variable: Log [GDP p/c PPP] in...
Africa & Europe & SE Asia & Ameri- Non- Colo- Not
Middle East C. Asia Pacific cas OECD OECD nized colonized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Patience 2.83∗∗∗ 1.82∗∗∗ 3.76∗∗∗ 2.42∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗ 2.23∗∗∗
(0.76) (0.33) (1.04) (0.32) (0.21) (0.65) (0.36) (0.51)
Constant 7.84∗∗∗ 9.09∗∗∗ 7.40∗∗∗ 8.55∗∗∗ 9.75∗∗∗ 7.77∗∗∗ 8.10∗∗∗ 8.87∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.19) (0.33) (0.20) (0.15) (0.20) (0.16) (0.30)
Observations 20 27 14 15 22 54 54 22
R2 0.274 0.448 0.430 0.592 0.498 0.073 0.313 0.434
Adjusted R2 0.234 0.426 0.383 0.560 0.473 0.055 0.300 0.406
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. In the first
column, the sample includes Africa and the Middle East, in the second column Europe and Central Asia,
in the third South-East Asia and Pacific, in the fourth the Americas, in the fifth (sixth) all (non-) OECD
members, and the seventh (eigth) all formerly colonized (never colonized) countries. The regional groups
follow the World Bank definitions.
itive unconditional correlation with patience. The results in columns (2), (4), and (6)
show that these positive relationships also hold conditional on the baseline set of control
variables in column (7) of Table 7.3.
Table 7.5. Patience and alternative development measures
Dependent variable:
Log [GDP per worker PPP] Human Development Index Subjective happiness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patience 1.56∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.23) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Constant 9.87∗∗∗ -66.1∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ -11.7∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ -11.1∗∗
(0.11) (31.10) (0.01) (5.03) (0.01) (5.50)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 71 69 76 74 76 74
R2 0.305 0.896 0.335 0.882 0.140 0.737
Adjusted R2 0.295 0.849 0.326 0.834 0.129 0.631
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See column (7)
of Table 7.3 for a complete list of the additional controls.
7.5.2 Patience and Growth
From a theoretical perspective, greater patience does not only imply greater steady state
levels of income, but also faster growth along the balanced growth path (see, e.g., Lucas,
1988).15 We therefore investigate the relationship between time preferences and growth
rates over the past 200 years, and compute the (geometric) average annual growth rate
in per capita GDP from different base years until 2010.16
15 Patience also affects growth off the balanced growth path, including cases in which patience increases
in income or wealth, see, e.g., Drugeon (1996), Das (2003), and Strulik (2012).
16 For Afghanistan, Botswana, Nicaragua, and Rwanda, GDP in 2010 is not available in the Maddison data
set on historical GDP. For these countries, we compute the annual growth rate until 2008 instead. None of











Table 7.6. Patience and economic growth
Dependent variable: Annual growth rate in GDP p/c (in %) since...
1820 1870 1925 1950 1975
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Patience 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.45∗ 0.88∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗ 1.58∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗
(0.11) (0.16) (0.12) (0.18) (0.24) (0.35) (0.33) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.52) (0.76)
Log [GDP p/c base year] -0.64∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗ -0.91∗∗∗ -0.73∗∗∗ -1.16∗∗∗ -0.87∗∗∗ -1.32∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.26) (0.24) (0.23) (0.28) (0.40)
Constant 1.34∗∗∗ 5.89∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 4.26∗∗∗ 1.90∗∗∗ 9.13∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗ 7.71∗∗∗ -230.9∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 8.69∗∗∗ -233.5∗
(0.05) (1.00) (0.06) (1.00) (0.12) (2.07) (0.14) (1.92) (74.01) (0.20) (1.98) (134.25)
Continent FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Additionals controls No No No No No No No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 31 31 42 42 33 33 63 63 63 66 66 65
R2 0.299 0.632 0.119 0.479 0.091 0.496 0.121 0.516 0.751 0.065 0.501 0.679
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.498 0.097 0.352 0.061 0.355 0.107 0.445 0.613 0.051 0.431 0.510
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Due to the lower number of observations, in columns (1)-(6) we
only control for continent fixed effects. See column (7) of Table 7.3 for a complete list of the additional controls.
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Table 7.6 presents the results of OLS regressions of annual growth rates computed
for each of several base years on patience. The first of the respective columns shows
the unconditional correlation between growth and patience, while the second column
includes controls for log per capita income in the respective base year to capture con-
vergence dynamics, and continent fixed effects. For base years after 1950, the larger
number of observations enables us to present a third specification in which we addition-
ally condition on the baseline control variables from column (7) in Table 7.3. Across base
years, greater patience is significantly associated with higher growth rates. This pattern
obtains for both very long-run growth rates and medium-run growth after World War
II. In sum, patience correlates not only with contemporary development, but also with
income growth over the last 200 years. Given this pattern, an immediate question is
whether the relationship between patience and income levels was already present in the
(distant) past. In Appendix 7.D, we investigate this issue by relating past development
(both in pre- and post-industrial times) to today’s patience. While these analyses natu-
rally rest on the assumption that the distribution of patience across countries remained
relatively stable over time, the corresponding results reveal strong relationships between
patience and historical income per capita in the 19th and early 20th century as well as
with economic development in 1500.
7.5.3 Patience and Factor Accumulation
The development accounting approach suggests that the reduced-form relationship be-
tween patience and development works through accumulation processes. In this section,
we further investigate whether the data are consistent with patience affecting income
through the “channels” of human and physical capital as well as (residual) factor pro-
ductivity. Whenever feasible, in these analyses, we consider both stocks and flows as
dependent variables, i.e., we analyze whether patience predicts the levels of production
factors and productivity as well as the corresponding accumulation flows.
7.5.3.0.1 Physical Capital. We start by regressing the stock of physical capital on pa-
tience. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7.7 present OLS estimates of the unconditional
relationship and of the relationship conditional on the extensive set of baseline covari-
ates from column (7) in Table 7.3. In line with a standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmansmodel,
the estimates reveal a significant positive relationship between patience and the stock of
capital per capita. Patience alone explains about a third of the variation in capital.
The relationship between patience and physical capital accumulation can also be in-
vestigated by looking at flows. Columns (3) to (8) of Table 7.7 present the respective
results for gross national savings rates, net adjusted national savings rates, as well as
household savings rates as dependent variables. The definitions of the first two variables
follow the World Bank terminology, according to which gross savings rates are given
by gross national income net of consumption, plus net transfers, as a share of gross na-
tional income. Net adjusted savings rates correspond to gross savings net of depreciation,
adding education expenditures and deducting estimates for the depletion of energy, min-
erals and forests, as well as damages from carbon dioxide emissions. Household savings
rates are measured as household savings relative to household disposable income. These
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data are based on surveys and are only available for OECD countries. Throughout, the
results reveal a significant positive relationship between patience and savings. In terms
of size and statistical significance, the effect is largest for household savings and net
adjusted savings, which includes education expenditures, and thus incorporates the ac-
cumulation of physical and human capital.17 The finding that patience is related to house-
hold savings rates even within OECD countries is also noteworthy, given the similarity of
this subset of countries in terms of economic development and other characteristics.18
7.5.3.0.2 Human Capital. As measures of human capital, we consider proxies for both
the quantity and quality of schooling, as well as investments into education. Specifically,
following the literature, we use average years of schooling as the baseline measure of
education. However, since years of schooling does not account for quality differences
across countries, we also use alternative measures. First, we take the human capital
index provided by the Penn World Tables, which aims to provide a quality-adjusted in-
dex by combining years of schooling with returns to schooling. As a second alternative
measure of quality-adjusted human capital, we employ a measure of cross-country dif-
ferences in cognitive skills derived from educational achievement tests (Eric A Hanushek
and Woessmann, 2012). Finally, we use education expenditure and public health expen-
diture as percentage of national income as a measure of the input into the human capital
formation process.
Table 7.8 summarizes our corresponding findings. Columns (1) and (2) reveal a posi-
tive relation between patience and average years of schooling. The explained variation of
roughly 40% indicates a strong unconditional relationship, which holds up when control-
ling for the baseline set of covariates.19 Columns (3) through (10) present the analogous
Table 7.7. Patience, physical capital, and savings
Dependent variable:
Log [Capital stock p/c] Gross sav. (% GNI) Net adj. sav. (% GNI) HH savings rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Patience 2.03∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 6.66∗∗∗ 8.11∗∗ 7.70∗∗∗ 9.65∗∗∗ 6.21∗∗ 7.08∗∗
(0.28) (0.31) (2.29) (4.01) (2.23) (2.96) (2.70) (3.13)
Constant 10.0∗∗∗ -147.6∗∗∗ 22.1∗∗∗ -1506.4∗∗ 10.2∗∗∗ 343.8 3.27∗∗ 2.86∗
(0.13) (43.14) (1.18) (580.16) (1.07) (729.38) (1.50) (1.63)
Continent FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No No
Observations 71 69 73 71 68 68 21 21
R2 0.327 0.861 0.058 0.474 0.102 0.537 0.231 0.272
Adjusted R2 0.317 0.799 0.044 0.249 0.088 0.326 0.191 0.144
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Gross savings and
net adjusted savings are national savings as % of GNI. Household savings as % of household disposable income.
Household savings rates are only available for OECD countries. Due to the small number of observations, in column
(8) the controls are restricted to continent dummies only. See column (7) of Table 7.3 for a complete list of the
additional controls.
17Unreported results show that patience is also significantly correlated with net FDI outflows (as % of
GDP).
18 Figure 7.9 in the Appendix presents a graphical illustration of this result.




















Table 7.8. Patience and human capital
Dependent variable:
Years of schooling Human capital index Cognitive skills Educ. exp. (% GNI) Public health exp. (% GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Patience 4.67∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.35∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.84) (0.11) (0.16) (0.13) (0.20) (0.31) (0.55) (0.48) (0.53)
Constant 5.40∗∗∗ -85.0 2.62∗∗∗ -30.8 4.39∗∗∗ -11.9 4.28∗∗∗ -68.9 4.11∗∗∗ 107.9
(0.24) (129.94) (0.05) (35.40) (0.08) (65.08) (0.16) (120.45) (0.21) (111.64)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 71 70 67 66 49 48 71 70 75 73
R2 0.429 0.798 0.330 0.718 0.283 0.757 0.138 0.561 0.327 0.761
Adjusted R2 0.421 0.710 0.319 0.583 0.268 0.561 0.125 0.369 0.318 0.663
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See column (7) of Table 7.3 for a complete list of the
additional controls.
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results for the four alternative measures of human capital. We find a significant positive
relationship of patience with all human capital proxies, both stocks and flows.
7.5.3.0.3 Patience, Productivity, and Institutions. The empirical literature has docu-
mented the importance of differences in residual factor productivity for comparative
development. We complete the investigation of the role of patience for the proximate
determinants by presenting evidence regarding the relationship between patience and
different measures of factor productivity. In light of the literature that, at least since Hall
and Jones (1999), has emphasized the role of institutions and social infrastructure for ex-
plaining cross-country productivity and income differences, we also consider institutions
as a deeper determinant of productivity differences across countries.
We investigate the association between patience and productivity using a standard
measure of total factor productivity (TFP) as well as three alternative measures that
capture differences in productivity related to innovation, consistent with standard the-
ories of endogenous growth. These measures are the share of GDP made up by R&D
expenditures, the number of researchers in R&D (per 1,000 inhabitants), and the Global
Innovation Index. This index is a summary statistic of innovative capacity, and hence
productivity, that consists of over 80 qualitative and quantitative items, including mea-
sures of institutions, human capital and research, infrastructure, market sophistication,
business sophistication, knowledge and technology outputs, and creative outputs.
Table 7.9 contains the respective estimation results. Using the standard TFP mea-
sure, we find a positive relation between patience and productivity (columns (1)-(2)).
As shown in columns (3)-(6), we also find strong and significant associations with pa-
tience when using R&D expenditure or the number of researchers in R&D as dependent
variable. Note that patience explains a substantially larger fraction of these R&D-related
variables (roughly 60%) than it does for TFP. In columns (7) and (8), we employ the
global innovation index as dependent variable. The relationship between patience and
factor productivity measured in terms of this index is similarly strong as the one with
R&D expenditure, and again remains significant when controlling for all baseline covari-
ates.20
A broader interpretation of productivity differences refers to the quality of the in-
stitutional environment. In this respect, higher patience might lead to the design of
higher-quality institutions if more patient decision-makers opt for creating institutions
that support sustainable development rather than short-run rent extraction. We consider
an index of democratic quality, an index of property rights as well as a social infrastruc-
ture index (Hall and Jones, 1999) as measures of institutional quality. Finally, as a proxy
for the quality of the financial institutional environment, we employ Standard & Poor’s
long-term credit rating, which arguably captures the structural institutional reliability of
a country in fulfilling its financial obligations. The regression results are presented in Ta-
ble 7.10. For each institutional proxy, we again report estimation results for two different
specifications, one with and one without controls. The estimates indicate a strong rela-
tionship between patience and institutions, confirming the hypothesis that patience is a
20 Figures 7.11 and 7.12 in the Appendix show the raw and conditional correlations between patience
and R&D expenditures, and between patience and the global innovation index, respectively.
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Table 7.9. Patience, productivity and innovation
Dependent variable:
TFP R&D exp. (% GDP) # Researchers in R&D Innovation Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Patience 0.36∗∗∗ 0.13 2.09∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 3.54∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗ 23.6∗∗∗ 18.1∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.09) (0.23) (0.59) (0.43) (1.02) (1.70) (2.91)
Constant 0.62∗∗∗ 1.07 0.96∗∗∗ 1.28 1.54∗∗∗ -29.8 39.1∗∗∗ -114.4
(0.03) (14.63) (0.08) (47.10) (0.16) (94.18) (0.82) (462.69)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 60 59 64 63 62 61 72 71
R2 0.338 0.724 0.574 0.716 0.526 0.738 0.619 0.825
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.567 0.567 0.570 0.518 0.597 0.613 0.750
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Number of re-
searchers in R&D are per 1,000 population. See column (7) of Table 7.3 for a complete list of the additional
controls.
significant correlate of democracy, property rights, social infrastructure, and long-term
credit ratings.21
In sum, patience predicts both, the stocks of and investments into physical capital, hu-
man capital, and productivity. In Appendix 7.F, we present extended specifications for all
dependent variables in which we additionally condition on income per capita. Although
controlling for GDP is likely to produce an underestimate of the relationship between
patience and the respective proximate determinant, we report these specifications to il-
lustrate that the consistent pattern linking time preferences to accumulation processes
does not arise as a mere artefact of the correlations between national income on the one
hand and proximate determinants on the other hand.
Table 7.10. Patience, institutions and social infrastructure
Dependent variable:
Democracy Property rights Social infrastructure S&P credit rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Patience 4.23∗∗∗ 2.95∗∗ 46.3∗∗∗ 35.0∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 10.7∗∗∗ 9.04∗∗∗
(0.82) (1.46) (4.39) (8.26) (0.05) (0.06) (0.82) (1.35)
Constant 6.63∗∗∗ 295.8 48.3∗∗∗ -83.6 0.50∗∗∗ 11.9 14.5∗∗∗ -271.9
(0.37) (227.41) (1.95) (1271.19) (0.02) (12.56) (0.42) (299.57)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 74 72 74 72 61 60 64 62
R2 0.202 0.686 0.515 0.640 0.461 0.793 0.607 0.768
Adjusted R2 0.191 0.554 0.508 0.489 0.451 0.678 0.601 0.647
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See column (7) of
Table 7.3 for a complete list of the additional controls.
7.6 Environmental Conditions and Revealed Patience
Measuring any preference parameter is burdened by the fact that responses in surveys or
experiments might capture some additional factors besides the actual preference param-
21 Figure 7.13 in the Appendix depicts the relationship between patience and property rights.
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eter of interest used in theoretical work.22 For the purposes of explaining the observed
heterogeneity in accumulation decisions across individuals, regions, and countries, it is
ultimately the observed variation in revealed patience that is the core object of interest
because this is the variation that ultimately matters for behavior with real (monetary)
consequences. Nonetheless, this section takes a more nuanced look at the data by in-
vestigating to which extent our main cross-country result on the correlation between
patience and per capita income is likely to be driven be actual (or innate) as opposed to
revealed patience.
7.6.1 Controlling for Country-Level Characteristics
7.6.1.0.1 Inflation and Interest Rates. If some respondents expect higher levels of in-
flation than others, or live in an environment with higher nominal interest rates, they
might appear more impatient in their survey responses, even if they have the same time
preference. Note, however, that the quantitative survey question explicitly asked people
to imagine that there was zero inflation. Also, previous research has shown that differ-
ences in interest rates are unlikely to drive choices in experimental environments, see,
e.g., Dohmen et al. (2010). Empirically, we check robustness to this concern by explic-
itly controlling for inflation (in terms of the consumer price index, or the GDP deflator)
and deposit interest rates. We find that the reduced-form coefficient of patience remains
quantitatively large and highly statistically significant after controlling for these factors,
see Table 7.13 in Appendix 7.B.1.
7.6.1.0.2 Borrowing Constraints. Respondents might be more likely to opt for imme-
diate payments in experimental choice situations if they face upward sloping income
profiles and are borrowing constrained. To address this issue, we first establish that the
correlation between patience and income is robust to controlling for covariates that cap-
ture different dimensions of the level of financial development or borrowing constraints
of a given country. Specifically, we employ the ratio of external finance to GDP (Rajan and
Zingales, 1998; Buera et al., 2011), as well as the (log) number of Automated Teller Ma-
chines (ATMs). In addition, we exploit the idea that borrowing constraints (if present) are
likely to be less binding for relatively rich people. We hence employ the average patience
of each country’s top income quintile as explanatory variable. Again, the reduced-form
relationship remains strong and significant, see Table 7.13 in Appendix 7.B.1.
7.6.1.0.3 Subjective Uncertainty. If respondents face subjective uncertainty in our
quantitative decision task, people might seem more impatient than they really are. To
check whether this drives the findings, we condition both on objective and subjective
measures of the quality of the institutional environment as well as people’s life ex-
pectancy. First, in column (1) of Table 7.11 we control for a property rights and a democ-
racy index. Second, in column (2) we make use of the fact that Gallup’s background data
contain a series of questions which ask respondents to asses their confidence in their in-
stitutional environment. A first composite index incorporates people’s confidence in the
22 See the discussion on elicitation of attitudes by Dohmen et al. (2011) and Dohmen et al. (2014), or
Dean and Sautmann (2014) for an analysis of the elicitation of time preferences.
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national government, the legal system and courts, honesty of elections, and the military.
An additional item asks for people’s confidence in the country’s financial institutions and
banks, and thus arguably captures a dimension of financial uncertainty as it applies to
our survey items. In column (3) we control for average life expectancy at birth. Results
show that patience continues to be a strong correlate of national income, conditional on
objective or subjective institutional quality, or life expectancy.
7.6.1.0.4 Education. Our survey requires respondents to think through abstract choice
problems, which might be unfamiliar and cognitively challenging for some participants.
This could induce people to decide based on heuristics, perhaps due to low education.
Table 7.11 presents the results of OLS estimations of per capita income on patience con-
ditional on several proxies for the average educational attainment in a given country.
Column (4) conditions on average years of schooling, while columns (5) through (7)
control for various school achievement measures derived from standardized test scores
(Eric A Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012). Despite the large correlation of these mea-
sures with GDP, patience remains statistically significant.
7.6.1.0.5 Measurement Error. A related concern is that the quantitative time prefer-
ence measure could suffer from measurement error arising from censoring. Specifically,
about half of all individuals in the world sample choose the immediate payment in all five
Table 7.11. Robustness
Dependent variable: Log [GDP p/c PPP]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Patience 0.67∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗





Confidence in financial institutions -3.60∗∗∗
(0.91)




Average years of schooling 0.25∗∗∗
(0.06)
Cognitive skills (math and science) 0.72∗
(0.37)
% of students reaching basic literacy 1.47
(0.90)
Share of top-performing students 12.1∗∗∗
(3.92)
Hofstede long-term orientation -0.00065
(0.01)
Constant 5.29∗∗∗ 8.10∗∗∗ -0.36 5.80∗∗∗ 5.82∗∗∗ 7.93∗∗∗ 8.71∗∗∗ 6.53∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.69) (2.08) (0.25) (1.72) (0.77) (0.29) (0.51)
Continent FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 73 57 76 71 49 49 49 61
R2 0.797 0.750 0.793 0.783 0.678 0.664 0.716 0.726
Adjusted R2 0.768 0.708 0.768 0.755 0.614 0.597 0.659 0.683
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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questions of the decision sequence, so that the elicitation procedure only allows putting a
lower bound on impatience. We check in various ways whether the results could hinge on
particular assumptions about the level of impatience assigned to these censored individ-
uals, see Appendix 7.B.1 for details. First, we directly manipulate the quantitative value
assigned to censored individuals, and find that the results are robust to using a wide
range of different values. Second, we sidestep the issue of bias in quantitative interpreta-
tion by taking an approach that avoids assigning a quantitative meaning: We collapse the
patience measure into an (ordinal) binary indicator for whether an individual’s patience
exceeds some patience threshold or not, so that a country’s average patience corresponds
to the fraction of the population that exceeds a given patience level. Across different pa-
tience thresholds, countries with a higher proportion of impatient individuals have lower
per capita income. Third, even when we drop all censored respondents from the analy-
sis, average patience of the uncensored population still correlates strongly with national
income. Finally, we make use of the idea that median patience is unaffected by censoring
concerns, as long as the median individual in a country is not censored.23 In sum, we
conclude that measurement error arising from censoring is unlikely to drive the results.
7.6.1.0.6 Culture. It is conceivable that our survey measure is related to GDP not due
to time preference, but rather because it is correlated with a broader cultural trait. Specif-
ically, Hofstede (2001) developed a qualitative long-term orientation variable that is only
available at the country-level and is occasionally used in the literature (e.g., Galor and
Özak, 2014).24 This long-term orientation variable is intended to capture various dimen-
sions of a broad concept of the perception of time.25 However, it lacks a tight association
with intertemporal tradeoffs between utility flows at different points in time. Moreover,
this measure is based on a composite of responses to qualitative items that were chosen
based on an ad hoc procedure. In contrast, our patience measure is based on a rigor-
ous experimental validation procedure, and captures tradeoffs between immediate and
delayedmonetary rewards, so that it appears more appropriate as measure of time prefer-
ences in economically relevant domains. While our patience measure is in fact correlated
with the long-term orientation variable (ρ = 0.35, p < 0.01), it has substantially more
predictive power for national income than the Hofstede measure, see column (8).
7.6.2 Eliminating Environmental Factors at the Individual Level
The results so far suggest that patience is a significant correlate of accumulation deci-
sions and income, consistent with micro-founded theories of economic development. As
shown in the previous section, the findings at the aggregate level cannot be easily ex-
23 As we discuss in detail in Appendices 7.B.1 and 7.C, all other findings in the paper also stand up to
robustness checks about censoring.
24 As Hofstede (2001) notes, “Long Term Orientation stands for the fostering of virtues oriented towards
future rewards, in particular perseverance and thrift. It’s opposite pole, Short Term Orientation, stands for
the fostering of virtues related to the past and present, in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of
‘face’ and fulfilling social obligations.”
25 Two of the underlying items ask respondents to assess the statements “We should honour our heroes
from the past.” or “Are you the same person at work (or at school if you’re a student) and at home?”, see
Hofstede’s Values Survey Module Manual at http://www.geerthofstede.nl/vsm-08.
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plained by third factors at the country level. In this section, we pursue an alternative
way of evaluating the importance of cognitive skills, education, mortality or institutional
quality in generating our cross-country results, by directly accounting for individual-
level variation in these aspects of the environment. In particular, we “clean” individual
patience of the influence of these variables and then use employ the residual patience as
proxy for people’s actual patience.
The GPS contains detailed information on several relevant aspects of the environ-
ment, which we organize in four distinct groups. First, we condition patience on a proxy
for cognitive skills in the GPS data set, in which respondents were asked to self-assess
their own mathematical skills (on a scale from 0 to 10). This variable helps eliminating
potential systematic differences in ability or cognitive skills that allow individuals to form
better beliefs or make better predictions that allow them to make more patient choices.
As second factor, we control for the respondents’ educational attainment (as a 3-step cat-
egory). While education has been treated as outcome so far, one might also argue that
better educated individuals are more capable of making intertemporal decisions because
they are better trained. Higher cognitive skills and better education together imply that
individuals are more capable of computing the returns on delayed rewards, thus mak-
ing them appear more patient.26 Third, we account for the expected remaining years
of life of each respondent, which are imputed at the country-cohort-gender level using
data from the UN World Population Prospects, as well as the respondents’ subjective
perception of their health status. In other words, for each individual, we compute the
average expected remaining years of life given their country, age, and gender. Individu-
als who face a shorter expected life and a higher risk of death might appear less patient
because of their lower subjectively perceived time horizon. Controlling for individual life
expectancy, we can rule out that time horizon effects interfere with measured patience.
Finally, we condition patience on respondents’ confidence in the quality of the institu-
tional environment in terms of the subjectively perceived overall quality of institutions
(including confidence in the national government, the legal system and courts, honesty
of elections, and the military), a perception of law and order, of corruption, and of the
respondents’ confidence in financial institutions and banks.
Appendix 7.B.2 shows that each of these four variables explains between 1.1% and
3.1% of the observed variation in individual-level patience; jointly they explain 6.5%.
Using the residuals from these regressions, we can construct a measure of “actual” indi-
vidual patience that is purged of the potential influence of environmental factors at the
individual level.
It turns out that the environmental component of patience (i.e., the predicted value
from the respective regression) explains 42% of the variation in income per capita across
countries, which is more than the rawmeasure of patience, which explains less than 40%
(see Table 7.3). Hence, the purging procedure seems to be successful and consistent with
the intuition that part of the effect of patience at the macro level is driven by unobserved
heterogeneity that is systematically correlated with development as well as patience,
such as institutional quality or life expectancy.
26We obtain similar results when not conditioning on education.
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Then, the question remains whether the aggregated component of the patience mea-
sure that is not explained by these perceptions and factors at the country level (the
purged measure of patience, i.e., the county-means of the residuals of the regression of
patience on subjective perceptions of the environment) still have explanatory power for
development differences.
The respective results are shown in Table 7.12. Regardless of the set of variables
that are eliminated from the patience measure at the individual level, the relationship
between per capita income and the purged patience variable is highly significant and
positive. Quantitatively, the coefficient estimates are comparable to those obtained with
the raw measure shown in Table 7.3, even though the purged measure explains less of
the variation in incomes across countries (in particular when patience is purged of all
variables jointly, which approximately halves the explained variance in terms of R2). This
documents that unobserved heterogeneity in terms of the subjective environment that
might influence the patience revealed in the responses to the survey questions cannot
explain the correlation between patience and income. This is strong evidence against a
merely spurious effect, and in favor of the role of patience as implied by micro-founded
theories of development.
Table 7.12. Patience and income: Purging patience of cognitive skills, life expectancy, health,
education, and subjective institutional quality
Dependent variable: Log [GDP p/c PPP]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Patience purged of cognitive ability 2.66∗∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.31)
Patience purged of life expectancy 2.67∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗∗
and health (0.29) (0.30)
Patience purged of education 2.47∗∗∗ 2.09∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.31)
Patience purged of institutions 2.57∗∗∗ 2.13∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.39)
Patience purged of all variables 2.36∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.40)
Constant 8.30∗∗∗ 9.08∗∗∗ 8.26∗∗∗ 6.56∗∗∗ 8.23∗∗∗ 9.12∗∗∗ 8.15∗∗∗ 6.72∗∗∗ 8.09∗∗∗ 6.45∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.21) (0.14) (0.25) (0.15) (0.22) (0.17) (0.39) (0.18) (0.41)
Continent FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 76 76 74 74 76 76 54 54 54 54
R2 0.361 0.679 0.365 0.659 0.288 0.658 0.310 0.642 0.219 0.629
Adjusted R2 0.353 0.646 0.357 0.629 0.279 0.623 0.297 0.596 0.204 0.582
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See column (7) of Table 7.3 for a complete
list of the additional controls.
7.7 Concluding Remarks
Using a unique novel data set, this paper has provided the first systematic investigation of
the relationship between patience, accumulation behavior, and income on a global scale.
Taken together, our findings could be interpreted as providing encouraging empirical
support for a large body of theoretical work. After all, both micro- and macroeconomic
theories of intertemporal choice highlight the crucial role of time preference in driving
future-oriented behaviors and ultimately income. Given the strong and robust relation-
ships between patience and accumulation processes across different levels of aggregation,
and on a global scale, an interesting question concerns the origins of variation in time
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preferences, both at the individual and at the country level. Among the few candidate
determinants that have been proposed are religion (Weber, 1930), cultural legacy as
manifested in very old linguistic features (Chen, 2013) as well as historical agricultural
productivity and crop yield (Galor and Özak, 2014). G. S. Becker and Mulligan (1997)
and Doepke and Zilibotti (2008, 2013) emphasize the two-way links between patience
and education as well as education and income. The results from our paper suggest that
much insight is to be gained from further delving into the determinants of time prefer-
ence.
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Appendix 7.A Details on Data Collection and Patience Measure
See Falk et al. (2015a).
Appendix 7.B Environmental Conditions and Revealed Patience
7.B.1 Controlling for Country-Level Observables: Details
7.B.1.0.1 Financial Environment. Respondents who expect higher levels of inflation
might appear more impatient in our quantitative choice task as they require a compensa-
tion for inflation. Similarly, high market interest rates could induce people to behave as if
they were impatient because they might try to “arbitrage” between the local credit mar-
ket and the hypothetical interest rates implied in the quantitative survey measure. Cross-
country differences in inflation and interest rates could bias our results on the relation-
ship between comparative development and patience. It is important to recall, however,
that our survey question explicitly asked people to imagine a zero inflation environment.
Likewise, previous research has found that differences in interest rates are unlikely to
drive choices in small-stakes experimental environments (e.g. Dohmen et al., 2010). To
empirically address this issue, we explicitly control for inflation (in terms of the consumer
price index, or the GDP deflator) and deposit interest rates. Columns (1) through (4) of
Table 7.13 present the corresponding results. As one would expect, both inflation and
high interest rates are negatively correlated with GDP. The coefficient of patience, how-
ever, remains quantitatively large and highly statistically significant when conditioning
on these variables. In addition, the coefficient estimate is only slightly smaller in size.
7.B.1.0.2 Borrowing Constraints. Ceteris paribus, respondents who face upward-
sloping income profiles and are borrowing-constrained might be more likely to opt for
immediate payments in experimental choice situations not because of intrinsic prefer-
ences, but rather because of a current cash shortfall. Since participants in rather poor
countries seem more likely to face such constraints, responses in our survey could make
such populations appear less patient than they actually are, and hence drive the rela-
tionship between patience and development. Note, however, that all monetary values in
the elicitation of the quantitative patience measure were adjusted in terms of purchasing
power parity to be approximately comparable across countries, hence minimizing prob-
lems of income differences. Empirically, we approach the issue of borrowing constraints
and financial development from two separate angles. On the one hand, we complement
our baseline specification by including two additional covariates, which capture differ-
ent dimensions of the level of financial development of a given country. In particular, we
make use of the commonly employed ratio of external finance to GDP, where external
finance is defined as the sum of private credit, private bond market capitalization, and
stock market capitalization (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Buera et al., 2011). In addition,
we use the (log) number of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), which arguably captures
elements of the accessibility of cash for private households, as a measure of financial de-
velopment. Columns (5)-(7) of Table 7.13 present the corresponding regression results,
which provide reassuring evidence that the relationship between comparative develop-
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Table 7.13. Patience and income: Robustness against inflation, interest rates, and borrowing
constraints
Dependent variable: Log [GDP p/c PPP]
The specifications address concerns regarding...
Inflation and interest rates Borrowing constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Patience 1.15∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 0.95∗ 0.79∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗
(0.39) (0.37) (0.48) (0.43) (0.34) (0.49)




Log [GDP deflator] -0.79∗∗∗ -0.59∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.17)
Log [Deposit interest rate] -0.69∗∗∗ -0.35
(0.16) (0.21)
Log [# ATMs] 0.56∗∗∗
(0.11)
External finance as % of GDP 0.25
(0.18)
Constant -161.5∗∗∗ -221.6∗∗∗ -193.5∗∗∗ -234.6∗∗∗ -41.8 -178.4∗∗∗ 8.01∗∗∗ -136.3∗∗
(56.38) (56.79) (59.31) (56.93) (52.16) (48.69) (0.14) (52.64)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 73 73 63 62 74 55 76 74
R2 0.884 0.895 0.884 0.898 0.907 0.910 0.453 0.860
Adjusted R2 0.833 0.848 0.821 0.836 0.867 0.848 0.446 0.804
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. Log CPI, GDP deflator, and deposit interest rate are calculated as log
(1 + x), where x is the respective variable. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See column (7) of Table 7.3 for a complete
list of the additional controls.
ment and our patience measure is largely unaffected by the level of a country’s financial
development. To reiterate this point from a different angle, we make use of the idea that
borrowing constraints (if present) are likely to be less binding for relatively rich people.
Thus, rather than computing simple country averages of our patience measure across all
respondents, we compute the average patience of each country’s top income quintile only
and use this measure instead of the population average patience measure. As shown in
columns (6) and (7), both in unconditional and conditional regressions the relationship
between GDP and patience is very similar to the baseline results using all respondents,
which again suggests that borrowing constraints on the part of respondents are unlikely
to be a main driver of our results.
7.B.1.0.3 Context and Cross-Cultural Differences. Conducting surveys in culturally het-
erogeneous samples poses the difficulty that respondents might interpret survey items
in different ways. This problem appears particularly severe in the case of qualitative and
context-specific items. Recall, however, that our quantitative question format provided
a specific, neutral, and quantitative choice context for respondents, hence alleviating
the need to construe alternative choice scenarios. Given that this quantitative item is ar-
guably less prone to culture-dependent interpretations, we conduct a further robustness
check in which we show that similar results obtain if we only employ the quantitative
measure. The latter measure is also more in line with how economists define and mea-
sure time preferences, i.e., choices over monetary rewards at different points in time.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7.14 show that using only the quantitative measure in fact
strengthens the results; in contrast, the qualitative item alone is only weakly correlated
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Table 7.14. Patience and income: Decision heuristics
Dependent variable: Log [GDP p/c PPP]
OLS WLS WLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Staircase patience 0.27∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Constant 6.25∗∗∗ -178.6∗∗∗ 6.79∗∗∗ -138.8∗∗ 6.98∗∗∗ -148.4
(0.25) (59.06) (0.27) (60.58) (0.29) (129.64)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 76 74 71 70 49 48
R2 0.465 0.865 0.535 0.900 0.537 0.867
Adjusted R2 0.457 0.811 0.528 0.856 0.527 0.760
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p <
0.01. See column (7) of Table 7.3 for a complete list of the additional controls. In
columns (3) and (4), each observation is weighted by average years of schooling, and
in columns (5) and (6) by average cognitive skills.
with national income, suggesting that culture-dependent interpretations might indeed
be an issue regarding this particular qualitative self-assessment. In this respect, it should
also be noted that the qualitative item is also a weaker predictor of financially incen-
tivized behavior in the validation experiments as compared to the quantitative measure
(though it is significantly related to experimental choices).
7.B.1.0.4 Cognitive Limitations and Heuristics. An issue that specifically concerns the
quantitative patience measure is the possibility of measurement error, due to the use of
heuristics tied to limited cognitive resources. For example, since our five-step procedure
forces respondents into five fairly similar decision problems, respondents might adopt
simple rules such as “always choose money today” in order to reduce cognitive burden.
Indeed, in our data, 55 % of respondents do always choose the immediate payment. No-
tably, to bias our results, the prevalence of decision shortcuts would have to be systematic
at the country level, rather than at the individual level, presumably due to differing levels
of education. As a first robustness check, we repeat our baseline specifications, but now
weight each country by its average years of schooling, to reflect potentially less accurate
measures of time preference in general for populations with less education. Columns (3)
and (4) of Table 7.14 show that this procedure yields results similar to the baseline re-
sults. In Columns (5) and (6) we try an alternative approach, weighting countries by
average cognitive skills as proxied by performance on standardized achievement tests
(see Eric A Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) for a discussion of the cognitive skills mea-
sure), and find similar results. In unreported regressions we also verify that the results
on development and the regional and individual levels also go through when we weight
responses by appropriate measures of educational attainment, or cognitive skills. Taken
together, we find little indication that variation in the use of heuristics across countries
or individuals could drive our results.
7.B.1.0.5 Censoring of the Quantitative Patience Measure. A related concern is that
the quantitative patience measure might suffer from measurement error due to censor-
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ing. For individuals who always choose the immediate payment in all choices, up to the
maximum possible delayed payment, the staircase procedure gives only a lower bound
for the level of impatience (see Figure 5.5). This could potentially bias our results. In
our robustness checks we distinguish between two cases: (1) A narrower case in which
censored individuals might happen to have approximately the same true patience value,
but we overstate this patience value (relative to uncensored observations) by assigning
an upper bound level of 1; (2) a broader case in which individuals in the censored range
might have substantially different true patience values, so that there is an additional bias
from ignoring heterogeneity when we assign them an identical (upper bound) patience
value.27 Both cases would introduce bias at the individual level, and at higher levels of
aggregation, because we assign a quantitative meaning to the difference in patience be-
tween the censored and uncensored observations, even though we do not observe the
true switching point of censored individuals.
Starting with case (1), we test whether the results are robust to assigning alternative
quantitative values of patience to the group of censored individuals. In columns (1)-(6)
of Table 7.15, we impute arbitrary values to censored individuals, ranging from -2 to
-50. The resulting estimates show that regardless of which value of patience one assumes
for the censored individuals, our result about average patience and national income still
holds.28 This suggests that in case (1), a particular quantitative interpretation of the
censoring value does not drive the findings. Notably, moving the censoring value to mi-
nus infinity corresponds to collapsing the patience measure to a binary indicator distin-
guishing between censored and non-censored observations. We check robustness to this
specification below.
Turning to case (2), in which there is an additional bias due to unobserved hetero-
geneity, we first address what is fundamentally a problem about quantitative interpreta-
tion by taking an approach that avoids a quantitative interpretation altogether. To this
end, we collapse the quantitative patience measure into a binary indicator for whether
an individual’s patience exceeds some patience threshold or not, so that a country’s av-
erage patience is given by the fraction of the population that exceeds a given patience
level. For instance, in columns (7) and (8) in Table 7.15, we binarize the data accord-
ing to whether a given individual was censored or not. The results show that, despite
the ordinal interpretation of the data, countries with a higher proportion of censored
respondents have lower income per capita. Similarly, in columns (9) through (14), we
introduce binary individual-level indicators for different patience cutoff levels (recall that
the staircase variable is coded to be between 1 and 32, so that higher cutoffs at the mar-
gin discriminate between increasingly patient people). The results are robust to these
different choices of cut-offs. This suggests that the conclusions are robust to a range of
different qualitative definitions of patience, and do not hinge on a strict quantitative
interpretation of variation in the patience measure.
27 This corresponds to the notion of “expansion bias” arising from a censored regressor. If the true relation-
ship between patience and GDP is linear, the “piling” up of observations at the (left-) censoring boundary
for patience leads to an inflated (in absolute value) OLS coefficient on patience.
28Note that the manipulation affects some country averages more than others, due to varying proportions
of censored individuals across countries, and thus the coefficient on patience need not change monotonically
across the columns.
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A second approach to addressing case (2) is to minimize the influence of censored
observations on the analysis. In columns (15) and (16), we report results in which all
censored individuals (equivalently, those using a heuristic to always choose immediate
payments) are excluded from the calculations of country averages. The results show that
countries with higher GDP have more patient uncensored populations.29 In columns (17)
and (18) we take a different approach, switching to median levels of patience because,
unlike country averages, median values are unaffected by the presence of censored indi-
viduals in the population, as long as the median individual in a country is not censored.
We then exclude entirely those countries for whom the median individual is censored.
The regressions with the remaining set of countries indicate a strong and robust rela-
tionship between GDP and median level of patience.30 Here, censoring bias is excluded,
and the quantitative patience measure explains more than 50% of the variation in na-
tional income (compared to 42% when we include all median-censored countries). This
indicates that the relationship between patience and GDP is not driven by censoring, and
interestingly, shows that patience can explain differences in national income even among
relatively rich nations in which the median individual is not censored. In addition, if any-
thing, the higher explained variance within the group of uncensored countries suggests
that the missing variation in the left tail of the country-level distribution prevents an
even stronger relationship between patience and national income in terms of variation
explained.
Other results in the paper also pass robustness checks for censoring. For example,
the finding that even binary variants of the quantitative measure predict outcomes is
neither confined to analyses with GDP as dependent variable nor to country-level anal-
yses as a whole. Section 7.C illustrates, repeating all of our main country-, regional-,
and individual-level analyses with a binary version of the quantitative measure in which
a value of zero is assigned to censored individuals and of one to non-censored respon-
dents. The results also hold for all measures of development at the country level, and
at the individual level, if we perform similar analyses excluding all censored individuals,
although the regional-level results weaken with this approach. Finally, note that to the
extent that censoring is a manifestation of decision heuristics, these robustness checks
provide further evidence that heterogeneity in cognitive skills does not drive the results.
29Notably, censoring is less prevalent in wealthier countries; this is consistent with a distribution of pa-
tience values that is shifted to the right for wealthy countries, and suggests censored populations are likely
more patient in rich countries as well.
30We also find similar results if we regress GDP on patience of the median individual, and leave countries










Table 7.15. Patience and national income: Robustness against censoring
Dependent variable: Log [GDP p/c PPP]
Independent variable is staircase patience in the following variations:
Patience at lower censoring point set to... Fraction of respondents who are more patient than outcome node... Exclude all censored Exclude all median-
-2 -20 -50 1 8 16 24 individuals censored countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Staircase patience 2.71∗∗∗ 1.73∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 5.57∗∗∗ 3.38∗∗∗ 6.42∗∗∗ 3.87∗∗∗ 7.73∗∗∗ 4.88∗∗∗ 9.93∗∗∗ 6.11∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(0.22) (0.35) (0.21) (0.33) (0.21) (0.32) (0.48) (0.67) (0.57) (0.83) (0.72) (1.09) (1.10) (1.51) (0.05) (0.05)
Staircase patience (median) 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Constant 8.32∗∗∗ -172.1∗∗∗ 8.32∗∗∗ -153.9∗∗∗ 8.32∗∗∗ -143.1∗∗ 5.90∗∗∗ -129.9∗∗ 6.44∗∗∗ -162.3∗∗∗ 6.84∗∗∗ -186.8∗∗∗ 7.07∗∗∗ -187.6∗∗∗ 5.56∗∗∗ -178.1∗∗ 8.30∗∗∗ 8.68∗∗∗
(0.13) (58.03) (0.13) (56.15) (0.13) (55.63) (0.27) (55.56) (0.24) (56.71) (0.22) (61.99) (0.21) (66.16) (0.77) (78.81) (0.39) (0.58)
Continent FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No No
Observations 76 74 76 74 76 74 76 74 76 74 76 74 76 74 76 74 25 25
R2 0.473 0.866 0.484 0.864 0.482 0.862 0.470 0.856 0.434 0.860 0.422 0.861 0.383 0.849 0.121 0.819 0.522 0.543
Adjusted R2 0.466 0.811 0.477 0.809 0.475 0.806 0.463 0.799 0.426 0.804 0.415 0.804 0.375 0.788 0.109 0.745 0.502 0.423
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See column (7) of Table 7.3 for a complete list of the additional controls. In columns (1)-(6), the independent variable consists of the
quantitative patience measure, where varying values are assumed for the lower censoring point, i.e., for those respondents who always opt for the payment today (these variables are standardized at the individual level). In columns
(7)-(14), the independent variable consists of the fraction of respondents in a given country who are more patient than a given outcome node, see Figure 5.5. In columns (15)-(16), the staircase patience variable is computed is average
staircase outcomes of those respondents who are not censored, i.e., all censored individuals are excluded from the sample. In columns (17) and (18), we the independent variable is the median quantitative patience measure and we
exclude all countries from the analysis in which the median is censored.
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7.B.2 Purging Individual Patience
Table 7.16 presents the results of the first stage of purging individual patience of cogni-
tive skills, education, life expectancy, health, and various dimensions of subjective insti-
tutional quality. In column (1), we regress all individual-level observations of patience
on people’s self-assessment of their math skills (as 11 distinct categories). In column (2),
we use each individual’s educational attainment (as a 3-step category). In column (3),
we employ the remaining years of life of each individual as a continuous variable. This
measure is imputed separately for each cohort and gender in a given country. In addi-
tion, column (3) includes a continuous subjective physical health index. This index is
included in Gallup’s background data and aggregates responses to five items, e.g., “Do
you have any health problems that prevent you from doing any of the things people your
age normally can do?”, see Appendix 7.H for details. In column (4), we use four variables
which proxy for the respondent’s overall assessment of the quality of their institutional
environment. The first index concerns the overall quality of institutions (including con-
fidence in the national government, the legal system and courts, honesty of elections,
and the military); the second index is about law and order (asking, e.g., whether people
recently had money or porperty stolen), and the third continuous index about corrup-
tion (asking whether corruption is widespread in business and the government). Finally,
this specification also includes a binary variable measuring respondendent’s confidence
in financial institutions and banks. Column (5) combines all previous specifications. In
sum, our proxies for individual-level characteristics cognitive skills, education, mortality,
and subjective institutional quality jointly explain 6.3% of the global variation in time
preferences. We proceed by generating the residuals of these regressions and employing
these as a “cleaned” patience variable for further analysis, see Section 7.6.2.
Table 7.16. Purging individual patience: First stage
Dependent variable: Patience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.20∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Cognitive skills Yes No No No Yes
Education No Yes No No Yes
Life expectancy and health No No Yes No Yes
Subj. institutional quality No No No Yes Yes
Observations 78755 79357 77414 50482 49603
R2 0.019 0.031 0.011 0.021 0.065
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.031 0.011 0.021 0.064
OLS estimates.
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Appendix 7.C Main Results Based on a Binary Version of the
Quantitative Patience Measure
This section provides a robustness check for all main results in the paper using a binary
version of the quantitative patience measure as explanatory variable. Specifically, we
assign a value of zero (one) to all (non-) censored individuals, so that the country-level
patience measure consists of the fraction of respondents who are not censored. Figure 7.3
illustrates the distribution of this patience variable across countries. Even using this much
coarser measure of patience do all of our results on the relationship between patience,
national income, growth rates, and the proximate determinants hold, see Tables 7.17 and
7.18.31 In fact, as Figure 7.4 illustrates, this binarized patience measure confers an even
stronger relationship with national income than our baseline measure because it also
captures meaningful variation in patience within the group of fairly impatient countries
(which are often “almost censored” using the average baseline staircase measure).
As Tables 7.19 and 7.20 show, the subnational results are also robust to employing












0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Average patience = fraction which is not censored in quantitative procedure
Distribution of fraction censored across countries
Figure 7.3. Distribution of average binarized patience variable across countries. Each individual
is assigned a value of one if they are not censored and zero otherwise.
31 Results for all other dependent variables (i.e., other proxies for the proximate determinants) closely

















Table 7.17. Replicate main country-level results with binarized quantitative patience measure (1/2)
Dependent variable:
Log [current GDP p/c] Log [GDP p/c 1925] Log [GDP p/c 1870] Log [GDP p/c 1820] Growth since 1975 Growth since 1925 Growth since 1820
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Staircase patience (fraction not censored) 5.57∗∗∗ 3.38∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ -0.10 1.45∗ 2.37∗ 1.09∗∗ 2.46∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.57
(0.48) (0.67) (0.33) (0.48) (0.32) (0.51) (0.32) (0.31) (0.85) (1.29) (0.52) (0.70) (0.20) (0.34)
Log [GDP p/c base year] -0.80∗∗ -1.04∗∗∗ -0.63∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.22) (0.15)
Constant 5.90∗∗∗ -129.9∗∗ 6.83∗∗∗ 7.31∗∗∗ 6.07∗∗∗ 6.01∗∗∗ 6.09∗∗∗ 6.67∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗ 7.16∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ 9.02∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 4.86∗∗∗
(0.27) (55.56) (0.16) (0.39) (0.13) (0.29) (0.13) (0.17) (0.42) (2.06) (0.28) (1.59) (0.09) (0.96)
Continent FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Additional controls No Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No
Observations 76 74 33 33 42 42 31 31 66 66 33 33 31 31
R2 0.470 0.856 0.400 0.642 0.369 0.612 0.240 0.704 0.030 0.472 0.125 0.582 0.195 0.584
Adjusted R2 0.463 0.799 0.380 0.559 0.353 0.532 0.214 0.614 0.015 0.397 0.097 0.465 0.167 0.432
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The patience variable is the fraction of respondents who are not left-censored in the quantitative patience procedure. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
See column (7) of Table 7.3 for a complete list of the additional controls.
Table 7.18. Replicate main country-level results with binarized quantitative patience measure (2/2)
Dependent variable:
Average years of schooling Education expenditure Log [Capital stock p/c] Net adjusted savings Total factor productivity R&D expenditure Property rights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Staircase patience (fraction not censored) 9.79∗∗∗ 7.30∗∗∗ 3.06∗∗∗ 3.42∗∗∗ 4.52∗∗∗ 2.35∗∗∗ 12.3∗∗∗ 20.5∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.29 4.02∗∗∗ 3.35∗∗ 85.7∗∗∗ 71.9∗∗∗
(0.90) (1.70) (0.63) (1.03) (0.53) (0.67) (4.33) (6.68) (0.12) (0.24) (0.51) (1.29) (8.56) (15.08)
Constant 1.14∗∗ -32.2 2.96∗∗∗ -50.3 8.07∗∗∗ -126.5∗∗∗ 4.94∗∗ 496.9 0.30∗∗∗ 2.07 -0.81∗∗∗ 27.9 11.4∗∗∗ 461.9
(0.45) (117.14) (0.33) (116.76) (0.31) (38.51) (2.34) (708.39) (0.07) (14.28) (0.20) (47.20) (4.26) (1293.34)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 71 70 71 70 71 69 68 68 60 59 64 63 74 72
R2 0.509 0.801 0.170 0.577 0.440 0.871 0.070 0.536 0.350 0.724 0.534 0.674 0.484 0.641
Adjusted R2 0.502 0.713 0.158 0.392 0.432 0.813 0.056 0.324 0.339 0.567 0.527 0.507 0.477 0.491
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The patience variable is the fraction of respondents who are not left-censored in the quantitative patience procedure. Education and R&D expenditure are % of GDP,
while net adjusted savings are % of GNI. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See column (7) of Table 7.3 for a complete list of the additional controls.
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Patience and GDP per capita
Figure 7.4. Patience and national income. The left panel depicts the raw correlation between log
GDP per capita (purchasing-power parity) and patience. Patience is the fraction of respondents
in a given country who never switch to preferring the delayed payment in the staircase elicitation
procedure, i.e., who are left-censored. The right panel contains a plot conditional on the full set
of baseline covariates in column (7) of Table 7.3.
Table 7.19. Main regional-level results replicated with binarized quantitative patience measure
Dependent variable:
Log [Regional GDP p/c] Avg. years of education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Staircase patience (fraction not censored) 3.36∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 7.76∗∗∗ 0.64 0.85∗∗
(0.60) (0.18) (0.15) (1.01) (0.52) (0.39)
Temperature -0.013 -0.048∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Inverse distance to coast 0.69 1.40∗∗
(0.43) (0.54)
Log [Oil production p/c] 0.21∗∗∗ -0.11
(0.06) (0.13)
# Ethnic groups -0.14∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.13)
Log [Population density] 0.083∗ 0.22∗∗
(0.04) (0.09)
Constant 7.31∗∗∗ 8.99∗∗∗ 8.38∗∗∗ 3.84∗∗∗ 7.09∗∗∗ 6.09∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.05) (0.36) (0.55) (0.15) (0.49)
Country FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 704 704 687 693 693 676
R2 0.274 0.938 0.952 0.345 0.936 0.957
Adjusted R2 0.273 0.932 0.947 0.344 0.930 0.954
Weighted least squares estimates, observations weighted by number of respondents in region. Standard
errors (clustered at country level) in parentheses. The patience variable is the fraction of respondents who
are not left-censored in the quantitative patience procedure. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7.20. Main individual-level results replicated with binarized quantitative patience measure
Dependent variable:
Log [HH income p/c] Saved last year Education level Health problems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Staircase patience 0.092∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(1 if not censored) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Age 0.67∗∗∗ -0.070 1.07∗∗∗ 0.15∗
(0.17) (0.31) (0.26) (0.09)
Age squared -0.42∗∗ -0.050 -1.89∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.30) (0.25) (0.10)
1 if female -0.072∗∗∗ -0.0062 -0.027∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Subj. math skills 0.037∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ -0.0081∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Confidence in financial 0.067∗∗∗
institutions (0.01)
Constant 6.43∗∗∗ 5.89∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.03)
Country FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Regional FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Religion FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 79245 68632 15260 10438 79357 68855 62727 59043
R2 0.607 0.656 0.071 0.134 0.200 0.326 0.025 0.152
Adjusted R2 0.607 0.650 0.071 0.113 0.199 0.316 0.025 0.139
Columns (1)-(4) are OLS and columns (5)-(8) ordered probit estimates. Standard errors (clustered at country level) in
parentheses. The dependent variable in (5)-(8) is educational attainment as a three-step category. In columns (5)-(8),
the R2 is a Pseudo-R2. The patience variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent was not censored in the staircase
procedure. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Appendix 7.D Patience and Historical Income
Accumulating evidence indicates that preferences are transmitted across generations
(see, e.g., Cesarini et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2012), and that differences in future-
orientation or time preferences may have deep cultural or environmental roots in the
distant past (Chen, 2013; Galor and Özak, 2014).32 If the relative distribution of pa-
tience (but not necessarily the absolute levels) across countries originates from agro-
climatological conditions, becomes manifest in linguistic patterns, and exhibits substan-
tial persistence over time, then the patience patterns found in contemporaneous popula-
tions should be related to not just contemporary, but also historical development. To test
this hypothesis, we repeat the analysis with measures of historical income before and
after the Industrial Revolution.
Columns (1)-(6) of Table 7.21 present the results of OLS regressions, in which we re-
late patience to (log) per capita income in 1925, 1870, and 1820, respectively.33 Through-
out, the results reveal positive and significant relationships, which hold up conditional
on continent fixed effects.
In order to investigate whether such a relationship was already present in pre-
industrial times, i.e., around 1500, we follow the literature and use (log) population
32 Additional evidence for the persistence of preferences and cultural values in general comes from the
work of, e.g., Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Voigtländer and Voth (2012), Alesina et al. (2013a), A. Becker
et al. (2015), and Grosjean (forthcoming).
33 The choice of these years is due to data availability constraints in the Maddison data set.
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density as proxy for economic development in the Malthusian epoch (Ashraf and Galor,
2011). We account for the compositional changes in the population since 1500 due to
migration flows and compute an ancestry-adjusted measure of population density by
adjusting the historical population density figures by post-Columbian migration flows
using the world migration matrix of Putterman and Weil (2010).34 In essence, we relate
patience of today’s population to the weighted average of population density that pre-
vailed in the country of residence of their ancestors in 1500. For example, we relate the
average patience of the contemporary US population to a weighted average of the past
population density of the “source countries” of US immigrants such as the UK, China, or
Angola.35
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 7.21 report the corresponding results. Consistent with
the findings for contemporary income, patience exhibits a significant unconditional cor-
relation with past population density. The inclusion of control variables leads to an even
stronger correlation between patience and past development.36 Columns (9)-(12) re-
port the results from complementary regressions with non-adjusted population density
in 1500 as dependent variable and excluding countries with particularly high migratory
inflows, or countries from the New World, from the analysis.37 These robustness checks
deliver qualitatively and quantitatively similar results.
Appendix 7.E Details for Regional-Level Analysis
Our regional-level data contain 704 regions (typically states or provinces) from the fol-
lowing countries: Argentina (16), Australia (8), Austria (9), Bolivia (8), Brazil (24), Cam-
bodia (14), Cameroon (10), Canada (10), Chile (12), China (23), Colombia (23), Czech
Republic (7), Egypt (3), Germany (16), Finland (4), France (22), Georgia (10), Ghana
(10), Great Britain (12), Greece (13), Hungary (7), India (24), Indonesia (17), Iran (30),
Israel (6), Italy (17), Jordan (6), Kazakhstan (6), Kenya (8), Lithuania (10), Macedonia
(3), Malawi (3), Mexico (28), Morocco (13), Nigeria (6), Nicaragua (17), Netherlands
(12), Pakistan (4), Poland (16), Portugal (7), Romania (8), Russia (27), Serbia (2), Spain
(19), Sri Lanka (9), Sweden (8), Tanzania (20), Thailand (5), Turkey (4), Uganda (4),
Ukraine (27), United Arab Emirates (7), USA (51), South Africa (9), Zimbabwe (10)
34 This procedure of computing ancestry-adjusted values is analogous to the standard procedure in the
literature, see, e.g., Ashraf and Galor (2011, 2013).
35Notice that the reverse, a computation of the distribution of patience for historical populations, cor-
rected for post-1500migration flows, is not possible due to the missing information on the historical ancestry
of the survey respondents.
36 Figure 7.7 in Appendix 7.G visualizes these two results.
37 These countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and the United States. Columns (9) and (10)






Table 7.21. Patience and historical development
Dependent variable:
Log [GDP p/c] in... Log [Population density in 1500]
Full sample Low migration Old
(ancestry- sample World
1925 1870 1820 adjusted) (non-adjusted) (non-adjusted)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Patience 0.91∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ -0.018 0.65∗ 0.79∗∗ 0.95∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 0.69 0.96∗∗
(0.16) (0.22) (0.16) (0.24) (0.15) (0.19) (0.36) (0.34) (0.49) (0.35) (0.50) (0.37)
Constant 7.58∗∗∗ 7.99∗∗∗ 6.81∗∗∗ 6.58∗∗∗ 6.51∗∗∗ 6.62∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ -13.5∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗ -10.7∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ -8.03∗
(0.09) (0.21) (0.07) (0.18) (0.06) (0.01) (0.13) (5.02) (0.16) (3.97) (0.17) (4.12)
Continent FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Additional controls No No No No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 33 33 42 42 31 31 75 74 69 69 59 59
R2 0.421 0.628 0.390 0.625 0.293 0.703 0.048 0.598 0.061 0.772 0.035 0.748
Adjusted R2 0.402 0.542 0.375 0.547 0.268 0.612 0.035 0.476 0.047 0.702 0.018 0.660
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. In columns (1)-(6), the dependent variable is historical
national income per capita. Due to the small number of obervations, we only control for continent fixed effects in these columns. In columns (7)
and (8), the dependent variable is ancestry-adjusted population density in 1500. In columns (9) and (10), it is non-adjusted population density,
and the sample excludes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Serbia, and the United States, see footnote 37. In columns (11)-(12), we exclude
the New World. See the text for details on the construction of the ancestry-adjusted variable. See column (7) of Table 7.3 for a complete list of the
additional controls. In this table, the control vector excludes the colonization dummy, genetic diversity and its square, and ethnic fractionalization.
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Appendix 7.F Additional Tables
Table 7.22. Patience and national income: Additional control variables
Dependent variable: Log [GDP p/c PPP]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patience 2.02∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗ 1.36∗∗ 1.47∗∗
(0.47) (0.46) (0.50) (0.53) (0.58) (0.58)
Will. to take risks -1.07∗∗ -0.78∗ -0.64 -1.05∗∗ -0.84 -0.95∗
(0.41) (0.42) (0.43) (0.49) (0.54) (0.55)
Mean elevation -1.04∗ -1.69∗∗∗ -0.92 -1.08 -1.05
(0.60) (0.56) (0.57) (0.67) (0.78)
Standard deviation of elevation -0.64 -0.14 -0.23 -0.019 -0.016
(0.56) (0.52) (0.40) (0.45) (0.48)
Terrain roughness 3.36∗∗ 3.06∗∗ 0.68 1.10 0.94
(1.27) (1.23) (1.51) (2.19) (2.32)
Mean distance to nearest waterway -0.62∗∗ -0.87∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗ -0.83∗∗ -0.84∗∗
(0.29) (0.31) (0.33) (0.34) (0.39)
1 if landlocked 0.38 0.61 0.59 0.43 0.45
(0.36) (0.37) (0.44) (0.40) (0.45)
Log [Area] 0.099 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.11
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Linguistic fractionalization 0.058 0.35 -0.027 0.13
(0.55) (0.51) (0.57) (0.60)
Religious fractionalization -0.60 -1.14∗∗ -1.13∗∗ -0.77
(0.46) (0.44) (0.55) (0.61)
% of European descent 0.15
(0.74)
Genetic distance to the U.S. (weighted) 0.030
(0.06)
Constant -189.4∗∗∗ -160.8∗∗ -176.5∗∗ -223.0∗∗∗ -248.4∗∗∗ -254.3∗∗∗
(62.84) (68.36) (69.44) (63.75) (68.73) (69.99)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal origin FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Major religion shares No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 74 74 72 72 72 71
R2 0.866 0.895 0.904 0.929 0.948 0.950
Adjusted R2 0.809 0.829 0.834 0.863 0.881 0.875
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Major religion shares
include the share of Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, Buddhists, Hinduists, and Atheists. See column (7) of





Table 7.23. Patience, Physical Capital, and Savings: Conditioning on per capita income
Dependent variable:
Log [Capital stock p/c] Gross savings (% of GNI) Net adjusted savings (% of GNI) Household savings rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Patience 2.03∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ -0.17 0.038 6.66∗∗∗ 8.11∗∗ 8.11∗∗ 8.33∗ 7.70∗∗∗ 9.65∗∗∗ 13.1∗∗∗ 13.9∗∗∗ 6.21∗∗ 7.08∗∗ 8.13∗∗ 8.82∗∗
(0.28) (0.31) (0.15) (0.15) (2.29) (4.01) (3.80) (4.69) (2.23) (2.96) (3.47) (3.21) (2.70) (3.13) (3.19) (3.46)
Log [GDP p/c PPP] 0.84∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ -0.54 -0.17 -2.03∗∗ -3.36∗∗ -2.17 -2.01
(0.05) (0.09) (1.16) (2.61) (0.91) (1.51) (2.34) (2.55)
Constant 10.0∗∗∗ -147.6∗∗∗ 3.03∗∗∗ -76.4∗∗ 22.1∗∗∗ -1506.4∗∗ 26.6∗∗ -1524.8∗∗ 10.2∗∗∗ 343.8 27.1∗∗∗ 35.2 3.27∗∗ 2.86∗ 24.7 22.8
(0.13) (43.14) (0.41) (35.71) (1.18) (580.16) (10.23) (679.89) (1.07) (729.38) (8.01) (790.61) (1.50) (1.63) (22.26) (25.67)
Continent FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No
Observations 71 69 71 69 73 71 73 71 68 68 68 68 21 21 21 21
R2 0.327 0.861 0.893 0.948 0.058 0.474 0.062 0.474 0.102 0.537 0.173 0.578 0.231 0.272 0.255 0.293
Adjusted R2 0.317 0.799 0.890 0.924 0.044 0.249 0.035 0.233 0.088 0.326 0.147 0.372 0.191 0.144 0.173 0.116
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See column (7) of Table 7.3 for a complete list of the additional controls.
Table 7.24. Patience and Human Capital Accumulation: Conditioning on per capita income
Dependent variable:
Average years of schooling Human capital index Cognitive skills Education expenditure (% of GNI)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Patience 4.67∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.22∗ 0.24 0.81∗∗∗ 0.35∗ 0.31∗ 0.031 1.45∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗ 0.79 1.38∗
(0.53) (0.84) (0.64) (0.97) (0.11) (0.16) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.31) (0.55) (0.55) (0.76)
Log [GDP p/c PPP] 1.08∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.24 0.081
(0.15) (0.37) (0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.16) (0.34)
Constant 5.40∗∗∗ -85.0 -3.64∗∗∗ 29.2 2.62∗∗∗ -30.8 0.90∗∗∗ -20.1 4.39∗∗∗ -11.9 2.40∗∗∗ 21.1 4.28∗∗∗ -68.9 2.25 -61.1
(0.24) (129.94) (1.17) (117.52) (0.05) (35.40) (0.26) (35.54) (0.08) (65.08) (0.53) (69.85) (0.16) (120.45) (1.38) (124.25)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 71 70 71 70 67 66 67 66 49 48 49 48 71 70 71 70
R2 0.429 0.798 0.673 0.827 0.330 0.718 0.579 0.746 0.283 0.757 0.436 0.810 0.138 0.561 0.177 0.562
Adjusted R2 0.421 0.710 0.663 0.745 0.319 0.583 0.566 0.616 0.268 0.561 0.412 0.643 0.125 0.369 0.153 0.357










Table 7.25. Patience and Total Factor Productivity: Conditioning on per capita income
Dependent variable:
Total factor productivity R&D expenditure (% of GDP) # of researchers in R&D (per 1,000) Global Innovation Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Patience 0.36∗∗∗ 0.13 0.043 0.054 2.09∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 1.44∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗ 3.54∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 0.97 23.6∗∗∗ 18.1∗∗∗ 12.5∗∗∗ 10.1∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.23) (0.59) (0.24) (0.46) (0.43) (1.02) (0.41) (0.74) (1.70) (2.91) (1.74) (2.43)
Log [GDP p/c PPP] 0.13∗∗∗ 0.074 0.27∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 4.30∗∗∗ 5.46∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.09) (0.25) (0.44) (0.77)
Constant 0.62∗∗∗ 1.07 -0.49∗ 8.45 0.96∗∗∗ 1.28 -1.36∗∗ 78.8∗ 1.54∗∗∗ -29.8 -4.18∗∗∗ 99.6 39.1∗∗∗ -114.4 3.15 672.2∗∗
(0.03) (14.63) (0.25) (14.52) (0.08) (47.10) (0.54) (42.16) (0.16) (94.18) (0.73) (75.06) (0.82) (462.69) (3.82) (309.92)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 60 59 60 59 64 63 64 63 62 61 62 61 72 71 72 71
R2 0.338 0.724 0.621 0.747 0.574 0.716 0.657 0.796 0.526 0.738 0.711 0.860 0.619 0.825 0.834 0.913
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.567 0.608 0.592 0.567 0.570 0.646 0.684 0.518 0.597 0.701 0.779 0.613 0.750 0.830 0.873
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. See column (7) of Table 7.3 for a complete list of the additional controls.
Table 7.26. Patience and Institutions: Conditioning on per capita income
Dependent variable:
Democracy Property rights Social infrastructure S&P credit rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Patience 4.23∗∗∗ 2.95∗∗ 1.52 1.52 46.3∗∗∗ 35.0∗∗∗ 24.8∗∗∗ 13.6 0.43∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.13∗∗ -0.069 10.7∗∗∗ 9.04∗∗∗ 7.44∗∗∗ 5.86∗∗∗
(0.82) (1.46) (1.27) (1.54) (4.39) (8.26) (5.86) (8.62) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.82) (1.35) (1.27) (1.77)
Log [GDP p/c PPP] 1.03∗∗∗ 0.97∗ 8.16∗∗∗ 14.6∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 2.04∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.54) (1.50) (3.11) (0.01) (0.04) (0.30) (0.66)
Constant 6.63∗∗∗ 295.8 -1.97 423.7∗ 48.3∗∗∗ -83.6 -19.7 1933.6 0.50∗∗∗ 11.9 -0.42∗∗∗ 43.0∗∗∗ 14.5∗∗∗ -271.9 3.33 55.9
(0.37) (227.41) (2.81) (242.87) (1.95) (1271.19) (12.51) (1335.14) (0.02) (12.56) (0.10) (14.93) (0.42) (299.57) (2.48) (322.31)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 74 72 74 72 74 72 74 72 61 60 61 60 64 62 64 62
R2 0.202 0.686 0.326 0.713 0.515 0.640 0.683 0.773 0.461 0.793 0.729 0.882 0.607 0.768 0.688 0.810
Adjusted R2 0.191 0.554 0.308 0.584 0.508 0.489 0.674 0.671 0.451 0.678 0.720 0.812 0.601 0.647 0.678 0.703





Table 7.27. Regional patience, human capital, and income: Robustness
Dependent variable:
Log [Regional GDP p/c] Average years of education
Sub-samples: Number of observations larger than...
N > 0 N > 10 N > 20 N > 50 N > 0 N > 10 N > 20 N > 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Patience 0.085 0.072 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.46 0.42∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.15) (0.31) (0.21)
Temperature -0.019∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.020∗ -0.0054 -0.051∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Inverse distance to coast 0.44∗∗ 0.38 0.48 0.63 0.64 0.78 1.04∗ 1.17∗
(0.21) (0.25) (0.31) (0.40) (0.50) (0.57) (0.58) (0.62)
Log [Oil production p/c] 0.24∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.093 0.053 0.050 0.042 -0.074
(0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12)
# Ethnic groups -0.13∗ -0.12∗ -0.11∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.32∗ -0.26∗∗ -0.32∗∗ -0.47∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) (0.18)
Log [Population density] 0.050 0.071∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.080 0.12 0.19∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11)
Constant 8.94∗∗∗ 8.84∗∗∗ 9.05∗∗∗ 8.98∗∗∗ 8.97∗∗∗ 8.66∗∗∗ 9.56∗∗∗ 8.81∗∗∗ 7.02∗∗∗ 7.28∗∗∗ 7.16∗∗∗ 7.02∗∗∗ 7.17∗∗∗ 6.73∗∗∗ 8.08∗∗∗ 6.94∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.24) (0.02) (0.27) (0.02) (0.37) (0.01) (0.48) (0.04) (0.55) (0.05) (0.54) (0.05) (0.61) (0.05) (1.00)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 704 687 657 640 544 527 361 344 693 676 646 629 534 517 355 338
R2 0.925 0.936 0.928 0.941 0.933 0.949 0.943 0.958 0.936 0.947 0.937 0.951 0.938 0.956 0.935 0.960
Adjusted R2 0.919 0.931 0.921 0.935 0.926 0.942 0.933 0.950 0.930 0.942 0.931 0.946 0.931 0.951 0.923 0.952
OLS estimates, standard errors (clustered at country level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Patience and Growth since 1870
Figure 7.5. Patience and long-run growth. The left panel depicts the raw correlation between
annual growth rates in GDP per capita (in %) since 1870 and patience, while the right panel
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Patience and Growth since 1950
Figure 7.6. Patience and medium-run growth. The left panel depicts the raw correlation between
annual growth rates in GDP per capita (in %) since 1950 and patience, while the right panel
contains a plot conditional on the full set of baseline covariates in column (7) of Table 7.3.
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Patience and pop. density in 1500
Figure 7.7. Patience and ancestry-adjusted population density in 1500. The left panel depicts the
raw correlation between ancestry-adjusted population density in 1500 and patience, while the
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Patience and net adjusted savings
Figure 7.8. Patience and Savings. The left panel depicts the raw correlation between net adjusted
savings (% of GDP) and patience, while the right panel contains a plot conditional on the full set
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(Added variable plot)
Patience and household savings
Figure 7.9. Patience and Household Savings. The left panel depicts the raw correlation between
household savings (% of disposable income) and patience, while the right panel contains a plot
conditional on the full set of baseline covariates in column (7) of Table 7.3.
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(Added variable plot)
Patience and average years of schooling
Figure 7.10. Patience and Average Years of Schooling. The left panel depicts the raw correlation
between average years of schooling and patience, while the right panel contains a plot
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(Added variable plot)
Patience and R&D expenditure
Figure 7.11. Patience and innovation. The left panel depicts the conditional correlation between
R&D expenditure (as % of GDP) and patience, while the right panel contains a conditional plot of
the relationship between the global innovation index and patience. Both plots are conditional on
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Patience and Innovation Index
Figure 7.12. Patience and innovation. The left panel depicts the raw correlation between R&D
expenditure (as % of GDP) and patience, while the right panel plots the raw correlation between
the Global Innovation Index and patience
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(Added variable plot)
Patience and property rights
Figure 7.13. Patience and property rights. The left panel depicts the raw correlation between the
property rights index and patience, while the right panel contains a plot conditional on the full
set of baseline covariates in column (7) of Table 7.3.
Appendix 7.H Description and Sources of Main Variables
7.H.1 Country-Level Variables
7.H.1.1 Outcome Variables
7.H.1.1.1 Contemporary national GDP per capita. Average annual GDP per capita over
the period 2003 – 2012, in 2005US$. Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
7.H.1.1.2 National GDP per worker. GDP per worker, 1990US$. Source: World Bank
Development Indicators, average 2003 – 2012.
7.H.1.1.3 Human Development Index. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a sum-
mary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long
and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI
is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions. Average
2000-2010, taken from UNDP.
7.H.1.1.4 Average subjective happiness. In Gallups’ World Poll, respondents are asked
to evaluate the current state of their lives, using the image of a ladder, with the best possi-
ble life for them as a 10 and the worst possible life as a 0. Source: theWorld Happiness Re-
port 2013, at http://unsdsn.org/resources/publications/world-happiness-report-2013/.
7.H.1.1.5 Historical Income Data and Growth rates in GDP per capita. Source: the Mad-
dison project.
7.H.1.1.6 Population density in 1500. Persons per square km, original data taken from
Ashraf and Galor (2013). The ancestry-adjusted population density measure is computed
by multiplying the contemporary population shares (as obtained from Putterman and
Weil (2010)) with the historical population density of the respective population’s ances-
tor countries.
360 | 7 Patience and the Wealth of Nations
7.H.1.1.7 Average years of schooling. The mean over the 2000-2010 time period, of
the 5-yearly figure, reported by R. J. Barro and Lee (2012), on average years of schooling
amongst the population aged 25 and over.
7.H.1.1.8 Human capital index. Human capital index provided by the Penn World Ta-
bles, which aims to provide a quality-adjusted index of human capital by combining years
of schooling with returns to schooling. The index is defined as e f (s), where f (s) = 0.134s
if s ≤ 4, f (s) = 0.134s× 4+ 0.101(s− 4) if 4< s ≤ 8 and f (s) = 0.134× 4+ 0.101× 4+
0.068(s− 8) if s > 8, where s = years of schooling.
7.H.1.1.9 Cognitive skills. Measure of cognitive skills derived from a series of stan-
dardized tests in math, science, and reading across countries, see Eric A Hanushek and
Woessmann (2012).
7.H.1.1.10 Education expenditure. Current operating expenditures in education, in-
cluding wages and salaries and excluding capital investments in buildings and equip-
ment. Source: World Bank Development Indicators, average 2003 – 2012.
7.H.1.1.11 Capital stock. Capital stock at constant 2005 national prices (in mil.
2005US$), average from 2002 to 2011. Data taken from the Penn World Tables.
7.H.1.1.12 National savings. Gross savings are calculated as gross national income less
total consumption, plus net transfers. Net national savings are equal to gross national
savings less the value of consumption of fixed capital. Adjusted net savings are equal to
net national savings plus education expenditure and minus energy depletion, mineral
depletion, net forest depletion, and carbon dioxide and particulate emissions damage.
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, average 2003 – 2012.
7.H.1.1.13 Household savings rate. The household saving rate is calculated as the ratio
of household saving to household disposable income (plus the change in net equity of
households in pension funds). Source: the OECD statistics database. We use the most
recent available data point (either projected or realized), working backwards from 2010.
7.H.1.1.14 Total factor productivity. TFP level at current PPPs (USA=1), average from
2002 to 2011. Source: the Penn World Tables.
7.H.1.1.15 R&D expenditure. Expenditures for research and development are current
and capital expenditures (both public and private) on creative work undertaken system-
atically to increase knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society,
and the use of knowledge for new applications. R&D covers basic research, applied re-
search, and experimental development. Source: World Bank Development Indicators,
average 2003 – 2012.
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7.H.1.1.16 Number of researchers in R&D. Researchers in R&D are professionals en-
gaged in the conception or creation of new knowledge, products, processes, methods, or
systems and in the management of the projects concerned. Average from 2003 to 2012,
taken from the World Bank Development Indicators.
7.H.1.1.17 Global innovation index. This index is a summary statistic of innovative
capacity that consists of over 80 qualitative and quantitative items, includingmeasures of
institutions, human capital and research, infrastructure, market sophistication, business
sophistication, knowledge and technology outputs, and creative outputs. Data from 2014,
taken from https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/content.aspx?page=data-analysis.
7.H.1.1.18 Democracy index. Index that quanties the extent of institutionalized democ-
racy, as reported in the Polity IV dataset. Average from 2003 to 2012.
7.H.1.1.19 Social infrastructure index. Index due to Hall and Jones (1999) which mea-
sures the wedge between the private return to productive activities and the social return
to such activities. This index is derived from two separate indices. First, an index of gov-
ernment antidiversion is policies created from data assembled by Political Risk Services
and covers the categories law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expro-
priation, and government repudiation of contracts. The second element of the index
captures the extent to which a country is open to international trade.
7.H.1.1.20 Property rights. This factor scores the degree to which a country’s laws
protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those
laws. It also accounts for the possibility that private property will be expropriated. In
addition, it analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within
the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. Average
2003-2012, taken from the Quality of Government dataset, http://www.qogdata.pol.gu.
se/codebook/codebook_basic_30aug13.pdf.
7.H.1.1.21 Standard & Poor’s long-term credit rating. Captures a country’s likeli-
hood of payment-capacity and willingness to meet its financial commitments, the
nature of and provisions of the underlying debt, as well as the protection in
case of bankruptcy. Source: http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovereigns/
ratings-list/en/us/?subSectorCode=39 on 9 October 2014.
7.H.1.2 Covariates
7.H.1.2.1 Consumer price index. Average 2003-2012, taken from the World Bank De-
velopment Indicators.
7.H.1.2.2 GDP deflator. Average 2003-2012, taken from the World Bank Development
Indicators.
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7.H.1.2.3 Ratio of external finance and GDP. External finance is defined as the sum
of private credit, private bond market capitalization, and stock market capitalization.
Source: Buera et al. (2011).
7.H.1.2.4 Number of automated telling machines. Average 2003-2012. Source: World
Bank Development Indicators.
7.H.1.2.5 Long-term orientation. Hofstede defines this concept by noting that every
society has to maintain some links with its own past while dealing with the challenges of
the present and the future. Societies prioritize these two existential goals differently. So-
cieties who score low on this dimension, for example, prefer to maintain time-honoured
traditions and norms while viewing societal change with suspicion. Those with a culture
which scores high, on the other hand, take a more pragmatic approach: they encour-
age thrift and efforts in modern education as a way to prepare for the future. Source:
http://geerthofstede.eu/research--vsm, retrieved on March 25, 2015.
7.H.1.2.6 Colonization dummy. Dummy equal to one if the respective country had at
least one colonizer over a long period of time and with substantial participation in gov-
ernance. Source: the CEPII geo database.
7.H.1.2.7 Area, distance to equator, longitude, landlocked dummy. Source: the CEPII
geo database.
7.H.1.2.8 Mean and standard deviation of elevation. Elevation in km above sea level,
taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013). Data originally based on geospatial elevation data
reported by the G-ECON project (Nordhaus, 2006).
7.H.1.2.9 Percentage of arable land. Fraction of land within a country which is arable,
taken from the World Bank Development Indicators.
7.H.1.2.10 Land suitability for agriculture. Index of the suitability of land for agricul-
ture based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing
degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological
indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH, taken
from Michalopoulos (2012).
7.H.1.2.11 Neolithic revolution timing. The number of thousand years elapsed, until
the year 2000, since the majority of the population residing within a country’s modern
national borders began practicing sedentary agriculture as the primary mode of subsis-
tence. The measure is weighted within each country, where the weight represents the
fraction of the year 2000 population (of the country for which the measure is being com-
puted) that can trace its ancestral origins to the given country in the year 1500. Measure
taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013).
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7.H.1.2.12 Precipitation. Averagemonthly precipitation of a country inmmpermonth,
1961-1990, taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013). Data originally based on geospatial av-
erage monthly precipitation data for this period reported by the G-ECON project (Nord-
haus, 2006).
7.H.1.2.13 Temperature. Average monthly temperature of a country in degree Celsius,
1961-1990, taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013). Data originally based on geospatial av-
erage monthly temperature data for this period reported by the G-ECON project (Nord-
haus, 2006).
7.H.1.2.14 Percentage in (sub-)tropical zones. Percentage of area within a country
which forms part of each of the tropical or sub-tropical climatic zones. Data taken from
John Luke Gallup, http://www.pdx.edu/econ/jlgallup/country-geodata.
7.H.1.2.15 Percentage at risk of malaria. The percentage of population in regions of
high malaria risk (as of 1994), multiplied by the proportion of national cases involving
the fatal species of the malaria pathogen, P. falciparum. This variable was originally
constructed by John L. Gallup and Sachs (2000) and is part of Columbia University’s
Earth Institute data set on malaria. Data taken from Ashraf and Galor (2013).
7.H.1.2.16 Predicted genetic diversity. Predicted genetic diversity of the contempo-
rary population, adjusted for post-Columbian migration flows and genetic distance be-
tween ethnic groups. See Ashraf and Galor (2013).
7.H.1.2.17 Ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization. Indices due to Alesina et
al. (2003) capturing the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the
same country will be from different ethnic (religious) groups.
7.H.1.2.18 Terrain roughness. Degree of terrain roughness of a country, taken from
Ashraf and Galor (2013). Data originally based on geospatial undulation data reported
by the G-ECON project (Nordhaus, 2006).
7.H.1.2.19 Distance to nearest waterway. The distance, in thousands of km, from a
GIS grid cell to the nearest ice-free coastline or sea-navigable river, averaged across the
grid cells of a country. Source: Ashraf and Galor (2013), originally constructed by John
Luke Gallup et al. (1999).
7.H.1.2.20 Legal origins. Origin of legal system: UK, French, German, Scandinavian,
Soviet. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
7.H.1.2.21 Major religion shares. Source: R. Barro (2003).
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7.H.1.2.22 Fraction of European descent. Fraction of the population which is of Euro-
pean dexcent. Constructed from the “World Migration Matrix” of Putterman and Weil
(2010).
7.H.1.2.23 Genetic distance to the United States. Fst genetic distance of a country’s
contemporary population to the population of the United States. Source: Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2009).
7.H.1.2.24 Trust. Part of Global Preference Survey. Elicited through respondents’ self-
assessment regarding the following statement on an 11 point scale: “I assume that people
have only the best intentions.”
7.H.1.2.25 Risk preferences. Risk preferences were measured in the Global Preference
Survey using two survey items. First, respondents went through a quantitative five-step
staircase procedure:
Please imagine the following situation. You can choose between a sure payment of a particu-
lar amount of money. or a draw. where you would have an equal chance of getting 300 Euro
or getting nothing. We will present to you five different situations. What would you prefer:
a draw with a 50 percent chance of receiving 300 Euro, and the same 50 percent chance of
receiving nothing, or the amount of 160 Euro as a sure payment? See Falk et al. (2015a)
for an exposition of the entire sequence of survey items.
In addition, respondents provided a self-assessment:
Please tell me, in general, how willing or unwilling you are to take risks. Please use a scale
from 0 to 10, where 0 means “completely unwilling to take risks” and a 10 means you are
“very willing to take risks”. You can also use any numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate
where you fall on the scale, like 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
These items were combined on standardized data using the following formula:
Will. to take risks = 0.4729985 × Staircase risk + 0.5270015 × Qualitative item
7.H.2 Regional-Level Data
Except for the patience measures and a region’s size (area), all regional-level data are
taken from Gennaioli et al. (2013). The area data were collected by research assistants
from various sources on the web.
7.H.3 Individual-Level Data
7.H.3.0.1 Household income per capita. Included in Gallup’s background data. To cal-
culate income, respondents are asked to report their household income in local currency.
Those respondents who have difficulty answering the question are presented a set of
ranges in local currency and are asked which group they fall into. Income variables
are created by converting local currency to International Dollars (ID) using purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) ratios. Log household income is computed as log (1+ household
income).
7.H Description and Sources of Main Variables | 365
7.H.3.0.2 Education level. Included in Gallup’s background data. Level 1: Completed
elementary education or less (up to 8 years of basic education). Level 2: Secondary -
3 year tertiary education and some education beyond secondary education (9-15 years
of education). Level 3: Completed four years of education beyond high school and / or
received a 4-year college degree.
7.H.3.0.3 Subjective self-assessment of math skills. Included in Gallup’s background
data. How well do the following statements describe you as a person? Please indicate your
answer on a scale from 0 to 10. A 0 means “does not describe me at all” and a 10 means
“describes me perfectly”. You can also use any numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate where
you fall on the scale, like 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. I am good at math.
7.H.3.0.4 Saved last year. Binary variable capturing whether the respondent saved any
money in the previous year. Included in Gallup’s background data.
7.H.3.0.5 Health problems. Included in Gallup’s background data. Binary response to
the question “’Do you have any health problems that prevent you from doing any of the
things people your age normally can do?”.
7.H.3.0.6 Confidence in financial institutions. Included in Gallup’s background data.
Binary response to the question “In this country, do you have confidence in each of the
following, or not? How about financial institutions or banks?”
7.H.3.0.7 Subjective institutional quality. Included in Gallup’s background data. This
variable consists of a perceived institutional quality index as it is provided by Gallup.
This index combines binary questions (yes / no) about whether people have confidence
in the military, the judicial system and courts, the national government, and the honesty
of elections. The index is then constructed by averaging the yes / no answers across
items.
7.H.3.0.8 Subjective law and order index. Included in Gallup’s Background data. De-
rived from responses to three questions: “In the city or area where you live, do you have
confidence in the local police force?”; “Do you feel safe walking alone at night in the city
or area where you live?”; “Within the last 12 months, have you had money or property
stolen from you or another household member?”.
7.H.3.0.9 Subjective physical health index. Included in Gallup’s Background data. De-
rived from responses to five questions: “Do you have any health problems that prevent
you from doing any of the things people your age normally can do?”; “Now, please think
about yesterday, from the morning until the end of the day. Think about where you were,
what you were doing, who you were with, and how you felt. Did you feel well-rested yes-
terday?”; “Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day yesterday?
How about physical pain?”; “Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the
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day yesterday? How about worry?”; “Did you experience the following feelings during a
lot of the day yesterday? How about sadness?”.
7.H.3.0.10 Subjective corruption index. Included in Gallup’s Background data. De-
rived from two questions: “Is corruption widespread within businesses located in (coun-
try), or not?”; “Is corruption widespread throughout the government in (country), or
not?”.
7.H.3.0.11 Remaining years of life. For each individual, we impute the remaining
years of life at the country-age-gender level using data from the UN World Population
Prospects, see http://esa.un.org/wpp/.
